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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the understanding of conflict intervention in 
protracted violent conflicts by studying the activities of civil society actors in regard 
to the conflicts in what was Yugoslavia until 1991. A very broad understanding of 
‘intervention’ is used for this purpose that includes all kinds of activities that relate to 
the conflicts. Based on a survey of activities in the period between 1990 and 2002, a 
framework for categorising and describing these interventions is applied according to 
basic functions in four ‘grand strategies’ of ‘peace-making’, ‘peace-keeping’, ‘peace-
building’, and ‘information, support, protest and advocacy’, with a total list of about 
230 instruments of conflict intervention identified.  
The study concludes that civil society actors played three different basic roles: They 
complemented the work of state actors, they were the avant-garde for approaches, 
strategies and methods that later became ‘mainstream’ in conflict intervention, and in 
some cases, they were able to control or correct actions by governments through 
advocacy or direct action. The development of instruments of civil conflict 
transformation received a massive boost through this engagement in the 1990s. 
The study supports the position taken recently by some researchers making 
comparative studies of cases of conflict intervention regarding the limited role played 
by dialogue and reconciliation work in regard to dealing with the overall conflicts: In 
spite of ‘reconciliation’ and inter-ethnic cooperation being at the core of the vast 
majority of all projects and programmes undertaken in the area, indicators of real  
impact regarding an overall positive change in society and prevention of future 
violence seem to be rather weak. 
The study further observes that there was a social movement developed relating to 
former Yugoslavia in many Western countries that in a hitherto unknown way 
combined traditional methods of protest and advocacy with concrete work in the 
field.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The wars in what soon became ‘former’ Yugoslavia began less than two years after 
the breakdown of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, in a time of international 
political upheaval and reconfiguration of relationships within the international 
community. They shaped international relations and organisations probably more 
than any other development of the 1990s. At the end of the decade, NATO had 
established itself as a world-wide actor inter alia delivering military peace-keeping 
instead of the United Nations, the USA had firmly emphasised its leadership role as 
the only remaining superpower, and the European Union started to establish itself as 
both a civilian and military power pursuing a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
and expanding into Eastern Europe (see Lucarelli 2000, Durward 2001, Kaufman 
2002, Popowski 2003, Siani-Davis 2003).1 On the other hand, in that same decade 
unarmed, civilian or nonviolent intervention in conflicts also came to the attention of 
policy-makers, donors and many international nongovernmental organisations 
(INGOs) that hitherto had worked exclusively in the fields of humanitarian aid or 
development. 
The armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia moved from West to East:2 They began 
with Slovenia in summer 1991, moved from there to Croatia where a ceasefire at the 
beginning of 1992 and the arrival of UN peace-keepers stopped the open violence 
until 1995 when war erupted again for a short period, and reached Bosnia-
                                                 
1
 Another development that can be directly traced back to the wars in Yugoslavia and in Rwanda 
were developments in the international legal system, with the war crime tribunals on these two 
conflict areas becoming the model for other country-specific courts, as well as providing an 
impetus for the formation of the International Criminal Court which was established in 2002 (see 
United Nations 2004a, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2008, 
Orentlicher 2008:9p). 
2
 To describe the whole region studied I am quite often using the term ‘former Yugoslavia’ in spite 
of the fact that many people in the newly independent countries reject this term as a reminder of a 
past they wish to leave behind. But I just could not think of another way to describe the whole area 
studied without having to list each time the names of all the different countries which would have 
made the text rather unwieldy. Alternatives like “Balkans” or “South East Europe” include 
countries not under research here (like Albania, Bulgaria) or exclude some that are (Croatia and 
Slovenia reject the designation ‘Balkans’ as discriminatory).  
 ‘Former Yugoslavia’ must also not be confused with ‘FR Yugoslavia’. The first term refers to the 
whole territory of what was Yugoslavia until end of 1991. FR Yugoslavia was founded in 1992 
and consisted of two republics: Serbia and Montenegro. Generally, I have tried to use the official 
names used by the different countries and entities at the respective time in their usual international 
version (for example Kosovo instead of Kosova). 
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Herzegovina in April 1992. The Dayton agreements that made Bosnia-Herzegovina 
an international protectorate ended that war in 1995, but after an interlude of a few 
years fighting in Kosovo in 1998 culminated in the attack by NATO on the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in early 1999 and the subsequent establishment of a 
protectorate in Kosovo. Two years later ethnic violence between Slavic Macedonians 
and the Albanian minority in Macedonia was settled comparatively quickly and 
without significant bloodshed. 
Many studies have been written about the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and the 
different efforts made by the international community to settle them and to build 
peace. These conflicts have elicited probably the broadest range of interventions by 
external parties ever seen so far. There has been little that was not tried over the 
years, by international organisations and individual governments, by 
nongovernmental organisations, churches, an uncounted number of small citizens’ 
groups in Western Europe and North America, by civil society groups from the 
former Yugoslavia itself, and others. But while activity at the level of states and 
intergovernmental organisations is reasonably well documented, this is not so much 
the case for the activities of international civil society.  
Governments and international organisations as well as researchers on conflict 
transformation have increasingly acknowledged a role for various forms of ‘civil’ or 
‘nonviolent’ intervention. However, comparatively little attention has been paid to 
the beginnings of this approach in response to the conflicts of former Yugoslavia. 
The response by civil society was unique in many ways: the humanitarian effort 
probably surpassed any earlier crises since World War II. But more importantly, 
many civil society organisations were not content with helping from afar but went to 
the countries of former Yugoslavia and began working there on the ground, with 
activities ranging from delivering the goods they had collected themselves to 
protective accompaniment of human rights activists, social work with displaced 
people, and training in nonviolence. And in addition, an embittered public debate on 
the right approaches and methods of ending the wars in former Yugoslavia 
characterised the discourse in that decade, with civil society groups arguing among 
each other as much as targeting their governments. 
1. Introduction  19 
 
 
This introductory chapter seeks to provide a brief overview of the goals and scope of 
the study, the methodology used, and gives an overview over the chapters to follow. 
 
1.1 Goals and Scope of the Study 
The basic goal of this study is to contribute to the understanding of conflict 
intervention in protracted violent conflicts, in particular the role played and 
approaches taken by civil society actors. The approach is an inductive and historical 
one. A very broad understanding of ‘intervention’ is used for this purpose: All kinds 
of activities by external actors that related to the violent conflicts in question are 
included, no matter whether or not the actors themselves saw them as conflict 
intervention, or whether they were pursued with the objective of influencing or 
solving the conflicts.3 In chapter 2 the concept of intervening actors will be further 
discussed. In my use of the term, actors from the area of Yugoslavia itself (so-called 
‘embedded actors’) are considered to be ‘intervening actors’ if they assumed a quasi-
third-party role.  
 
1.1.1 Objectives 
The study pursues four concrete objectives: 
1.1.1.1 Objective 1) Assess Assumptions Regarding Conflict Intervention 
The first goal is to test certain commonly-held assumptions regarding conflict 
intervention by civil society actors. These basic assumptions or hypotheses are: 
1. Different actors have different instruments and strategies of conflict intervention 
available – not all can do the same, or with the same degree of effectiveness.  
1.a Civil society actors are mostly involved in peace-building, and play an 
essential role there (see Rupesinghe 1998, Miall, Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse 1999, Ropers 2002, Barnes 2005 and Paffenholz and Spurk 
2006).  
                                                 
3
 The rationale is that - as for example the discussion on “Do no harm” has shown – all activities 
undertaken in the context of a conflict are likely to have an impact on that conflict, no matter if 
intended or not (see Anderson 1999 and 2001b). 
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1.b They have a very limited role in finding negotiated solutions at the 
governmental level (see the same references as in 1.a). 
2. Different levels of society (top level, middle range, grassroots) require different 
instruments and strategies of intervention to deal effectively with the conflict (see 
Ropers 1999 and 2005). 
3. Different stages of conflict escalation warrant different instruments and strategies 
of intervention – or the effectiveness of different methods varies depending on 
when they are used. 
3.a The greater the escalation in a conflict, the more coercion /force is needed in 
order to intervene successfully (see Fisher 1993b, Miall, Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse 1999:21p, Fisher 2001, Paffenholz 2001:76pp). 
3.b Nonviolent peace building and development projects are only possible before 
a conflict escalates to war, and in the post-war period (see Deutscher 
Entwicklungsdienst 2003).4  
These assumptions and hypotheses have been tested against the facts observed 
regarding interventions by civil society actors in the former Yugoslavia, and are 
discussed in the conclusions of this study (chapter 9.2.1). 
 
1.1.1.2 Objective 2) Suggest an Inclusive Framework for the Categorisation of 
Activities of Conflict Intervention 
It will be asked if the three common categories of peace-making, peace-keeping and 
peace-building indeed cover everything that external actors undertook in relation to 
the conflict in former Yugoslavia.5 The premise informing this objective was that if 
these categories proved to be comprehensive in their coverage, then it would confirm 
that this framework has utility not only as a prescriptive model (what should be 
done), but also as a model for the analysis of civil society interventions in other 
                                                 
4
 The German Development Service there categorically states that during war “no projects are 
possible”. See also Miall,  Ramsbotham and Woodhouse who provide some discussion of 
activities possible in war times (1999:128pp). This does of course not refer to humanitarian aid. 
5
 For these categories, see Galtung 1982 who first defined these three ‚peace strategies’ as follows: 
Keeping the opponents apart [peace-keeping], negotiating a political solution [peace-making]  
and finally, tying the adversaries into something that could be called a peace system [peace-
building] (Galtung 1982:8, translation by CS). 
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violent conflicts. If, on the other hand, there were activities falling outside the three 
broad categories, this would raise the question of whether the model needed to 
include additional categories (see chapters 2 and 9).  
 
1.1.1.3 Objective 3) Document and Analyse the Activities of Civil Society 
As a historical study one objective of the research was to document the activities of 
civil society in relation to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia in order to fill the gap 
left by the focus on interventions by state actors that has been the prime focus of 
other researchers. 
 
1.1.1.4 Objective 4) Develop an Inclusive List of Instruments of Conflict Intervention 
As a by-product and presented in an appendix, this study has tentatively drawn up a 
list of instruments or methods of conflict intervention by state and by non-state actors 
that complements the well-known list of methods of nonviolent action published by 
Gene Sharp (1973). 
 
1.1.2 Scope 
The case study had to be limited both geographically and time-wise. Geographically 
it is limited to those countries which were (as republics or regions) part of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between the end of World War II and 1991. 
1988 was originally chosen as the starting date for the study in order to capture the 
early years of emerging conflict which eventually led to war. The intention was that 
by commencing the study at this point the ‘normality’ of the preceding period would 
highlight the escalation that followed. But in fact, 1990 became the start date of the 
study as little activity by governments or international civil society actors could be 
identified before that date. The same flexibility was followed regarding the end-date. 
The systematic survey ended with 2002, but in a few exceptional cases, when 
interesting projects had just begun around that date, the time-span was extended 
beyond that date. 
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1.2 Methodology 
The researcher professes a special affinity to the research subject. By academic 
training, I am a social anthropologist, but I have spent most of my professional life 
working for different nonviolent or peace organisations. Throughout the 1990s I was 
involved - sometimes as volunteer, sometimes as staff person - in NGO work in the 
area. This involvement included inter alia organising nonviolence training 
programmes, co-initiating and co-leading an international volunteer project known as 
the ‘Balkan Peace Team’, and organising and participating in protests against 
military interventions by NATO. A number of activities and interventions described 
in this study I witnessed first-hand.  
The bulk of the data collection for the study was undertaken over a two year period 
between autumn 2002 and winter 2004/2005, financed with a grant from the German 
Foundation  for Peace Research (DSF).6 This phase of the research was concluded in 
June 2005 with a 60-page research report to the DSF.7 For this PhD study, the data 
collected on non-state actors were analysed in more detail.  
 
1.2.1 Literature and Sources 
There is a multitude of secondary literature which deals historically or analytically 
with the behaviour of the different international (state) actors that intervened in the 
conflicts of former Yugoslavia.8 However, most of these studies are more interested 
in the motivations and the political interaction between these actors than in the 
question of the impact of their different approaches to the conflict. There are only a 
few studies that seek to analyse different interventionary approaches to the conflicts 
in the Balkans (for example Sloan 1998), whilst those theoretical studies dealing with 
conflict intervention per se have merely drawn on the examples from the Balkan s 
for illustrative purposes (for example Rupesinghe 1998). 
                                                 
6
 In reality, it took almost three years before the research report to the Foundation was submitted 
(Schweitzer 2005). 
7
 There has been no further publication from that research grant. Rather, the writing-up of the 
findings has happened with this thesis here. 
8
 They are too numerous to cite. Please see instead the references in the different sections of this 
thesis. 
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Although the scientific output on conflict intervention in the last decade has been 
enormous, only a small fraction of this literature focuses on civil society approaches. 
There are only a few general studies on civil society conflict intervention into the 
former Yugoslavia: Large (n.d., c. 1997)9 on second-track intervention in former 
Yugoslavia, Schmitz (1998) on nonviolent interventions by the European peace 
movement, Scotto (2002) on NGOs in Mostar, and some books with collections of 
articles on different civil society activities, usually with a focus on civil peace 
services (deployment of civilian ‘conflict consultants’) and on Bosnia-Herzegovina 
or Kosovo (e.g. Chagnon 1998, Evers (ed.) 2000, Fischer and Tumler 2000, Tullio 
(ed.) 2002, CDA-Collaborative of Learning Projects 2006, Fischer (ed.) 2007).  
In addition, there have been a number of studies and evaluations of the work of 
individual NGOs: For example Fischer (2001 and 2007d) on the Centre for 
Nonviolent Action, Leatherman (1999), Neufeldt, McCann and Cilliers (2000) and 
Gagnon (2003) all on Catholic Relief Services, Schweitzer and Clark (2002) and 
Mueller (2004) on Balkan Peace Team, Fischer (2006b) on youth work in Tuzla.  
Since the basis of the study was to obtain an overview of interventions and their 
impact over a period of about fifteen years, it has not been possible to use 
exclusively primary sources. The information on different state actors relies on 
secondary literature.10 Compilations of NGO addresses proved to be a valuable 
source for obtaining a preliminary overview of civil society activities (Netzwerk 
Friedenskooperative 1994, 1995 and 1996, Pax Christi Nederland (ed) 1995, ICVA 
2000, Cereghini and Sighele 2002, Tullio and Vertucci 2002). The sources upon 
which the study of civil society actors has been based included not only the studies 
and evaluations mentioned above but also the leaflets, booklets and other ephemeral 
or ‘grey literature’ produced by the organisations themselves. In some cases I had 
access to correspondence and minutes of meetings and other ‘in-house’ documents.  
                                                 
9
   Amazon gives the publication date as October 1997 for Large but in the version of the book used 
by me there is no date given. 
10
 Primary sources used have been biographies of diplomats, politicians and peace-keepers, 
interviews, documents like UN Security Council Resolutions, OSCE and EU reports, web-pages of 
EU, NATO, UN and several of their sub-organisations and their project reports, texts of official 
agreements, media reports. 
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This data was supplemented by a few interviews and information collected through 
participation at NGO meetings.11  
Country-wise, there emerged a clear focus on some countries from where I had most 
information: Germany first, France, Italy and the USA second, with Britain, 
Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries and some others coming third. 
 
1.2.2 Research Steps and Methods Used  
1.2.2.1 Collection and Codification of Data 
The first step of the research was a survey of interventions in the area of former 
Yugoslavia between 1988 and 2002. For this purpose, information from the above-
mentioned sources was collected, codified and categorised. Both primary sources 
like original documents and secondary literature were treated alike as sources for 
information at this stage. For this study information was collected about activities of 
around 50 state and international organisations and around 770 citizens’ groups and 
NGOs, mainly from Europe and the USA. Of these about 35 could be categorised as 
having an international character (INGOs). This list was far from exhaustive – in 
Germany alone one activist estimated that there were 1,700 such groups in 1994 
(Vack 1996:14).  
These categories were freely adapted from the codification method developed using 
the methodology of ‘grounded theory’. (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Strauss and Corbin 
1998, Silverman 2001). This is a method of inductive analysis in which, instead of 
beginning with hypotheses which are tested, the researcher begins with a rather 
general formulation of what s/he wants to develop a theory about (the research 
subject). He or she then collects data – for example conducts qualitative interviews 
or gathers texts. Important here is that what constitutes secondary literature for other 
types of research can become a source to be analysed itself. The next step is the 
codification of the data. Data are transformed into concepts which entail a process 
akin to the translation of mere observation into interpretation. Strauss and Corbin 
give the example of watching a woman in a restaurant standing close to the kitchen 
                                                 
11
 This ‘ephemeral’ material is listed in the bibliography. If not otherwise indicated there, it is part of 
my collection of materials. 
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and looking around. The researcher asks what she is doing and comes up with the 
answer “observing” – observing being the concept. These concepts then are put 
together in categories. These then can be analysed in regard to their frequency, 
intensity, duration etc. Having done this first step of coding – which can be done line 
by line or in a more summary manner, the researcher then asks certain basic 
questions in order to compare the data and thereby eventually arrive at hypotheses 
about their connections.  
In this study, the methods of Grounded Theory have been adapted to meet the need 
to analyse a very large number of sources – literally thousands of pages. A line-by-
line analysis was impossible, and has only been used for certain texts in order to 
identify strategies of civil society intervention. For the bulk of the materials, charts 
with a rather crude list of categories were created. These categories which constituted 
columns in large Word tables into which I then entered the data were: 
• Actor (for example UN, Peace Initiative Town X) 
• Category of actor (for example international organisation, NGO) 
• Instrument of intervention: the concrete activity/ activities the actor was engaged 
in. Leaving aside the question of purposes, impact of interventions and the actor 
using them for the later step of analysis of the data, I chose here a rather simple 
model based more on grammatical than conflict transformation related criteria: I 
sought to portray the activity found in the sources in a simple sentence describing 
an activity: Actor (subject) does or applies (verb) something (object). This 
activity is usually explained by the actor with a reason (mostly something that 
happened before), it is intended to fulfil one or several purposes, and applying 
the object leads to an outcome (intended or unintended). For example: “The UN 
(subject) sends (verb) multinational lightly armed forces (object) in order to 
separate the Croatian Army and the Serbian forces in Croatia  (intention)”. I then 
formulated sentences which I could compare. For example: “Balkan Peace Team 
sends teams of volunteers to Serbia and Kosovo to facilitate dialogue”. “The EC 
sends civilian monitors to Croatia to monitor the ceasefire and the protection of 
civilians”. What they had in common was the “sending” of personnel, which thus 
became one of the initial headings in a long and open-coded list of concrete 
activities which was allowed to grow freely as I worked my way through the 
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texts. The eventual total number of types of activities in this first list was around 
588.12  
The other categories in these tables were: 
• Short summary of the activity  
• Target area (town, region, country, area) 
• Target groups, persons (for example refugees, women)  
• Time, duration (date and duration of the activity) 
• Reasons given by actor for intervention (this is the motivation and different from 
the intention. Usually it is based on what happened before the action is taken) 
• Context, situation 
• Intention (What the actor wants to be the outcome of his action. This is what 
happens after the action is taken.) 
• Assumptions the actor has on the conflict 
• Impact: What the source used says about impact 
• Transactions with other interveners 
• Sources (if one and the same activity was described by more than one source, 
they often were put into one and the same entry line)  
This way, there was a table created for each year between 1988 and 2004, and there 
were extra tables for interventions by state and non-state actors which went on over a 
longer period of time. 
Many thousands of activities were found, but the data did not lend itself to statistical 
evaluation. For example, units were “Y started doing X in 1992“, or ”Z giving a 
workshop in 1999“. These two do not compare with each other, because the latter 
was a single event, the former referred to an ongoing programme. Nevertheless, 
sometimes trends could be discerned based on the frequency with which certain 
                                                 
12
 These original headings have little to do with the categories of instruments formed in the next step. 
They were only an internal help for easier coding. Identified were the following: Military 
instruments / peace-keeping (74 activity types), Civilian peace-keeping/monitoring (15), 
Humanitarian aid (67), Diplomatic and political activities (39), Conflict mediation (31), Sanctions 
(18),  Administration and democratic regime (47), Human rights (36), Reconstruction (18), 
Economic Activities (28), Protest/Appeals (32), Creating publicity (40), Peacebuilding (113), 
Research /Science (27), General/other (3). 
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activities appeared in the data. Such phenomena are examined in the chapters to 
follow.  
 
1.2.2.2 (Re-)Categorisation of Data into ‘Grand Strategies’ 
The next step after the initial coding of the activities in these charts was their re-
categorisation into broader and more comprehensive categories based on the triad of 
the ‘grand strategies’: peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building. For each of 
these broad categories I created a number of sub-categories. Furthermore, in addition 
to the three broad categories, I introduced a fourth covering activities that did not 
deal with the conflicts directly but targeted other interveners and the public in third 
countries, e.g. media reports, appeals and advocacy work with other external actors 
(see chapter 2.2.4 and 2.4.5). 
As will be described in chapter 2, there are already a number of different 
categorisations of conflict intervention and in particular of peace-building. So the 
question may be asked: “Why yet another list of categories?” Indeed, when preparing 
the analysis of the sources on interventions in former Yugoslavia, I had hoped to 
make use of one of the existing categorisations and just apply it. But there have been 
three problems that in the end caused me to develop and use my own categorisation. 
1. Some of the categorisations seem not to be based on any coherent criteria – 
rather, they compare ‘apples with pears’. Alger’s tool chest with “diplomacy” 
side by side with “feminist perspectives” is the best example of that (see Kille 
2004). 
2. Other lists (like the ones by Lewer and Rambotham 1993 or Lund 2001) reflect 
the common knowledge of practitioners involved in conflict transformation work. 
But they lack an empirical basis explaining why these distinctions and not others 
had been made. And the mere fact that the lists all differ from each other shows 
that there is no ‘natural’ categorisation suggesting itself almost automatically. 
3. The inductive approach taken in the gathering of data made it necessary not to 
use lists based on assumptions that I wanted to research – like the relationship to 
the conflict stage, or the purpose or impact, or any combination of the three.  
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One important point needs to be addressed here: the distinctions between ‘activities’, 
‘instruments’ and their purpose. ‘Activity’ refers to what an actor appears to have 
been doing, for example ‘conduct a trauma workshop’. The instrument used in such a 
case would probably be ‘trauma healing through group sessions’, and the purpose 
would most likely be to help war victims resume normal lives without being 
handicapped by trauma. The difference between instrument and purpose may be 
considered obvious (it certainly has been obvious for the military theoreticians 
writing on strategy), but in my experience equating the means with the purpose is 
still something that happens too often in discussions on conflict intervention.13 Thus 
dialogue meetings may serve as second-track diplomacy to find a solution to the 
matters at hand (peace-making), or to overcome prejudice and achieve eventual 
reconciliation (peace-building). International volunteers can be sent to provide 
protection to local activists (peace-keeping), or to work on one or another of the 
many different projects falling under peace-building, etc.14 
                                                 
13
 For example it can be noticed that none of the various categorisations of conflict interventions 
discussed below in chapter 2.2 lists an instrument twice for different purposes. 
14
 To illustrate the point of similar means having different strategic ends, military means are a good 
example since they were used in the case studied for a large range of different purposes.  The 
following purposes can be listed under peace-keeping: 
a)  Surveillance of cease-fires and of the disarmament of soldiers, separation of forces, the 
protection of demilitarised zones and ‘safe zones’. These traditional peace-keeping tasks, 
undertaken by all peace-keeping missions in the region.  
b)  Armed protection of humanitarian aid. 
c)  To enforce certain behaviour on the ground, for example opening roads and protecting ethnic 
minorities, securing elections etc.  
d)  To protect international military and civilian personnel.  
Under peace-making would fall the following: 
e)  To supervise sanctions. 
f)  To use bombing as a sanction/ punishment: Most of the air strikes by NATO that were 
requested by the UN before the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994 and 1995 had 
that character.  
g)  In its extreme case, air strikes were used to directly force a conflict party to lay down its arms 
and to agree to a ceasefire / peace treaty by destroying its (military) resources and by 
increasing the price for continuing the war. Examples are the bombings in the last months of 
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the NATO war on Yugoslavia in 1999. 
h)  The clandestine arms smuggling and the activities of mercenaries (both ‘real’ mercenaries 
coming by private initiative, and soldiers sent clandestinely by their governments) that 
happened in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia / Kosovo before and during the wars 
happened with the goal to influence the outcome of the conflict, and therefore would also fall 
under this category here.  
And finally as peace-building has to be considered: 
i)  To provide humanitarian and reconstruction aid (in the periods after the conclusion of cease-
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1.2.2.3 Writing-Up  
In the process of writing up this study, I did not only use the material collected in the 
mentioned Word tables but went back to some original sources in order to be able to 
describe in more depth the activities of some of the projects.  
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The first three chapters, including this introduction, are meant to lay the framework 
for the analysis: The second chapter of this thesis deals with core concepts relating to 
interventions in conflict zones: Terms like conflict, strategy etc. are defined, and 
concepts and categorisations of conflict intervention discussed.  
The third chapter gives a short overview of the history of the geographical area 
studied, and reviews the different theories presented regarding the causes of the 
armed conflicts in the region. 
The fourth chapter analyses interventions in the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia 
by state actors, including international organisations. The motivation for that chapter 
has been twofold. Firstly, the actions of civil society actors were in many ways 
related and woven into what the state actors did, and therefore their interventions 
could not be grasped outside of the context shaped by the international state 
community. Secondly, it would distort the overall picture of the events in the region 
in the decade studied if the focus on civil society actors resulted in under-
emphasising what was in many ways the much heavier impact and influence of 
international organisations and governments. 
The next four chapters then document and analyse the interventions by civil society 
actors, organised according to the framework of four categories mentioned above. 
The chapters on ‘peace-making’ and ‘peace-keeping’ are rather short compared to 
the chapters on ‘peace-building’ and on ‘information, support activities protest and 
advocacy’, but that only reflects the data available.  
Having taken care of the documentation and analysis of the data (objective 3), the 
conclusions at the end of the study then take up the first two of the objectives 
                                                                                                                                          
fires mostly). 
j)  To arm and train local forces, for example the ‘Train and Equip Program’ the USA undertook 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995.  
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formulated: They discuss issues about intervention by civil society actors, and 
present a revised model or framework for categorising conflict interventions. 
There are two appendices: A list of the methods of intervention identified (meeting 
objective 4), and some graphics on distribution of certain types of activities during 
and after wars. 
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2. Approaching Conflict Intervention: A Discussion of the 
Theoretical Basis 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss theoretical concepts and terminologies that 
relate to conflict intervention. Many of these concepts are contested, with different 
authors having very different understandings of what they mean. Therefore it is 
necessary to define how each of these terms is used here in this study. There is no 
claim implied that these definitions are the ‘right’ ones, and all the others are 
‘wrong’. Definitions are just tools, and those definitions were picked or developed 
that best serve the purpose of this study.  
The discussion of basic terminologies is followed by an overview over different 
categorisations of conflict intervention, and an explanation of the categorisation that 
I chose for this study. The last section of this chapter looks at the concept of 
intervening actors, so-called ‘third’ or ‘external’ parties in general, and on the 
plethora of ‘civil society actors’ in particular. 
 
2.1 Basic Terminologies 
2.1.1 Social Conflict and War 
Conflicts may be categorised according to  
• Different objects (e.g. resource-based conflicts, conflicts over governance and 
authority, ideological and identity conflicts, see Rupesinghe 1998:33pp),  
• Visibility (latent or manifest conflicts),  
• Characteristics of the conflict parties and their position and relationship to each 
other (e.g. individuals-groups, rulers-ruled),  
• The ABC-triangle of Johan Galtung (1996:70pp) of A = Attitude or 
Assumptions, B = Behaviour and C = the Contradictions / Content of the conflict. 
• Levels of escalation (see Glasl 1990 who distinguished nine stages and Fisher 
1993a and 1993b who reduced Glasl’s stages to four main ones), and  
2. Theoretical Basis  32 
 
 
• The means used to carry the conflict out (violent – nonviolent etc.) 
There are many definitions of social conflict. Space does not allow discussing them 
in detail. In this study, the term is used in the definition proposed by Friedrich Glasl, 
which has the advantage of being broad and neutral enough to allow an all-
encompassing view of social conflict.  
Social conflict is an interaction between actors (individuals, groups, 
organisations and so on), where at least one actor sees incompatibilities in 
the thinking/ imagination/ perception, and/ or feeling, and/or wanting with 
another actor (other actors) in a way, that in the realisation there is 
impairment by another actor (the other actors).(Glasl 1994:14, translation 
CS)15  
Conflicts become a special issue for attention when and if they are carried out by 
violent means. Peace researchers have reserved the term ‘war’ for violent conflicts 
that fulfil certain criteria. Usually there has to be a minimum number of casualties 
(1,000 per year or per conflict), and some kind of regular army and central 
organisation on at least one side of the conflict.16 Violent conflicts that do not fulfil 
these criteria are just called ‘armed conflicts’.17  
 
2.1.2 On the Concept of Strategy 
Terms like ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’ have spilled over from the military jargon not only 
to common language, but also to theoreticians of conflict transformation and 
                                                 
15
 "Sozialer Konflikt ist eine Interaktion zwischen Aktoren (Individuen, Gruppen, Organisationen 
usw.), wobei mindestens ein Aktor Unvereinbarkeiten im Denken/ Vorstellen/ Wahrnehmen 
und/oder Fuehlen und/oder wollen mit dem anderen Aktor (anderen Aktoren) in der Art erlebt, 
dass im Realisieren eine Beeintraechtigung durch einen anderen Aktor (die anderen Aktoren) 
erfolge." (Glasl 1994:14p). This is not very different from Fisher’s definition who calls conflict“a 
social situation involving perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between two or more 
parties, attempts by the parties to control each other, and antagonistic feelings by the parties 
toward each other.” (Fisher 1990:6) 
16
 Not in all definitions. The German AKUF (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung, 
www.akuf.de) for example does not use numbers of casualties as a criterion (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Kriegsursachenforschung 2000:60). See also Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:23 for an 
overview of different categorisations. Major organisations carrying out annual statistics include the 
PIOOM program at the University of Leiden/Netherlands, Wallensteen et. al. at Uppsala 
University, the "Military Balance" of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the German 
AKUF based in Hamburg, and the “Conflict Barometer” produced by the HIIS in Heidelberg. 
17
 Using that definition, the conflicts in Slovenia 1991 and Macedonia 2002 would not qualify as a 
war, and the conflict in Kosovo in summer 1998 be borderline. The other armed conflicts – 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the NATO war on Kosovo/Yugoslavia in 1999 were definitely 
wars.  
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intervention. Clausewitz, writing on military strategy, defined strategy as “the use of 
an engagement for the purpose of the war”, and tactics as “the use which is made of 
the armed forces in battle” (Clausewitz 1998:103, translation by CS). 
The military historian Basil Liddell Hart criticised Clausewitz’s definition of strategy 
for narrowing its meaning to the battle-field, thus conveying the idea that battle is the 
only means to the strategic end. He distinguished three areas: policy, grand (or 
higher) strategy and strategy. Policy governs the object of war. The purpose of grand 
strategy is to coordinate and direct all the military, economic, moral and diplomatic 
resources toward the attainment of the political object of the war. Strategy is “the art 
of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy”. Tactics then 
are the “dispositions or/and control of such direct action” (Liddell Hart 1967:321). 
Clausewitz and Liddell Hart used the concept of strategy in a purely military context. 
One of the first authors to transfer the term to non-military contexts (in his case: 
nonviolent action) was Gene Sharp.18 He defined grand strategy, strategy and tactics 
without referring to its military origin:  
Grand strategy is the broader conception which serves to co-ordinate and 
direct all the resources of the struggle group toward the attainment of the 
objectives of the conflict. Strategy, a more narrow term, is the broad plan 
of action for the overall struggle, including the development of an 
advantageous situation, the decision of when to fight, and the broad plan 
for utilising various specific actions in the general conflict. Tactics refers 
to plans for more limited conflicts within the selected strategic plan 
(Sharp 1973:493).  
For the purpose of this study, the concept of strategy in the context of conflict 
intervention was used following Sharp’s definition.  
 
                                                 
18
 Building on Sharp, Robert J. Burrowes in order to develop a strategy of nonviolent defence 
describes a comprehensive strategic theory, using elements from Clausewitz, Gandhi and the 
human needs/conflict theory. He points out – and that issue will be pursued further in the last 
chapter of this book – that “any strategy for dealing with conflict…is based, implicitly or 
explicitly, on a conception of conflict.” (Burrowes 1996:62). According to him strategic theory has 
three functions: 
1. to explain the nature and causes of conflict in the international system and to identify the 
causes of conflict in a particular situation, 2. to identify the appropriate strategic aims for 
dealing with a particular conflict and to guide the formulation of a strategy to achieve those 
aims; and 3. to provide tactical guidance within the context of this strategy. (Burrowes 
1996:125) 
 Jean-Marie Muller defined it more simply: “Strategy concerns the conception and execution which 
regulates and co-ordinates the different activities of an intervention; tactics concerns the 
conception and execution of each of these activities" (Muller 1999:4, translated by CS). 
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2.1.3 Different Terms for Handling Conflict 
There is a confusing panel of generic terms describing approaches and 
methodologies of how to deal with conflict: conflict resolution, conflict settlement, 
conflict management, conflict regulation, conflict transformation, peace-building, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and others.  
Some distinguish a triad of conflict resolution, settlement and transformation. Here 
conflict resolution implies that "the deep-routed sources of conflict are addressed, 
and resolved". Conflict settlement then refers to the “reaching of an agreement 
between the parties which enables them to end an armed conflict. It puts to an end 
the violent stage of conflict behaviour.” And conflict transformation, a term usually 
ascribed to John Paul Lederach (1997) “implies a deep transformation in the parties 
and their relationships and in the situation that created the conflict” (all quotes from 
Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:21).19 In German the standard generic 
term is  ‘Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung’ (‘civil conflict resolution’ -, though ‘resolution’ 
is not a good translation of what in German just means ‘working on conflict’). The 
‘civil’ in this term has a threefold meaning: It may refer to a) anything which is not 
military-based (and thereby for example including international police forces), or b) 
to activities by civil society organisations alone (for example Mueller and Buettner 
1996), or c) it may refer to efforts to ‘civilise’ a conflict, bringing it back to 
institutionalised and nonviolent forms of transformation (see Haller 2003).20 
 
2.1.4 Conflict Intervention 
Intervention is a term with highly diverse definitions. At least three meanings can be 
distinguished: 
In International Relations the term is usually reserved for cases where military action 
is taken against the will of the parties in conflict (see Debiel and Nuscheler 1996). It 
is usually used synonymously for ‘humanitarian intervention’. For example, the 
report The Responsibility to Protect defined humanitarian intervention as “coercive – 
                                                 
19
 Similar the Berghof Handbook (2001). For definitions of conflict resolution, see also Burton and 
Dukes 1990. 
20
 See Weller 2007 for a discussion on the history of the term ‘Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung’. 
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and in particular military – action again  another state for the purpose of protecting 
people at risk in that other state” (The Responsibility to Protect 2001:vii). 
Others broaden conflict intervention to include other kinds of coercive action. Siani-
Davies (2003:2-3) points out that those concerned with international law tend to see 
intervention as “improper interference by an outside power with the territorial 
integrity or political independence of a state”, measuring it against established norms 
of non-intervention.21  
Others made a distinction between coercive and non-coercive modes of intervention. 
Partly these broader usages stem from social psychology; partly they were developed 
by those wishing to include non-state actors who have no (or less) ‘sticks and 
carrots’, and distinguishing explicitly between coercive and non-coercive 
intervention (see e.g. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:11).22  
Burrowes writing about ‘cross-border nonviolent intervention’ classified intervention 
as follows: 
1. Who? The intervention can be classified by the nature of the party that 
carries it out. …. 
2. Why? The intervention can be classified by nature of its political 
impact. At one end of the spectrum, intervention might reinforce the 
                                                 
21
 See also Popovki (2003:42) and Weiss (1996:58) for comparative definitions. 
22
 To substantiate this point that may still present a minority point of view, at least in International 
Relations, several such definitions are quoted below. 
 Kelman and Warwick have defined already in 1978:  
Social intervention is any act, planned or unplanned, that alters the characteristics of 
another individual or the pattern of relationships between individuals. The range of acts 
covered in this definition is intentionally broad. It includes such macro phenomena as 
national planning, military intervention in the affairs of other nations, population policy 
and technical assistance. It also applies to psychotherapy, sensitivity training, 
neighbourhood action programs, experiments done with human beings and other micro 
changes. (Quoted after Lewer and  Ramsbotham 1993:26.) 
 Czempiel sees intervention as  
any influencing a system of domination from the outside, no matter if that is done without 
violence or violently. (Czempiel 1994:402, translation by CS). 
 Matthies speaks of  
intervention as a normative and practical approach of the politics of the international 
community to protect human rights and to contain and prevent wars and horrors of wars, 
using a broad spectrum of means and methods” (Matthies 1993:10, translation by CS). 
 Crocker writes:  
The term ‘intervention’ is intended to convey the full range of methods and tools whereby 
a variety of external parties – for instance, the United States, other major powers, the 
United Nations, and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) – may become involved in 
attempts to cope with conflict. (Crocker 2001:229). 
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dominant social cosmology; at the other end, it might facilitate 
structural change and the creation of social cosmologies that satisfy 
human needs… 
3. How? The intervention can be classified by the means used to conduct 
it. … Intervention might be military, economic, ideological, or 
nonviolent, although these means are not mutually exclusive 
(Burrowes 2000:47-48) 
In this study the following definition of conflict intervention is proposed: 
Conflict intervention refers to activities in relation to the conflict undertaken by 
actors who have not been direct parties to the conflict before its escalation began, 
irrespective of whether such measures take place with or without the agreement of 
the parties in conflict, and whether they are violent or nonviolent in nature. 
In this study I have tried to avoid using the terms ‚nonviolent intervention or civil 
intervention.23 The reasons are that on the one hand nonviolent instruments are also 
used by civilians working for state agencies, actors who are not the focus of this 
study. And on the other hand I was interested in all strategies that civil society agents 
may have used without getting into a debate on the nature of violence and 
nonviolence and which activities to include and which to exclude because they were 
not ‘truly nonviolent’.24 
Jonathan Goodhand (2001) made another distinction regarding this field that is often 
referred to. He pointed to the difference between work that is primarily intended to 
deal with conflict, and work that has other objectives, for example development 
cooperation and humanitarian aid, but which takes place in violent contexts. This led 
                                                 
23
 There are very few comprehensive articles or studies on nonviolent intervention in the broad 
understanding of intervention as I am using it. Most studies interested in nonviolent approaches of 
movements are dealing with issues in their own society, or of globalisation. Articles on nonviolent 
intervention focus usually on one particular approach or activity which I would define as 
‘nonviolent peace-keeping’ (see Mueller and Buettner 1998, Moser and Puangsuwan Weber 2000, 
Schweitzer et al. 2001, Hunter and Lakey 2003 and the bibliography by Carter, Clark and Randle 
2006).  
24
 For example in earlier solidarity movements with Latin American countries international armed 
brigades were a rather well-known phenomenon. 
 In international relations as well as in part of the literature on conflict transformation, one finds the 
distinction between “hard” and “soft” power that has been introduced by Joseph Nye (2001). Both 
terms are mainly used by adherents of the so-called realist school of International Relations. By 
hard power they mean the power to command, to order or to enforce. The concept of ‘carrots and 
sticks’ is closely related to it. Soft power means the capacity to influence an actor by different, 
usually non material means. It is often linked to intervention by civil society actors. The intervener 
here seeks to convince the parties, not to force them, using symbolic resources like prestige and 
respect he may have (see Hampson 2001:297, Miall, Ramsbotham and  Woodhouse 1999:10 and 
388pp, Nye 2001:354pp). 
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him to make the distinction between working on conflict, and working in conflict.25 
Using the definition proposed here, both working in and on conflict is included.  
Intervention in this sense does not need to take place in the target country. In 
particular protest and advocacy work intended to make another actor take certain 
actions often takes place outside the target country. The campaigning by many 
citizens’ groups and NGOs in Western European countries and the USA for the 
lifting of the arms embargo and/or a military intervention in Bosnia in the early 
1990s are examples for that. 
 
2.2 Overview Over Different Categorisations of Conflict Intervention 
2.2.1 ‘Tool Chests’ and Categorisations by Function 
Some authors have been content to define lists of interventionary tools without 
making explicit which parameters or criteria they used to create them. The most 
expanded one is probably the ‘peacebuilder’s tool chest’ developed by Chadwick 
Alger. It includes 24 tools ranging from ‘diplomacy’ and ‘balance of power’ to 
‘peace education’ and ‘feminist perspectives’, sorted in six vaguely historically 
defined sections. Other authors have subsequently followed his example adding even 
more tools to the ‘chest’.(see Kille 2004).   
Other authors have developed categorisations that are based on the concepts and 
typologies used by practitioners. One example would be the peace-building 
categories suggested by the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, 
quoted by Llamazares and Reynolds Levy (2003:12) that includes 13 categories, 
starting with conflict resolution and early warning, and ending with training and 
policy development.26 Unlike the exhaustive listing of methods by Gene Sharp 
(1973) in a somewhat related but different field of nonviolent action, these are not 
lists of methods but of vaguely defined and sometimes inconsistent categories of 
methods. They often mix methods (for example “monitoring”), target groups (for 
example “youth”), and objectives (for example “peace work”). And while some 
                                                 
25
 His third category is „working around conflict“ what refers to the attempt to ignore the conflict or 
see it as a purely environmental factor. 
26
 See also Lewer and Ramsbotham 1993, Large n.d., Lund 2001, Tullio and Vertucci 2002:299, 
Ropers 2002 and Fischer 2006a. 
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categories are widely used (e.g. “human rights”, “media”), each author also names 
categories none of the others have.27  
 
2.2.2 Categorisations According to Conflict Stages 
Some authors have linked intervention to conflict stages, and /or to the level of 
society at which it is targeted. Fisher (1990:235pp, 1993a:253pp), to give an 
example, linked particular modes of intervention to his four stages of conflict 
intervention.28  
Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992:12), the former Secretary General of the United 
Nations, suggested in his report Agenda for Peace four areas of action taken together 
offering ‘a coherent contribution towards securing peace’ in a sequential order. 
These were preventive diplomacy (including fact-finding, early warning, preventive 
                                                 
27
 To confuse the picture even more, there is a multitude of categorisations for the activities of 
mediation or negotiation. Here, not only almost every author chooses again his or her own list of 
terms, but the definition of some of these terms are outright contradictory. This is especially true 
for ‘mediation’. For some, the role of mediator describes a situation where the external party does 
only help those in conflict to find a solution, but without interfering by making proposals of his 
own or propagating specific solutions. Others would describe that as facilitation, and reserve 
mediation to cases where the external party gets rather actively involved. For still others, it is the 
generic term describing all kinds of such situations which leads to strange sentences like: 
“Mediation…is more interfering than other types of mediation” (Paffenholz 2001a:76).  
 Almost the only thing they have in common is the recognition of arbitration as a method of its 
own, and that most recognise a continuum between third-party negotiators who use considerable 
pressure to bring the parties in conflict to an agreement, and third-party negotiators who act as 
facilitators helping the parties in conflict to find their own solution. 
28
 Stage I (discussion/debate): The intervention in that stage he calls ‘conciliation’, “in which a 
trusted third-party provides a... communicative link between the antagonists for the purposes f 
identifying the issues, lowering tension and encouraging direct interaction, usually in the form of 
negotiation.”  
 Stage II (polarisation): The intervention is ‘consultation’, “in which the third-party works to 
facilitate creative problem-solving through communication and analysis, making use of human 
relations skills and social-scientific understanding of conflict etiology and dynamics.” Once the 
misperceptions and misunderstandings are cleared up, the parties can then may begin mediation in 
order to reach an agreement. 
 Stage III (segregation): Threats are being dealt with by arbitration, “wherein the third-party 
renders a binding judgment arrived at through consideration of the individual merits of the 
opposing positions and then imposes a settlement which is deemed to be fair and just”, or by 
mediation with muscle, “which encompasses pure mediation but also moves beyond it to include 
the use of leverage or coercion on the part of the mediator in the form of promised rewards or 
threatened punishments, and may also involve the third-party as monitor and guarantor of the 
agreement”. 
 Stage IV (destruction). The interventions here are first peace-keeping to control the violence, and 
then arbitration or mediation with muscle, or a direct step to consultation and development aid to 
reduce inequity (all quotes from Fisher 2001:15-17). 
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deployments, and demilitarised zones); peace-making (bring the hostile parties to 
agreement by peaceful means) that embraced mediation and also included services of 
the International Court of Justice and assistance through the different UN agencies 
and programmes, sanctions and the use of military force; peace-keeping and post-
conflict peace-building. 29  
There are two problems with the categorisation by stages if the intention is to use it 
as a means to sort activities found in a case study. One is that conflicts rarely develop 
in an ideal-typical way and different conflicts in different stage of development can 
often be found side by side. Another is that some of these categorisations include 
assumptions that this study would like to test, e.g. the relationship between escalation 
and the need for increasing force. For these reasons these models did not seem 
appropriate for the purpose of this study. 
 
2.2.3 Multi-variant Models of Conflict Intervention  
Reimann (2001) links main concepts of conflict management with three ‘tracks’ of 
actors, as well as with the presence or absence of coercion involved, and comes to 
four ideal-typical ways of dealing with conflict:30  
1. Conflict Settlement (track I, governments / international organisations): Official 
and coercive measures (e.g. sanctions, power mediation, peace enforcement) 
2. Non-coercive measures: facilitation, negotiation/mediation, fact-finding 
missions, peace-keeping 
3.
 Conflict resolution (track II, second-track diplomacy): non-official and non-
coercive strategies (e.g. facilitation or problem-solving workshops).  
4. Conflict Transformation: Wide ranging activities from track I ( e.g. ‘power 
mediation’), track II (e.g. facilitation/consultation) and track III (grassroots’ level 
activities, e.g. psychological, trauma work, capacity building, development and 
humanitarian aid).  
                                                 
29
 In the second edition of the Agenda for Peace Boutros-Ghali (1995) separated out the use of 
militar y force as peace enforcement. 
30
 Though she does not use the term ‘intervention’, all her methods of conflict management refer to 
the work of third parties. 
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One of the most complex pictures has been drawn by Ropers, Heinrich and Mueller. 
(See table 1 below) They combine conflict stages with Lederach’s (1997:38pp) three 
levels of leadership in society (top, middle-range and grassroots’ leadership) in an 
overview called Options for Conflict Transformation.31 It is probably one of the most 
complex and thorough models (though not easy to read) but like the other 
categorisations it lacks a solid empirical basis. For example, it will be shown later 
that there have been facilitation and ‘good offices’ at the top leadership level, and 
trauma work and care for war victims at grassroots’ level right in the middle of the 
wars in the former Yugoslavia.  
 
Table 1) Options for Conflict Transformation 
 
 
 
 
 
Another concept that aims at encompassing different approaches and strategies at 
different stages of conflict development has been presented by Volker Matthies 
                                                 
31
 Unpublished table by Barbara Mueller (2004), based on a powerpoint presentation) by Heinrich 
and Ropers 1992. Reprinted here with permission from B. Mueller. 
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(2003). He speaks of “primary” prevention that are measures before a conflict has 
turned violent, “secondary” prevention meaning measures during war and “tertiary” 
prevention after the end of the war. The measures are further distinguished as to 
whether they seek to influence process (the actors), or structures and institutions in 
order to empower them to deal with problems and conflict in future. Key areas are 
security (including the so-called ’DDR’ – demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration of soldiers as well as security sector reform), the political system (rule 
of law, public services), the economic system (reconstruction and development as 
two issues here), and psychological dimensions (under which he not only places 
dealing with trauma but also what other authors would call community dialogue and 
networking).  
 
2.2.4 The Three ‘Grand’ Strategies 
Another way to categorize conflict intervention is to use the triad of peace-making, 
peace-keeping and peace-building. Since the Secretary General of the United 
Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali published in 1992 the already mentioned Agenda for 
Peace, these terms have become well known.  However, it was not Boutros-Ghali 
who invented these terms but Johan Galtung (Galtung 1976, reprinted in Galtung 
1982) 20 years earlier who called them “approaches to peace”. Since then these 
terms have been refined by other authors such as the social anthropologist Stephen 
Ryan who speaks of “peace strategies” (Ryan 1995:102). Together, these three 
strategies formulate a general theory of achieving or maintaining peace. As Miall et 
al have written: 
With reference to the conflict triangle, it can be suggested that peace-
making aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists, peace-
keeping lowers the level of destructive behaviour, and peace-building 
tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict 
(Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:22, referring to Galtung’s 
ABC triangle).  
For both Galtung and Ryan these three strategies are seen as complementary, to be 
pursued at the same time. Peace-keeping without peace-making and peace-building 
would be very difficult because the violence might overwhelm the process, and any 
group wishing to sabotage a peace initiative would find it easy to provoke armed 
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clashes. If peace-building is ineffective, the decision-makers might lose the support 
of their communities, and if peace-making is ineffective, the perceived disagreement 
that caused the conflict will remain unresolved, and the probability that violence 
would restart would be high. (Ryan 1995:117 pp). 
In this study these three types of intervention will be referred to as the ‘grand 
strategies’ of conflict intervention, and used as the basis for the categorisation of the 
findings, because they constitute the most adequate organising framework for 
categorising all the different interventionary activities identified within this study and 
describe different functions that serve well to distinguish activities. Below and in the 
conclusions I will however discuss some modifications of the framework that are 
suggested by an analysis of the data on interventions in the former Yugoslavia. 
 
2.2.4.1 Peace-making 
Stephen Ryan defined peace-making as being concerned “with the search for a 
negotiated resolution of the perceived conflicts of interests between the parties” 
(1995: 106).32 He distinguishes three main approaches to peace-making.  
• The use of the law, such as when a conflict is taken to an international court 
whose rulings are considered binding for the parties in conflict, or when a 
conflict involving a minority group is addressed through the introduction of new 
laws aimed at protecting that minority. 
• Negotiation which includes ‘track 1’ and ‘track 2’ approaches33,  
• Violence or power, seeking to impose a solution on the parties (Ryan 
                                                 
32
 Miall, Ramsbotham  and  Woodhouse speak of “moving towards settlement of armed conflict, 
where conflict parties are induced to reach agreement voluntarily” (1999:22). And the Berghof 
Handbook defined  
Peace-making - Track l intervention consisting mainly of negotiation and mediation 
beginning after the outbreak of open conflict and aimed at moving towards the 
brokering of an end to the violent conflict. A process usually striving for a political 
settlement on the level of legitimate or de facto leaders. Usually result-oriented 
which may also seek to change the attitudes of the main protagonists. (The Berghof 
Handbook 2001:Vp) 
33
 Different categories of peace-making by negotiation have been discussed in footnote 27, p.38. For 
the different “tracks”, see below section 2.2.5. 
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1995:106pp). 34 
So peace-making is defined here as working as an external party towards a 
settlement of the conflict through either law, negotiation, or the exercise of violence 
and/or other forms of power. 
 
2.2.4.2 Peace-keeping 
Johan Galtung (1996:103) defined peace-keeping as efforts to “control the actors so 
that they at least stop destroying things, others, and themselves”.  
Traditionally peace-keeping has been considered a task of the military and perhaps 
the police, best represented in its classical form by the UN ‘blue helmets’. However, 
it should be noted that there have also been a number of civilian peace-keeping 
missions by both state and civil society actors (see Schweitzer et al. 2001, chapter 2)  
Authors who are mainly interested in nonviolent intervention have broadened the 
concept of peace-keeping to include other smaller-scale activities such as the 
unarmed accompaniment of human rights activists threatened by death squads.  
Schirch (1995:20-31) has called such activities intercessionary peace-keeping, a 
mode of intervention which maintains unequal distance between the parties and is 
appropriate for situations where the parties to a conflict are not easily spatially 
separated. 
In this study, peace-keeping will be understood as the prevention of direct violence 
through influence or control of the behaviour of potential perpetrators. 
 
2.2.4.3 Peace-building 
Peace-building is the strategy that more than peace-keeping and peace-making 
includes normal citizens in the peace process. It “underpins the work of peace-
                                                 
34
 Bercovitch makes a somewhat similar distinction but with four subcategories: a) violence and 
coercion, b) deterrence, c) adjudication, d) accommodation (e.g. bargaining and mediation), saying 
that “These four ways of managing conflicts correspond roughly to power-based approaches to 
conflict (violence and deterrence), rights-based approaches (adjudication), and interest-based 
approaches (accommodation).” (Bercovitch 2002:40) 
2. Theoretical Basis  44 
 
 
making and peace-keeping by addressing structural issues and the long-term 
relationships between conflictants” (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:22).  
The Berghof Institute writes that as a generic term it refers to  
… all activities intent on building and promoting peace and overcoming 
violence. A long-term process that seeks to positively alter structural 
contradictions, improve relations between the conflict parties, and 
encourage overall constructive changes in attitudes. May also refer to 
activities connected with economic development, social justice, 
reconciliation, empowerment of disadvantaged/strategic groups, and 
humanitarian support. Applicable to all conflict stages, levels, and mainly 
to Tracks 2 and 3. (Berghof Handbook 2001:V) 
If peace-building is limited to the functions of addressing a) structural issues and b) 
long-term relationships, it seems difficult to include some of the activities named 
above in the Berghof Handbook and/or identified in the survey for this study. 
Making sure that people have food or shelter, or that soldiers are disarmed, stands of 
course in a certain relationship to these functions but it seems stretching their 
meaning to say that, for example, sheltering refugees is firstly about improving 
relationships or dealing with structural issues.  
A possible solution may be to borrow something that Ryan wrote about peace-
building. He calls it “the strategy which most directly tries to reverse those 
destructive processes that accompany violence" (Ryan 1995:129). Relief and 
reconstruction definitely do that. Therefore, I suggest “reversing destructive 
processes” as an additional third function of peace-building, while taking the view 
that helping people to survive a war as a first step to reversing its destructive 
processes.35  
Peace-building in this study could then be re-defined as all those activities that are 
not either peace-making or peace-keeping but which address structural issues and 
relationships between the conflict parties or that otherwise seek to reverse the 
destructive processes of conflict and war.  
I suggest this wide definition in spite of the (well-founded) criticism that while 
peace-making and peace-keeping might be pretty clear-cut categories, to designate 
                                                 
35
 I am not the first to suggest including relief under peace-building. For example, the Canadian 
Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (quoted by Llamazares  and  Reynolds Levy 2003:12)  
lists “humanitarian relief and emergency assistance, tackling basic needs (food, shelter, health, 
suffering)” under peace-building. 
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all activities that fall outside the parameters of peace-making and peace-keeping as 
peace-building means that such a category or grand strategy “is in danger of 
becoming meaningless” (Llamazares and Reynolds Levy 2003:11).36 Since in this 
study however the categories of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building are 
used solely as a means of categorising the activities that external actors undertook in 
regard to former Yugoslavia, I decided to use the wider term and find meaningful 
subcategories to encompass different activities rather than expand the listing of grand 
categories/strategies.37 
Since peace-building is such a large category, I developed a list of nine sub-
categories to cover the different types of activities that can be subsumed under peace-
building. Some of these categories are rather standard, like ‘DDR’ (‘disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration’), reconstruction, transitional justice or state-
building and democratisation, but others may be less common: So I created for 
example an extra category of cultural activities (theatre, film, music events), and I 
did not use a category ‘reconciliation’ because this goal entered into so many 
different kinds of activities.38 The nine categories of peace-building distinguished in 
this study are the following: 
1. Humanitarian Relief (during and after war, including material aid, sheltering and 
caring for refugees) 
2. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants (DDR)39 
3. Reconstruction and refugee return40 
                                                 
36
 Their answer is to restrict the term to those activities that “promote positive peace”. 
37
 The CDA- Collaborative Learning Projects (2006:10), facing the same dilemma of peace-building 
being a rather vague concept, chose another solution within the broad framework of addressing the 
causes of ongoing and future conflict: “Consequently, rather than supply a definition of 
peacebuilding, this research sought to identify and reflect on what people themselves – from 
UNMIK to NGOs to local community members – characterised as peacebuilding in the Kosovo 
context“ 
38
 As an objective, reconciliation is present in many different instruments, for example civil society 
building, dialogue promotion and social work. 
39
 See Spear 2002. The reintegration part of ‘DDR’ overlaps with other categories because it can 
include economic support, vocational training or working on trauma. But since ‘DDR’ is a 
standard category for donors as well as in the literature on peace-building, I decided not to 
separate these three elements even though it would be more systematic in this context to rename 
this category here only ‘disarmament and demobilisation’  without ‘reintegration’. 
40
 It must be seen however that the boundaries between humanitarian aid, reconstruction and 
development work tend to dissolve increasingly as the same organisations tend to engage in all 
three, and nowadays, as donors provide such budget lines, also adding programmes that explicitly 
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4. Social and psycho-social work 
5. Economic recovery  
6. Transitional justice and human rights documentation 
7. State-building, democratisation and civil society support. This vast category 
includes support for the reform of juridical systems, police, educational systems, 
elections etc. as well as the multiple activities addressing civil society.41  
8. Promote peace skills and dialogue: Under this category I included all those 
activities that took place with the explicit goal of promoting peace and 
reconciliation, like nonviolence training or dialogue meetings. It is so-to-say 
‘peace work pure’: Activities that pursue peace and reconciliation without linking 
this objective to activities of social work, aid or civil society support. 
9. Cultural activities. 
 
2.2.5 Possible Additions to the Three ‘Grand Strategies’ 
Having introduced the concept of the three ‘grand strategies’ of peace-making, 
peace-keeping and peace-building the question however remains if they indeed cover 
everything that external actors have been found to undertake in regard to the conflicts 
in former Yugoslavia. , Before analysing what additional approaches the empirical 
data suggests, two additional concepts from the literature need mentioning – 
prevention and early warning.  
 
2.2.5.1 Prevention and Early Warning 
The three peace strategies are usually presented as strategies to be used after a 
conflict has escalated to violence, and many authors identify prevention as an 
approach of its own (Leatherman et al. 1999, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 
                                                                                                                                          
deal with conflict (see Adams and Bradbury 1995, Gass and van Dok 2000). Many speak of a 
‘continuum’ of emergency relief - rehabilitation - development co-operation (similarly the phases 
the UN defined for Kosovo after the NATO war, with ‘consolidation’ as the third phase. See 
Llamazares and  Reynolds Levy 2003). 
41
 The reason why state and non-state functions are being put in one category is that it is sometimes 
not easy to separate them. Not only are political parties while being a non-state actor a crucial 
factor in state-building, but also support for the educational systems tends to have both aspects 
(see chapter 7). 
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1999, Leonhardt 2000, Lund and Rasamoelina (eds.) 2000; Rubin 2002, Lund 2004, 
Matthies 2005).42  
Nevertheless, when looking at the different activities undertaken with the objective 
of  preventing a conflict from becoming violent, we find the instruments such as 
monitoring missions, convening international meetings, shuttle mediation, and even a 
military peace-keeping mission – none of them fundamentally different to what was 
done once violent conflict erupted.43 Preventing violence, finding a negotiated 
solution, and dealing with the relationships and structural issues are all elements of 
prevention, and therefore I would argue that the activities of prevention can be found 
in all three ‘grand strategies’ and do not consist a strategy of their own. 
 
                                                 
42
 Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999:97) distinguish ‘light’ prevention which is aimed at 
preventing situations with a clear capacity for violence from degenerating into armed conflict, and 
‘deep’ prevention: addressing the root causes, including underlying conflicts of interest and 
relationships. Lund (2004) also uses the term  'deep' prevention for the latter. Other terms are 
'structural' (Carnegie Commission 1997) or 'structural' and 'systemic' prevention (Rubin 2002). 
'Systemic' prevention refers to the 'promotion of policies that counteract ways that global 
institutions promote or facilitate violence' (Rubin 2002:131), for example in the field of global 
economics, and is not country-specific. 'Deep' or 'structural' prevention deals with a situation in a 
specific country or region before the spiral of escalation is put in motion, and the danger develops 
of mass atrocities being committed. Structural prevention may mean to deal with economic 
injustices and to ensure human rights and political participation of all levels of society and all 
minorities. International wars, the number of which has been greatly reduced in the last decades, 
can be prevented by traditional mechanisms like power balances, conventions on disarmament and 
cooperation, democratisation of all countries in question, or joint membership in international 
organisations. Burg and Shoup (1999:389) distinguish genuine preventive action that addresses the 
sources of conflict from early prevention in bresponse to an outbreak of violence, aiming at 
stopping its escalation, and crisis intervention. 
If a conflict has clearly begun to escalate, then what is needed is what the Carnegie Foundation 
and Rubin call 'operational' prevention – specific actions taken to confront an imminent crisis. 
Here there needs to be no doubt that a certain situation may be of relevance for R2P, because there 
is usually clear evidence that indicates the potential for such crimes. Instruments applicable by 
civil society actors in such contexts include second-track mediation, dialogue support, and 
advocacy for decisive action by the country in question and/or by the international community. 
Ackermann (2000:19,99) says that the approaches taken to prevent conflict can be found also in 
post-war situations, in what she calls post-conflict prevention: preventing the re-emergence of 
disputes by reintegrating and reconstructing the war-torn society.  
43
 Besides early warning as a much-discussed prerequisite, instruments may include confidence 
building, economic measures (sanctions, conditionality, economic dispute resolution mechanisms), 
and structural measures like development aid, support for transition to democracy and capacity-
building, support of civil society, measures aiming at countering a ‘culture of violence’, prejudice-
reduction and encounters between members of enemy groups, human right protection, and many 
things more. See Lund 1996, Berghof Handbook 2001, Paffenholz 2001b:22, Tullio and Vertucci 
2002:299.  
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2.2.5.2 Peace Enforcement 
Peace enforcement is a rather vague term, and is used to describe different 
approaches usually of the military kind.44 The term became broadly known when 
Boutros-Ghali (1995) used it in the second edition of his Agenda for Peace as an 
activity distinct from prevention, peace-making, peace-building and peace-keeping. 
It includes what elsewhere is called robust peacekeeping - the use of force to carry 
out the mandate - as well as ‘war to end war’ enterprises. The latter was the official 
legitimisation for the NATO bombing in Bosnia 1995 and the Kosovo/Yugoslavia 
war by NATO in 1999.45 The essence of peace enforcement is not so much the use of 
force per se, but rather the lack of consent by one or all of the parties in conflict to 
the intervention.  
Peace enforcement operations range from low-level military missions to 
protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance, to full-fledged 
enforcement action to roll back aggression. Undertaken under chapter VII 
of the United Nations Charter, their defining characteristic is the lack of 
consent to some or the entire UN mandate. Militarily, these operations 
seek to deter, dissuade, or deny success to acts of aggressive force. By 
using collective force to preclude an outcome based on the use of force by 
the parties, the UN seeks to persuade the parties to settle the conflict by 
negotiation. (Doyle 1997:4)46 
But is peace enforcement really an approach or strategy of its own? Stephen Ryan 
(1995) considers ‘violence and power’ one of the three subcategories of 
peacemaking. In this sense, ‘peace enforcement’ as practised in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
or Kosovo belongs to the category of peace-making (see chapter 4) and is what Art 
and Cronin (2007) call ‘coercive diplomacy’. In other cases, it falls under military 
peace-keeping if it is mandated invoking chapter VII of the UN Charter, but in 
neither case it is a ‘grand strategy’ of its own.  
 
                                                 
44
 The question if there can be nonviolent ‘enforcement’ through direct nonviolent action, e.g. 
interpositioning of activists between the front of two warring parties, has been discussed in the 
literature on nonviolent intervention. Most authors studying interpositioning projects have come to 
the conclusion that it is not a promising strategy. See different contributions to Moser-Puangsuwan 
and Weber 2000, and Schweitzer et al. 2001, Chapter 2. It seems, however, that stopping a war is 
something different than preventing violence at a more local level – interpositioning, unarmed 
body-guarding and the like have proven very successful in the latter cases.  
45
 Also for the 2nd Iraq war in 1991. An early example may be the Korean War (1950-53). 
46
 The Berghof Handbook (2001:vi) defines peace enforcement broader as “diplomatic and military 
measures to stop a violent conflict and/or enforce a peace agreement; usually carried out by a third 
party military force to bring an end to armed hostilities in a conflict situation” . 
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2.2.5.3 Information, Support to Other Actors, Protest and Advocacy 
The activities that can be subsumed under peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-
building do not exhaust the list of activities that different actors undertook in regard 
to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. What was not possible to place under them 
have been: 
• Information –  media outside of former Yugoslavia reporting on the conflicts, and 
‘pure (academic) research’ studying them;  
• Numerous activities of protest and advocacy by civil society groups targeting 
other intervening actors or the general public, seeking to inform them and/ or to 
change their behaviour;  
• Activities supporting intervening actors - applied research, funding, coordination 
and capacity-building of interveners.  
All three have in common that they are not directly dealing with the parties in 
conflict like the three grand-strategies identified so far, but are ‘one step removed’, 
addressing those who intervene.  It seems to me therefore better to consider targeting 
other intervening actors as a strategy of its own, though it is a strategy standing in an 
instrumental relationship to the other ones. 
 
2.2.5.4 A Widened Framework for Categorising Conflict Intervention  
To summarise what has been said so far: 
• It has been suggested that ‘prevention’ and ‘peace enforcement’ are no ‘grand 
strategies’ of their own. Prevention is an objective requiring elements of all the 
three ‘grand strategies’. And ‘peace enforcement’ can be found as a means in 
both peace-making and peace-keeping. 
• For the category of peace-building, it has been suggested to add “reversing 
destructive processes of war” as an additional third function in addition to 
addressing relationships and dealing with structural issues. 
• As a strategy of its own, information, support to, and protest and advocacy 
targeting other interveners is added as a fourth one, although it stands in an 
instrumental relationship to the other three strategies. 
2. Theoretical Basis  50 
 
 
After having analysed the different activities of civil society actors (and of state 
actors) in the following chapters, I will return in the conclusions (chapter 9) to this 
framework and present a model outlining its different characteristics.47 
 
2.3 The Different Actors in Conflict Intervention 
2.3.1 The Relationship of Interveners to the Conflict 
Generally, actors in a conflict are all those individuals, groups and institutions that 
have some kind of relationship to the conflict, be it through  
• direct involvement as representatives of those who are perceived to be direct 
parties to the conflict, 
• being affected by the conflict by being a member of one of the communities in 
war, or 
• choosing to intervene in the conflict as what is usually considered an ‘external’ or 
‘third’ party.48 
Of course, the distinction between internal and external actors is not altogether as 
clear as it seems at first glance. The case of former Yugoslavia shows clearly how 
quickly ‘external’ parties became factors in the complex relationship between the 
parties in conflict. Rather than being the ideal-typical ‘neutral’ party still depicted in 
some of the literature on conflict mediation, there are at least two factors at work that 
quickly tend to destroy this fiction of the neutrality of interveners:49 
1. Local actors take them into account in the pursuit of their goals and strategies, 
sometimes to the degree of seeking to manipulate them.50 
                                                 
47
 The categorisation developed for this thesis I have since then used for another publication that gives 
a general and systematic overview over all the different approaches and strategies of non-violent 
conflict transformation (without special reference to the Balkans): see Schweitzer 2009. 
48
 See Ropers who defined: “Third parties may be either state or non-state institutions or individual 
persons or groups of persons who at least are not immediately involved in the conflict.” (Ropers 
1996:417, translation CS).  
49
 Ropers calls the concept of a neutral third party an ‘ideal-typical figure’, referring to Max Weber’s 
term (see Ropers 1996:419). 
50
 There have been at least four different strategies how local actors sought to influence the so-called 
international community or individual external actors in the former Yugoslavia: 
•  Advocacy Work: The leaders of the secessionist republics quite early (in 1990) sought support 
from Western governments through diplomatic means and the sending of delegations. Croatia 
2. Theoretical Basis  51 
 
 
2. External actors have motives for being involved, invariably pursuing their own 
interests at least to some degree.51 
Both factors have been amply recognised in the literature on conflict intervention, as 
Touval and Zartman have observed,  
Initially, third parties are accepted as mediators only to the extent that 
they are seen as capable of bringing about acceptable outcomes; then, 
their subsequent meddling is tolerated because they are already part of the 
relationship. (Touval and  Zartman 2001:432) 
For these reasons, some authors have suggested that the relationship of external 
parties to a conflict should rather be thought of as a continuum or as an onion with 
different layers. In its core are fully internal actors (core parties). In the next layer 
there are active influential and marginal parties, and at the outer border are very few 
almost uninvolved, purely external ones:  
 
                                                                                                                                          
even hired the Washington-based PR firm Ruder Finn Global Public Affairs for US$ 
10,000/month plus expenses to present a “positive Croatian image” to members of Congress, 
administration officials and news media (Sremac 1999:71, 110).  
•  Using supporters (mainly from the diaspora, but also parts of the human rights and peace 
movements) to promote issues in certain Western countries: Especially Croats and Bosnians 
have had a lot of support for their claims and suggestions in the West, expressed by 
demonstrations, press releases and other media work, as well as by advocacy work with 
politicians.  
•  Not proven though often speculated about is the issue of certain military incidents (like the 
grenade attacks on a market in Sarajevo, or attacks on hospitals in Croatia) having been 
consciously provoked or even staged in order to provoke a stronger military reaction by the 
international community. (Generally commenting on it are e.g. Schwegmann 2003:185 and 
Calic 1996:181. General MacKenzie (1993:99) doubts that the Bosnian Serbian Army was to 
blame for the so-called breadline massacre in 1993.) 
•  Threatening interveners: When NATO in support of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping troops 
began bombing military installations of the Bosnian Serbs, they responded in November 1994 
and again in May 1995 by taking UN soldiers as hostages, and demanding the end of the 
attacks. (This has been described in many sources. See for example Meder and Reimann 
1996:20, Krech 1997.) 
51
 This has been much reflected in the literature on international intervention. See Woodward 1995, 
Gow 1997, Burg and Shoup 1999, Carpenter (ed.) 2000, Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000 and many 
others.  
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Table 2) Relationship of parties to a conflict 
 
 
In the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, just to give an example, there were at least 
three major internal parties: the political-military organisations of the 
Muslims/Bosnians, the Croats and the Serbs. The two neighbouring countries FR 
Yugoslavia and Croatia formed a second circle around those, and then as a third 
circle there was the international community with its different organisations (see 
Ducasse-Rogier 2003:34).  
‘Embedded’ actors in this model are those who are ‘internal’ but who seek to adopt a 
non-partisan stance in relation to a conflict of which they do not consider themselves 
to be a party. An example would be those individuals, groups and agencies who 
sought to de-escalate violence or work for reconciliation between ethnic and 
religious groups in the midst of violence. In the former Yugoslavia there have been 
some such groups formed in the early 1990s in each republic. Many of them widened 
the range of their activities from their country to those of the neighbouring countries 
– e.g. groups from Belgrade working in the Serbian-controlled parts of Croatia, a 
trainers’ group based both in Sarajevo and Belgrade, or Croatian human rights 
activists supporting groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see chapters 5 and 7 for some 
examples of such ‘embedded groups’).  
 
Diagram adapted from Encarnacion, McCartney and Rosas 1990:45, reprinted in Lewer and 
Ramsbotham 1993:31 
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2.3.2 Categories of External Actors 
External parties are often categorised into governments and international 
organisations on the one side (track 1) and all the others on the other (track 2).52  
Other authors introduced a track 3 to refer to actors at the grassroots level, or all 
those  
process- and structure-oriented initiatives undertaken by actors involved 
in grassroots training/ capacity building and empowerment, trauma work, 
human rights and development work, and humanitarian assistance. 
(Reimann 2001:4-5). 
However, even three tracks do not adequately cover all the very different roles 
performed by non-state actors in particular. The former Ambassador John McDonald 
observed that “the designation of Track Two could no longer hold the variety, scope 
and depth of all the different kinds of citizen involvement” (Diamond and  
McDonald 1991:3).  He came up with the term ‘multi-track diplomacy’, 
distinguishing originally five different ‘tracks’, which with Louise Diamond was 
expanded to nine.53  
I have drawn on this model for my own categorisation of external actors which 
seemed a better fit for the case under study. The first distinction needs to be made 
between two main types of actors: state and non-state, but with a grey middle area. 
State actors fall into four main subtypes:  
1. International organisations (defined with Willetts (1997:303) as “any institution 
with formal procedures and formal membership from three or more countries”) 
like the United Nations, the European Community or the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 54, 
2. Individual states acting on their own or within a group of states,  
3. Sub-state entities like municipalities, districts or states within a federative nation 
(like the German bundeslaender), and  
                                                 
52
 According to Lewer (1999), the term ‘Track Two Diplomacy’ was first coined in 1981 by 
Davidson and Montville”. See below  2.3.2 for a discussion of the concept of ‘tracks’. 
53
 These nine tracks are: governmental; professional conflict resolution; business; private citizen; 
research, training and education; activism; religious; funding; and public opinion. 
54
 The OSCE was called Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) until 1994.   
 The former Polish President Tadeusz Mazowiecki was the first Special Envoy (see for example 
Mazowiecki 1995). He stepped down in 1995 and was replaced by Elisabeth Rehn, who in turn 
was followed by Jiri Dienstbier (Benedek 2001:210p). 
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4. State-run agencies, institutions and foundations.55  
Between state and civil society there are institutions and organisations that are 
closely linked to a state. These could be state-run media, different types of 
cooperation between state and –nonstate entities (an example would be foundations 
in which governmental as well as civil society organisations are jointly forming a 
board), political parties and so-called Quangos – organisations that are formally non-
governmental but heavily dependent on state structures.  
Non-state actors could be categorised in two different ways, regarding their scope or 
their type.56 For the scope, there are local, national and transnational or international 
actors. As to different types, again as is the case with other categorisations presented 
in this chapter, there is no generally recognised list of types of non-state actors that 
all authors would refer to.57  For the purposes of this study, the categories shown in 
the following table seemed to serve best: Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs)58, 
citizens’ Groups / Community-based organisations59, traditional governmental 
structures, e.g. Councils of Elders, religious or faith-based organisations with an 
                                                 
55
 For example the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD), Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency SIDA or Canadian International Development 
Agency  CIDA. 
56
 Fischer (2006:4) argues out that the term ‘non-state actor’ “reflects the assumptions of realism 
theories which assert that interactions between states are the central relationships of interest in 
studying international policy.” However, when the term is used here it is merely done so for 
practical reason, as a category describing in fact everybody who is not ‘state’, but without the 
underlying assumption about the relative value of state and non-state actors that she is reading into 
the term. 
57
 Just to give one more example for such lists to compare with Diamond and McDonald: Barnes 
(2005:8) distinguishes three main types of organisations: Nongovernmental organisations, 
voluntary charities and community-based organisations, and a number of ‘secondary’ groups: 
Political parties and movements, Business Associations, Trade Unions and Professional Bodies, 
Cooperatives and SelfHelf Initaitves, Private Foudnations and Philanthropy, Media: State and 
Non-Profit, Educational and Research Institutes, Arts collectives and Cultural Associations, 
Religious Institutions and Faith-Based Organisations, Traditional Structures and Councils of 
Elders, Youth Unions and Student Organisations, Women’s Groups and Associations, Social, 
Environmental, and Human Rights Movements, Political Parties and Movements.  
58
  Understood with Anderson as  
privately organised and privately financed agencies, formed to perform some 
philanthropic or other worthwhile task in relation to a need that the organisers feel is not 
adequately addressed by public, governmental, or UN efforts (Anderson 2001:638). 
59
 The distinction between citizens’ groups and  NGOs is a rather fluid one. One criteria which may 
at least work for Europe is the question of registration as a non-profit or charitable organisation, 
and the degree of formality of their association. 
 Another related term sometimes found in the literature is ‚social movement organisation’. Such 
organisations are the structural basis for social movements. They may be associations, citizens’ 
committees, church institutions etc. See Janett 1997:146.  
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explicit religious background or mandate60, cultural institutions, private media, trade 
unions and professional organisations, private research institutions, private donors, 
diaspora groups and individuals61. A non-state actor usually not counted as part of 
civil society is business.62 
The types of intervening actors are presented on the next page in tabular form: 
                                                 
60
 Religion-based actor is the term that Weingardt (2007) is using. 
61
   Individuals acting on their own are usually missing from lists of non-state or civil society acors. 
However, they played an important enough role in the area of former Yugoslavia to deserve a 
cetagory of their own 
62
 On the role business could play in conflict transformation, see Haufler 2001. 
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Table 3) Intervening Actors 
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This study here is dealing with what is termed ‘civil society actors’. For that reason, 
the concepts of civil society and how it relates to ‘non-state actors’ in general needs 
special mention. ‘Civil society’ is a term which is defined differently by different 
authors. I won’t discuss the different concepts because that is not of real relevance 
for this study here. Instead, I would like to refer to Barnes and her definition that in 
my eyes reflects well what many authors agree on civil society: 
Most broadly understood, ... civil society refers to the web of social 
relations that exist in the space between the state, the market (activities 
with the aim of extracting profit), and the private life of families and 
individuals (Barnes 2005:7). 
Using this definition as a basis, it means that non-state actors and civil society actors 
overlap a lot, but that there is one type of non-state actor listed above that does not 
meet the definition of civil society actor, namely business.  
 
2.4 Conclusions 
Studying the full picture of conflict intervention rather than just its diplomatic side 
has only begun in the last 15 or 20 years. Today there are many studies seeking to lay 
a theoretical basis, as well as case studies on certain conflicts. Most of them have 
been published since the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that many of the 
interventions at least in these early years of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia took 
place without being able to make use of this research and theoretical groundwork. 
However, there is still no model shared by all theoreticians and practitioners alike on 
what conflict intervention in total entails, what the methods and strategies are and 
how they can be categorised. Empirical studies surveying different practices have 
only been undertaken for single fields, for example media support, or single periods 
and places. 
This chapter has aimed at laying the groundwork for the different concepts and 
terminologies used. In the first step, social conflict, war, strategy, different terms of 
handling conflict and conflict intervention were defined. 
Going through different categorisations of conflict intervention, in the end it has been 
suggested for this study to use a categorisation with the ‘grand strategies’ of peace-
making, peace-keeping and peace-building plus ‘information, support, protest and 
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advocacy’ added as the basic categories. The aim of peace-making is to help 
achieving a settlement of the conflict, peace-keeping seeks to control, prevent or 
reduce violence and peace-building attempts to address the destructive effects of war 
and the structural issues and relationships that drove the conflict. ‘Information, 
support, protest and advocacy’ address other intervening actors or the general public 
abroad, and therefore stand in an instrumental relationship to the first three strategies. 
A third topic has been the different actors in conflict intervention. The first was the 
issue of the relationship of so-called ‘third’ or ‘external’ parties in general where it 
was concluded that the existence of such parties is to some degree a fiction because 
actors involving themselves in a conflict become part of the conflict whatever they 
might wish.. As regards the categorisation of intervening actors, the organising 
framework adopted consists of two main categories of state and non-state actors, 
each with a number of sub-categories.  
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3. On the History of the Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia 
 
Today there are seven formally independent states on the territory of what had been 
Yugoslavia until the end of 1991. Since it is by now almost 20 years that the wars in 
former Yugoslavia began, it seems advisable to give a historic overview to be able to 
mention situations and events in later chapters without having to explain then in 
detail the context. Therefore, this chapter gives a short introduction on the basic facts 
and figures of Yugoslavia, and then goes through the history of the conflicts country 
by country.  
 
3.1 Yugoslavia until 1991 
John R. Lampe (2000), a well-known historian, subtitled his book on the history of 
Yugoslavia Twice there was a country.63 In fact, there is hardly a better way of 
describing the history of ‘Jugo-Slavia’ which means ‘South Slavia’. Yugoslavia (to 
use the English spelling) made a relatively recent appearance on the world map. The 
first state that united the South Slav peoples  under one government was founded in 
1918 as the ‘Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes’, later renamed the ‘Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia’,  which ended with the German occupation in 1941. The second, the 
‘Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia’ (‘Federal People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia’ until 1963) was founded in 1945/46 and ended in January 1992. The last 
remnant with the name Yugoslavia, the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ which 
consisted of only  two of Yugoslavia’s former republics, Serbia and Montenegro, had 
a little noticed end in 2002 when it was renamed ‘Serbia and Montenegro’.64 
The socialist Yugoslavia, inhabited in 1990 by around 23.5 million people, consisted 
of six republics: Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and 
Slovenia. After 1974, two autonomous areas within Serbia (Vojvodina in the North 
with a large number of Hungarians, and Kosovo in the South with up to 85% - 90% 
of Albanians) had a status which almost resembled those of the five republics. Its six 
                                                 
63
 The sources for the events described in this chapter are not annotated case by case when it was 
assumed that the events are undisputed, common knowledge. For an overview over the history of 
Yugoslavia, see especially Lampe 2000 and the literature quoted in chapter 4. 
64
 In 2006, these two parted company as well. 
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main peoples were Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Muslims and 
Macedonians. Three main religious orientations (Islam, Orthodox and Catholic), two 
scripts (Latin and Cyrillic), at least three undoubtedly different Slavic languages 
(Macedonian, Slovene and the different dialects or languages that after 1945 were 
subsumed under ‘Serbo-Croatian’), plus Albanian and Hungarian as languages with a 
completely different linguistic heritage, and a sharp city-countryside divide were 
other distinctive features of what was a very multi-cultural country.65 None of the 
republics were mono-ethnic before the war. Most mixed was Bosnia-Herzegovina 
where no ethnic group – neither Muslim, Serbs nor Croats - constituted an absolute 
majority.66 
Table 4) Map of Yugoslavia 1990 
 
Yugoslavia in 1990, with the borders of Kosovo that is today an independent country 
emphasised. 
Map courtesy of www.theodora.com/maps, used with permission. 
                                                 
65
 This  is not the place to enter the discussion if Serbian, Montenegrian, Croatian and Bosnian are 
distinct languages or just dialects. At least formally linguists tended to categorise them as the 
latter, but with political independence not only each country insists on its language being 
considered a language of its own, but also differences between them were strengthened, for 
instance by introduction of archaic words. Clearly different languages of their own are Slovenian, 
Macedonian and Albanian – the latter not being a Slavic language. 
66
 In Bosnia-Herzegovina lived in 1991 c. 44 % Muslims, 31 % Serbs and 17 % Croats, ‘Yugoslavs’ 
and ‘others’ being less than 8 %. (Lampe 2000:337) 
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1986 can probably be considered the year when the fundamental political changes in 
Yugoslavia began which eventually led to its dissolution. Tito had died in 1980 and 
six years later new political leaders came to power in the Communist Party in most 
republics.67 From the beginning, this change had two interwoven faces: 
democratisation and nationalism.68 Youth protests, nationalistic demonstrations and a 
strike of Albanian miners in Kosovo characterised these years. In March 1989 the 
Serbian constitution was amended and both Kosovo and Vojvodina lost their status 
as autonomous regions.  
In 1990 all republics held elections for the republican leadership which were the first 
multi-party elections. In Croatia and Slovenia those parties or coalitions won that 
stood for autonomy or secession from Yugoslavia, and referenda soon after 
confirmed the wish for independence from Belgrade.  
 
3.2 The Beginning of the End: the Wars in Slovenia and Croatia and Their 
Aftermaths 
The conflict finally escalated to violence right after the declarations of independence 
of Slovenia on 25 June 1991 and of Croatia one day later. The government in 
Belgrade tried to prevent the secession of Slovenia by having the Yugoslav Peoples’ 
Army (JNA) secure Slovenia’s international borders. But the Slovene leadership, 
which had managed to build up some kind of army mainly using the weapons stored 
in Slovenia for the Territorial Defence, confronted the JNA. Thanks to successful 
mediation by the European Community (EC), a cease-fire was negotiated at Brioni 
on the 7th July, and in a later Brioni Agreement of 3rd August, it was agreed that the 
declarations of sovereignty be suspended for three months.  
There has been some speculation why this ten-day conflict was so short and 
relatively ‘un-bloody’ compared to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. The commonly 
held view is that Belgrade decided to let Slovenia go because it was  considered to be 
the main trouble-maker in the Federation, and the fact that there was no Serbian 
                                                 
67
 The later Presidents of Serbia and Slovenia, Milosevic and Kucan, were two of them. 
68
 Before 1986, ethnic tensions had broken out in Yugoslavia already more than once. In the 1950 
protests in Kosovo were brutally suppressed by the Serbian police. In Croatia there was some kind 
of nationally-motivated unrest in 1971-72, the so-called ‘Croatian Spring’ that triggered the reform 
of the constitution in 1974. 
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minority in Slovenia worth mentioning probably eased that decision. Lord Owen, 
who served as a negotiator for the EC between 1992 and 1994, has posited that there 
was a deal between the Slovenian leadership and Belgrade that Slovenia would stay 
neutral in the dispute between Serbs and Croats if it were allowed to secede from 
Yugoslavia (see Owen 1995:34).69 
But while the JNA eventually withdrew from Slovenia on 19 July, a few days later 
local fighting between Croats and Serbs in Croatia escalated. The JNA soon began 
fighting on the side of the Serbs instead of, as it seemed initially, trying to stop the 
violence.70 Those areas in Croatia where a considerable Serbian population (not 
always the majority) lived were quickly brought under control of the JNA and local 
Serbian militias. Croats living in Eastern Slavonia and Krajina had to flee, whole 
villages were raided and destroyed. After the fall of the town of Vukovar in Eastern 
Slavonia, borders between Croatian-controlled and Serbian-controlled areas were 
established, and a military stalemate was achieved. 
From the international side, in 1991 the European Community was the first to lead 
negotiations but was unable to bring about any lasting agreements. In November a 
UN envoy, Cyrus Vance, succeeded in getting the parties agree to a cease-fire, and 
by the end of November 1991 the JNA finally withdrew from Croatia after the 
Croatian army lifted its blockade of the JNA barracks. The cease-fire was finally 
signed on 2 January 1992, and the UN sent peace-keeping forces (UNPROFOR) to 
Croatia to monitor the Serbian-controlled parts that proclaimed themselves in 1992 
as Serbian Republic of Krajina.  
Already by November 1991, the break-up of Yugoslavia seemed irreversible. An 
arbitration commission known as the Badinter Commission was established by the 
                                                 
69
 Slovenia after recognition managed to keep apart from most of the conflicts in the countries with 
which it once had shared a state, aside from receiving large numbers of refugees, and some minor 
disputes with Italy regarding the Italian community in Slovenia. 
 Slovenia joined NATO in March 2004, and on 1st of May 2004 became a member of the EU. 
70
 The role of JNA in the secession process is a matter of debate.. The JNA was always a powerful 
institution in Yugoslavia. Was it now the arm of Serb nationalists, as many in the Western former 
Yugoslav countries now maintain, pointing at the number of high officers who were of Serbian 
ethnicity (and overlooking that in the navy Croats dominated, and in the air force Slovenes)? Or 
did it until autumn 1991 seek to maintain a socialist Yugoslavia, being a neutral buffer between 
Serbs and Croats until September 1991 when the army more or less broke apart on ethnic lines - 
mostly Serbian and Montenegrin officers remaining, while most others deserted to join the new 
armies of their republic? See Woodward 1995:257. The EC mostly accepted the Croat and 
Slovenian interpretation of the JNA being a Serb army and an occupation force. 
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EC to collect and decide upon applications for independence from former Yugoslav 
republics. It declared Yugoslavia to be in state of dissolution, but even before it made 
its final report that recommended the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and 
Macedonia, and asked Bosnia-Herzegovina to conduct a referendum on its future 
status, the EC had decided to recognise Slovenia and Croatia.71  
Unhappy and dissatisfied at the failure of the UN to take steps towards demilitarising 
and re-integrating Krajina, in May 1995 Croatia reoccupied the Serbian-controlled 
part of Western Slavonia in the so-called ‘Operation Flash’, and two months later in 
a second operation (‘Storm’) the other parts of Krajina (with the exception of Eastern 
Slavonia) were also reoccupied.72 The majority of the Serb inhabitants of Krajina, 
around 200,000 (US Committee for Refugees 2001), including  many who had come 
earlier as refugees from Bosnia, fled to Serbia or neighbouring Serbian-held parts of 
Bosnia.73 
Thanks to international mediation, there was no third offensive directed at Eastern 
Slavonia. The Erdut agreement of November 1995 agreed that the territory be 
reintegrated into Croatia after a two-year period of transitional administration by the 
UN (UNTAES mission). UNTAES worked out well and the area came back to 
Croatia in January 1998.  
After 1990, Croatia was ruled by one national and rather authoritarian party, the 
HDZ. Following the death of President Tudjman in December 1999, the power 
balance in Croatia shifted, and the next elections brought a Social-Democrat-led 
coalition to power74  
In 2000, Croatia became a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace, and began 
negotiations with the EU on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement which was 
then signed in October 2001. At the time of writing (2009) Croatia has joined NATO 
but the application for membership with the EU is still being processed. 
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 With Germany (and Austria) pushing the recognition of these two Catholic republics.  
 Macedonia was not recognised because of a veto by Greece which suspected Macedonia of having 
claims on its territory. 
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 Correctly: Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, the UN-Protected Area East. 
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 Other sources speak of 300,000 refugees. 
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 Dvornik and Solioz (2007:15) distinguish four distinct phases of the transition process in Croatia: 
a transitional period (1991 - 1995), a period of authoritarian nationalism and economic recovery 
(1996 -1998), a period of transitional democratisation (1998 – 2000) and a period of democratic 
consolidation and EU integration (2001-2007).  
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The armed conflict in Slovenia had relatively few casualties – official statistics speak 
of 19 dead on the Slovenian side and 44 dead from the Yugoslav army. For Croatia, 
there are no reliable casualty figures because these figures are usually presented 
together with the casualties in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see below 3.3).75 The Croatian 
government in 1995 gave the figure of around 9,000 dead plus almost 3,000 missing 
people. Between 1991 and 1995, between 300,000 and 350,000 ethnic Serbs left 
Croatia (mostly to FR Yugoslavia or to the Serb-controlled areas such as Krajina), 
whilst approximately 220,000 ethnic Croats were internally displaced from the 
Krajina, mostly going to government-held areas or in smaller numbers to the 
Croatian-dominated parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within the period of ten years 
after the war, almost all Croats were able to return, while more than 110,000 ethnic 
Serbs were still waiting (Klincov n.d., Mikic 2003).  
 
3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina: No Time for Real Independence 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina the referendum on independence demanded by the EC took 
place on 1st March 1992, and on 3rd March Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its 
independence, against the will of most of its Serb population.76 It was recognised on 
6 April by the EU and the USA – two days later the war began.77  
In the first phase of the war until end of August 1992, the Bosnian Serbs brought 
almost two thirds of the territory under their control – almost all of eastern Bosnia, a 
northern corridor, eastern Herzegovina and the Bosnian Krajina. 750,000 people 
were displaced within one month. A quickly-founded Serbian Republic announced in 
May the establishment of a government of its own led by President Karadjic, and the 
founding of its own army under General Mladic.  
In the second phase in autumn and winter 1992/93, there was a consolidation of the 
territories controlled by each side, and some counter-offensives by the Bosnian army 
regained Serb-held areas around Srebrenica and Tuzla. Fighting occurred mainly 
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 Fischer 2007a:x confirms the unclarity. 
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 Unknown to the public at that time, in early 1991 or perhaps even already in July 1990 Milosevic 
and Tudjman met several times and discussed the partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina between 
their two countries. That they had had secret meetings, the most famous at Karadjordjevo in March 
became known when Tudjman gave an interview to the London Times in July 1991. See 
Woodward 1995:172, Silber and Little 1996, Burg and Shoup 1999:82, du Pont 2002:234. 
77
 Locally-based violence had already started in some areas in 1991. 
3. History   65 
 
 
where borders differed from the cantonisation plans proposed by the international 
mediators.  
The third phase was the time of a second parallel war in Bosnia between the formerly 
allied Croats and Muslims when the Bosnian Croats (supported by Croatia) aimed at 
portioning out a territory of their own. This war began in April 1993, although there 
had been armed clashes as early as May 1992. In August 1993, the Bosnian Croats 
proclaimed a ‘Croatian Republic Herceg-Bosna’, with Mostar as its capital. The 
Serbs in that phase retook most of the territory which they had lost during the winter, 
even co-operating with the Croatian army from time to time. In December 1993, a 
‘Christmas Truce’ was concluded but did not hold long. 
The fourth period began when in February/March 1994 the USA managed to mediate 
a cease-fire between Croats and Muslims. The so-called ‘Washington Agreement’ 
also put Mostar under EU administration. Some fighting between the re-allied 
Muslims and Croats and the Serbs during 1994 ended with another cease-fire 
mediated by elder statesman Jimmy Carter at the end of 1994. At the same time, the 
relationship between the Bosnian-Serb leadership and Belgrade changed. With the 
closing of Serbia’s borders to Bosnia-Herzegovina in autumn 1994 it became clear 
that some kind of split had occurred though it is contested how serious it was (see 
Ripley 1999:35). 
The fifth and last period began in May 1995 after the break-down of the cease-fire. 
First the Serbs sought to eliminate all Muslim enclaves, the so-called ‘UN-protected 
zones’ that UNPROFOR had established under their humanitarian mandate in Bosnia 
since summer 1992. The Serb forces succeeded in occupying two of them, killing or 
displacing most of their Muslim inhabitants. This led to increased engagement by 
NATO that had arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina earlier to supervise the arms embargo 
and no-fly zone that the UN had established. A bombing campaign on Serbian troops 
and installations was intended to seriously impair the military capacity of the Serbian 
side. In September 1995 the new Bosnia-Herzegovina coalition government 
representing Muslim and Croat forces managed to supply themselves with modern 
arms in spite of the official arms embargo, and started an offensive against Serb 
troops mainly in the Western parts of Bosnia.  
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The war ended after months of shuttle mediation led by US envoy Holbrooke with 
the Dayton Agreement which was signed in December 1995. This placed Bosnia-
Herzegovina under international administration secured by NATO-led peace-keeping 
forces.78 
The exact total number of casualties in this period is unknown. Estimates of the 
number of casualties in Bosnia-Herzegovina range between 145,000 and 280,000, of 
which over two thirds were civilians (see Krech 1997:100, Rathfelder 1998:214, 
Burg and Shoup 1999:169pp, Lampe 2000:365pp, Schneckener 2003:43, Gromes 
2007:143).79 The Croat-Muslim war is estimated to have cost more than 20,000 
victims. Around 1.2 million became refugees, around 1 million were internally 
displaced – together this amounted to around 60% of the pre-war population - many 
never to return to their homes (Cousens and Cater 2001:25, quoting World Bank and 
UNHCR). In total more than 3 million people are assumed to have become either 
IDPs or refugees (Lampe 2000:366).80 
With the Dayton Agreement the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina were ended. The 
international community took over the government and administration of the country, 
and the Office of the High Commissioner (OHR) for many years became the real 
government (see chapter 4). Bosnia-Herzegovina today consists of two entities – the 
Federation with Croats and Muslims as its constituent peoples, and the Serbian 
Republic (Republika Srpska-RS). Following the post-Tito model of the former 
Yugoslavia, a three-head rotating presidency was formed, one for each nationality. 
But in fact until recently most political decisions (if not made by the international 
administration) were made on the level of the entities, in spite of the internationally-
enforced introduction of some Bosnia-Herzegovina-wide regulations such as 
common citizenship, passport and vehicle number plates in 1997. In 2000 and 2001, 
Croats in Herzegovina tried to establish a Croat entity but failed under the pressure 
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 The NATO forces were called Implementation Force IFOR (end of 1995-December 1996), 
replaced by Stabilization Force SFOR (December 1996 – December 2004). SFOR in its turn was 
replaced by a EU-led force EUFOR. 
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 A civil society organisation in Sarajevo, the Research and Documentation Centre, in its 2006 
report speaks of secured data on ‘only’ 96,000 dead and missing persons (Fischer 2007a:x). 
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 Bosnia-Herzegovina also hosted some 25,000-30,000 refugees from Croatia and after the war of 
early 1999 a few thousands from Kosovo. Currently (meaning 2007 or 2008), there are 
approximately 9,000 refugees from Croatia and about 500 from Kosovo still living there (Klincov 
n.d.)  
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of the international administration. In 2003 more power was shifted to the national 
government at the expense of the entities, and in 2005 Bosnian armed forces were 
unified, whereas under Dayton each entity had had its own army. In the second half 
of the 1990s several communal, entity-wide and federal elections were held. In the 
local elections in spring 2000 for the first time parties won that were not based on the 
ethnic principle. This tendency was confirmed by the third nationwide elections in 
November that year. But in the general elections in 2002 (the first organised without 
the assistance of international administrators, and with a turnout of only 55%) the 
ethnic divide grew again and the three national parties won once more. 
 
3.4 From the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia through the Federal Republic 
Yugoslavia to Serbia and Montenegro 
After the recognition of the secession of all other republics in early 1992, the two 
remaining republics Serbia and Montenegro decided in April 1992 to form a new 
state of their own, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FR Yugoslavia), claiming to 
be the legal successor of SFR Yugoslavia. 
After the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, most sanctions on the FR 
Yugoslavia were lifted with only a so-called ‘outer wall’ left which controlled certain 
financial transactions and blocked FR Yugoslavia from reintegration into the 
international community. Also in 1996 FR Yugoslavia normalised its relations with 
Macedonia and Croatia and established full diplomatic relations with Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
In November 1996, a coalition of oppositional parties called Zajedno won in 
November in the second round of local elections in 32 municipalities, among them 
almost all larger cities. But Milsevic’s electoral commission declared the results in 
14 cities invalid because of alleged irregularities, and organised new elections that 
were boycotted by the opposition. In December mass protests of the opposition 
started in Nis, then in Belgrade and other towns, joined by a number of different 
groups, among them students, professional groups and pensioners.81 The protests 
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 Anti-government protest in Serbia has had a longer history going back to 1990 when (like in other 
republics at that time) a first anti-governmental protest took place, and opposition parties 
formed.(Three parties with a democratic outlook became important in the years to come: the 
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continued over Christmas, and in January 1997 there were more than 100,000 in 
nightly demonstrations on the streets, even after Milosevic conceded the victory of 
Zajedno in Nis. After 60 days of protest, he relented in February and declared the 
original election results valid.  
Though the protests for some time continued after February, the opposition was not 
prepared to use its advantage. Observers at that time thought that Milosevic’ days 
may have been numbered, but by end of the year he had stabilized his position again. 
He won the elections for President of Yugoslavia in July 1997 with a high majority, 
and his ally Milutinovic became in December 1997 President of Serbia (the office 
Milosevic held before).  
The year 1998 was mainly characterised by new inflation (a hyperinflation caused by 
the international sanctions in 1992-93 had been stopped with the introduction of a 
new currency), and the beginning of the armed conflict in Kosovo (see below 3.5). 
After the break-down of the Rambouillet negotiations in March 1999, NATO 
attacked FR Yugoslavia on 24th March. Many towns, the economic infrastructure, 
transport ways etc were repeatedly bombed, although NATO claimed its targets were 
militarily relevant. The bombing of chemical plants caused heavy poisoning of the 
environment, as did the use of uranium-depleted weapon heads. On 10 June 1999 FR 
Yugoslavia eventually signed an agreement with NATO which put Kosovo under 
international administration.  
After the war the opposition in Serbia gained ground. In January 2000 18 opposition 
parties and alliances agreed to stand against Milosevic and mobilised, supported by 
the student movement Otpor (see also chapter 7.7.5.3). When early presidential and 
                                                                                                                                          
Democratic Party led by Zoran Djindjic, the Party of Serbian Renewal (SPO) under Vuk 
Draskovic, and the small Civic Alliance headed by Vesna Pesic who also founded the Center for 
Antiwar Action. See Balkan Peace Team 1996/1997, Lampe 2000, Centre for Applied NonViolent 
Action & Strategies 2008a.  
An important date has been the 9th of March 1991 when a demonstration of 100,000 to 150,000 by 
the new opposition parties ended in street fights with the police, and one protester and one 
policeman lost their lives. The next day 10, 000 students went to the streets, blocking the centre 
Belgrade with a sit-in until the military withdrew from the town.  
One year later, in spring 1992 there have been large student protests demanding a liberalisation of 
the university system that spread from Belgrade to Novi Sad, Nis and Kragujevac. They were 
joined by major opposition parties that formed a coalition called DEPOS, and in June more than 
100,000 protested in front of the Federal Parliament demanded better election conditions. After 
that, the parties (whose coalition DEPOS had soon dissolved), media and NGOs continued their 
work but there have been no more mass protests until 1996. 
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parliamentary elections on 24 September appeared to be manipulated, public protest 
was joined by more than a million citizens from all over Serbia. In an almost 
completely nonviolent uprising in October 2000 Milosevic was toppled.  
The year 2001 saw the extradition of former President Milosevic to the International 
Tribunal in The Hague, and also was marked by violent incidents caused by an 
Albanian resistance group in a region of South Serbia, the Presevo valley bordering 
with Kosovo, that demanded the integration of Presevo into Kosovo. NATO and the 
UN eventually reacted by mediating an agreement with the Albanians, and allowed 
Serbian armed forces to return to the border region to maintain order. This armed 
conflict cost around 100 lives, and displaced for a short time about 12,500 people.  
In 2002 Serbia and Montenegro engaged in protracted negotiations about their future 
relationship. They came under significant pressure from the international community 
who were opposed to any further secession in the region. Initially they agreed to the 
creation of a looser confederation between the two republics.  The new state was 
called State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, but in June 2006 Montenegro split 
from Serbia, becoming a state of its own.  
 
3.5 Kosovo: From Autonomy in Serbia Through ‘Kosmet’ to War and 
Becoming a Protectorate 
In Kosovo in July 1990 the parliament was suspended, and many Albanian civil 
servants as well as medical personnel and others were dismissed from their jobs. In 
1991 Albanian-language school curricula were replaced by Serbian ones, and 
‘Kosmet’ (for ‘Kosovo and Metohija’), as the province was officially called, was put 
fully under Serbian control. The Kosovo-Albanians under the leadership of 
‘President’ Rugova reacted to the developments with a campaign of nonviolent 
resistance. An alternative parallel system in mainly three fields was built up: politics 
(elections were held and a government put in place), education (‘shadow schools’) 
and health (with the NGO ‘Mother Theresa’ as the major supplier of medical aid). 
But the nonviolent resistance movement also had its weaknesses.82 Its strategy 
depended on support by the international community – right from the beginning 
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people hoped that international pressure and the presence of international peace-
keepers would secure Kosovo’s independence. It also lacked a willingness to try to 
negotiate with Serbia, an attitude matched by the FRY leadership. In 1997, young 
people were not willing any more to accept the ban of public demonstrations by the 
leadership that considered public action as too dangerous, and held mass 
demonstrations. About the same time, an armed movement had emerged, called the 
UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army). Its first attacks on police stations and on Albanians 
whom they considered collaborators with Serbia began in 1996. By 1997 the 
violence was undeniable, although in October 1997 there was still also nonviolent 
activism, like student demonstrations for the re-opening of the university and 
schools. 
In 1998 the UCK became more and more the real power factor. By mid-June it 
temporarily controlled large areas in central Kosovo, rapidly retreating in the face of 
a summer offensive by FRY security forces. Contrary to the reports in Western 
media, the fighting in 1998 was a confrontation of the Yugoslav Army with the 
UCK. There was no attempt at systematic ‘ethnic cleansing’ as has often has been 
claimed by Western politicians trying to legitimate the NATO-war of 1999, though 
most victims were civilians and the numbers of IDPs rose to between 230,000 and 
more than 400,000 (see Hamilton and Man 1998, Schweitzer 1998, Loquai 2000). 
Under a massive threat by NATO to intervene, the fighting between the Serb forces 
and the UCK was suspended in autumn, and a large-scale civilian observer mission 
by the OSCE sent to Kosovo. But in early 1999, violence was on the rise once again. 
On the one side, the UCK had retaken control over those areas it had already 
controlled in summer 1998, and on the other the Yugoslav Army probably got ready 
for another offensive after the end of the war. 
A coalition of Western States called for negotiations in Rambouillet in which they 
sought agreement from both sides to put Kosovo under international administration. 
When these negotiations failed, NATO attacked on 24 March, first with the 
explanation that it wanted to force Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet agreement, then 
claiming it wanted to prevent ethnic cleansing and a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ 
which in fact it had just caused (Marcon 2000:41, Lutz 2001).  
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The war in 1999 cost the lives of an estimated 7,000-11,000 Albanians and 1,200- 
2,000 Serb civilians.83 The number of Serbian soldiers killed is estimated at around 
1,000. More than 850,000 Albanians left Kosovo, up to 600,000 were internally 
displaced. After the war 125,000 out of a total population of 200,000 ethnic Serbs 
left Kosovo, since then even more have gone. The same is true for other minority 
groups such as Roma and Ashkali. (For these figures, see Daalder and O’Hanlon 
2000:3, Lampe 2000:408, Buckely and Cummings 2001:1, Dannreuther 2001:26, 
O’Neill 2002:15, CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006:4).84 
After the cease-fire the UN and NATO together with a larger number of other 
international organisations and institutions set up a protectorate with NATO as its 
peace-keeping arm (KFOR), and the UN as civil administrator (UNMIK).   
While the physical reconstruction has gone ahead quickly, there has been very little 
change on the other fronts. The economic situation is disastrous and again, as in the 
1990s, many people have started to migrate to other countries as cheap labour force 
in order to feed their families. Serbs have regrouped, living mainly in enclaves and 
even there found themselves insecure as three days of ethnic violence in March 2004 
proved in which 19 people died, nearly 1000 were injured, perhaps 4,000 Serbs 
driven from their homes, and several hundred houses burned. These incidents also 
showed that neither NATO nor the newly-created multiethnic police of Kosovo were 
equipped (or perhaps willing) to quell the unrest (see International Crisis Group 
2004a, CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006). 
For a long time, the status question of Kosovo remained unresolved, the international 
community arguing that ‘standards came before status’. After unsuccessful EU-led 
negotiations in 2007, however, Kosovo declared its independence in spite of bitter 
resistance by Serbia and its ally Russia in February 2008, and was quickly 
recognized by a number of relevant countries, among them most EU members as 
well as neighbouring countries.85 
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 Human Rights Watch which is the only NGO that researched all military incidents involving 
civilian victims came to a figure of 500 Yugoslav civilians killed (Human Rights Watch 2000). 
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 Before the war there had been up to 155,000 Roma and Ashkali, of whom more than 100,000 have 
been displaced. 
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 Until November 2008, Kosovo has been recognised by 51 of the 192 U.N. member states, among 
them 22 members of the European Union and the USA. (Karajkov 2008) 
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3.6 Macedonia: From an Example of ‘Working Prevention’ to Armed Uprising 
Macedonia’s (official name till today: ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’-
FYROM) path to independence was thorny because of the resistance its neighbour 
Greece put up. Greece expressed concerns that Macedonia had territorial claims, and 
disliked the use of antique symbols which it considered its own.86 It set up a trade 
embargo which harmed Macedonia’s economy quite a lot. Only in April 1993 was 
Macedonia accepted into the United Nations and simultaneously recognised by most 
EC countries. To prevent Macedonia from being drawn into the wars of the 
neighbouring countries, a UN peace-keeping force and later a long-term OSCE 
mission were deployed, and throughout the 1990s Macedonia was considered a 
successful example of conflict prevention (see Ackermann 2000 and Lund 2000). 
Greece lifted its embargo after US mediator Holbrooke managed to get an agreement 
between the two governments during his shuttle tours to end the Bosnian war in 
September 1995. This agreement then opened up Macedonian membership of the 
OSCE, the Council of Europe and the NATO Partnership for Peace. In 1996, also a 
trade and cooperation agreement with the EU was concluded.  
The second half of the 1990s was characterised by some tensions with the Albanian 
minority, particularly in the context of the Kosovo crisis and war. In spring 1999, 
Macedonia had (rather unwillingly) become host to about 344.000 Albanian refugees 
from Kosovo.  
In 2001 unrest in the Western parts of Macedonia, inhabited by a large Albanian 
minority, escalated to violence. Macedonia first tried to deal with the insurgency by 
military means. When this failed and the fear of a second Kosovo became 
predominant, EU, NATO and OSCE stepped up their mediating efforts and managed 
to conclude the so-called Ohrid agreement signed on 13 August 2001.87  
While the number of casualties was low compared with the other violent conflicts 
(around 400 dead), the crisis in Macedonia 2001 temporarily displaced about 
150,000 people, the majority of whom fled to Kosovo, but  most were able to return 
quickly (Wilkinson 2001). 
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 For an overview over the events of 2001, see Gallagher 2005. 
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In March 2004 Macedonia applied for EU membership and like Croatia is close to 
concluding the steps needed to join NATO but has not been issued an invitation yet 
because Greece is blocking its membership (International Crisis Group 2009). 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The discussion about the causes of the conflicts leading to war in former Yugoslavia 
took place inside the countries concerned as much as outside (see Cox 1998:7pp and 
Kaufman 2001:4 pp). The debate among the citizens of former Yugoslavia focused 
on the question whether the wars were ‘wars of aggression’ by Serbia/Yugoslavia, 
and the Yugoslav People’s Army an occupation force (although it had been in all 
republics before secession), or if they were ‘civil wars’ which was usually equated 
with the term ‘ethnic conflict’.88 The international debate partly mirrored this 
discussion but also offered some other explanations of which only a few can be 
mentioned here. 
The interpretation as an ethnic conflict has  been popular among Western observers, 
often considering the wars as expression of deep-rooted and intractable antagonisms 
handed down through the generations until a liberating ethno-nationalist explosion 
blew off the heavy lid from an over-heated ‘boiling cauldron’ caused by the 
suppression of ethnic conflict during Tito’s time (see Kaplan 1993, Glenny 1996).89  
An explanation favoured by many critical and anti-nationalist scholars both from the 
region and outside has focused on power struggles of nationalist leaders who 
appeared in the wake of the breakdown of Communism, and who resorted to violent 
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 For comments on the first view, see for example Christiakis 1996:51, Dizdarevic 1992, Woodward 
1995:257pp. Also US ambassador Zimmermann makes this point. (Zimmermann 1996:143). 
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 However it has to be observed that these conceptions usually display a simplistic understanding of 
ethnicity as something primordial and not subjected to manipulation. The existence of political 
leaders claiming that the problems their society faces originated in the existence of antagonistic 
ethnic groups, referring to historical events (including traumas) to strengthen the ethnic/national 
identity, using ethnic identity to promote political and representative claims, artificially 
strengthening a separate identity by reforming language and introducing separate cultural symbols 
– in short, all that could be observed in the former Yugoslavia can be described as characteristics 
of ethnic conflict without going back to assumptions on the primordiality or instrumental character 
ethnicity and nation. (See for the discussion between ‘primordialists’ and ‘instrumentalists’ Shils 
1957, Geertz 1963, Glazer and Moynihan 1963 and 1975, Narroll 1964, van den Berghe 1978, 
Cohen 1978, Tilley 1997:509, Banton 2001). 
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conflict along ethnic lines to keep their opponents from mobilising the population 
against the regime itself (see Licht and Kaldor 1992, Stubbs 1999). 
Another explanation associated with Susan L. Woodward (1995) explains the 
development of violent conflict at the beginning of the 1990s as the result of a deep 
economic and political crisis in the area. In the economic field, the long-lasting 
inflation and the economic reforms undertaken to deal with the crisis caused civic 
unrest, and competition between the republics. When in the wake of the breakdown 
of the political systems in Eastern Europe in 1989 the (already weakened) leadership 
of the League of Communists had to give way to multi-party systems, the transition 
of the constitutional order, including its social and economic rights to another order 
led to disintegration of governmental authority and breakdown of a political and civil 
order.90  
Stuart J. Kaufman offers a synthetic ‘symbolic politics theory of ethnic war’: 
The symbolic politics theory holds that if the three preconditions – hostile 
myths, ethnic fears, and opportunity – are present, ethnic war results if 
they lead to rising mass hostility, chauvinist mobilisation by leaders 
making extreme symbolic appeals, and a security dilemma between 
groups. Different kinds of triggering events work by activating either the 
hostility or chauvinist mobilisation (Kaufman 2001:34).  
According to him “people choose by responding to the most emotionally potent 
symbol evoked” (Kaufman 2001:28). Nationalist myths of Serbs and Croats 
encouraged mutual hostility as did memory of violence during World War II. 
Chauvinist mobilisation by leaders in order to build coalitions was based on making 
other Yugoslav peoples scapegoats for the problems of their own populations. 
Economic rivalries and declining living standards deepened the crisis. This created 
also a security dilemma which led ethnic groups to mobilise against each other. 
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 A related explanation is offered by Schierup (1999a and 1999b). He believes that the economic 
reforms in the 1970s, rather than modernising the socialist system, led to growing autonomy of 
republics and weakening of the federation. According to him, by 1980 the republics were already 
beginning to look and act like small nation-states. Local party leaders and managers attempted to 
maintain legitimacy by continuing to provide employment and social services despite worsening 
economic conditions. In competition with the others, each republ ic, often at the level of the 
individual enterprise, tried to forge links with international companies. The deepening crisis 
tended to reinforce local relations and kinship ties. Urban-rural links were strengthened , 
republican structures were ‘blended organically with the most authoritarian features of the social 
and political relations of real socialism’. The local party elites and the increasingly ‘national’ 
working classes were to be bound together by innumerable ties of an increasingly traditional 
character. These were displayed in idioms such as kinship, friendship, locality and ethnicity, 
taking the form of a complex network of reciprocal favours (see also Duffield 2001:169). 
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Most of the different explanations sketched above seem to contain some element of 
truth. This also matches the general discussion on causes of armed conflicts that also 
seems to come to the conclusion that conflict cannot be reduced to a single cause, or 
a single explanation.91 It is obvious that there are "very few necessary conditions" 
which need to be fulfilled in order for a war to develop, and  
very many sufficient conditions, of which only a few of these may apply, 
in any single conflict. War is possible as soon as weapons are available 
with which to fight it and as long as there is a dispute between two or 
more parties. What makes war probable, however, is a far more 
complicated question (Smith 2000:4).  
Smith proposes to distinguish background causes, mobilisation strategies, triggers 
and catalysts.92 Using this concept, amongst the main background causes one might 
refer to:  
• A history of ethnic conflict going back at least to the first Yugoslavia, and the 
fear of which led to the suppression of expression of ethnic identity during Tito’s 
time, which in turn radicalised certain elements of society in all republics. 
• The economic problems of Yugoslavia which were experienced differently in 
different regions / republics (depending on the degree of industrialisation, and 
access to foreign markets). 
• The breakdown of the socialist regimes in 1989. 
• A federative structure which favoured attempts to deal with these problems on a 
regional (republican) rather than the national level. 
Mobilisation strategies were pursued at different levels: 
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 The research on causes of armed conflict in general so far has not produced a consistent theory 
acceptable to most scholars working in the field. There are different categories of explanations: 
genetic and evolutionary/biological theories (aggression as a genetic function, maximisation of 
survival chances), behaviourist theories (war as learned behaviour), cost-benefit theories 
(maximisation of benefit), ecological explanations (war for scarce resources), social/cultural 
theories (ethnicity and/or religion as conflict causes), and cognitive (attitudes) explanations (see 
Orywal 1996 and Smith 2001 for overviews over the different theories). 
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 He refers to David Dressler’s model whose terminology he slightly changed. It distinguishes five 
causal roles: A reason (‘historical problems’), a trigger, a target (the objective of an actor), a 
channel (lien of political, social economic or national cleavage to design group identities), and 
catalysts (any factors that control the rate, intensity, and duration of a conflict). See Baechler 
2002:8pp. 
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• Party leaders in the republics re-defined politics in national rather than in 
socialist terms in order to rally people to their support, and to protect particular 
interests of their republic or region. 
• After the political changes of 1989, democratisation which was mainly defined as 
introduction of several parties added to the diversification of the political picture. 
• Nationalisation of politics in turn caused radicalisation of those ethnic groups and 
resistance – mostly at a very regional level – by those who experienced or feared 
exclusion because they did not belong to the nation in question. They responded 
by seeking autonomy or inclusion into the ‘home country’ from which they were 
divided by a republican border.  
• The moves by Milosevic to bring Kosovo, the Vojvodina and Montenegro under 
his control which probably can mainly be explained by the power politics of an 
over-ambitious man and his followers, and the dynamics which these moves 
caused (alienation of the Western republics etc). 
• The first multi-party elections in 1990 in all republics and their results which led 
to disruption of the functioning of central institutions at the federation level. 
All this in hindsight can be seen as clear warning signals that violent conflict might 
develop, but they in themselves do not explain why the wars then began when they 
did. For that triggers were needed. The main triggers of the escalation, meaning 
factors that affected the timing of the onset of the armed conflict, included:  
• The declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia against the will of the 
central government and the (at that time still predominantly Yugoslav-oriented) 
army leadership. 
• Once the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was used in Slovenia in an attempt to 
prevent secession, local tensions and limited violence in Croatia (and parts of 
Bosnia as well although this was hardly noticed at that time) fell into the pattern 
of Belgrade (“the Serbs”) and the JNA going to war against the secessionists, and 
led to a violent reaction by the new Croatian government and its fledgling army, 
whose actions (blockade of the JNA barracks) then escalated the conflict further. 
• For the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina the trigger was the completed secession of 
Croatia and Slovenia and the internationally-promoted referendum on 
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independence which left the three-nation republic caught between two stools: 
Croats looked towards Croatia, Serbs identified with Serbia and rejected a 
separation from it, and the Muslims without a ‘home nation’ outside Bosnia were 
in between. 
Catalysts, factors that influence the intensity and duration of a conflict, may have 
been: 
• The second Gulf War at the beginning of 1991 had set a precedent for 
internationally sanctioned and successful military intervention. I remember 
discussions in 1991 that Belgrade and the JNA assumed that their intervention in 
Slovenia would be tolerated in the same way as the US-led UN intervention in 
Iraq was. 
• The speed in which the conflicts became violent may be explained by what 
Matveeva and Paes (2003) call a “gun culture”, referring to popular attitudes of 
general acceptance towards guns in societies where many people owned hunting 
rifles, as well as having access to other weapons in their capacity as members of 
the Territorial Defence. 
• Pre-existing local conflicts which then fell into the pattern of the wider war. 
• The UN arms embargo which initially clearly favoured those who inherited the 
weapons kept by the JNA – meaning mainly the Serbian armed forces in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
To sum up, what kind of wars were these? Civil war, wars of secession, international 
wars? I would reply: all of the above. The wars of secession in Croatia and Slovenia 
became an international conflict formally as soon as these republics were recognised 
internationally. Yet in Croatia there was a strong element of civil war still remaining 
because it was not the JNA occupying Croatia, but rather local Serbs seeking 
autonomy from Croatia led the struggle. Bosnia had an even stronger character of 
civil war, in spite of the international element, through the barely disguised 
involvement by Serbian and Croatian troops, military materiel and money. 
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4. The Main Interventions by Governments and International 
Organisations 
 
The course of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia described in the last chapter was 
heavily shaped by the interventions of the international (state) community. It is 
necessary to give an overview of their interventions before coming to the instruments 
and activities of the civil society actors, because in many ways the state actors set the 
framework in which the civil society groups acted. It would also distort the overall 
picture of the events in the region in the decade studied if the focus on civil society 
actors resulted in under-emphasising what was in many ways the much heavier 
impact and influence of international organisations and governments.  
 
4.1 The Use of Peace-making Instruments 
In chapter 2, peace-making was defined with Ryan (1995) as working as an external 
party towards a settlement of the conflict through either law, negotiation, or the 
exercise of violence and/or other forms of power. 
 
4.1.1 Peace-making by Law 
In the period under study, peace-making by law played almost no role in the former 
Yugoslavia. Of course principles of international law were invoked many times, both 
in the context of appeals and decisions of the UN Security Council and in 
humanitarian activities (for example the protection of prisoners of war). However, 
these and other applications of international law, such as the establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), belong under 
peace-building: their purpose was not to find a solution to the conflict. As for 
national laws, there have been many reforms in the successor states to Yugoslavia, 
including measures to protect minority rights, but they all came after the wars and 
therefore are also better placed in the context of the post-war institution- and state-
building. 
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4.1.2 Peace-making by Negotiation 
4.1.2.1 The Structures of Negotiation Diplomacy 
As for peace-making by negotiation, the organisational framework was first set by 
the European Community.93 After the Brioni conferences in July and August 1991 
successfully dealt with the armed conflict in Slovenia, the EC created a new 
conference to settle the war in Croatia. On 7 September 1991 the so-called Hague 
Conference or ‘EC Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague’ (ECCY) was opened, 
chaired by the EC’s special envoy Lord Carrington, but proved unable to reach any 
lasting agreements (see Lucarelli 2000:24). Frequent cease-fires were agreed and 
usually broken within a couple of days. The Conference was suspended in November 
and on 8 November EC foreign ministers agreed limited economic sanctions against 
Yugoslavia. With the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in August 1992 the ECCY was 
revived and enlarged into the ‘International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia’ 
(ICFY), being co-chaired by the EC/ EU (David Owen succeeding Carrington as 
envoy) and the United Nations (initially Cyrus Vance).94 ICFY provided the 
framework in which between 1992 and the end of 1993 a number of peace plans for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were developed. It also handled other issues in the region 
(Kosovo, Macedonia, Croatia), achieving some positive outcomes (see Rossanet 
1996 for a description of its work).95 
In 1994 a newly formed Contact Group consisting of USA, Britain, France, Russia 
and Germany assumed leadership in dealing with the Bosnia war, replacing ICFY in 
this role.96 Between 1994 and the Kosovo war in 1999, the Contact Group, in spite of 
                                                 
93
 The European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) in 1993. 
94
 Invited were the 12 EC member countries, the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, Japan and Canada for the ‘Group of 7’, Czechoslovakia and Sweden for the CSCE, 
Sweden, Switzerland (as a host of many humanitarian organisations), Senegal (for the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference), Turkey and Indonesia (as future coordinators of the Non-
Aligned Movement), representatives of the neighbours of the former Yugoslavia and 
representatives of all six former Yugoslav republics. FR Yugoslavia was present with its President 
(Milosevic) and Prime Ministers (who varied over the period) in a personal capacity after the 
status of FR Yugoslavia became unclear. Kosovo Albanians were invited as observers. See Owen 
1995, Rossenet 1996, Sloan 1998:21 and 46, Clark 2000:90 and 239; Kaufman 2002: xv, 
Woodward 1995:302pp. 
95
 ICFY established six Working Groups: Bosnia-Herzegovina; Humanitarian Issues; Ethnic and 
National Communities and Minorities; Succession Issues; Economic Issues; Confidence and 
Security-building and Verification measures.  
96
 The Contact Group had no contractual agreements as basis, and used only informal rules of 
cooperation (see Schwegmann 2003). Italy joined it in 1996. 
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its internal problems caused by very different views and the members’ regional 
alliances, has remained the main international coordination body dealing with the 
conflicts (see Schwegmann 2003). 
 
4.1.2.2 The Contents of Negotiation Diplomacy 
As described in Chapter 3.2, the EC and the USA in autumn of1991 began to accept 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia and sought to contain the conflict by developing 
‘objective’ criteria and processes for recognition of the separatist republics.97 In 
October the Hague Conference decided to suspend any decision on this issue for two 
months, and the EC established an Arbitration Commission of international lawyers 
(the so-called Badinter Commission) to make recommendations regarding the status 
of Yugoslavia and conditions for recognition. At the end of November, the Badinter 
Commission declared Yugoslavia to be in a state of dissolution, and on 11 January 
1992 made its final report. This stated that Slovenia fulfilled the conditions defined 
by the Commission for independence. Croatia and Macedonia were asked to adjust 
their Constitutional Laws, and Bosnia-Herzegovina was asked to conduct a 
referendum. The application by Kosovo was denied on the grounds that Kosovo had 
not been a republic of Yugoslavia, as were similar applications by Krajina Serbs and 
Bosnian Serbs, although the Commission stated that these groups were entitled to 
enjoy minority rights. Yet even before this Commission report, the EC had decided 
to recognise Slovenia and Croatia, and ‘unofficially’ Germany already recognised  
Slovenia and Croatia on 23 December, arguing that the EC had already decided to do 
so. Macedonia was not immediately recognised, however, because of a veto by 
Greece which suspected Macedonia of having territorial claims against Greece. (For 
                                                 
97
 To my knowledge and contradicting some of the myths of leftist factions of the peace movement 
that perceived an international conspiracy to break up one of the last strongholds of socialism, 
there was little official sympathy for the secession of Croatia and Slovenia before their declaration 
of independence in summer 1991, aside from some Catholic circles (Libal 1997:11, Eisermann 
2000:33). However, the situation changed quickly once the armed conflict began. Germany and 
Austria were among the first to begin talking about the possibility of recognition. Mostly it was 
expressed in the context of ‘if the war does not stop, then we would have to consider recognition’. 
This attitude was read in the secessionist republics as support for their independence, and it seems 
that Germany already at the beginning of July proposed at a meeting of the Council of Ministers in 
the Hague that the EC could collectively recognise Slovenia and Croatia (see Genscher 1995:938, 
Woodward 1995:178, Libal 1997:16, 39pp and 52pp, Lucarelli 2000:124, Radan 2002:164). 
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what was described here, see Genscher 1995:954,Gow 1997:56, Libal 1997:65, Burg 
and Shoup 1999:83, Lucarelli 2000:27 and 126, Markovic 2000:30.) 
Leaving aside the contentious issue of the internal politics and interests of the 
Western countries, the main international objective in regard handling the conflicts in 
former Yugoslavia was the containment of the crisis and specially the prevention of 
large refugee movements (see Gallagher 2003). The approach on which by end of 
1991 most countries agreed was to internationalise the conflict. By the recognition of 
independence of Slovenia and Croatia, the conflicts were transformed from an 
internal to an international issue which was (at that time) a precondition for the UN 
to send peace-keeping forces, which in turn were an important factor of the cease-fire 
agreement concluded on Croatia in January 1992 (see Libal 1997:86pp, Holbrooke 
1998:31pp, Kaufman 2000:xiv, 76; Lampe 2000:372, Lucarelli 2000:20,28 and 
135pp). 
Whilst recognition may have helped end the war in Croatia, it must also be 
considered one of the triggers for the war that started only four months later in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. As described in chapter 3, Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised 
on 6 April 1992, although despite the firm opposition expressed by Serbs in the 
March referendum the Serbs. Inclusion in the EC-orchestrated process of dissolution 
of Yugoslavia left Bosnia-Herzegovina suspended between the Serbian-dominated 
rest of Yugoslavia and newly independent Croatia.98  
In the period that followed, the EC and the UN tried to end the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina by proposing different structural models for that country, all based on 
ethnically defined territories and thereby involuntarily mirroring the military 
development on the ground where so-called ethnic cleansing was in the process of 
creating mono-ethnic areas.99 Even before the creation of ICFY and the beginning of 
                                                 
98
 The recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 6-7 April was pushed by the USA more than by the 
EC. The USA argued that the recognition was necessary because Croatia and Serbia planned to 
divide Bosnia among themselves, and both EC and USA hoped by their recognition to deter war 
(see Zimmermann 1996:18pp, Gow 1997:89pp, Libal 1997:93, Lampe 2000:78 and 364, 
Kaufmann 2002). Bosnian President Izetbegovic obviously saw that coming and pleaded with 
Western countries to wait with the recognition when he met with Genscher in December 1991 (see 
Woodward 1995:261). That it triggered the war was later recognised even by US mediator 
Holbrooke, though he – probably correctly- argues that the war was likely to have begun anyway ( 
Holbrooke 1998:31pp). This is also the point of view of Gow (1997:34), Lucarelli (2000:129) and 
Gallagher (2003:72pp). 
99
 Before the war, there had been few mono-ethnic areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina there had been a proposal to create three constituent 
units within Bosnia-Herzegovina, brought forward by Cutilheiro for the EC (see 
Krech 1997:48 and 65, Burg and Shoup 1999:109, Markovic 2000:36). This plan 
failed, despite initially seeming to have chances for acceptance, and in the first 
months of war, the ICFY in different rounds of negotiations developed the Vance-
Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) at the end of 1992.  
VOPP proposed a regionalisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten cantons. But the 
parties, especially the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs, disagreed with 
(different) part of the plan until eventually the negotiators had to abandon it after a 
referendum conducted by the Bosnian Serbs in May 1993 emphatically rejected it 
(Sloan 1998:50, Lucarelli 2000:45, Kaufman 2002:98).100 The next plan - the Owen-
Stoltenberg Plan - reverted to the three-entity model, trying to be closer to the reality 
on the ground, and suggested a confederation or union with three ethnically defined 
constituents (see Owen 1995:xvii and 193pp, Krech 1997:92, Burg and Shoup 
1999:263pp).101 However, this was also quickly rejected because the parties could 
not agree on the borders and the percentages of territory each of them would get. The 
European Union and ICFY then for some time tried to continue the negotiations 
varying the Plan and its percentages a bit (European Union Action Plan) but also 
failed (Owen 1995:238pp, Sloan 1998:55, Giersch 1998:167). The Contact Group, 
which began its work in 1994 after the Federation between Croats and Bosniaks was 
created, then proposed in summer 1994 a union of two states which more than twelve 
months later basically became the model for Dayton (see Calic 1996:188pp, 
Markovic 2000:153pp, Kaufman 2002: xvii, Schneckener 2002:112).  
The different structural options proposed by the international community have been 
criticised in at least three regards (see Owen 1995:62, Burg and Shoup 1999:218pp, 
Lampe 2000:377, Lucarelli 2000:42, Markovic 2000:181pp, Kaufman 2002: xv, 
Ducasse-Rogier 2003:58pp and 96 pp):  
• The peace plans applied the logic of ‘one territory - one ethnic group’ which was 
at cross-purposes with the ideals of modern democracy (see Schneckener 2002 
for a discussion of structural options available in civil wars). 
                                                 
100
 The Bosnian Serbs controlled at that time around 70% of the territory but the Plan allotted them 
only 43%. 
101
 Thorvald Stoltenberg replaced Cyrus Vance as co-chair of ICFY in April 1993. 
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• A division by ethnic group was the logic of at least two of the warring parties, 
and thereby the proposals seemed to strengthen and confirm the purposes for 
which they had gone to war,  
• On the ground new peace plans and the maps accompanying them often led to the 
intensification of fighting, including contributing to the break-up of the original 
Croat-Muslim alliance.  
Some years later, the international community took a very different approach to the 
conflict in Kosovo. Prior to 2007, international bodies were very hesitant to make a 
final decision on the status of Kosovo, instead insisting that first issues of 
democratisation, economic stability, rule of law, a dialogue with Belgrade and 
minority rights were to be resolved (see Knoll and Molina 2002). If this was partly a 
lesson drawn from the 1990s, the conclusion was not necessarily correct:  insecurity 
about the future was itself a factor increasing “the political temperature in the 
province and arguably contributed to an increase in ethnically motivated violence” as 
Llamazares and Reynolds Levy concluded after surveying 21 humanitarian, 
development and peace organisations in Kosovo (Llamazares and Reynolds Levy 
2003:10). 
 
4.1.3 The Role of Violence and Power 
Peace-making by negotiation and peace-making by violence or power can be quite 
hard to distinguish, at least in the cases of the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 
1992 and 1995, and Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. In both cases the negotiations were 
accompanied by pressure through sanctions and soon also by a threat and execution 
of air bombing to a degree that eventually went far beyond the negotiation techniques 
of ‘sticks and carrots’.  
 
4.1.3.1 The Sanctions 
Sanctions have been an important instrument used by international state actors to 
support their peace-making efforts, either by withdrawing means needed for the 
continuation of the conflict, and/ or by putting pressure on the targeted side to lay 
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down their arms and come to a peace agreement.102 In July 1991 the EC declared an 
arms embargo on all Yugoslavia, and in September this was adopted by the UN in 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 713. The embargo was monitored by the 
Western European Union (WEU) and NATO (see Leurdijk 1996:28, 228; Meder and 
Reimann 1996:5pp).103  
Until 1995, the arms embargo was the focus of much political controversy because it 
implicitly treated all sides in the conflicts as equal. The USA, the Organisation of 
Islamic Conference (OIC), and also many civil society groups – as well as Croatia 
and the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina itself – argued that the embargo violated 
the right of Muslims and Croats to self-defence (see for example Sloan 1998:50, 
Markovic 2000:104pp, Clark 2001:37, Kaufman 2002:100).104  
A second military sanction was the establishment of a no-fly zone over Bosnia in 
1992, monitored by UNPROFOR, and from 1993 on partly enforced by NATO 
(UNSCR 757 and 781, see Owen 1995:298, Sloan 1998:22, Lucarelli 2000:39 and 
176, Kaufman 2002:xv). 
Economic sanctions started right after the declaration of independence of Slovenia 
and Croatia in May 1991 with the freezing of economic assistance to Yugoslavia by 
the EC and the USA.105 When the war in Croatia began, both quickly threatened 
economic sanctions. In late October 1991 the EC decided to terminate its agreement 
on cooperation and trade, and this was soon to be followed by other countries.106 In 
                                                 
102
 Skidelsky and  Mortimer see sanctions as one ‘link in a chain of graduated pressure short of war’, 
more powerful than diplomatic pressure but less powerful than military preparation (Skidelsky and  
Mortimer 1996:154). See also De Jonge Oudraat (2001:232) on economic sanctions, and the report 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (2001:30p) for a list of types of sanctions distinguishing sanctions in a 
military, economic and political/ diplomatic area.  
103
 Between November 1992 and the end of 1995, 63,000 vessels were checked, with 833 diverted to 
Italian ports (see Pirani and Zucchoni 2001:50pp).  
104
 When in 1993 the US Congress voted to lift the arms embargo, President Clinton vetoed that 
decision. 
105
 Actually there were measures that can be considered economic sanctions of a more informal type 
already in 1990 when the USA withdrew an implicit offer of financial aid. See Gow 1997:208, 
Woodward 1995:384, ‘Jugoslawien will Schulden stunden’ 1991. 
106
 The EC concretely mentioned the suspension of the Economic Co-operation Treaty and the 
expulsion of Yugoslavia from the list of preferred nations if hostilities were not ended within days. 
Sanctions declared in November 1991 also included an oil embargo by the UN. Bosnia, 
Macedonia, Slovenia and Croatia were exempted from the sanctions already in late 1991, as was 
Montenegro in January 1992. See Genscher 1995:957p, Stremlau 1996:25pp, Gow 1997:52, Libal 
1997:14 and 69; Sloan 1998:49, Weller 1999:17, Lucarelli 2000:19pp, Markovic 2000:19, 28pp 
and 71, Pirani and Zucconi 2001:48, Kaufman 2002:99 and 130. 
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the next two years, in the face of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, these sanctions 
were targeted at Serbia, and tightened several times, until in the end there was an 
almost total embargo on all trade, traffic and cultural relations.107  The objective was 
to isolate Serbia which was considered to have control over the Bosnian Serbs, and 
thereby the key to a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed, it was only in 1994 
that the Bosnian Serbs were directly targeted by the UN. UNSCR 942 prohibited 
states from admitting into their territories Bosnian Serb officials and military officers 
forbade trade with any entity owned or controlled by Bosnian Serbs, and froze 
financial assets held abroad. During the last months of 1994, the EU tried a stick and 
carrot tactic by offering to gradually lift sanctions if the Serbs agreed to territorial 
concessions demanded by the Bosnian government (see Giersch 1998:167, Sloan 
1998:55). 
Most of these sanctions were ended in early 1996, with only a so-called ‘outer wall 
of sanctions’ against FR Yugoslavia maintained because of the situation in 
Kosovo.108 However, sanctions on FR Yugoslavia were reintroduced in early 1998 in 
response to the violence in Kosovo in form of a new arms embargo, an oil embargo, 
an embargo on other equipment ‘that could be used for repression’, denial of visa for 
FR Yugoslavia representatives, and a moratorium of export credits. During the war 
in 1999, with UNSCR 1160 and UNSCR 1199 additional sanctions were added, such 
as a total ban on export goods and any financial transactions with persons or 
companies in FR Yugoslavia, and the freezing of funds and assets. Their last 
remnants were finally lifted after the fall of Milosevic in 2000 (see Mueller 1999:68, 
Buckley 2001:157, Kaufman 2002:xx, Pavlovic 2002:286, United Nations 2002).109 
The sanctions against Serbia weakened its economy considerably and, as was often 
remarked, critically hit its citizens probably more than its government.110 The 
                                                 
107
 The Resolutions in question were: UNSCR 757on the economic and cultural sanctions, UNSCR 
787 prohibiting transportation of oil, petroleum and coal through Serbia, and authorising NATO 
and WEU to search naval vessels, and UNSCR 820  freezing financial assets of Yugoslavia, and 
turning the sanctions into a blockade.  
108
 Preventing FR Yugoslavia’s return to World Bank and IMF. See Judah 2002:125, Kaufman 
2002:154. 
109
 However, in the next years especially the USA have threatened with economic sanctions several 
times more in the context of their demand to extradite Milosevic and Mladic. See Borden 2001, 
Cvijanovic 2001a, b and c, Stephen 2003. 
110
 Already in October 1993 the report of the ICFY Humanitarian Working Group warned of the 
destructive effects of sanctions, estimating that 50% of the FR Yugoslavia citizens were without 
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damage between 1991 and 1994 alone was estimated to be slightly above US$45 
billion. Hyperinflation was such that the government had to introduce a new currency 
in order to halt it (Babic 2001).111 As to their effectiveness, most analysts believe that 
they played a role in ending the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina by making Belgrade 
change its policy towards the Bosnian Serbs, but others, such as Woodward, have 
questioned their significance (Woodward, 2005). Moreover, opposition groups in 
Serbia have expressed the opinion that the sanctions strengthened the regime rather 
than weakened it (see de Jonge Oudraat 2001, Dragovic-Soso 2003:120pp).  
 
4.1.3.2 The Use of Military Means 
The military engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina grew slowly over the years. 
UNPROFOR was neither permitted nor equipped to enforce its mandate, or even 
protect itself in some circumstances.112 In 1993 NATO was asked to give ‘close air 
support’ to the peace-keeping mission, although permission for any air attacks had to 
be obtained from the UN.113 The first tactic was to attack only weapon sites deemed 
to be firing on protected zones (so-called ‘smoking gun targets’). The discussion on 
escalating air strikes continued through 1994. When in 1995 ‘close air support’ was 
considered no longer effective, the UN Security Council (in UNSCR 958) asked 
NATO air forces to undertake all necessary measures to support UNPROFOR and 
allow the fulfilment of its mandate. Air strikes were undertaken to serve as warnings 
or threats to make the warring parties comply with the UN rulings, and in this 
context NATO created a list of military targets. In May 1995 NATO attacked several 
                                                                                                                                          
adequate means of support. See Christiakis 1998, Markovic 2000:188. 
111
 As a side effect, also the neighbouring countries (Greece, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Rumania, 
Hungary) suffered losses of several billion of US$ each (Calic 1996:168p). 
112
 In 1994 and 1995, many soldiers were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serb Forces. See Meder and 
Reimann 1996:22, Krech 1997:130, Burg and Shoup 1999:329, Ripley 1999:107pp, Hillen 
2000:177, Lucarelli 2000:65, Markovic 2000:203, Clark 2001:49. 
113
 The USA propagated from 1992  on a strategy of ‘lift and strike’, meaning to lift the arms 
embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina and conduct air strikes. This was however rejected by those 
countries who contributed to UNPROFOR, fearing for the security of their peace-keepers. See 
Owen 1995:xiii and 159pp, Meder and Reimann 1996:10, Sloan 1998:50, Markovic 2000:70, 
Clark 2001:37, Kaufman 2002:100. 
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times but stopped its bombing when up to 500 UNPROFOR soldiers were taken 
hostage by the Bosnian Serbs (see Ripley 1999).114 
The third step of escalation was decided in the face of the fall of the UN protected 
enclaves Zepa and Srebrenica in July 1995 and the wish to protect the remaining 
enclave of Gorazde. Russia managed to convince the Bosnian Serbs not to attack 
Gorazde, but on  30 August 1995 a mortar attack on Sarajevo provided the trigger for 
NATO to implement ‘Operation Deliberate Force’. This operation concentrated on 
more extended bombing of targets in or near UN-declared safe areas or military 
targets supporting forces besieging the safe areas (see Ripley 1999 for a detailed 
study on this operation). It focussed on Sarajevo, seeking to force the Serbs to 
withdraw their heavy weaponry from the area. The goal was to ‘inflict pain’ on the 
Bosnian Serb military by attacking key supporting facilities and bases. The bombing 
campaign was considered by the Holbrooke negotiation team as leverage for their 
parallel efforts to hammer out a peace agreement, though they themselves had no 
direct influence on the NATO activities. Most analysts give the bombing some credit 
(though not being the only factor) in forcing the Serbian side to eventually sign the 
Dayton Agreement (see Holbrooke 1998:146, Burg and Shoup 1999:334pp, Weiss 
1999:12). 
The second instance of the use of military means for ‘peace enforcement’ was in 
relation to Kosovo / Yugoslavia in 1998 and 1999. As described in chapter 3.5, the 
Albanian resistance against Serbian control of Kosovo had changed by 1998 from a 
nonviolent one to an armed uprising by the Kosovo Liberation Army UCK, and was 
met with heavy violence from the side of Serbian troops and Special Police. In the 
face of growing numbers of IDPs and refugees, by the end of September 1998 the 
USA and Britain started to threaten FR Yugoslavia with air strikes if the Serbian 
forces were not withdrawn from Kosovo. In the Contact Group, Russia announced 
that it would veto a UN Security Council decision sanctioning air strikes.115 NATO 
decided to go ahead on its own without a UN mandate and, when negotiations were 
stalled, NATO gave an activation order to its air force. Shortly before the end of an 
                                                 
114
 On the military activities, see also Meder and Reimann 1996:20, de Jonge Oudraat 1999:66pp, 
Sloan 1998:31, Lucarelli 2000:64p, Markovic 2000:133, Kaufman 2002:xvii. 
115
 Russia has always been very critical of any actions taken against Yugoslavia and was considered 
an ally of Belgrade (see Buckley 2001). 
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ultimatum NATO had set, FR Yugoslavia agreed to withdraw its troops, and to allow  
the OSCE to monitor the cease-fire through a civilian Kosovo Verification Mission 
(KVM) (see Debiel 1999b, Weller 1999:22pp, Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000:46, Judah 
2002:183).116  
But soon after New Year 1999, there were clear indicators that violence would be 
resumed in Kosovo in the spring. Accompanied by repeated NATO threats to bomb 
Yugoslavia, the Contact Group called for negotiations that eventually were 
conducted in February 1999 in Rambouillet, France. The mediators there presented a 
proposal that included a cease-fire, autonomy, a three-year NATO peace-keeping 
force in Kosovo and a mechanism for finding a final political settlement for Kosovo 
while maintaining the territorial integrity of FR Yugoslavia (the latter two were 
rather contradictory, see Clark 2000:181, Dauphinee 2003, Wolff 2003:91pp). When 
the negotiations failed because Belgrade did not agree to the presented plan, NATO 
attacked – without a mandate by the UN Security Council - FR Yugoslavia on the 24 
March.  
Various reasons were given to justify this attack. According to General Wesley Clark 
(2001:185 and 205) it was to hit the Yugoslav military and police activities on the 
ground as rapidly and effectively as possible in order to degrade its capacity to 
continue repression of the civilian population, and to force President Milosevic to 
comply with the demands of the international community (meaning to sign the 
Rambouillet agreement). NATO Secretary-General Solana said one goal was to 
remove Milosevic from office (see Schaefer 1999, while the diplomat Grabert 
(1999), as well as other officials and media, spoke of the prevention of a 
humanitarian catastrophe. The circumstances and legitimisation of the attack are 
highly contentious and triggered vivid protests by civil society groups in most NATO 
countries. The lack of a UN mandate and the readiness to put all blame for the 
conflict on the Serbian side alone were the most important points here.117  
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 Durward (2000:31) says: "In Ambassador Holbrooke's words, it was the credible threat of 
imminent NATO air strikes that induced Milosevic to comply." Also after the signing of the 
agreement, the NATO activation order remained standing and it was quite clear for all actors on 
the ground that to resume fighting would lead to NATO intervention (see Schweitzer 1999c). 
117
 One example of apparent one-sidedness is the handling of the so-called Racak massacre. The 
OSCE mission found in the village Racak in early January 1999 45 killed persons in civilian 
clothes and immediately blamed Serb forces for a massacre on civilians. Later forensic reports that 
in addition were kept partly secret were not able to remove doubts on the interpretation of the 
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When the bombings did not lead to a quick result, NATO escalated its air raids, and 
added more and more targets to its list (Clark 2001:317).118 NATO also began 
considering the sending of ground troops, but before a decision was made Belgrade 
gave in and opened negotiations on a ceasefire at the beginning of June leading to the 
eventual end of the bombing campaign (see Zitzlaff 1999:54, Daalder and O’Hanlon 
2000:174, Kaufman 2002: xxii). Immediately after the ceasefire, on 11 June, NATO 
(and Russian) troops entered Kosovo, and Kosovo was put under international rule 
by the UN, with NATO-led KFOR as its military arm. 
The NATO war on FR Yugoslavia has been subjected to very divergent political 
assessments. While NATO presented it as a successful case of peace enforcement to 
prevent much worse happening in Kosovo, for many critics – not only from the peace 
movements, leftist parties, and Russia but many international lawyers and politicians 
as well - it was a clear violation of international law, and guided by ulterior motives 
that had nothing to do with war or peace in Kosovo but with NATO’s need to 
redefine its role after the end of the Cold War (see Chomsky 1999, Loquai 2000, 
Ronnefeldt 2001, and the contributions in Albrecht and Schaefer (eds.) 1999).119  
There were at least two main factors that caused the failure of negotiation diplomacy 
that preceded the war: First there was a miscalculation from the side of the 
international community about the importance the Serbian regime gave to Kosovo - 
it seems that they expected Belgrade to give in as it had in 1995 regarding Bosnia. 
Secondly, it was an explicit part of the strategy of the Kosovo Albanians to bring 
                                                                                                                                          
killings. Another example is the claim that the Serbian side long before the war planned the ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ of Kosovo in an operation titled ‘Horseshoe’. Some observers and researchers consider 
the existence of this plan a fact (for example Gallagher 2005:60pp. Gow 2003 discusses horseshoe, 
(2003:207-9), concluding that Operation Horsehoe was not the plan for ethnic cleaning, but 
insisting that there was an “operational plan for which Serbian forces were mobilized and waiting 
only for the signal to start.” Others have expressed doubts on the authenticity of  this paper that 
was allegedly discovered by German intelligence services or argue that it does not contain at all 
such a plan for ethnic cleansing (see Kalman 1999:135 and Loquai 2000).   
118
 Contrary to public claims, NATO bombed a number of civilian targets including schools, 
television stations, trains and historic monuments. A list of these targets has been compiled for a 
complaint before the War Crimes Tribunal by the American Association of Jurists together with 
jurists from Toronto (Pinter 2000). The use of depleted uranium in shells, and the bombing of oil 
refineries and chemical factories caused substantial health hazards throughout Serbia. 
119
 Some commentators suggest other motives of economic or strategic nature, some of these I find 
less convincing (access route to the oil in the Caspian Sea ), and some blatantly far-fetched (Serbia 
being seen by US policy makers a potential centre of resistance to the US ‘New World Order’). 
For these assumed objectives, see Chossudovsky 2006, Johnstone 2000:16, and the materials 
collected for a civil society tribunal on the NATO war (‘Internationales Europaeisches Tribunal 
ueber den NATO-Krieg gegen Jugoslawien’ 2000).  
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about an international military intervention that would separate Kosovo from Serbia 
and thereby enable them to achieve the independence they had struggled for since the 
early 1990s, and consequently they had no reason to sustain the 1998 ceasefire (see 
Clark 2000, Layne 2000a:14, Lutz 2001, Judah 2002:103).  
 
4.1.3.3 The Relationship Between Conflict Stage and Degree of Force Used 
At first glance the review of the successes and failures in peace-making (see below) 
could be seen as evidence to support the assumption that the more a conflict 
escalates, the more pressure by the international negotiators is needed to secure an 
agreement.120 Indeed, the negotiations on the Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995, 
and on the Kosovo war 1998-99, were accompanied by substantial pressure in the 
form of sanctions and threats of military action. So although officially NATO’s 
bombing in Bosnia 1995 was legitimised by reference to the need to protect Sarajevo 
and other UN protected areas, Holbrooke (1998) in his account of the shuttle 
negotiations in summer-autumn 1995 is quite frank about his hope that NATO’s 
intensified bombing would put pressure on President Milosevic to come to an 
agreement. 
However, first impressions may be false, and indeed at second glance the story of the 
negotiations in the former Yugoslavia raises doubts about this assumption of a 
definite empirical link between ‘showing muscle’ and negotiation success:  
• Generally speaking, there can be no doubt that in the case of Bosnia in summer 
1995 the intervention of international parties was decisive, both in “helping to 
produce a new balance of forces on the ground and in pressuring parties to sign 
an agreement about which they were ambivalent at best” (Cousens and Cater 
2001:26). Otherwise there would have been no negotiations and no treaty without 
the international intervention. But observers who studied the NATO bombing 
campaign argue that the military balance on the ground, and the joint Bosniak-
Croat ground attack, were as decisive as NATO’s bombing in creating a ‘ripe 
moment’ for the negotiations to succeed (see Burg and Shoup 1999:408pp, 
Ripley 1999, Schneckener 2002:45). Therefore, to attribute the success of Dayton 
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 This was found to be the common view of all negotiators who published their accounts. For a more 
theoretical assessment, see for example Clément 1997:10.  
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solely to the NATO bombing is to overrate the significance of international 
military force in this case. 
• On the other hand, the Washington Agreement of 1994. ending the war between 
Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, seems to have been achieved 
without much negative pressure but rather with a promise by the USA to step up 
its military and perhaps also financial support after the end of the war. According 
to an interview reprinted in the magazine of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly at 
that time, the initiative for and the contents of this agreement did not even come 
from the USA at all but from a (Croat) member of the Bosnian Presidency, Prof. 
Dr. Ivo Komsic, who claims that he had to persuade people from the US Senate, 
Congress, State Department and Vice President Gore to support the suggested 
agreement (Radio Zid 1994). 
• The same is true for the Erdut Agreement on Eastern Slavonia that prevented a 
new military offensive by Croatia: There was certainly some urgency on the part 
of international mediators, but again the agreement was reached without any 
clear threat to use military force. 
Looking at these three examples, there is no clear relationship between level of 
escalation and degree of pressure exerted. Ripe moments and stalemates (Zartman 
and Touval 1985), ‘carrots’ and a feeling for the political possible seem to have 
played the decisive role. These findings are by no means conclusive – that would 
have needed a far more in-depth study than the survey done here. But I believe that 
the indicators found justify the call for a renewed study on the relation between force 
and negotiation.121 
 
4.1.4 Peace-making: A Picture of Mixed Results 
To conclude this section: in spite of the assessment that “almost no instrument fell so 
much into discredit as that of negotiation diplomacy” (Calic 1995:187, translation 
CS), there was a significant range of more-or-less successful peace-making 
initiatives. 
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 An earlier version of this section 4.1.3.3 that was fundamentally rewritten for this purpose here has 
been submitted in the final report to the German Foundation Peace Research that funded the 
original study on which this thesis is based (Schweitzer 2005). 
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• In July-August of 1991 the EC ‘troika’ of current, former and future EC 
Presidencies had the lead in the negotiations to end the conflict in Slovenia. This 
led to a cease-fire agreement (Brioni Agreement) and the withdrawal of the 
Yugoslav army from Slovenia. 122 
• In November 1991 the UN Secretary-General sent an envoy, Cyrus Vance, who 
succeeded where the EC had failed. On 23 November a cease-fire was agreed at 
the UN headquarters in Geneva between Milosevic, Tudjman and the Yugoslav 
Minister of Defence Kadijevic.123 The fighting did not immediately stop, but on 
28 November the JNA finally withdrew from Croatia after the Croatian army 
lifted its blockade of the JNA barracks. The cease-fire was finally signed on 2 
January 1992, and the UN committed itself to send peace-keeping forces to 
Croatia.124 
• In September 1992 the EC monitors at local level, and ICFY at higher level 
negotiated the withdrawal of the JNA from Prevlaka (Croatia) and the 
subsequently demilitarisation of the peninsula (see Gow 1997:106). 125 
• The US mediated behind closed doors the Washington Agreement in March 1994 
between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats that ended the violence and created the 
Federation between Croats and Muslims.126  
• The Contact Group mediated the Erdut Agreement on Eastern Slavonia 
concluded in November 1995.127 
• Mediation by shuttle diplomacy conducted by the US negotiation team in the 
                                                 
122
 On the Brioni negotiations, see Kalman 1993:56pp, Jansa 1994:246pp, Genscher 1995:940, 
Holbrooke 1998:29, Large n.d.:6, Lucarelli 2000:20 pp, Markovic 2000:20pp. 
123
 Thereby including the JNA as a negotiating partner – something the EC had failed to do  
(Woodward 1995:183). 
124
 On these negotiations, see Genscher 1995:964, Meder and Reimann 1996:5, Gow 1997:60, Libal 
1997:76, Vance 2001, Goulding 2002:294pp, Kaufman 2002:xiv. 
125
 Prevlaka is a peninsula belonging to Croatia but at the border to Montenegro. In September 1992, 
ECMM and ICFY jointly negotiated the withdrawal of the JNA from the area and its subsequent 
demilitarisation. UNPROFOR (UNSCR 779) supervised the withdrawal with military observers. 
After 1995, a UN observer mission (UNMOP) took over monitoring the area until its mandate was 
ended end of 2002. See Gow 1997:106, Maloney 1997:41pp, Zitzlaff 1999:47, Lucarelli 2000:39, 
Markovic 2000:70.  
126
 There are little details known about how this agreement came about. See the comments in 4.1.3.3 
and see Radio Zid 1994, Owen 1995:268pp, Burg and Shoup 1999:294, Lucarelli 2000:59, 
Markovic 2000:134pp, Schwegmann 2003:81. 
127
 See the section on UNTAES below in 4.3.2, and Holbrooke 1998:266pp, Markovic 2000:244, 
Schoups 2001:389. 
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conflict between Macedonia and Greece eventually ended with an interim 
agreement between the two countries signed on 13th September 1995 (see 
Ackermann 2000:122pp).  
• The Dayton Agreement of December 1995 ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
It was prepared by shuttle mediation undertaken by the US negotiation team led 
by Holbrooke.128 
• During March-May 2001, NATO, the OSCE and the USA negotiated the end of 
the armed Albanian uprising in the Presevo valley in South Serbia (International 
Crisis Group 2003d). 
• In August 2001, the EU, NATO and the OSCE mediated the Ohrid Agreement 
ending the violence in Macedonia (Broughton 2002:270, Paes and Schlotter 
2002, International Crisis Group 2003h). 
• In early 2003, the EU mediated an agreement between Serbia and Montenegro to 
found a confederation (Klotz 2002:245). 
On the other side there have been whole years spent with unsuccessful negotiations: 
• OSCE remained relatively ineffective, despite the launch of its Early Crisis 
Mechanism (Becker 1991:944, Libal 1997:14, Lucarelli 2000:19, Kaufman 
2002:21). 
• EC / EU, UN and Contact Group all failed to secure the agreement of all sides to 
the different peace plans proposed for Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 
1994.  
• NATO and the OSCE’s efforts to stop the escalation of violence in Kosovo in 
                                                 
128
 To call the Dayton conference a face-to-face meeting may be misleading. Mostly the parties stayed 
in different rooms, and the negotiators went from one to the other. Holbrooke uses the term 
‘proximity talks’.  
 There is no full agreement in the literature on why Dayton was successful. It was probably a mix 
of different factors, among them  
 the international community speaking finally with one voice,  
 the escalation of the enforcement means,  
 Croatia and Serbia being in basic agreement (to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina),  
 the military aid the US promised the Bosnian government, called the Train and Equip 
programme. It was agreed in the context of the Washington Agreement in 1994. See 
Cousens and Cater 2001:40, Duffield 2001:67, Riegler 1999:48pp, Shearer 1998:57.  
 a military balance achieved in summer / autumn 1995. 
 On the negotiations in Dayton, see Holbrooke 1998, Ischinger 1998, Sloan 1998:75, Burg and 
Shoup 1999:413, Clark 2001:54pp, 65, Kaufman 2002:120, Schneckener 2003:45. 
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1998 achieved only short-term relief, undone by the failure of the February 1999 
Rambouillet conference.129 The negotiators probably were guided by the false 
assumption that Milosevic would cave in when faced with the threat of military 
intervention as he had before Dayton (see Clark 2001:185, Dannreuther 2001:23, 
Kaufman 2002:177pp). 
 
4.2 The Use of Peace-keeping Instruments 
Peace-keeping has been defined here as the prevention of direct violence through 
influence or control of the behaviour of potential perpetrators. 
In the area of former Yugoslavia during the time under consideration there were a 
large number of peace-keeping missions with different mandates, scope and 
character.  
 
4.2.1 Military Peace-keeping Missions 
The first military peace-keeping mission was the United Nation Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR). UNPROFOR was set up in January 1992 (by UNSCR 727 and 743) 
to monitor the borders between the government-controlled and Serb-held territories 
within Croatia. For that purpose, four ‘UN Protected Areas-UNPA’ were created 
along the zones. In December 1992 UNPROFOR was split into three units: 
UNPROFOR I in Croatia, being renamed UNCRO in 1995 before being withdrawn 
in January 1996, II in Bosnia-Herzegovina until end of 1995 and III from January 
1993 in Macedonia, renamed the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force 
Macedonia (UNPREDEP) in 1995 and withdrawn in 1999. UNPROFOR's mandate 
was changed and enlarged several times between 1992 and 1995.130 In Gow’s words, 
                                                 
129
 As in the case of Dayton, some shuttle mediation prepared the conference itself, but it was 
orchestrated from the beginning with the threat by NATO to bomb Yugoslavia if the Serbian 
troops did not stop their fighting. The Contact Group had defined a list of ‘non-negotiable 
principles’ for Rambouillet. Two of them were irreconcilable: the territorial integrity of FR 
Yugoslavia and mechanisms for a final political settlement for Kosovo. See Zitzlaff 1999:42, 
Zumach 1999:66, Clark 2000:250, Buendnis 90-Die Gruenen Bundestagsfraktion 2001:18pp, 
Dannreuther 2001:19pp, Judah 2002:144, 201,220; Kaufman 2002:172pp, Dauphinee 2003, Wolff 
2003:91pp. 
130
 The deployment grew from 11,000 troops in Croatia to (figures from March 1995) 38,599 military 
personnel, including 684 United Nations military observers. The Force also included 803 civilian 
police, 2,017 other international civilian staff and 2,615 local staff. The expenses for UNPROFOR 
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UNPROFOR’s “de facto mandate was to create and maintain a stalemate on the 
ground to allow international diplomacy to work” (Gow 1997:102). Over time it took 
on a number of roles (see Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:276pp): 
• Peace-keeping functions in and at the border of four UN-Protected Areas in 
Croatia; 
• Performance of immigration and customs functions on Croatia's borders; 
• Monitoring of cease-fires in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
• Providing security and functioning of the Sarajevo airport; including the delivery 
of humanitarian aid through the airport; 
• Delivery of humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina, protection of 
UNHCR aid convoys;131 
• Monitoring of military withdrawals, heavy equipment removal, and 
demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula; 
• Passive monitoring of a flight ban over Bosnia-Herzegovina (its active 
enforcement was later given as a mandate to NATO), 
• Deterring attacks against the so-called ‘safe areas’ in Bosnia (Srebenica, 
Sarajevo, Zepa, Gorazde, Tuzla and Bihac) that were created by the UN to 
protect these ethnic enclaves.  
UNPROFOR is generally not considered to have been a successful peace-keeping 
mission. Croatia criticised its failure to implement the demilitarisation of the Serbian 
territories and their return to Croatia. In 1995, others noted that UNPROFOR could 
merely watch while Croatia reoccupied by force most of the Serb-held territories 
(Fetherston 1994:77, Gow 1997:104pp). In Bosnia-Herzegovina it undoubtedly 
contributed enormously to the humanitarian relief efforts (see Owen 1995:349 and 
366). In many cases its presence contributed to the security in the area, and it 
separated the Croatian and Muslim troops after the Washington Agreement in 1994. 
                                                                                                                                          
were about US$4,7 billion which made it the most expensive peace-keeping mission by the UN to 
that date  (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:285). 
 For references on UNPROFOR, see Morillon 1993, MacKenzie 1993, Fetherston 1994:75pp, 
Woodward 1995:105pp, Ekwall-Uebelhart  and Raevsky 1996:25pp, Gow 1997:105pp and 131, 
Hillen 1998:142pp, Burg and Shoup 1999:91, de Jonge Oudraat 1999, Ramsbotham  and 
Woodhouse 1999: 276pp, Weiss 1999:97pp, Gordon 2001, Goulding 2002:322pp, Hedl and 
Magas 2002.  
131
 In 1993 alone, almost 5,000 UNHCR convoys were escorted (Hillen 2000:172). 
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On the other hand, the humanitarian convoys were also regularly used by Bosnians 
as a cover for attacks on the Serbian troops (see Ripley 1999:121). UNPROFOR 
often appeared helpless in the face of the ongoing violence and, because of the 
vulnerability of its own troops, was viewed by many politicians as more of a liability 
than an asset. It proved unable to give protection to two of the so-called safe areas 
(Zepa and Srebrenica) when the Serbian troops decided to occupy them in 1995 (see 
Leurdijk 1996:60p, Gow 1997:127, Sloan 1998:28, Ripley 1999:114).132 Two of its 
main problems were the lack of resources and an unrealistic mandate (Weiss 
1999:97). Hillen (2000:195) identifies three reasons for the failure of UNPROFOR: 
the lack of co-operation from the warring parties, inadequate numbers to form a 
deterrent presence in a very difficult terrain, and the incapacity to use active force.133  
The military peace-keeping mission of the UN in Macedonia, although a part of 
UNPROFOR, had a very particular threefold mandate: 1) To monitor parts of border 
areas with Albania and FR Yugoslavia, 2) To strengthen Macedonia’s stability by 
providing preventive forces, and 3) To report on developments that would constitute 
a threat to the country, meaning an attack by FR Yugoslavia on Macedonia. Initially 
reducing tensions between Albanians and Macedonians was a secondary concern, 
mainly left to the OSCE, but it later came to receive more attention. UNPREDEP 
came to a premature end when China vetoed its continuation in February 1999 (in 
retaliation for Macedonia recognising Taiwan in the hopes of obtaining a loan - 
Ackermann 2003:118). The Macedonia mission has been evaluated very positively, 
almost all analysts  acknowledging its role in enhancing the sense of security within 
the country and strengthening the moderate political orientation of the Gligorov 
administration (see Moeller 1997:293pp, Ackermann 2000:121, Lund 2000c:199). 
Subsequently in 2001 NATO carried out a short-term disarmament mission in 
Macedonia, ‘Operation Essential Harvest’, after the Ohrid Peace Agreement brought 
an end to the flare-up of violence between Albanian rebels and the Macedonian 
government. It collected about 3,000 weapons and was declared successful by 
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 The behaviour of the troops on the ground varied considerably. In , several cases UN forces went 
beyond pure self-defence, as for example when British troops held Serbian troops in May 1995 at 
Gorazde until Muslim troops were able to take over.  
133
 Weiss (1999:131pp) developed an assessment of military costs and civilian benefits from 
UNPROFOR’s intervention that lists costs, casualties and political impact as well as civilian 
benefits in different areas. 
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NATO, although observers noted that little real disarmament had taken place, with 
only old weapons having been handed in (see Petruseva 2001, Vankovska 2002).134 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton Accords charged NATO with the deployment of 
a ‘robust’ military peace-keeping force with 58,000 troops to ensure the exact 
delineation of the agreed cease-fire and inter-entity boundaries, the separation of 
forces, and demilitarisation.135 After a year, the ‘Implementation Force’ IFOR was 
renamed Stabilization Force (SFOR) whose mandate included also securing free 
movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, humanitarian work and support to civilian 
organisations, securing elections, protection of minority return and other tasks (see 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:17pp).136  
The overall purpose of post-war peace-keeping in Bosnia has been to create a secure 
environment in which reconstruction and peace-building could take place. Generally 
it has been considered highly successful (unlike its predecessor UNPROFOR)  
thanks to the ‘robustness’ of its Chapter VII mandate, its more limited focus, and the 
greater  degree of acceptance  and legitimacy it enjoys since it came after the cease-
fire (see the literature cited above).  
The ‘Kosovo Force’ KFOR was mandate by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 
after the end of the NATO war. It is based on and led by NATO, but also includes 
troops from non-NATO-states including Russia. Initially it comprised 46,000 to 
50,000 soldiers (42,500 in Kosovo and the rest in Macedonia) and its overall 
mandate was formulated along similar lines to that of SFOR: To establish and 
maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order; to 
monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the agreements that 
ended the conflict; and to provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
(KFOR Information n.d.).  
                                                 
134
 The almost daily articles published in die tageszeitung between 8 August and 27 September) were 
also a source. 
135
 By UNSCR 1031. The numbers were gradually reduced. In 2003, 12,000 troops remained. IFOR’s 
very limited mandate was criticised and led to the eventual change of the mandate one year later. 
So for example IFOR refused to accompany and protect minority returns (see Riegler 1999:51). 
136
 In 2004, the European Union took over the peace-keeping from NATO, and SFOR became 
EUFOR with a current strength (in 2008) of 6,500 troops (see the webpage of EUFOR, 
<www.euforBosnia-Herzegovina.org>). 
 On IFOR/ SFOR, see also the literature below on the UN protectorate in Bosnia, and Meder and 
Reimann 1996, Oschlies 1997, Pugh 1998, Sloan 1998, Kaufman 2002. 
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Another of its functions has been to deter a new attack by FR Yugoslavia. Besides 
the pure peace-keeping tasks like separation of the armed forces, prevention of 
violence, de-mining, disarmament etc., KFOR also involved itself in a wide variety 
of peace-building activities including reconstruction, food distribution and provision 
of medical services.137 
KFOR has been criticised for its inadequate protection of the Serbian minority on 
occasions, and its failure to function effectively during the days of ‘ethnic’ clashes in 
2004 (Judah 2002:288, O’Neill 2002:44, 107, Skoglund 2004.).138 
On three occasions in former-Yugoslavia, troops capable of military enforcement 
have been deployed to protect (military or civilian) peace-keepers, although none of 
them saw major action: 
• Sanctioned by UN  Security Council Resolution 998, France and Britain sent 
about 10,000 troops as a Rapid Deployment Force to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
June- July 1995 (see Ripley 1999:130pp). 139 They were meant to protect an 
eventual withdrawal of UNPROFOR that was foreseen at that stage as necessary 
to give NATO free hand with militarily enforcing an end of the war. 
• The second was the NATO Extraction Force, deployed in Macedonia in 
December 1998 to protect the staff of the Kosovo Verification Mission (Troebst 
1999, Weller 1999:22, Zitzlaff 1999:42, Loquai 2000:10, Judah 2002:188). 
• The third was ‘Operation Amber Fox’ in Macedonia, set up by NATO in 2001-
2002 with around 700 troops in the follow-up to Operation Essential Harvest.  Its 
mandate was to protect the civilian EU and OSCE monitors overseeing the 
implementation of the peace plan. (see International Crisis Group 2002c, Saskova 
2003)140 
One further type of military peace-keeping needs to be mentioned here, observer 
missions such as those deployed in the Prevlaka peninsula 1992-2002. Mostly these 
observer missions were part of the respective overall peace-keeping mission in the 
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 On these activities, see Clark 2001:410p, Reinhard 2001, Kaufman 2002:200, Judah 2002:284p, 
O’Neil 2002:43pp, KFOR Information n.d. and KFOR Objectives/Mission n.d. 
138
 Reinhardt (2002), the second KFOR commander, considers KFOR a success and claims that it 
fulfilled its mandate. 
139
 See also Krech 1997:132, Lucarelli 2000:68, Markovic 2000:206p, Kaufman 2002:118. 
140
 In 2003, the EU took over responsibility for the deployment, and Amber Fox became Concordia. It 
was in 2004 replaced by a Police Operation (‘Proxima’)  
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region. They served as ‘eyes and ears’ of the UN, sought to deter atrocities, acted as 
mediators between warring parties (for example in Mostar in summer 1993 and in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in the winter of 1993-1994) and as confidence builders for the 
local population (Husum 1998). 
 
4.2.2 Civilian Peace-keeping 
There have been two larger-scale civilian peace-keeping missions. They are of 
special interest from the point of view of nonviolent intervention because they are 
early examples of civilian peace-keeping organised by intergovernmental 
organisations.141  
The first was the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM, later EUMM, 
from 1991-2007).142 In July 1991 the ECMM was sent to Slovenia and Croatia with a 
typical peace-keeping mandate, namely to help establish the ceasefire by 
• Lifting the blockade of JNA units and facilities, 
• Facilitating the unconditional return of JNA units to their barracks, 
• Clearing roads, 
• Effecting the return of all facilities and equipment to JNA, 
• Monitoring the deactivation of territorial defence units and their return to 
quarters, 
• Monitoring  the suspension of the implementation of declarations of 
independence for the agreed period of three months in 1991, 
• If and when required, monitoring the release and return of prisoners detained in 
connection with hostilities since 25 June 1991 in cooperation with ICRC 
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 Though their civilian character however was limited since they operated in heavily militarised 
scenarios. The Kosovo Verification Mission was even protected by a NATO Extraction Force (see 
above).  
142
 They were mainly recruited from civil servants (diplomats) and the military (professional 
soldiers). Besides the (then 12 ) EC countries also Canada, Sweden and some Eastern European 
countries participated. The head of the mission automatically came from the country which had the 
EC (EU) presidency, and changed every six months (as did most of the monitors, few of whom 
had contracts for longer than six months.) The EUMM in the Western Balkans came to an end 
formally  on 31 December 2007, during its final years only maintaining a presence  in Montenegro 
and Albania. For ECMM / EUMM in general, see Mercier 1995:29, Zimmermann 1996:172, 
Giersch 1998:96pp and 129pp, Ripley 1999:57, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999:88, Weller 
1999:220, ICVA 2000, Goulding 2002:303.  
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(Maloney 1997:28pp). 
With the deployment of UNPROFOR in 1992, the mandate of ECMM changed. It 
concentrated then on those thematic and geographic areas which did not fall under 
the UNPROFOR mandate, gathering information on ceasefire violations, military 
movements, the local civil situation and the status of implementation of the Vance 
Peace Plan of 1991 (the plan that had led to the deployment of UNPROFOR I). They 
also accompanied international negotiator teams, brokered local cease-fires, helped 
with the exchange of prisoners of war, escorted (without arms) humanitarian aid, 
reported on human rights violations, etc.143  
At the end of 1992 EC monitors were also sent (on request by these states) to 
Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Macedonia. The intention of these deployments was 
to prevent ‘spill-over’, and to monitor the security situation (Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse 1999:88pp). After 1996 they started working in Kosovo, and in 
November 1999 deployed observers to FR Yugoslavia to monitor the political and 
security developments, and facilitate contacts between the parties (Mauro 2002:303). 
In March 2001, EUMM also became active in the North West of Macedonia 
(European Union Monitoring Mission n.d.).144 
In Croatia the ECMM ran into many problems. It faced logistical dilemmas and 
suffered from poor communication and confusion over objectives and priorities. The 
Serbs saw the monitors as spies for Croatia, while in Croatia they were considered 
highly ineffective and usually referred to by the nick-name ‘ice-cream men’ because 
of their white uniforms (see Maloney 1997, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 
1999:88pp, Weller 1999:220, Lucarelli 2000:26pp). Nevertheless, they may have 
achieved more on the ground than they were credited with at the time, preventing 
small incidents from leading to major confrontations (see Gow 1997:106, Libal 
1997:49, Girsch 1998:98). 
Under the threat of NATO intervention in Kosovo in the autumn of 1998, the 
Yugoslav government under Milosevic agreed at the end of October 1998 to the 
deployment of a ‘Kosovo Verification Mission’ (KVM) under the umbrella of OSCE 
                                                 
143
 They also became involved in small-scale humanitarian aid, for example delivering letters across 
border-lines, locating missing people etc. (EUMM 2004) 
144
 At that time, it consisted of approximately 100 monitors seconded by EU member states as well as 
by Norway and Slovakia. 
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(Loquai 2000:31 pp).145  An unarmed OSCE mission was acceptable to both sides, 
although the Kosovo-Albanian leadership would have preferred an armed peace-
keeping force. Deployment began in November 1998, but not having the personnel 
(or equipment) ready, the Mission only reached around 75% of the agreed number of 
2,000 staff before it was withdrawn on March 20, 1999 after the collapse of the 
Rambouillet negotiations. 
Its mandate was to establish a permanent presence throughout Kosovo, monitor the 
ceasefire agreed between OSCE and FR Yugoslavia in October 1998 and to report 
cease-fire violations, conduct border monitoring, facilitate the return of refugees 
along with ICRC and UNHCR, and it was also anticipated that they would supervise 
elections in Kosovo. The Verifiers established permanent outposts in crisis areas, 
visited places where fighting was reported, monitored several court trials, conducted 
weapons verification inspections, accompanied Serbian police and Serbian 
investigators to places controlled by the UCK, and sought to intervene actively if 
they came across violent incidents (Loquai 2000:42, 60; the Kosovo Updates from 
1999, OSCE 1999e, OSCE 1999f, Walker 1999). 
The evaluation of KVM is rather contested. On the one hand, it undoubtedly 
managed to reduce violence by talking to both sides and convincing them to contain 
localised outbreaks of violence. 146 In addition, their mere presence played a role in 
restraining violence (Walker 1999, Loquai 2000:62). Specifically, at the beginning of 
the mission the cease-fire was respected. Both the Serbs and the more moderate 
commanders of the UCK were willing to stop fighting, which gave a chance for 
stabilisation of the situation. Refugees and displaced persons returned in greater 
numbers as the fighting calmed down (Loquai 2000:61 , Wenig 1999/2000:89). 
According to Wenig (1999 and 2000:84) even in January-February 1999 when the 
situation became tense again, the arrival of KVM personnel on the scene usually had 
a de-escalating effect. 
On the other hand the Verifiers could not contain the violence. There were attacks on 
police and civilians all the time in varying degrees, and increasingly also on the 
                                                 
145
 The main literature on the KVM are: OSCE 1999a, OSCE 1999b, Weller 1999:22, Daalder and 
O’Hanlon 2000:47, Loquai 2000, Clark 2001:139pp, CORE 2002, Judah 2002, Kaufman 2002: 
xxi, 163 and 189, Schweitzer et al. 2001, Dufour 2007. 
146
 “The first weeks of deployment had shown that in those areas where verifiers were present, the 
number of incidents decreased.“ (Wenig 1999:83p, translation CS) 
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Verifiers themselves (see OSCE 1999g, and the Kosovo Updates from 27.1.99, 
22.2.99, 23.2.99, 26.2.99). The agreement to deploy KVM was also flawed because it 
was an agreement between the USA and FR Yugoslavia, with the UCK not being  a 
party to it, and not feeling bound by it (Calic 1998b, Loquai 2000:24 and 54, Riedel 
and Kalman 2000:157, Schweitzer 1999c). As Judah (2002:198) and Loquai 
(2000:62) point out, the cease-fire was also used by the UCK to move back into its 
strongholds as soon as the Yugoslavs withdrew, probably in preparation for a new 
offensive in spring 1999. 147 
My evaluation would be that under the circumstances KVM was deployed - with one 
party of the conflict explicitly hoping to bring about the military intervention already 
threatened against the other party - the KVM was surprisingly successful in the 
field.148  
 
                                                 
147
 Some opponents of NATO intervention have voiced the suspicion that the KVM was no more than 
a smoke screen to prepare the NATO campaign and spy out military targets for NATO (see 
Scheffran 1999:63, Loquai 2000:36p). The facts in the sources and secondary literature, however, 
all tend to indicate that NATO was already prepared and willing to attack, not wishing a second 
protracted war like in Bosnia, but that it did not have a primary overriding interest in starting this 
war as soon as a pretext offered itself. 
148
 There were several other missions and organisations with peace-keeping roles and functions: 
- The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), consisting of diplomats of the USA, 
Russia and the EU accredited to Belgrade, was created in July 1998 before the deployment of 
the KVM, and continued on in close cooperation with the OSCE until the two missions 
eventually were merged. Its tasks were reporting, escorting staff,  investigating incidents, 
patrolling, and meeting village leaders to discuss security. See Petritsch et al. 1999:225, 
Troebst 1999, Zitzlaff 1999:42, Kaufman 2002:162, as well as the KDOM Daily Reports and 
KDOM Updates. 
- International police (IPTF/ CIVPOL and EUPM) were deployed by the UN or the EU at one 
point or the other in almost all countries of former Yugoslavia. They have usually had a 
mandate that focussed on training of local police (which would fall under peace-building), 
but many of them also had a monitoring element to their mandate including dealing with 
incidents of political violence and how ethnic minorities were treated by the local police 
forces. The IPT in Kosovo from 1999 onward has been one of the first international police 
missions with an executive mandate, meaning that they have the right to arrest people 
themselves rather than only accompanying local forces. For the International Police missions, 
see Eide and Holm 2000, Hartz 2000, Gourlay 2004, Orsini 2004.  
- UNHCR being UN’s lead agency to deal with the humanitarian crises in former Yugoslavia 
also had a clearly protection-related mandate, e.g. through its presence at vulnerable places. 
There were also cases when UNHCR helped threatened groups to leave the area or the 
country, although this was mostly the initiative of the staff on the ground and not part of their 
mandate. To avoid the accusation of helping with ethnic cleansing, UNHCR was not 
supposed to help people escape (see Woodward 1995:319 and 325, Otim 1996:121). For 
UNHCR in general, see the webpage http://www.unhcr.ba/, and also Mercier 1995:40 and 
49, Woodward 1995:243, Gow 1997, Weiss 1999:108 and 117; Ackermann 2000:174, 
UNHCR 2000a, International Crisis Group 2002-b, UNHCR 2003. 
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4.2.3 Peace-keeping: Another Picture of Mixed Results 
Peace-keeping interventions took place during each phase of the conflict’s escalation. 
There were not only missions after cease-fire agreements were concluded (SFOR, 
KFOR, KVM), but also during war (UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ECMM), 
and in one case as a preventive deployment (UNPROFOR/UNPREDEP in 
Macedonia).  
As discussed above, the evaluation of each of the different military peace-keeping 
missions has been contested, with UNPROFOR II in Bosnia being probably on the 
negative end of the spectrum, and SFOR and UNPROFOR III / UNPREDEP rated 
most positively. The experience of these missions has also informed deliberations 
within the UN. The most important general conclusion drawn was that no future 
peace-keeping missions should be mobilised without a cease-fire first being 
established. They should also have clear and realistic mandates, and missions should 
be deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to ensure enforcement 
capacity. Another consequence has also been that the deployment of large-scale 
missions (Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995, Kosovo 1999) became a role for NATO 
(see Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999, Hillen 2000:246pp, van Brabant 2001). 
As to the civilian missions, once again there has been no consensus regarding their 
achievements. One side has drawn from the experiences in former Yugoslavia the 
conclusion that peace-keeping needs the capacity of armed enforcement, and that 
unarmed observers have no place in war. In this view, they can even tempt 
perpetrators to attack because they cannot defend themselves (see Seidt 2002:47). 
The other side believes that in spite of difficult circumstances the civilian missions in 
the former Yugoslavia are examples that unarmed peace-keeping may work, and that 
civilian large-scale peace-keeping is an instrument with significant potential (see 
Schweitzer et al. 2001). 
 
4.3 The Use of Peace-building Instruments 
Peace-building has been defined as all those activities that address structural issues 
and relationships between the conflict parties in an effort to reverse the destructive 
processes of conflict and war. 
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As a strategy it covers a much broader range of activities than the other two, peace-
keeping and peace-making. The enormous amount and diversity of activities makes it 
very difficult to come to a good summary overview of such initiatives in relation to 
the Yugoslav conflicts. 
The understanding of most of the external actors engaged in peace-building is that its 
overall objective is to help create a sustainable situation,  marked by the absence of 
violent conflict and by rule of law, a state taking adequate care of the needs of its 
citizens, a democratic system with parties and elections, a vibrant civil society, free 
media and a working economy capable of providing sustained income to the 
population (see Licklider 2001:749pp, CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 
2006:10pp).149  
 
4.3.1 Peace-building Activities by State Actors  
Peace-building has been the strategy where civil society actors were as involved as 
state actors. Also, unlike in peace-making and peace-keeping where international 
organisations and state governments dominated the field, sub-state entities like 
regions, states (‘bundeslaender’), municipalities etc. have been involved in various 
peace-building activities (see Coletti et al. 2007).150  
 
4.3.1.1 Humanitarian Relief 
In humanitarian relief, UNHCR played the lead role during the periods of war in the 
coordination of material aid and support for IDPs and refugees (Cutts 1999, 
Ruessmann 1999c). 
                                                 
149
 None of these objectives is value-free. The international community intervening in the former 
Yugoslavia (and in most other conflicts in other parts of the world) sees itself as part of the 
Western culture, and is seeking to implement its understanding and visions on how state and 
society have to look like and to interact.  
150
 See Coletti et al. 2007 for a discussion of the role of sub-state authorities in the conflicts of the 
Balkans. 
 A well-known example is the initiative Causes Communes which was founded in 1993 by Swiss 
and Belgium communities. Causes Communes in which more than half of all Belgium 
communities participated, formed partnerships on the community level with refugee camps in 
former Yugoslavia, mostly collecting humanitarian aid for them (see Busch 1992, Large n.d.:19).  
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Individual governments provided large sums of money and sent their aid 
organisations. There are no total figures, but perhaps the following give an 
impression of the size of aid that went to the area.  
• UNHCR sent 950,000 metric tonnes of humanitarian assistance to some 2,7 
million beneficiaries in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 (Cutts 1999:2). 
• According to one statistic, Bosnia-Herzegovina alone in 1995 received US$ 391 
million emergency aid which put it on the top of the list of aid recipients that year 
(Fearon 2006). 
• Between July 1992 and end of 1995, UNHCR also co-ordinated an airlift to 
Sarajevo that delivered an estimated 160,000 tonnes of food, medicines and other 
goods to Sarajevo in over 12,000 flights (Cutts 1999:18) In 1994 alone, 55,000 
tonnes came by airlift, and around  27,000 by truck (Weiss 1999:109). 
 
4.3.1.2 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Soldiers (‘DDR’) 
Where peace-keeping forces were deployed, DDR came under their mandate.151 In 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the demobilisation was supervised by IFOR / SFOR, and 
financed by the World Bank. Of the estimated 400,000 soldiers in 1995, around 
370,000 were demobilised by 2000 ( King, Dorn  and Hodes 2002:10pp).152 In 
Kosovo, the UCK was officially disbanded, the weapons collected and stored in sites 
watched by KFOR, and the fighters either were supported in going back to civil life, 
or became part of the Kosovo Protection Corps that was intended to be an unarmed 
civil relief organisation helping with reconstruction.153 Some also were accepted into 
the newly formed police service (KFOR n.d.-a and b, O’Neill 2002:43pp, Reinhardt 
2002:40 and 571). In Macedonia in 2001, NATO as mentioned in 4.2.1 collected 
weapons from the Albanian rebels after the Ohrid peace agreement. 
 
                                                 
151
  On DDR activities, see Krech 1997:156pp, Sloan 1998:88, Zitzlaff 1999:55, International Crisis 
Group 2001a, Kaufman 2002:144, Meyer zum Felde 2002:74, de Vrieze 2002:293. 
152
 At the same time, the USA ran the ‘Train and Equip’ programme mentioned above, using a private 
mercenary firm (MPRI) to train Bosnian government soldiers (the RS was at first not included in 
the programme). See Krech 1997:138, King, Dorn  and  Hodes 2002. 
153
 IOM for example set up Employment Assistance centres and ran training programmes (Core 
2002:51, Clark 2002, 19). 
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4.3.1.3 Physical Reconstruction and Refugee Return 
Physical reconstruction has mostly been financed with international government 
money, and governmental as well as non-governmental agencies took care of much 
of the implementation (see chapter 7).154  
Reconstruction has been closely linked to refugee return: Soon after the Dayton 
Agreement the countries hosting refugees wished them to return which gave in 
consequence a boost to reconstruction efforts.155 On the ground, refugee return was 
the primary responsibility of UNHCR (see UNHCR 1999a, 2003a and 2004). It has 
been one of main challenges in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Initially UNHCR and other 
implementers emphasised repatriation to areas where displaced could be assured of 
their security which basically meant those areas where their own ethnic group was 
the majority. So-called minority return gathered pace only several years after the end 
of the war.156 
Another state actor involved in reconstruction (and in humanitarian aid) has been the 
military. Sometimes these were private initiatives of the soldiers involved.157 
Frequently, however, international forces used humanitarian aid and reconstruction 
aid as a means to gain acceptance in the population - aid became here an element of 
force protection (Lambach 2004:9): It was part of IFOR’s mandate to rebuild schools 
                                                 
154
 To give a figure of the challenge the task of reconstruction posed: In Bosnia nearly 500,000 
dwellings were damaged or destroyed of which by 2000-2001, 125,000 dwellings had been 
rehabilitated (Wilkinson 2001). In Kosovo, some 120,000 homes were damaged during the war, 
with 49,000 beyond repair (United States Committee for Refugees 2001). 
155
 Host countries of the Bosnian refugees adopted various policies. Austria after first seeking to 
restrict the immigration in 1992, offered all Bosnians work permits from 1993 on, an offer that 
60,000 Bosnians accepted. Sweden offered the same for its 58,000 war refugees (though deporting 
Albanians from Kosovo, as did many other European countries as well before 1998), and so did 
Denmark, Norway and Turkey . Switzerland and Germany (who had hosted between 320,000 and 
400,000 war refugees) sought quick repatriation and enforced it for those who did not accept to 
leave voluntarily, against the concerns raised by UNHCR. All countries provided some sort of 
financial aid for the returnees, and also facilitated test visits to prepare the return (see Woodward 
1995:364, Krech 1007:172, Oschlies 1997:93pp and 118pp). 
156
 In the first two years, returns to the Republika Srpska (RS) were minimal. After 1997, minority 
returns stepped up. UNHCR announced in 2004 that in total 1.000.473 people had returned to their 
home areas. (All figures from Kleck 2007-a:107p and ‘Over A Million Bosnians Back Home’ 
2004). 
157
 For example Italian soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina made collections at home of food, toys and 
clothes for distribution in refugee camps. A Norwegian Battalion  in their free time repaired and 
cleaned schools and football fields in their free time. Turkish soldiers collected money among 
themselves and spend it on assistance (e.g. buying watches for blind children). A Canadian Army 
surgeon worked once a week in hospital in Kosovo to do operations, and German soldiers formed 
a organisation called ‘Lachen helfen’ – ‘Help to laugh’ (Hilaj 1998, Blix 1999, Paulsen 1999, 
Andersen 2000, Lambach 2004:7). 
4. Governmental Interventions  108 
 
 
and hospitals, and restore key telecommunication assets. Their Civil-Military-
Cooperation (CIMIC) team had 350 specialists (lawyers, educators, public 
transportation specialists, engineers, agricultural experts, economists, public health 
officials, veterinarians, communication experts) who gave technical advice and 
assistance to various commissions and working groups, civilian organisations, NGOs 
and local authorities (Joulwan and Shoemaker 1998, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 
1999:17pp, Riegler 1999:20pp and 50pp, Lambach 2004).  
The same is true for KFOR which engaged public works and utilities, construction, 
transportation, railway operations, fire services, food distribution, removal of 
unexploded ordnance, mine-awareness education, medical services, etc. (KFOR 
Objectives/Mission n.d.-b).158  
 
4.3.1.4 Social and Psycho-social Work 
In this field, the international state actors mainly played the role of donors financing 
NGOs doing the work, or working through their specialised development 
organisations. This kind of work will be described more in chapter 7 below.  
 
4.3.1.5 Economic Recovery 
While both state and non-state actors worked and continue to work in this field, the 
big financial aid and reconstruction programmes usually came from states and 
international organisations like EU, USA, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).159  
According to Woodward (2002:185) economic aid is serving three basic purposes:  
1. Reviving the economy to buy confidence in the peace process;  
2. Funding to implement specific commitments laid down in the peace agreement;  
3. Laying economic foundations necessary to sustain peace over the longer term.  
                                                 
158
 For example, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates that participated with a small troop in KFOR 
built a hospital in Vucitrn that served the local population (Reinhardt 2002:467). 
159
 Financial aid by the EU between 1991-1999: Bosnia-Herzegovina: 2,061.87 m €, Croatia 353.76 
m €, FR Yugoslavia: 471.80 m €, Macedonia 403.89 m €, Regional Cooperation 462.15 m €. 
Member states of the EU gave to Bosnia-Herzegovina: 507,90 m €, Croatia 1,165.9 0m €, FR 
Yugoslavia: 712.40 m €, Macedonia 178.20 m €, which sums up to  16,956 million € by the 
European Union to former Yugoslavia (Polzer 2000:143pp). 
4. Governmental Interventions  109 
 
 
For Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995 several donor conferences were held which 
decided on substantial multilateral and bilateral aid (see Schneckener 2003:57pp).160 
The Office of the High Commissioner (OHR) was also involved with privatisation of 
enterprises, and with making economic contracts.  
In Kosovo, UNMIK (see below) took over the administration of the entire public 
sector, handling the management of 370 socially owned enterprises, and sold some of 
them, for example the Trepca Mines, to international firms (Pugh 2000:10, Del Re 
2003:88). 
After the war in Kosovo in 1999 the EU created the Stability Pact for South East 
Europe that targeted not only all countries in former Yugoslavia, but all South-East 
Europe including Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary etc.161 It is based on the assumption 
that only economic recovery and democratisation would bring sustainable peace to 
the region. In three so-called tables it deals with Democracy and Human Rights, 
Economic Development and Security. Its goals are trust building and to further 
regional solidarity and cooperation of the countries in the region, strengthen 
tolerance, democratisation, human rights etc, improve the security in the region, 
support economic recovery and market economy, and eventually bring the countries 
closer to Europe (see Stability Pact 2001).  
Some of the donors also engaged in direct help, for example offering micro-credits 
like the World Bank did in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Pugh 2000:13). In Kosovo after the 
NATO war a number of European financial institutes and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) together founded a Micro Enterprise Bank 
to provide loans to small enterprises (Behrens 2002:136, CORE 2002, Reinhardt 
2002:349).  
 
                                                 
160
 For the donor conferences, see ECU-FAX 1/96, Oschlies 1997:56, ICVA 2000, Pugh 2000:17pp, 
McMahon 2001, Poucher-Harbin 2002. 
161
 The Stability Pact has channelled much aid to SEE, and most countries of former Yugoslavia have 
initiated the process of joining the EU through the Stabilisation and Association process. However, 
the Stability Pact “has proved not to be, as was hoped for, a kind of Marshall Plan for the Balkans” 
(Detrez 2002 a:192). See also Riedel 1999:174 pp, Hombach 2000, Polzer 2000:135, Dilg 2001, 
Fawn 2001:151, Knaus 2001a, Papic 2001, Welfens 2001, Behrens 2002, Broughton 2002:272, 
Commission of the European Community 2002, CORE 2002:57, Detrez 2002a:193, Eavis and 
Kefford 2002:12. 
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4.3.1.6 Transitional Justice 
The term ‘transitional justice’ emerged in the 1990s (Buckley-Zistel 2007). It is 
defined as 
a range of approaches that societies undertake to reckon with legacies of 
widespread or systematic human rights abuse as they move from a period 
of violent conflict or oppression towards peace, democracy, the rule of 
law, and respect for individual and collective rights. (International Center 
for Transitional Justice 2008a) 
Several recent publications on the issue that all seek to give an overview of the 
different (judicial and non-judicial) approaches more or less agree (while using 
slightly varying terminology) on the following list of activities (Buckley-Zistel 2007, 
International Center for Transitional Justice 2008a, Zupan 2007): Fact-finding and 
documentation, lustration, truth commissions; prosecution of perpetrators of human 
rights abuse before both national and international courts; victims’ reparation; 
‘dealing with the past’, including working with victims on traditional justice and 
reconciliation mechanisms; establishment of memorials and museums; and – to be 
discussed in this study under the sub-section ‘rebuilding public institutions’ -  
institutional reform and formal and non-formal education. 
The OSCE and the UN have been the two international organisations most closely 
involved in human rights monitoring, together with a number of civil society actors. 
From the side of governments, especially the Special Envoy sent by the Secretary 
General of the United Nations and his reports played an important role, as did reports 
by the CSCE / OSCE (see Krech 1997:71, Lucarelli 2000:38pp).  
Special mention needs to be made of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague that was created by the United Nations (UN 
Security Council No 827 in May 1993) during the war in Bosnia. 162 163 Its purposes 
are  
                                                 
162
 ICTY’s full name is: “International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991”. 
163
 Other activities on transitional justice have been undertaken by the national governments. In 
Serbia, President Kostunica established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in February 2002. 
It had a three-year mandate but was disbanded in February 2003 without having undertaken any 
substantial research (International Center for Transitional Justice 2008c, ‘Keine Chance auf 
Versoehnung’ 2003, ‘Yugoslavia to set up ‘truth commission’ on war crimes’ 2001). In 2003 
however, a War Crimes Chamber at the Belgrade District Court was established in 2003 and in 
2004 opened the first trial concerning the killing of some 200 people seized from a hospital in 
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to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, to render justice to the victims, to deter 
further crimes, [and] to contribute to the restoration of peace by 
promoting reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia (United Nations 
2004a).  
It deals with grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws 
or customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity if they were committed on 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.The first trial took place in 1996. 
The ICTY is meant to have finished its work by 2010. In 1999, it indicted Milosevic 
as a war criminal. He was finally arrested in 2001 but died during trial. Several other 
serious perpetrators are still free.164 By 2008, the ICTY had indicted a total of 161 
individuals, and 48 had been sentenced (International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia 2008).165  
 
4.3.1.7 State-building, Democratisation and Civil Society Support 
These tasks are today considered essential elements of peace-building. The basic 
objectives are to restore or establish security (mainly through a reform of the security 
sector), the establishment of a statehood in line with rules and procedures of modern 
democracy (multi-party elections, a constitution granting equal rights to all citizens 
etc.), and guarantee of welfare (including social services, schooling, economic 
reforms etc.) (see Call and Cousens 2007, Kritz 2007). It is also the probably the 
most political and value-loaded type of peace-building because it is shaped by 
particular assumptions of how the interveners think a society should function. 
Democracy aid, while being an element of international politics since the 1960s, 
became especially fashionable after 1989 in the context of the revolutions in Eastern 
Europe and former Soviet Union.  
                                                                                                                                          
Vukovar (Croatia) in 1991. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there have been two short-termed truth 
commissions mostly doing fact finding on Srebrenica and the siege of Sarajevo, and the 
establishment of a War Crimes Chamber created with the direct involvement of the ICTY 
(International Center for Transitional Justice 2008c, Orentlicher 2008:62pp). 
 For lustration, there has been no legislation other than in Serbia in 2003, but there was no real 
access for victims to secret files. In Croatia and Macedonia, personal files kept by state security 
are “in principle” accessible (Zupan 2007:332). 
164
 Bosnian-Serb President Karadjic was until July 2008 on the top of that list when he was arrested in 
Serbia. 
165
 On ICTY, see also Krech 1997, Zitzlaff 1999:52, Lampe 2000:380, Markovic 2000, Carothers 
2001, Clark 2001:327, Vezic 2001,Freeman and Wierda 2002, Kaufman 2002: xxii ,193, O’Neill 
2002:53, Toncic 2002, Cvijanovic 2003b, and the UNSCR 808 and 827. 
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Carothers (1999:87pp) speaks of a ‘democracy template’ with three categories: 
elections, state institutions and civil society which, in the case of civil society 
interveners, is often translated into financial and other support for oppositional 
parties, independent media and oppositional NGOs (see also McMahon 2001). This 
kind of aid has provided in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, which were put 
under international administration (see below), as well as in those countries that 
remained independent (Macedonia, FR Yugoslavia, Croatia).166  The difference is 
that in the quasi-protectorates the external state actors were more or less free to 
mould institutions and processes as they saw fit, while they had to be more 
circumspect in the independent countries, in order not to be accused of meddling.167 
Schneckener (2008) distinguishes four general strategies of state-building. Elements 
of at least the last three can be found in the former Yugoslavia: 
1. Liberalisation first: democratisation and free markets, based on the observation 
that democracies tend not to go to war against each other.168 Economic 
liberalisation and early elections have been among the first targets of the 
international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
2. Security first: Demobilisation, security sector reform, training of military and 
police, reform of courts, creation of peace economies, dealing with organised 
crime. This strategy is mostly pursued by Great Britain and partly the United 
Nations in their peace-keeping missions, and it can be clearly recognised as the 
approach taken on Kosovo.169 
3. Institutionalisation first: Strengthening of legitimate and effective structures on 
national as local level.  
                                                 
166
 For security sector reform, see King et al. 2002:8, Call and Stanley 2002. For police training and 
its financing, and the monitoring of courts and police, see Riegler 1999:43, Call and Barnett 
2000:58pp, Cordone 2000, Holm 2000:144pp, Everts 2001, Buwitt 2002, CORE 2002:46pp, King 
et al. 2002:23pp, Reinhardt 2002:52 and 248; United Nations n.d.–c, Wagtmann 2002, Zellner 
2002:21pp. For the reform of customs service, see King et al. 2002:20pp, Petritsch 2000. 
167
 For instance, the OSCE encountered this kind of problem in Croatia in the late 1990s (see OSCE 
2004e). As a consequence interventions were couched in terms of provision of advice and support 
rather than the direct implementation of specific peace-building programmes. It is interesting to 
note that involvement in capacity building for civil society organisations and agencies only came 
to the forefront of the agenda of state actors at the end of the 1990s. 
168
 See Call and Cousens 2007 for a discussion of the thesis of ‚democratic peace’. 
169
 The reform of the security sector is considered to be an important part of the rebuilding of a 
functioning state. It includes police, courts, prisons, rewriting of laws, capacity training and also 
support of the military (King, Dorn and Hodes 2002:38). 
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4. Civil society first: Support of parties, NGOs and independent media. 170  
Involvement in capacity-building for civil society organisations and agencies only 
came to the forefront of the agenda of state actors at the end of the 1990s. This 
approach has found its clearest expression in the interventions on the political 
system in Serbia. There state and non-state actors focused on civil society, including 
independent media and oppositional parties, actively working towards regime 
change (see Pugh 2000 and chapter 7.7).171 For civil society support, the work of the 
OSCE is a good example - by the end of the 1990s it had missions in almost all 
countries of former Yugoslavia.172 In addition, many state actors also played the role 
of funders for projects that targeted civil society.  
 
                                                 
170
 In several cases actors from the international community even set up media of their own rather 
than supporting existing ones. For example they tried in Bosnia-Herzegovina to create networks of 
electronic media. In 1991, there were 54 radio stations and 5 TV. In 1997 these numbers had risen 
to 156 radio and 52 TV. At beginning of 2001, there were 210 radio and 71 TV (Udovicic 2001). 
Most of these networks failed. For example the Open Broadcast Network OBN that was set up 
after 1995 at the state level to overcome the division into the two entities cost US$20 million 
before it folded down (Rhodes 2007:23, Topic 2007:175). In 2004, the strategy was revised and 
support focused again on self-initiated radio and television stations (see Popovic 2004). 
171
 That led the EU in late 1999 even to target municipalities ruled by the opposition by making them 
the sole beneficiaries of a programme called ‘Energy for Democracy’, receiving heating oil. Only 
after fall of Milosevic was that programme extended to the whole of Serbia (Pugh 2000:11, 
Dragovic-Soso 2003:129).  
172
 Generally speaking the missions’ purposes have been twofold: to facilitate the political processes 
that are intended to prevent or settle conflicts, and to ensure that the OSCE community is kept 
informed of developments in the countries where missions are present (OSCE 1999c:45).   
 In the area of former Yugoslavia, there have been several missions since 1992: The first two 
OSCE missions were the ‘CSCE Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina’ 
established in summer 1992; and the OSCE ‘Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje’ established in 
September 1992. The first one had to leave the country in July 1993 when FR Yugoslavia - 
reacting to the sanctions against it and its de-facto exclusion from the CSCE - refused to renew its 
permission to stay. Later, other missions were sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996 onwards), the 
Republic of Croatia (since 1996), Kosovo (since 1999) and Serbia and Montenegro (since 2001). 
Most of them had a rather strong peace-building element  together with a smaller early warning 
and monitoring (peace-keeping) mandate. They undertook tasks such as preparation and conduct 
of elections, civil society development, human and minority rights monitoring and support, rule of 
law development including supporting the fight of organised crime, police training, political 
advising, confidence building through various inter-ethnic projects, education, media 
development, advising and assistance to the government to increase representation of non-majority 
communities in public administration, support of military and public enterprises (Macedonia), 
monitoring and support refugee return (Croatia), institutions-building, public administration 
reform, anti-corruption support, election organisation and supervision. (For the different missions, 
see OSCE 1999c and 2004a –g.) 
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4.3.1.8 Peace and Dialogue  
‘Peace and dialogue’ is a category that has been created to describe all those 
activities that took place with the explicit goal of promoting peace and reconciliation 
without linking this objective to activities of social work, aid or civil society support. 
It is often funded by state actors (governments, EU) but otherwise mostly to be found 
in the activities of civil society actors. 
 
4.3.1.9 Cultural Activities 
As with ‘Peace and Dialogue’ above, this category like the before mentioned 
category seems to have been largely limited to civil society interveners. 
 
4.3.2 International Administration (‘Protectorates’) 
The regions and countries put under international administration form a special case 
in the former Yugoslavia.173 While UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia, was set up with a 
strict timeline as a transitional arrangement, the international missions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo have been much longer-term and more open-ended.174 Both 
have been the object of intensive study.175 
                                                 
173
 The governance structures set up in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina governance structures give 
the international administration the power to overrule the democratically elected government of 
the areas. But the term ‘protectorate’ is often shunned though more and more used also in official 
texts, for example by the German Ministry for Development (Bundesministerium fuer 
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2004) that speaks of a ‘liberal protectorate'. 
Cousens and Cater (2001:129) talk of a ‘creeping protectorate’, Pugh (2000:2) uses the term 
protectorate without any qualification. One official term is ‘assisted state’. 
174
 A fourth one was the European Union Administration in Mostar (EUAM) during the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has been a special case, resulting from the otherwise failed efforts of ICFY 
to get the parties to agree to the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan in August 1993. That was a plan to divide 
Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic areas, with Mostar that has always been almost half Muslim, 
half Croatian with a smaller Serb minority as well, being put under EU administration for two 
years. Only the agreement on Mostar was signed, and former Mayor of Bremen (Germany) Hans 
Koschnick got appointed as EU administrator. The goal of the international administration was to 
normalise the situation between (Muslim) East and (Croat) West Mostar and deal with the ethnic 
split, plan for democratic elections at the end of the mandate, and give humanitarian assistance. 
The administration in these two years achieved some small progress like freedom of movement 
between the two parts of Mostar, reconstruction, a joint police but overall met with much 
resistance from the side of the Croats in West Mostar. A real unification of West and East Mostar 
did not take place, and violence was always a possibility.  Koschnick stepped down in 1996 after 
disagreements with the EU on how to handle the situation. After the end of the two years of 
EUAM, the administration of Mostar was integrated into the overall international administration of 
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4.3.2.1 UNTAES 
UNTAES was a complex UN mission with 5,000 soldiers and approximately 1,000 
observers and civilian personnel, with a two year mandate (1996-1997) and located 
in the remaining Serb-held area after Croatia had reoccupied the other parts of so-
called Serb Krajina in 1995. It was established by the UN Security Council (UNSCR 
1037) with the Basic Agreement concluded in Erdut in November 1995 between 
Croatia and the Serb government in the Eastern UNPA zone. Its overall goal was to 
peacefully reintegrate that area into Croatia safeguarding its original multi-ethnic 
character. Its tasks were to supervise and facilitate demilitarisation; monitor 
voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced; contribute by its presence to the 
maintenance of peace and security and otherwise assist in the implementation of the 
Erdut Agreement (see Grabner 1997, Rappold 1997, Large n.d.:110pp, Ramsbotham 
and Woodhouse 1999:58pp, Schoups 2001). After the end of UNTAES, the area was 
reintegrated into Croatia in January 2008 without the feared massive emigration by 
the Serbian population. 
UNTAES is widely considered one of the most successful UN peace support 
missions: It found good cooperation from the conflicting parties, had a clear and 
time-limited mandate, sufficient resources, and support from both international 
governmental actors and excellent cooperation with local and international NGOs 
(Kruhonja 2002, Schoups 2001:391pp).  
 
4.3.2.2 International Administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
The international administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina was established under the 
Dayton Agreement. The civil administration is headed by the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR) who is an individual nominated by the Peace Implementation 
Council (PIC), a group of 55 countries and international organisations (see Troebst 
                                                                                                                                          
Bosnia-Herzegovina. See Owen 1995:211p, Koschnick and Schneider 1996, Krech 1997:97, 
Lucarelli 2000:53p, Bazzocchi 2001, Bose 2002 and 109pp; Scotto 2002.  
175
 On Bosnia-Herzegovina, see International Crisis Group 1999f and 2001c, Cousens and Cater 
2001, McMahon 2001, Ducasse-Rogier 2003, Downs and Stedmann (eds.) 2002, Fischer (ed.) 
2007, Gromes 2007. On Kosovo after the war, see International Crisis Group 2004a, Kellermann 
2006, King and Mason 2006,  Knudsen and Laustsen 2006, Kramer and Dzihic (2006), Rosenblum 
and Knight 2006, Smyrek 2006. 
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1998:39pp, Fluegger 2002:197).176 In December 1997 the PIC increased the rights of 
the OHR, being dissatisfied with the speed of the changes implemented so far. Since 
then the OHR has had (and used) much more enforcement power, for example 
removing Bosnian public officials from office who in his eyes violated the Dayton 
Agreement or legal commitments, and imposing laws as he saw fit if the Bosnian 
legislative bodies failed to do so (see Chandler 1999, Knaus 2001b, International 
Crisis Group 2003g, Schneckener 2003:61). 
Some important changes were enforced by the OHR against the will of many of the 
local politicians. The introduction of a common currency, common flag, licence 
plates that did not indicate the origin of the car have had an impact, bringing the two 
entities (Federation and Serbian Republic) closer together. 
A large number of international actors have shared in the tasks of the peace 
implementation: NATO (military peace-keeping through IFOR/SFOR), OSCE 
(responsible for regional stabilisation, human rights, and elections), and the UN 
(United Nation Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina - UNMIBH) are the three major 
ones. Besides these, also the EU, IMF, World Bank, the European Court for Human 
Rights, the Council of Europe, UNHCR, the European Court for Human Rights and 
others have been assigned tasks under the Dayton treaty (see Cousens and Cater 
2001, Ducasse-Rogier 2003, Schneckener 2004). 
 
4.3.2.3 Kosovo 
The protectorate in Kosovo is based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244. 
Unlike in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international organisations were put into a clear 
hierarchy with the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) being the lead organisation 
(though without control over KFOR). UNHCR was made responsible for 
humanitarian assistance (so-called pillar one, phased out in 2000). UNMIK in 
addition to its coordination role has been made responsible for dealing with civil 
administration, justice and international police (pillar two). The OSCE (OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo - OMIK) became responsible for democratisation and institution-
building, human rights promotion and monitoring, and for elections (pillar three). 
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 The PIC is seen as a successor to ICFY. 
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The EU was charged with the so-called pillar four: reconstruction and economic 
development.177  
As to refugee return, the situation in Kosovo was very different from Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Here, the Albanian refugees returned on their own immediately after 
the war, and even faster than UNHCR would have liked them to do. The problem in 
Kosovo has been more that NATO and UNMIK failed to provide a stable security 
environment for the ethnic minorities - Serbs and Roma in particular. Perhaps 
125,000 Serbs have left Kosovo since the war of 1999, and the events in 2004 as well 
as in early 2008 after the declaration of independence of Kosovo have demonstrated 
that the threat of ethnic violence has not been overcome.178 (In addition to the 
literature cited above, see Dannreuther 2001:265, Matveeva and Paes 2003:29, 
Salihu et al. 2004.) 
 
4.3.3 Peace-building: How much is enough? 
It is very difficult to evaluate the peace-building efforts undertaken by the 
international community without including the contribution of civil society. Aside 
from the administration of the international protectorates almost all peace-building 
has been a joint effort of state and non-state actors. For that reason, I would like to 
refer to the conclusions of chapter 7 and just remark in very general terms that peace-
building in the area under study still has a long way to go. There certainly have been 
serious changes and improvements over the last ten or fifteen years, mostly in regard 
to state-building and a decrease in the likelihood of new violence. The peace 
agreements have held, and clear progress in refugee return and reconstruction has 
been made. On the other hand, the ethnic antagonisms have not been overcome, not 
all conflicts have found a peaceful settlement yet (see the unilateral declaration of 
independence by Kosovo against the will of Serbia). The economic situation in most 
countries is disastrous, with high rates of unemployment, migration by better 
                                                 
177
 In the first phase (‘emergency phase ‘) most agencies focused on urgent humanitarian needs 
(shelter, fuel, food, water) to help the returnees survive the winter 1999-2000. In the next 
‘transition’ phase, the international interveners moved along the ‘relief-to-development’ 
continuum. The third phase, ‘consolidation’ began with the formation of the provincial 
government in March 2002 (Llamazares and Reynolds Levy 2003:7pp). 
178
 If the figure of 125,000 Serbs is accurate is not clear – UNHCR is using the figures given by the 
Serbian government. (Verbal reference by Howard Clark.) 
4. Governmental Interventions  118 
 
 
educated youth, and a major source of income coming from international sources, 
while organised crime is flourishing. Democratisation is in fact more formal than real 
(see for example Gallagher 2005, the contributions in Dvornik and Solioz 2007 and 
in Fischer (ed.) 2007, Fischer 2007e and Gromes 2007).  
 
4.4 Addressing Other External Actors: Protest and Advocacy 
This chapter has so far provided an overview of the most important instruments that 
could be categorised under one the ‘grand strategies’ of peace-making, peace-
keeping and peace-building. In addition, there have however also been activities that 
did not directly target the conflict and the antagonists but rather other intervening 
actors: Though international actors tried to coordinate their efforts, at most points of 
crisis (meaning mainly the periods 1991-1995, and 1998-1999) there was a lively and 
partly public discussion under way between different states about how to proceed, 
and to criticise and influence each others’ approaches. 
There were different lines of disagreements that led to public (or discreet) protests 
and to advocacy among the international state interveners:  
• Within the EC, one of the main disagreements was the early approach to the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia (see above). At various other times too, parts of the 
EC/EU were at loggerheads with each other. The most public example was in 
July 1992 when the EC negotiator and ICFY co-chair Lord Owen wrote to British 
Prime Minister John Major urging the use of NATO to enforce a cease-fire. The 
next day his letter was published on the front page of a major London newspaper, 
the Evening Standard, causing great political irritation (see Kaufman 2002:96pp). 
• The EC/EU and the USA were often in disagreement on how to handle the 
conflict in Bosnia. Between 1993 and 1995, the USA tried to convince its EU 
partners to lifting of the arms embargo and conducting air strikes. That was 
regularly rejected by those EU countries contributing troops to UNPROFOR 
since they were concerned about the security of their troops (see Clark 2001:37, 
Hadzic 2003, Kaufman 2002:100, Krech 1997:82, Lucarelli 2000:44 pp, Meder 
and Reimann 1996:13, Owen 1995:xvi, Sloan 1998:50). 
In 1993 Europeans accused the new Clinton administration of undermining the 
Vance-Owen peace plan the EC-UN negotiators were trying to get signed (see 
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Owen 1995:101).  
• The West (meaning the EU and USA) has had sharp disagreements with Russia 
regarding the attitude towards Serbia. Russian governments have always 
expressed political sympathy for Belgrade leading in 1995 to strong protests 
against the expansion of NATO bombing (see Markovic 2000:205, Meder and 
Reimann 1996:27, Sloan 1998:77pp). This conflict became  more intense in 1998 
and especially 1999 around the NATO intervention in Kosovo/Serbia, going  
beyond the exchange of diplomatic notes and public statements: Russia 
suspended its membership in the NATO Partnership for Peace, and immediately 
KFOR was established, Russian troops stole a march on NATO by occupying 
Prishtina Airport directly after the end of the war on 12 June 1999, almost 
causing a confrontation with NATO forces (see Mueller 1999:68 and 162, 
Zitzlaff 1999:53, Buckley 2001:157). 
• Between Islamic countries and “the West” there were tensions regarding what the 
Islamic countries saw as a lack of support for the Bosnian (‘Muslim’) 
government  (see Krech 1997:77, Mellenthin 1992). The OIC continuously 
demanded – also in the United Nations – to lift the arms embargo and to use ‘all 
necessary means’ to end the war.  
 
4.5 Prevention 
Prevention is a goal inherent in all three ‘grand strategies’ rather than a strategy on 
its own. Stopping current and preventing new violence almost always go hand in 
hand where conflicts tend to spread from one geographical area to the next.  
Prevention warrants discussion especially because it played a role in a number of 
civil society activities, especially in advocacy work trying to warn the international 
state community about new possible areas of war and imploring them to take early 
action. 
The conflicts in former Yugoslavia are not an example of early warning and early 
crisis management at its best. There was some warning – from diplomatic sources, 
secret services as well as some NGOs like Helsinki Watch and Amnesty 
International - but little action before 1991 (see Zimmermann 1996:58pp, 82pp, Gow 
1997:204, Lucarelli 2000:16, Eiff 2002:155). When the conflicts first became visible 
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in 1990, members of the international community did little more than meeting with 
both representatives from Belgrade and the republics threatening secession.179 
Rather, the focus in 1990 – one year after the break-down of socialism in Eastern 
Europe - seems to have been on ‘democratisation’, meaning pushing for multi-party 
elections and free market trade. The only genuine preventive measure was the offer 
of some financial aid by the EC, IMF and USA (see Lampe 2000:328 and 355, 
Gallagher 2003:39pp).180 The USA warned the Yugoslav government not to take any 
violent steps to prevent secession, but also made it clear that they wanted a one-state 
solution (see Woodward 1995:154pp, 383, Zimmermann 1996:100, 122pp).  
The first six months of 1991 then saw a string of visitors coming to Belgrade, 
sometimes also stopping by in Ljubljana and Zagreb, appealing to the conflicting 
parties to resolve their differences peacefully, and offering new economic 
incentives.181 But all these came far too late to influence the process.  
After the violent response to the declarations of independence by Slovenia and 
Croatia, the CSCE activated its newly created crisis mechanism in June 1991. 
However, it was sidelined by the EC which took over mediation.182 The CSCE then 
                                                 
179
 Gorbatchev visited Slovenia in the course of his 5-day visit to Yugoslavia in March 1988 
(‘Gorbatschow ignoriert ‚slowenischen Fruehling’’ 1988); US Deputy-Secretary Eagleburger 
visited in February 1990 (Zimmermann 1996:58pp), and German Foreign Minister Genscher met 
different leaders in August 1988 (Genscher 1995). See also Kalmann 1993:20 and Woodward 
1995:136, 145, 149pp. 
180
 See also Woodward 1995:385, Dominik 2001:248p, and the newspaper articles ‘Belgrad hebt 
Preisbindung auf’ 1988, ‘IWF-Kredit an Berlin’ 1988, ‘Auch Japan will fuer UdSSR nicht zahlen’ 
1990. 
181
 In early March a delegation of the Council of Europe came, and soon after an EC Troika 
(representatives of the past, present and future EC presidency) visited Belgrade. They offered 
some ‘carrots’ in form of prolongation of the financial aid (credits) until 1995 and to increase them 
by 30% to 1.5 billion German Marks (around 750 million Euros). In early May EC President 
Delors and Prime Minister of Luxembourg Santer visited Belgrade and also met with Slovenian 
president Kucan. Delors promised to request US$4,5 Billion in aid from the EC in support of 
Yugoslavia’s commitment to political reform. Italy in May argued for an aid packet to Belgrade – 
a policy which it reversed after visits by Kucan and Tudjman in early June.  The last visitor before 
the declarations of independence then was US Secretary of State Baker who came on 21st of June, 
stating that the US would support a democratic and undivided Yugoslavia, and would not 
recognise unilateral secessionist moves. See Woodward 1995:161, Zimmermann 1996:133pp, 
Holbrooke 1998:27, Eisermann 2000:33, Markovic 2000:18pp, Judah 2002, Kaufman 2002: xiv 
and 67. 
182
 This crisis mechanism consisted first of a request of clarification on what was going on by the 
government of Yugoslavia. The second step then was to call a meeting (in July) of the CSCE 
Council of the Senior Officials in Vienna. This meeting agreed on an Urgent Appeal for a cease-
fire in Slovenia, to conduct a diplomatic mission to Yugoslavia for mediation, and offered the 
sending of an observer mission. Two later emergency meetings in August and September 1991 
repeated the calls for ceasefires and negotiations, and adopted the arms embargo of the EC. See 
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started to focus more on the situation within what became in 1992 the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. 
In the case of Kosovo the general perception within the territory and from many 
critics outside is that Kosovo did not receive any international attention before 1998. 
This is not entirely correct. The Council of Foreign Ministers and the Commission of 
the EC/EU were certainly interested in Kosovo from 1991 on, and frequently called 
on FR Yugoslavia to restore the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The CSCE 
sent one of its first long-term missions in 1992-93 to Kosovo, Sandjak and 
Vojvodina had to withdraw it when Belgrade did not extend its permission in 
summer 1993, while a special Working Group set up by the ICFY also accompanied 
the processes there from 1992 onward (see Becker 1991:944p, Woodward 1995:175, 
295, Meder and Reimann 1996:4pp, Libal 1997:17, Troebst 1998:26, Weller 
1999:18, Lucarelli 2000:19, Markovic 2000:54pp). The Kosovo issue also played a 
central role when the EU decided in 1997 to set up a Conflict Prevention Network 
whose main function was as a think-tank on conflict prevention and early warning 
for the EC Commission.183  However, decisive action was only taken by the 
international community when the nonviolent movement had broken down and was 
replaced by an armed uprising in 1998. 
Macedonia is often cited as a successful example of prevention because it was not 
drawn into the wars in the 1990s. This is mostly credited to the long-term human 
rights work of the OSCE in the country, and the presence of the first-ever preventive 
peace-keeping force since end of 1992.184  However there were few signs of early 
action in response to indicators of possible conflict after 1999 such as the influx of 
about 350,000 Kosovar refugees, including the relocation of UCK fighters from 
Kosovo to Macedonia (UNHCR 1999c, Vankovska 2002:5, International Crisis 
Group 2004c). Two years later, however, there was a prompt and determined 
                                                                                                                                          
Becker 1991:944pp, Woodward 1995:175, Meder and Reimann 1996:4, Libal 1997:14pp and 44, 
Lucarelli 2000:19, Kaufman 2002:21). 
183
 The CPN was directed at that time by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Eberhausen, and 
commissioned pilot studies on Zaire and Kosovo (see Troebst 1998:51.) 
184
 The ‘OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje’, established in 1993, had the dual function of early 
warning and conflict prevention. And the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 
opened an office in Macedonia in 1992, visiting the country in person more than 50 times between 
93 and 2001. On the OSCE in Macedonia, see Ackermann 2000:130pp, Miall 1999/2000:41, 
Rogier 2001, Ungaro 2001, van der Stoel 2001, Broughton 2002:270, Zellner 2002:21pp, Paes 
2002:237p. . 
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reaction from the side of the international community when violence eventually 
broke out in 2001 (see Gallagher 2005). 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has focussed on the effects of the interventions by international state 
actors on the conflict on the ground, characterised above all by intensive mediation 
efforts, military intervention and the commitment of enormous financial resources of 
which the total sum remains unknown. The picture drawn is one of successes and 
failures – the open violence eventually was (more or less) controlled, but usually late 
and coming with a high price that mostly the local population had to pay, and the 
post-war environment is riddled with economic and social problems. 
One important observation of particular relevance later in this study when looking at 
the activities of civil society actors is that violence was the easiest means to attract 
international attention. This is especially true for Kosovo which had been very much 
on the back-burner of international attention. The conflict there was seen through the 
lens of human rights and minority law rather than as the case of a majority 
population struggling with unarmed means for its independence. One of the Kosovo-
Albanian negotiating team concludes:  
The break-up of the former Yugoslavia has demonstrated that only war 
attracts the attention of the great powers. Only the use of violence serves 
as a catalyst for political solution, compelling the West to rush in to 
prevent conflict spreading throughout the region (Surroi 2001). 
This observation is definitely a challenge for those seeking nonviolent alternatives. 
Furthermore, however, violence was not only a recipe for local actors to attract 
attention but also often the only recognised means of solving conflict. As argued 
above, the general lesson most state actors took from the former Yugoslavia was ‘our 
interventions need to be based on a credible military threat and military capacity’. 
Therefore the successes of civilian peace-keeping in the region (see 4.2.2) were 
largely ignored. Instead, military forces were deployed to protect international 
civilian personnel even in contexts where there was very little threat as in Macedonia 
2001.  
In this sense, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia did damage far beyond its primary 
victims in the countries in war. The conflicts, and the ways they were handled by the 
4. Governmental Interventions  123 
 
 
international interveners strengthened the position of those who can only imagine 
international politics being successful when based on violence. 
In the next chapters in discussing the contributions of civil society actors to the 
interventions in the former Yugoslavia, we will frequently notice how this tension 
between violent and nonviolent approaches shaped the overall picture of what was 
done (or not done) in regard to dealing with the violent conflicts in this area. 
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5. Working Towards a Settlement of Conflict: Peace-making by Civil 
Society Actors 
 
Having looked at the core concepts relating to conflict intervention, the history of the 
area of former Yugoslavia and the interventions undertaken by state actors, it is now 
time to turn to the activities of civil society actors. In this and the next chapters I will 
describe these activities using the overarching categories introduced in the previous 
chapter: the three ‘grand strategies’ of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-
building, plus the more instrumental strategy of information, protest and advocacy 
that aims to influence other intervening actors. 
Peace-making, the topic of this chapter, has been defined as working as an external 
party towards a settlement of the conflict through either law, negotiation or the 
exercise of violence and/or other forms of power. There are not many publications 
discussing the contribution of civil society actors on peace-making in the former 
Yugoslavia. Besides The War Next Door by Judith Large (n.d.) and two small books 
on Kosovo (Troebst 1998, l’Abate 1997) most publications dealing with civil society 
actors focus on (mostly post-war) peace-building.  
Looking at the different examples found, they all fall into the category of peace-
making by negotiation in a wider sense. It seems feasible to categorise them 
according to the level of society they targeted, following Lederach’s (1997:38pp) 
distinction between top, middle-range and grassroots leadership in conflict. Top level 
mediation aims at direct impact, expecting the leaders to change their behaviour. 
Initiatives targeting the middle-range leadership are based on much more indirect 
mechanisms, be it influencing those who then can influence the decision-makers (e.g. 
second-track problem-solving workshops), or be it supporting and/ or influencing the 
opponents of the decision-makers in the hope that there will be sooner or later a 
change in power. And at the grassroots level, most conflict settlement efforts were 
not focused on the overall conflict as much as addressing more concrete matters at 
hand or the situation in a particular locality or municipality.  
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5.1 Top Level Peace-making 
The most important cases here are the mediation by the former US President Jimmy 
Carter in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Catholic Community of Sant’ Egidio in the 
Kosovo conflict.185 
 
5.1.1 Jimmy Carter in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
After the end of his term as President, Jimmy Carter together with his wife Rosalynn 
founded in 1982 a NGO called the Carter Center, based in Atlanta, USA, to “advance 
human rights and alleviate unnecessary human suffering, seeking to prevent and 
resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and democracy, and improve health” (The Carter 
Center 2008, Mission Statement). As an elder statesman, Carter himself has offered 
mediation services in a number of conflicts.  
In the former Yugoslavia Carter got involved in December 1994, mediating a 
temporary four month cease-fire agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Owen 
1995:309pp, Sloan 1998:37pp, Weiss 1999:124, Markovic 2000:183pp). The 
agreement was made in response to a six-point peace plan proposed by Bosnian Serb 
President Karadjic in a CNN interview on 14 December, Carter visiting both Bosnian 
leaders - Izetbegovic in Sarajevo and Karadjic in Pale - as well as President 
Milosevic in Belgrade.186  Carter reasoned that it would be easier to reach an 
agreement on a temporary cease-fire than getting all sides to commit to a formal 
overall peace plan. Such a temporary agreement, he hoped, could then be the first 
step towards substantive peace talks. 
                                                 
185
 There have been some few others. For example Owen (1995:242) mentions a private citizen, a 
Serb by birth, living in Paris. Being a successful publisher, he was, in Owen’s words, always ready 
to host private meetings with Yugoslavs. He did arrange such a meeting between Muslims and 
Serbs in Geneva in December 1993, and with Krajsnik in January 1994.Unfortunately I have not 
been able to find any other source on his activities. 
 A case of another high-profile individual mediating was US Senator Jesse Jackson. In May 1999, 
during the NATO was on the FR Yugoslavia, he negotiated the release of three US soldiers taken 
prisoner by Belgrade (Clark 2001:288p). 
186
 Owen (1995:309) believes that there was prior communication between Karadjic and Carter, 
speaking of a ‚prearranged statement’ by Carter in which he announced he would visit Pale after 
the CNN interview.  
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The mediation effort was coordinated with the United Nations, and included a four 
months truce meant to last from January to May, a separation of forces, the 
withdrawal of heavy weapons and the inter-positioning of UNPROFOR along the 
line of confrontation, freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR, the 
exchange of detainees, and compliance with earlier agreements concerning Sarajevo, 
Gorazde and Srebenica.187 
The ceasefire held de facto only until March-April 1995. By that spring, both parties 
had regrouped and started new military campaigns, beginning with a Bosnian 
Government offensive near Tuzla (Sloan 1998:38). I am not aware of any deeper 
evaluation of Carter’s initiative but, looking at the events in later 1995, see no 
indication that the cease-fire was a first step towards the all-encompassing (Dayton) 
peace talks as Carter had hoped. Its main positive outcomes lay probably on the 
humanitarian side, helping people to get over the winter in Bosnia without the 
additional hardship of actual fighting. 
 
5.1.2 Communità di Sant’Egidio in Kosovo 
The second high-level mediation was about another conflict the Kosovo conflict. The 
Communità di Sant’Egidio is a Catholic lay organisation often considered to be an 
instrument of informal diplomacy of the Vatican (Weller 1999:127).188 Established in 
1968 as a humanitarian organisation, today it has around 30,000-50,000 volunteers 
worldwide. Through its commitment to inter-religious and ecumenical dialogue, the 
Community has built up a reputation for mediation although, as most mediation 
happens outside the public sphere, not very much is known about this side of their 
work. Their biggest success has been mediation in the Mozambique conflict in 1989 
– 1992 (see Paffenholz 2001c, Cereghini and Sighele 2002:126-137). They were also 
                                                 
187
 The Contact Group however seems to have had mixed feeling about Carter’s initiative because 
their policy at that point was that there were to be no negotiations before all sides committed 
formally to the peace plan the Group had devised. And the Bosnian President Izetbegovic and his 
government were unhappy about Carter speaking with the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs in their 
capital Pale, thereby giving them legitimization. On the other hand Owen claims that he and his 
co-chief negotiator Stoltenberg took, in Owen’s words, ‘a positive attitude to this’ (Owen 
1995:309). 
188
 The Community’s webpage has little information on their political work. See 
http://www.santegidio.org/ [accessed 22 April 2008]. 
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involved in Guatemala and Algeria, and had been active doing humanitarian work in 
Albania since the 1980s.  
The Community’s work in Albania provided the basis for involvement in Kosovo. 
President Rugova visited their Community in Italy in 1993.189  In 1996-98 the 
Communità di Sant’Egidio mediated between the Kosovar leadership and President 
Milosevic on the re-opening of the Albanian schools (see de Vrieze 2002:291 and 
87pp.190 ) The closing of Albanian-language schools and the university in Prishtina 
by Serbia was not only highly contentious but of symbolic importance to the conflict. 
The Community called their work ‘help for dialogue and communication’, not using 
the term mediation.191 According to l’Abate (1997:21, 89), they first created a list of 
problems faced by the civilian population in Kosovo, then chose the issue of 
education as being most suitable to deal with first, and then had a number of 
meetings with both sides at different levels, helping them to exchange materials and 
proposals. 
This mediation, which was supported by both the EU and the USA, was successful 
insofar as it led to an agreement for the reopening of schools signed by Milosevic 
and Rugova in Belgrade on 1 September 1996.192 A mixed Serb-Albanian group was 
set up to negotiate its implementation but at first failed to do so.193  
In summer 1997 San Egidio renewed its mediation attempts, and managed to get the 
working group to meet in October 1997 and February 1998. In March 1998 an 
Implementation Agreement on Education was signed that planned the reopening of 
the Prishtina University in several steps, as well as the reopening of elementary and 
                                                 
189
 The Kosovo conflict had continued throughout the 1990s in the form of open state repression and 
nonviolent resistance against the Serbian rule by the Kosovo Albanians (see chapter 3). 
190
 The mediation efforts are also mentioned and described in Milosevic 1996, l’Abate 1997:21, 
Troebst 1998, Riskin 1999, Weller 1999:93, Clark 2000:125, Lund 2000c:195, Appleby 
2001:828pp and Cereghini and Sighele 2002. 
191
 Probably due to the diverse meanings of the term ‘mediation’ which is often understood to be a 
negotiation effort with a very active and dominant negotiator. See Chapter 2. 
192
 It immediately earned international recognition and in the next year was often referred to in 
official documents of intergovernmental bodies (EU, Contact Group, USA, Council of Europe, 
OSCE, WEU). 
193
 Troebst (1999:78) maintains that the agreement was flawed with technical mistakes and 
weaknesses, for example there were different translations in Albanian and Serbian language, with 
the Serbian version not mentioning university students. It was also unclear if students would return 
to state-run education or if the university buildings would be turned over to them. And there was 
no time-table for implementation. 
5. Peace-making by Civil Society Actors  129 
 
 
high schools, and naming Sant’ Egidio as the institution to assist with the different 
steps to be taken, including ‘finding a solution for possible problems which could 
emerge’ in the context of the reopening of schools.194 Eventually the university 
buildings were handed over in 1998 (after having been vandalised, see Clark 
2000:157).  
 
5.2 Middle Level Peace-making 
At this level of society, it was possible to distinguish three different approaches to 
peace-making: problem-solving workshops, creation of safe spaces for ongoing 
dialogue between middle-level opposition leaders, and the propagation of possible 
solutions by international civil society actors. 
 
5.2.1 Problem-solving Workshops 
Middle level peace-making in the context of the former Yugoslavia mostly took the 
form of what is called second-track problem-solving workshops. A well-established 
method, their basic idea is to bring together influential personalities from all sides in 
the hope that they would develop a more positive attitude towards opponents through 
meeting face-to-face, come up with possible solutions of the conflict at large, and 
filter these up to the decision-makers on their respective side.195  
In my survey of external interventions in the former Yugoslavia there were many 
examples of such initiatives, using comparable methods if not the exact term 
‘problem-solving workshop’.Most were focused on the Kosovo conflict, but there 
has been also at least one case in Croatia. To give just four examples: 
• The International Helsinki Federation (IHF), an international organisation 
monitoring the compliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final 
Act, has had three national committees in FR Yugoslavia, in Serbia, Montenegro 
                                                 
194
 The texts of both agreements are documented in Weller 1999:93-94. 
195
 The method was  first identified and described by Herbert Kelman (see Kelman 1996). Several 
international NGOs, among them International Alert and the Berghof Center are practitioners of 
the approach in various parts of the world. 
5. Peace-making by Civil Society Actors  130 
 
 
and Kosovo. It was therefore in a good position to support peace-making in the 
Kosovo conflict. Among other activities, it helped - with support of the Executive 
Director of the IHF - to arrange a meeting of Serbian and Kosovo Albanian 
intellectuals in Montenegro in June 1997, with a follow-up meeting in Prishtina 
20 February 1998. The meetings ended with an appeal for a peaceful solution and 
continued dialogue (Troebst 1998:95p). 
• The German Bertelsmann Foundation is a foundation of a publishing house 
which engages in advocacy work on different national and international issues, 
advising the European Union and individual governments. Between 1996 and 
1998 they (together with the Munich University Research Group on European 
Affairs) ran a project on Kosovo, bringing together seven Kosovo Albanian and 
Serbian intellectuals in several meetings where in small groups They discussed 
and later published recommendations on questions such as how to improve the 
given situation, how to achieve an extended autonomy and how to realise 
independence (l’Abate 1997:107pp, Troebst 1998:88pp). 
• After the end of the NATO war of 1999 the US Institute for Peace (USIP), a 
congress-funded quasi-NGO (‘Quango’) from the USA, facilitated meetings 
between a spectrum of Albanian and Serb political and community leaders, 
discussing a wide range of topics concerning reconstruction and co-habitation (de 
Vrieze 2002:298).  
• Large (n.d.:75) mentions one case of a mediation attempt in Croatia in 1995 by 
the German Foundation Die Schwelle (The Threshold) who sought to bring 
together representatives from Baranja and Osijek for ‘ a negotiation process 
parallel to that of Erdut’.196 The goal of The Threshold according to Large was to 
have a people’s agreement supporting what the high level negotiators hammered 
out in Erdut, but the attempt failed.  
 
                                                 
196
 ‘ Erdut’ was the agreement on Eastern Slavonia which allowed a peaceful reintegration of that part 
of Croatia into Croatia under the supervision of a UN Mission in 1996-1997. 
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5.2.2 Supporting the Political Opposition 
Support to the opposition – political parties, NGOs, independent media, other leaders 
– may fall under the categories of peace-making or of peace-building, depending on 
the context and the objectives of the activity. The literature usually treats this as a 
typical approach in state-building and democratisation (see Carothers 1999, Call and 
Cousens 2007). As such it will be discussed further in the chapter on peace-building. 
However, I would argue that supporting the political opposition could also be 
considered an element of peace-making, namely when the goal is to help the 
opposition formulate alternative solutions to the conflict or suggestions on 
approaches how to settle it. 
The difference from problem-solving workshops is less the method than the 
assumption about how to achieve an impact: Problem-solving workshops normally 
address people who are part of or close to the current regime and government, hoping 
that to influence decisions at their level. Creation of safe spaces for meetings and 
ongoing dialogue between middle-level opposition leaders implies expectations of 
either a future change of government, or pressure that the opposition puts on the 
regime in order to force it to change its politics.  
In the case studied here, there have been several examples of this approach, mostly in 
the form of supporting the establishment of permanent institutions or round tables of 
oppositional politicians and/ or civil society leaders from the different countries of 
former Yugoslavia. Perhaps the two most important of them will be presented here: 
the Verona Forum and the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly. 
 
5.2.2.1 Verona Forum 
The Verona Forum was created in 1992 and brought together oppositional politicians 
and NGO and media representatives for consultations and ongoing work on political 
alternatives to war (see Schweitzer 1992, Langer 1993, Langer 1995, Large n.d.:5). 
It began with a ‘Forum for Peace and Reconciliation in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia’, a conference organised by two Green politicians, the late South 
Tyrolean member of the European Parliament Alexander Langer, and the Austrian 
MP Marijana Grandits. They invited around 50 people from oppositional parties and 
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civil society organisations from all countries of the former Yugoslavia to meet for 
three days in September 1992 in Verona. The conference was also attended by about 
the same number of international civil society representatives, among them the 
International Helsinki Federation, the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly and a number of 
national groups and organisations. The goal of the conference was to discuss new 
ideas for peace and reconciliation, to initiate and support a positive dialogue between 
the ‘democratic and peace oriented’ forces in all states, and to impact the 
international peace process. 
The conference agreed on a final declaration that called for the protection of 
individual human rights, demanded the creation of a UN protectorate for Bosnia-
Herzegovina and immediate international recognition of Macedonia, and also called 
for negotiations on Vojvodina and Kosovo. Many other items remained 
controversial, starting from the question of a military intervention in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the issue of sanctions against Serbia, possible sanctions against 
Croatia, to the question of the status of Kosovo. 
The conference decided to set up permanent structures of dialogue, calling itself 
Verona Forum, led by an international steering committee of people from the former 
Yugoslavia and third party countries. This Committee met for some time quite 
intensively by phone or using other conferences as an occasion for personal 
meetings. Over the next year, it also planned and conducted several activities such as 
other conferences and round tables, supported free media and established a 
permanent coordination and communication in the European Parliament.197 It played 
an important role in bringing the democratic opposition of the different countries 
together (Coletti et al. 2007).198 
 
5.2.2.2 Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly 
The second permanent structure that served for the exchange and development of 
possible solutions among politicians and civil society leaders of the former 
                                                 
197
 I lack definite information on when the Steering Committee dissolved. The latest activities that I 
found were in 1997 (European Parliament 1997). 
198
 Many of these activities, however, I would rather rate under peace-building. 
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Yugoslavia was the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (HCA). The HCA has been an 
international umbrella consisting of civil society representatives from all the OSCE 
countries, understanding itself as a civil society mirror of the Helsinki Final Act from 
1975 (CSCE). It was founded in 1990 with a conference in Prague, and throughout 
the first half of the 1990s held regular international conferences. In the later 1990s its 
importance diminished and eventually the international office in Prague was closed. 
Today there are still some national branches (France, Greece) but no visible activities 
of the international any more.  
The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia was a major focus of attention for the HCA, 
with its first two co-chairs Sonia Licht (Serbia) and Mary Kaldor (Britain) both 
having a special commitment to the area. 199  The HCA had members from civil 
society groups in FR Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia. It 
served as a space where civil society leaders of the different countries could come 
together and exchange their views and discuss matters of common concern. One 
typical event was the ‘Citizens and Municipal Peace Conference’ held in Ohrid, 
Macedonia, in November 1992. The chair of that conference, Mient Jan Faber, wrote 
afterwards: 
Ohrid was not a peace conference of like-minded people. Or maybe it is 
better to say that although everyone was in favour of peace, the majority 
of the participants from the Balkans were highly aware that they belonged 
to ethnic groups, and therefore were ‘separated’ from one another. 
Albanians from Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia united forces; Serbs 
formed their own clusters; Macedonians energetically went around 
seeking support for their national policy to become internationally 
recognised. Thanks to some pressure and above all the persistence of the 
participants from outside the Balkans, the conference adopted a plan 
which was explicitly and exclusively based on the protection of human 
beings and multi-ethnic communities. (Faber 1993:14) 
 
                                                 
199
 The HCA like the Verona Forum was multi-functional. Many of its activities rather fell under 
protest and advocacy or peace-building. For example they organised in September 1991a Peace 
Caravan with 400 people from 30 countries travelling from Slovenia through Croatia, Bosnia to 
Serbia that was focussing on awareness raising of its international participants (see Vack 1996:27, 
210 and other sources quoted in chapter 8). There were also many conferences and delegations, 
appeals and proposals etc. (Solioz 1993). The HCA Youth Network founded in 1997 in Bosnia-
Herzegovina brings youth from all Bosnia together for seminars, conferences and trainings (Kaiser 
1994, Bekkering 1997, Bekkering 2000:192, Stovel 2000:29, Du Pont 2002:240). 
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5.2.3 Seeking to Influence the Conflict Parties Through Suggesting Solutions 
There have been a number of international organisations that initiated conferences 
and wrote and published papers suggesting solutions to the conflicts– for example 
the International Crisis Group, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the 
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy or the Aspen Institute Berlin. 
They usually addressed their suggestions to both local actors and international 
interveners. L’Abate (1997) and Troebst (1998) both have described a number of 
such initiatives regarding the Kosovo conflict. The point is that while papers were 
usually based on fact-finding missions, and conferences usually had participation 
from people from the region, in most cases the main target group seems to have been 
rather the international interveners, not the governments or oppositional actors in the 
countries in conflict (Haensel and Stobbe 2002:25). These therefore would fall rather 
under the category of advocacy work, treated in this study here as a strategy in its 
own right, and are further described in chapter 8. I would argue that suggesting 
solutions to the conflict should be categorised as part of peace-making only if the 
addressees are clearly the parties in conflict. 
One example of a group that sought to do this is the Transnational Foundation for 
Peace and Future Research (TFF), based in Sweden.200 They developed a method 
their head Jan Øberg calls ‘conflict mitigation’ (see Clark 2000:162, l’Abate 
1997:49pp, Øberg  1994, Transnational Foundation 2000, Troebst 1998:85pp).201 By 
that they mean a multi-pronged and multi-step approach. It begins with exploratory 
research missions to meet with politicians and NGO representatives from all sides. 
Based on the findings of these missions they then write draft reports, often 
containing proposals for solutions that are suggested to them during the visits. They 
share these with the people they met, as well as making them public, and invite the 
conflict parties to comment on them. The philosophy behind this approach is that 
people ‘own’ their conflicts and therefore need to be supported in the process of 
solving them themselves rather than an external party presenting ready-made 
solutions (Øberg 1994:147). 
                                                 
200
 For some of the other examples given by Troebst and l’Abate it is on the basis of the survey 
undertaken not clear if they had such contact or not, and therefore their work is not described here 
in detail. 
201
 Like Search for Common Ground they have had also a number of projects that would be 
considered peace-building projects. 
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Kosovo has been one of their major foci right from 1992 on. To give just one 
example, in 1996 they proposed a three year UN Temporary Authority for Kosovo 
comparable with UNTAES, then being established in Eastern Slavonia, in order to 
make space for peace-building efforts and a ‘Helsinki-Process’ for all the Balkans 
(Troebst 1998:85). 
 
5.3 Grassroots Level Peace-making 
Peace-making is most easily identified when the actors involved belong to the high 
or middle level of society. In the sample collected for this study, there have been 
many examples of grassroots dialogue meetings and encounters. However, I would 
place most of them under peace-building because their objectives were to improve 
the relations and create a better understanding between people from different sides of 
the conflict divide. (It must be remembered that these ‘grand strategies’ are not 
defined by the type of activity undertaken - for example ‘dialogue’ - but by the 
objectives and function of these activities. Few of these initiatives/interventions were 
concerned with the pursuance of the peace-making task of concrete steps towards a 
solution or settlement of the conflict(s).202)  
In the literature it has been observed that if in a violent conflict there is peace-making 
at grassroots level that deserves this name, it is usually undertaken by local 
‘embedded’ actors (see chapter 2 for the concept of embedded actors), not by 
international ones (see Wake 2005, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006).203 Also its impact is 
                                                 
202
 Ropers distinguished four types of dialogue, one of which is “dialogue as pre-negotiation”. But 
this type is based at the middle level of society and includes problem-solving workshops and the 
like (Ropers 2004:179). The other three – “dialogue as grassroots peace building and interpersonal 
reconciliation”, ”dialogue projects combined with individual capacity building”, and “dialogue 
projects combines with institution building, networking, and practical projects” fall under peace-
building. 
203
 However, international actors often engage in what is called ‘micro negotiations’ or, in the 
language of the United Nations, ‘humanitarian negotiations’(Goodwin 2001:122pp, McHugh and 
Bessler 2006). This refers to concrete negotiations on the ground, dealing with local matters, and is 
often needed in order to fulfil the mandate of the organisation in question, for example negotiating 
permission to deliver goods to IDPs in a certain area. In the words of Jan Egeland in the preface to 
a recent UN guide to ‘humanitarian negotiations’: “Every day, humanitarian workers are faced 
with situations that require some form of negotiation, from seeking agreement on how best to 
access those in need, to reaching an understanding with other actors of how best to protect 
civilians in times of armed conflict” (cited in McHugh and Bessler 2006:iii). This is clearly related 
to local-level peace-making but the scope of its impact is even more limited. 
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rarely the conflict at large but rather the concrete manifestation of the conflict at 
local level, though there have been exceptions to this second observation in other 
parts of the world.204 Although the activities of local civil society have not been the 
primary focus of this study here, by including such ‘embedded’ parties who intervene 
in the conflict in their own country in a study on conflict intervention, I hope to 
counteract any false impression that on the ground there was only conflict and war, 
and peace only came from abroad.  
There is one case of such local peace-making documented. It took place in Gorski 
Kotar, a mixed Croat-Serb region close to Rijeka in Croatia (Wintersteiner 
1994:226). In November or December 1991 a Croat village and a Serb village, two 
villages linked by a traditional friendship, started to build barricades – which in other 
parts of Croatia had been the prelude to open fighting In spite of strong reservations 
by the others in his village a retired Croatian philosophy professor who belonged to 
the leadership of his village went together with two other people went over to the 
Serb village.   Promising that his village would remove its barricades, he convinced 
the other village to do likewise. After that visit, his village dismantled its barricades. 
In January he returned to the Serb village. Despite the tension and distrust finally 
also the Serb village removed its barricades, and answered with a counter visit in 
May. Since then the two villages continued good relations, the project of a ‘peace 
school’ was born (see chapter 7), and a peace memorial created.  
 
5.4 Conclusions 
Thousands of NGOs and other non-state actors have involved themselves in one way 
or another in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Nevertheless, given what we know 
today about the possibilities and restrictions civil society faces when intervening in 
                                                                                                                                          
 To give one example: from 1998 on Pax Christi Germany ran a community project in the small 
town of Benkovac,/in the Croatian Krajina. Their peace workers mediated between a Serbian 
family returning to their house (which they had fled during the 1995 Croatian reconquest) nd the 
ethnic Croatian family who had lost their own homee and moved in here.  After some ‘shuttle’ 
mediation both sides agreed to meet and developed an understanding that they shared a problem. 
The result was that they both shared the house for some time (Meyer 2000:314). 
204
 For example the region of Wajir in Kenya where a local women's group managed to initiate a 
peace-process for the whole region. See Mathews 2001, USAID in 
http://eastafrica.usaid.gov/en/Article.1117.aspx [accessed 12.11.2008] 
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conflicts, it is not surprising to see that , there have been very few activities which 
would fall under the category of peace-making. Basically, there have been in this 
chapter five main types of activities distinguished: 
1. High level mediation, aiming at finding a solution to issues related to the ‘big 
conflict’. 
2. Second track conflict-solving workshops, aiming at the middle-level leadership 
with the expectation that peace-making suggestions would ‘trickle up’ to the top-
level leaderships. 
3. Creation of safe spaces for ongoing dialogue between middle-level opposition 
leaders, with the expectation that they would be instrumental in bringing about a 
power change and then their voice would count. 
4. Activities aiming at bringing proposals for solutions to the forefront of discussion 
in the target countries, with both power-holders and opposition as target groups. 
5. Grassroots mediation seeking to find solutions for conflicts at local or regional 
level, seeking to stop or prevent violence. 
If the approaches here are compared with those of state actors, it becomes obvious 
that they all fall under the subcategory of peace-making by negotiation.205 That does 
not mean that civil society actors in general do not have means of pressure at their 
disposal, though these usually will remain below the level of direct physical 
enforcement: There are instruments, such as boycotts, that attempt to apply pressure 
in favour of a certain a solution (peace-making by violence or power) but they have 
to the knowledge of the author not played a role for civil society actors in the case 
studied here.206  
The high-level and middle level peace-making examples have several things in 
common, though the basis for comparison is probably too small for any real 
generalisation: 
                                                 
205
 See chapter 2 for the varying terminology of this type of work. 
206
 Rather there have been a number of organisations acting consciously against the state-imposed 
embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by taking (sometimes even clandestinely) 
humanitarian aid or material support for NGOs into that country. 
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• They were conducted by mediators with an established name. They were either 
led by personalities who because of their previous or current public political role 
had access to political leaders (Carter, Langer, Grandits) or had a longer history 
of discreet mediation in other conflicts (Sant’ Egidio). 
• They mostly pursued limited goals (not solving whole conflict but only one step 
or aspect). 
• They were undertaken discreetly, without accompanying publicity. 
• They did not use ‘sticks and carrots’. 
• They were coordinated with and supported by state actors.  
The two high-level mediations were successful looking at the immediate outcome 
though neither of the two was of longer-lasting impact. The middle level examples 
show little success that can be easily grasped and offered as an example. On the basis 
of the information collected, it can only be speculated that there was a longer-term 
effect achieved through the different workshops and meetings in the field of longer-
term peace-building because people became acquainted with each other and began to 
develop some trust. 
The grassroots peace-making is mostly dealing not with the conflict at large but with 
localised or otherwise limited issues which are related to the overall conflict, but 
whose solution would not mean an end to that overall conflict.  
This rather short chapter looked at peace-making, one of Galtung’s three ‘grand 
peace strategies’. The next chapter will turn to the second of these strategies, peace-
keeping, which shares with peace-making its comparative small number of examples. 
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6. Preventing and Stopping Violence: Peace-keeping by Civil Society 
Actors 
 
The function of peace-keeping has been defined as the prevention of direct violence 
through influence or control of the behaviour of potential perpetrators.207  
There were many instances of military peace-keeping as well as unarmed peace-
keeping by state actors in the area of the former Yugoslavia (see chapter 4.2). 
However, peace-keeping by civil society actors was – unlike the situation in some 
other countries - relatively rare. Preventing and stopping violence by addressing the 
potential perpetrators has mostly been just one function among several of the 
different projects and organisations in question.208  
As to the sources, there is quite good documentation on several of these projects 
through books and articles, but to my knowledge no publication discussing ‘peace-
keeping by civilian actors’ specifically in the area of former Yugoslavia. 
The following analysis distinguishes between three different kinds of civil society 
peace-keeping projects.  
1. Longer-term projects,  
2. Projects assuming protective roles in certain situations, and  
                                                 
207
 That is the difference to other forms of protection that target rather the victims than the 
perpetrators, To give an example: Finding a safe place for a refugee to stay means to protect him 
or her against further violence. But it is not peace-keeping but an action of humanitarian relief that 
has been categorised in this study as peace-building. The same is true of the protection work of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia they regularly 
negotiated the exchange of detainees and visited Prisoners of War (see Morillon 1993:151p, 
Mijovic 2001:172, King, Dorn and Hodes 2002:28p). So for example they made it possible in 
September 2002 that 1,600 former detainees from Bosnian camps were evacuated to Karlovac in 
spite of Croatia first being unwilling to accept them (Owen 1995:55), and soon after in October 
played a crucial role in the agreement by all warring parties in Bosnia to set free all prisoners of 
war (Krech 1997:73, Markovic 2000:70).  
208
 Those interested in studying civilian peace-keeping would need to look to other cases: 
Israel/Palestine, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Indonesia, and a number of Latin American countries 
where protective accompaniment has become a standard strategy for nonviolent interveners. In the 
last ten years there has been a growth both of practical experience and of theoretical reflection on 
civilian peace-keeping little known in the 1990s. That it received less attention before than is 
already indicated by the fact that – aside of perhaps a few articles in magazines and the book 
edited by Hare and Blumberg (1977) - the first scientific studies on this topic only came out in the 
middle of the 1990s: Buettner (1995), Schirch (1995), Weber (1996), Coy (1997) and  Mahony 
and Eguren 1997 are the first ones I am aware of. See also Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber 2000, 
Schweitzer et al. 2001, Schirch 2006 and Mahony 2006 for overviews over such projects.   
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3. Short-term inter-positioning projects like peace marches and the like. 
 
6.1 An Organisation with a Longer-Term Peace-keeping Mandate: The Balkan 
Peace Team 
There is only one example of an organisation that had a longer-term peace-keeping 
mandate: The volunteer project Balkan Peace Team (BPT) that was working with 
small teams of 2-5 people each in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
between 1994 and 2001.209 BPT’s overall goal was a wide one: to “promote a 
peaceful development by maintaining a permanent presence of international 
volunteers in some crisis areas” (Schweitzer and Clark 2002:29). Protection and 
support of dialogue were its two foci. In Croatia protection was more important, 
whilst in Serbia and Kosovo the priority was the support of dialogue between civil 
society activists. A mandate with six working areas included two points that clearly 
fall into the area of peace-keeping:  
The Balkan Peace Team… 
• acts as international observer at the scene of incidents or potential 
flashpoints; 
• Escorts individuals or maintains a presence in threatening situations 
(Schweitzer and Clark 2002:29).210 
In Croatia between 1994 and 1999, BPT operated under the name of Otvorene Oci 
(Open Eyes) deploying two teams of volunteers, one in Zagreb (or Karlovac for part 
of the time) and the other in Split. There were two main issues around which 
Otvorene Oci’s peace-keeping activities revolved: 
The first was the issue of illegal house evictions which was a focus of concern for a 
number of local human rights groups. In the first years after independence, the 
Croatian state (or local authorities) tried to evict tenants from flats that had belonged 
to the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army. Victims were usually ethnic Serbs. Accompanying 
                                                 
209
 The Balkan Peace Team was founded and run by a group of mainly European-based peace 
organisations, among them War Resisters’ International, International Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung, OEsterreichische Friedensdienste, Dutch 
Mennonite Ex-Yugoslavia Working Group, Collectif du jumelage (Geneva), Mouvement pour une 
alternative nonviolente, Brethren Service and (with a somewhat special status)  Peace Brigades 
International. Its coordinating office was based in Germany.  
210
 The other points were identifying possibilities for dialogue, serving as a channel for non-partisan 
information from the region, assisting in the promotion of human rights, and contributing skills for 
example through trainings. 
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local human rights activists to evictions was one of the first protection-related 
activities Otvorene Oci undertook in 1994 (see Balkan Peace Team 1994, 1995 and 
1996a, Mueller 2006:48). When called to an eviction, BPT volunteers usually did not 
only come by themselves but also called upon other international agencies and media 
to be present as well. In several cases the police aborted their attempts to evict the 
tenant when they found that internationals were present in the flat.  
The second was monitoring the situation in the former Krajina (UN Protected Areas 
West and South) after the reoccupation by Croatia in 1995, and again the 
accompaniment of local activists to the area. In Western Slavonia, BPT together with 
volunteers from other international projects entered the area within a few days of the 
reconquest, seeking to establish a continuous presence of observers. One volunteer 
spent two nights in the house of a local politician who was considered to be 
threatened (see Mueller 2006:63).  Both in Mueller (2006) and Schweitzer and Clark 
(2002), as well as in the BPT newsletters and special reports (for example Balkan 
Peace Team 1995 and 1996a), a number of further examples of accompaniment of 
local activist in this context can be found: 
• A volunteer from BPT Karlovac accompanied a human right activist to Western 
Slavonia for an exploratory mission researching human rights violations and 
killings (Mueller 2006:64).  
• BPT Split in and after 1995 sought to maintain a regular presence in  the area 
around Knin, and made a point of visiting villages in the area and inquiring after 
people’s well-being, specially of the elderly Serbs who stayed behind when the 
Croatian army reoccupied the territory (Mueller 2006:69pp, Schweitzer  and 
Clark 2002:7, 30pp).  
• The Split team accompanied in 1996 an activist from Split when a family from a 
village in the former ‘Sector South’ reported the bombing of their houses on the 
Croatian Statehood Day. The activist and BPT accompanied a representative of 
the family to the police to inquire about the investigation, and they talked with 
other international organisations including the ECMM. Afterwards, BPT wrote a 
public report that was distributed through the international BPT member 
organisations as well as to international actors in Croatia (see Balkan Peace Team 
1996e, Mueller 2006:96pp). 
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• In another case, the team accompanied an activist from the (Croatian) Helsinki 
Committee in a visit to two Serbian monasteries in Krajina in order to assess their 
needs (Balkan Peace Team 1996d).  
To assess BPT’s strategy, two other points need to be mentioned. The first is BPT’s 
limited ability to develop ‘international clout’. BPT was influenced by Peace Brigade 
International’s theory of unarmed deterrence:211  
International accompaniment can succeed in deterring attacks because the 
decision makers behind these attacks seldom want a bad international 
image. They don’t want the world to know about what they are doing. 
They don’t want diplomats making them uncomfortable mentioning 
human rights problems in their meetings. They don’t want to read in the 
international press that they are being called monsters or criminals. They 
will avoid all that if they can. (Mahony 2004:7)  
For that reason, at least BPT member organisations expected to build up similar 
international influence and support (see Balkan Peace Team Coordinating Committee 
1998). However, in the event, other than through its member organisations, very little 
was done in this respect, partly because of simple lack of resources (see Schweitzer 
and Clark 2002:21 and 39). How much that affected BPT’s efficacy is not clear. 
The second point is BPT’s relationship to the international missions, especially 
UNPROFOR and EC: Other than in the context of exchanging information or having 
to request permission to enter certain areas, BPT kept a conscious distance from 
them. This was partly due to the fact that BPT was an initiative of a coalition of 
pacifist groups that as a matter of principle did not wish any cooperation with armed 
actors or governments. But it was also due to BPT’s practical experience in the field. 
In Croatia (and to a lesser degree in Serbia) the international state actors (UN, 
EC/EU etc) were not well liked, and so not being identified with them gave a 
strategic advantage to the operation on the ground (Schweitzer and Clark 
2002:38).212 
                                                 
211
 Though not being the first or only organisation practising protective accompaniment or 
intercessionary peace-keeping in Schirch’s terminology, it is Peace Brigades International who 
elaborated this technique the most, and whose name is most linked to accompaniment. According 
to this deterrence theory, the protective effect of international presence is that of an indirect threat 
– the threat with an international reaction in case an attack or human rights violation occurs in the 
presence of the international monitor / accompanier, thereby increasing the political cost. See 
Mahony and Eguren 1997 and Mahony 2004 and 2006. 
212
 Just to remark on the term ‘pacifist’: I use this term to describe certain groups in a way it is often 
used in Germany , that is more or less a synonym for ‘nonviolent’ but with a more political 
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6.2 Projects Assuming Peace-keeping Roles Incidentally in Certain Situations 
In the last years and in the context of the discussion on human security, it has be 
more widely recognised that civilian protection may be a function to be fulfilled by 
aid and development organisations operating in insecure environments,  even though 
their mandate does not foresee this(see Slim and Bonwick 2005, Mahony 2006, 
O’Callaghan and Pantuliano 2007). While the theoretical acknowledgment may have 
still been mostly lacking in the earlier 1990s, in practice many organisations found 
themselves challenged with issues of direct protection.  
• International volunteers working in refugee camps in Croatia (see 7.4.1) provided 
by their presence a certain protection especially for Muslim refugees, as Ruez 
(1994:74) confirms. The Muslim refugees were merely tolerated in Croatia, and 
the international presence (and the publicity due to their presence) prevented or 
mitigated police actions in the camps. 
• A second example would be the International Volunteer Project Pakrac. This was 
a youth and reconstruction project in Croatia run by a Croatian NGO in 
cooperation with the UN (see 7.3.2.1). After the reoccupation of Western 
Slavonia in 1995, some other international volunteers in addition to BPT 
maintained a presence in houses of the minority of Serbs who had not fled during 
the offensive and were now threatened (see Balkan Peace Team 1996b, 
Committee for Conflict Transformation Support 2001).  
• Especially in the early years after the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
peace-building projects working there found themselves sometimes challenged 
by the possibility of interethnic violence especially in the context of refugee and 
IDP return. While they usually tended to call to IFOR / SFOR in for such cases - 
for example to escort people visiting graveyards - there were also situations 
where the presence of the civilian peace or development workers directly 
provided some protection. So for example one peace worker from the German 
Civil Peace Service in Banja Luka looked after an elderly widow who had 
returned to her pre-war apartment but was afraid of being attacked and evicted 
again (see Pax Christi 2003). 
                                                                                                                                          
connotation to it – a pacifist organisation would be one that on the basis of its nonviolent approach 
involves itself in politics regarding issues of militarization and disarmament, rejecting all military 
means out of principle.  
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• According to Lambach (2004:8), in Kosovo after 1999, staff from the German 
Forum Civil Peace Service though otherwise cooperating with KFOR preferred 
to accompany Serbian returnees themselves in spite of security concerns rather 
than calling KFOR because they feared that KFOR’s presence would provoke 
extremist forces. 
• Many local NGOs, especially the women, anti-war and human rights groups had 
international volunteers working with them. Sometimes these volunteers were 
deployed by a peace service organisation, sometimes they just came on their own 
(see 7.7.5.2). As several activists from Croatia confirmed in personal talks and 
interviews conducted at the occasion of a War Resisters’ International meeting in 
Ohrid 2004, having these internationals around gave the local activists protection. 
 
6.3 Short-term Inter-positioning Projects 
The third type of activities with clear peace-keeping functions have been a number of 
‘peace marches’ that took place between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as 
well as one small action in Kosovo in 1998.213 They can all be classified as a form of 
’inter-positioning’ (see Schirch 1995).214 The basic idea of inter-positioning is to 
stand between two warring parties and stop the violence because these parties would 
hopefully refrain from attack knowing that the first casualties would be the 
nonviolent activists. However, most of the examples presented below tended to 
prioritise ‘witnessing’ and ‘expressing solidarity’, with the inter-positioning function 
as secondary though clearly recognizable.215 
 
                                                 
213
 I am not counting the 1991 Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly ’peace caravan’ among their number 
because its objectives were public protest and education of the international participants (see Buro 
1997:122p, Vack 1996:27, 210).  
214
 I have personal knowledge of three of the actions described in this chapter, having participated in 
’¡Solidarity for Peace’ and ’Mir Sada’ as well as co-organised ’Sjeme Mira’. 
215
 “Witnessing” refers to a Christian concept. Generally it means expressing one’s beliefs in public. 
For nonviolent groups it implies furthermore the expression of the nonviolent approach and 
convictions the group professes. “Public witness is an intentional way of offering our peace 
perspective to the wider community”, write Christian Peacemaker Teams ( [online] at 
<http://www.cpt.org/about/faq#21> [20.1.2009]), one of the evangelical nonviolent Christian 
groups standing for this approach.  
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6.3.1 Inter-positioning in the Bosnian War 
In September 1992 a small group of about 20 participants going went to Sarajevo 
(Laubenthal 1992, World Peace and Relief Team n.d., World Peace and Relief Team 
1993, Schweitzer 1994:59). It was organised by the World Peace and Relief Team 
(WPRT), a small humanitarian / peace organisation set up by a British citizen living 
in Austria. The founder and his co-worker and wife, a Fellowship of Reconciliation 
Austria employee, had been involved in an earlier inter-positioning project, the Gulf 
Peace Team, in 1991.216 The approach of WPRT was to combine humanitarian aid 
with peace action. They travelled to Sarajevo by road, and then carried out 
humanitarian work, mostly in the hospital, for four weeks. Their hope was that their 
presence would constitute a buffer between the armed forces, but there is no 
indication that this goal was achieved beyond the fact that they were allowed to go in 
and out of Sarajevo in safety (see World Peace and Relief Team n.d. and 1992).  
In December 1992 there was a peace ‘caravan’ with the title ‘Solidarity for Peace in 
Sarajevo’ which was much larger, having about 500 participants, mostly Italians with 
perhaps 30 from other countries like USA, Belgium and Germany (see Beati i 
costruttori di pace 1992, War Resisters International 1994:6, Schirch 1995, 
Schweitzer et al. 2001-chapter 2, Una risposta alla violenza (n.d.), Cavagna 2007).  It 
was organised by the Catholic Italian organisation Beati i costruttori di pace, founded 
in 1985 by a Catholic priest named Don Albino Bizzotto, and working in many parts 
of the world. Like WPRT, they sought to combine humanitarian aid with peace work 
and from 1992 onwards they had a small permanent team of volunteers in 
Sarajevo.217 The goals of the December 1992 intervention – a 24 hour visit to 
Sarajevo - were moderate, and did not assume that they would be able to stop the 
war. They were 
to promote a peaceful solution of the conflict, to demonstrate that the 
search for peace is not an exclusive function of governments, be witness 
to violations of human rights and to living conditions and will to peace of 
people affected by war. (Beati i costruttori di pace 1992) 
                                                 
216
 The international Gulf Peace Team tried to prevent the (UN-sanctioned) threatened attack of the 
Allied Forces against Iraq in early 1991. Up to 250 activists inter-positioned themselves on the 
border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq in the desert.  Iraq evacuated the protesters to Baghdad after 
ten days of the bombing. The Gulf Peace Team is documented among other places in Buettner 
1995, Schirch 1995, Burrowes 2000 and Schweitzer et al. 2001.   
217
 For today’s activities, see http://www.beati.org. The page however does not include any 
documents on the peace caravans described here.  
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But one of its effects was a 24-hour cease-fire in Sarajevo because the Serbian forces 
stopped shelling the town for the time the caravan was in Sarajevo, so it can be 
argued that there was some de-facto inter-positioning by the peace caravan.  
In August 1993 Beati i costruttori di pace joined forces with the French humanitarian 
organisation Equilibre for another, even larger peace caravan with around 3,000 
participants under the name Mir Sada / We share one peace (see Tonnis and Carlen 
1993, Papini 1995, Schirch 1995, Mueller and Buettner 1998, Schweitzer 2000a, 
Cozzoli 2002). As in December 1992, there was to be a bus caravan to Sarajevo, with 
a smaller group of activists intending to stay some time in the Serbian-controlled 
territory.218 To the goals of the previous Solidarity for Peace was added an element 
of trying to enforce a cease-fire by the presence of the caravan (see Papini 1995:67). 
About 2,000 people from Italy, France, USA, Japan, Germany, Britain, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Greece, Sweden, Norway and the Czech Republic gathered in 
Split, Croatia for the four-week project.219  However, various factors - including 
disagreement on the goals as well as differences in the risk assessment - caused a 
falling out between the two organisers soon after a first group of buses had left Split 
and entered Bosnia, and Equilibre decided to quit the action. One for Equilibre’s 
changed risk analysis was that, in addition to the fighting in central Bosnia, the USA 
had now announced that they were prepared to attack Serbian positions south-east of 
Sarajevo (Tonnis and Carlen 1993). Shortly afterwards Beati i costruttori also 
decided to abandon the journey and return to Split because of military action on the 
road ahead. Only a small group with a couple of vehicles travelled on by themselves, 
not accepting the authority of the organisers and without their backing. A couple of 
other buses travelled later from Split to Mostar where a demonstration was held in 
the Croatian part of the town. 
The evaluation of the project is contested. While the organisers considered the visit 
an outright success (personal knowledge), many participants saw it as a failure since 
Sarajevo was not reached. As I saw it at that time, the reasons for Mir Sada not 
achieving its goals were 
• imprecision about the goals; 
                                                 
218
 The original plan had been to create three peace camps, one in each ethnic region of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, with 60-80 participants in each camp, and staying for one to two weeks. 
219
 3,000 according to some sources for example Tonnis and Carlen 1993. 
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• flawed structure of organisation and decision-making; 
• mistakes in relationship to the local peace groups, and 
• lack of preparation of the participants. (Schweitzer 2000a) 
Local peace and anti-war groups tended to be generally very critical about these 
peace caravans, as was reflected in an evaluation by War Resisters’ International one 
and a half years later. Referring to the December 1992 and the August 1993 actions 
the report observed: 
Each action has tended to have a powerful personal impact on 
participants, but less on the situation. The actions tended to express 
vague, rather general sentiments; the larger actions were an organisational 
nightmare. Consultation with local groups was also a weakness (War 
Resisters’ International 1994:6; see also Schirch 1995:65pp on the same 
issue). 
After these international projects, Beati i costruttori di pace continued to experiment 
with inter-positioning:220:  
• During a peace demonstration somewhat later in 1993 a group of activists tried to 
cross symbolically a bridge between the Muslim and Serbian part of Sarajevo. 
The action went dramatically wrong, and one of the activists of Beati i costruttori 
di pace was killed by gun fire (Cavagna 2007).221 
• In September 1994, more than 100 people visited Sarajevo to express solidarity 
with the people who suffered from war, and to symbolically offer a form of 
anticipated accompaniment to the Pope (who they were demanding should also 
visit Sarajevo) (Cozzoli 2002:174).  
• In August 1995, 200 people wanted to repeat a visit but were stopped in 15 km 
distance from Sarajevo (Cozzoli 2002:174). 
                                                 
220
 There was one more international peace march: 'Sjeme Mira' ('Seed of Peace'), set up in December 
1993 by around 20 US-American, Dutch and German participants of Mir Sada who, being 
dissatisfied with how Mir Sada had worked out, wanted to do a smaller action of their own 
(Schirch 1995; Mueller and Buettner 1998, Schweitzer et al. 2001chapter 2). The group comprised 
primarily of activists from Catholic Workers US and the German Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung 
(Federation for Social Defence) travelled in several vehicles for two weeks through southern 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, distributing leaflets and some humanitarian aid, and tried to make 
contacts with people who appeared open towards peace. Its goals were not so much inter-
positioning as promoting peace and witnessing the situation. The action as such has been evaluated 
mostly positively by its participants, but like its predecessors did not leave any lasting impact. 
221
 While the media immediately blamed a Serbian sniper, Beati i costruttori di pace rather assumes 
that the bullet that killed Gabriele Moreno Locatelli came from the Muslim side. See Cavagna 
2007. 
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6.3.2 Inter-positioning in Kosovo 
Prevention of violence through international presence later came up again in the 
context of the Kosovo conflict: 
In March 1998, the US-American nonviolent group Peaceworkers, an organisation 
with a long history of direct nonviolent action, sent a delegation to Kosovo in 
solidarity with the Kosovar students of the University of Prishtina demonstrating in 
for the reopening of the university and for political freedom (see Hartsough 1996, 
Hartsough 1998,  Peaceworkers 1998, Hartsough 2008). Five of the US-American 
activists were arrested and deported after a few days in jail. Their action falls under 
the category of peace-keeping insofar as it was quite explicitly based on methods of 
inter-positioning and international presence as understood by the initiator David 
Hartsough. Peaceworkers hoped that their international presence would help provide 
protection to the Albanian nonviolent protesters and help make peaceful change 
possible in Kosovo (Hartsough 2008).222  
 
6.3.3 Relationship to Other Actors 
To conclude this section, two additional observations need to be made. The first is 
the issue of ‘international clout’. The public relations work around the different 
marches varied, but at least the main ones undertaken by Beati i costruttori di pace 
were well documented in Italian and partly also other international media.223 
The second is about the relations to state actors, especially UNPROFOR in Bosnia-
Herzegovina: To access Sarajevo was at that time not possible without at least being 
tolerated by UNPROFOR that controlled the access to the no-man’s land between the 
Serbian circle and the government-held inner part of Sarajevo. Therefore, the 
caravans were announced to UNPROFOR and they gave some degree of support, at 
least in terms of opening the road so that the convoys could pass. As I remember, 
there were also offers by UNPROFOR to accompany the bus caravans in the same 
manner as they accompanied UNHCR convoys, but these offers were turned down to 
                                                 
222
  It also had an aspect of protest and advocacy since called people to make protests to the Yugoslav 
and US president, and to send support messages to the students in Kosovo.   
223
 And being a Catholic organisation, Beati i costruttori di pace had access to official channels of the 
Catholic Church. 
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emphasise the nonviolent and non-partisan position of the interveners. 
 
6.4 Conclusions  
Compared to the activities described in the later chapters on peace-building and 
protest and advocacy, there have been only very few examples of nonviolent peace-
keeping by civil society actors in the case study. Three types were distinguished: 
1. Longer-term projects with peace-keeping as part of the mandate, with Balkan 
Peace Team in Croatia being the only example; 
2. Protection activities by projects that were about other objectives but who took a 
role in protection when the situation warranted it; 
3. Short-term inter-positioning projects. 
Unlike in countries where there are NGOs (international or local) whose main roles 
are protective accompaniment or monitoring and presence, there were no civil 
society projects that focussed exclusively on such peace-keeping functions (see 
footnote 2 this chapter). As with peace-making, civil society peace-keeping was 
dealing with two different contexts: the ‘conflict at large’ (seeking to stop the war 
through inter-positioning), and concrete protection of specific people in specific 
locations (protective presence and accompaniment). The different methods used 
match well what has been identified in other studies, especially the comparative work 
by Slim and Bonwick (2005) and Mahony (2006): 
• Deterrence through international clout, or rather: connectedness to other 
international actors.224 
• Protection through building connections to potential perpetrators on the ground. 
• In addition it is clear that internationals have a symbolic power as ‘untouchables’ 
whether or not they could mobilise international clout (BPT in Croatia was not 
strong on the latter, but nevertheless was able to protect).  
                                                 
224
 However, deterrence is not the only strategy in protection. Slim and Bonwick (2005) and the 
authors of the Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility study (Schweitzer et al. 2001) came to the 
conclusion that there were alternative sources of protection than deterrence, for example respect 
for the intervener because of his/ her identity (age, gender, country of origin), his/her role and 
whom s/he represents (e.g. the UN), law and tradition (e.g. ethics of hospitality), and simply 
building up trust with all sides.  
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Other observations to be made are: 
• The function of protection has sometimes benefitted from being combined with 
other types of activities, such as civil society support, humanitarian aid or 
dialogue work. The connections to different actors made in the course of these 
other activities could be used when protection was called for. This is clearly 
shown by the example of BPT as well as of the incidental protection work. The 
relationship to the international governmental interveners, especially the military 
peace-keepers, is ambivalent. It seems that the overall ideological orientation of 
those running projects which they as demonstrating an alternative to military 
intervention (see the chapter on protest and advocacy) played as much a role as 
the situation on the ground. Projects run by pacifist groups kept a clear distance 
and maintained cooperation at a minimal level, which they also justified by 
finding better acceptance on the ground (BPT). Other – human rights, 
humanitarian and also peace service organisations – displayed generally a higher 
degree of cooperation with the military forces (for example seeking out the 
military peace-keepers as first option for protection), but again there was in the 
sample one case where this was not done because of the group in question felt 
that accompaniment by the military increased instead of lowered the risk.225  
Those projects hoping to stop the violence by inter-positioning themselves mostly 
had very limited success. While their presence indeed in at least some cases led to a 
reduction of the fighting, the short-term character of their stay made it easy for the 
combatants to allow for such a break in the fighting without it having a real influence 
on the conflict. This is not surprising and confirms the findings from other studies 
(see Weber 2000, Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber 2000, Schweitzer et al. 2001). 
Inter-positioning with the goal of simply stopping a war has never worked so far for 
a variety of reasons that have both to do with the character of modern war and with 
the logistical challenges ‘peace armies’ face.226 
                                                 
225
 This picture is not surprising taking later cases like for example Afghanistan where a number of 
NGOs seek to maintain their distance to the international military because being seen as connected 
to them would increase their risk and jeopardise the work they are doing (Lambach 2004). See also 
VENRO (2003) for a general statement on the issue. 
226
 The Gulf Peace Team in the desert had the attacking air force flying over their heads to Baghdad. 
And most other ‘peace army’ initiatives never got beyond the planning stage because of 
insurmountable logistical problems (finance, transportation, access to the war area). 
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On the other hand the remark needs to be made that it may be ‘unfair’ to evaluate 
these projects only in regard to stopping violence. They all had other goals as well, 
foremost expressing solidarity and reporting what they saw back home, while those 
actions carried out by the Catholic organisation Beati i costruttori di pace also had a 
strong religious element of ‘bearing witness’ in a spiritual sense that cannot be 
measured by hard-core social science impact indicators. 
Projects dealing with concrete threats of violence in a more limited context have had 
overall more success. The evaluations of the work of Balkan Peace Team show that it 
played a constructive role in protection in Croatia. 
The question if ‘civilian peace-keeping works’ is of course a wider question that was 
already addressed in chapter 4, acknowledging that the major projects of civilian 
peace-keeping in former Yugoslavia were not undertaken by civil society but by state 
actors (see 4.2.2). 
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7. Dealing with the Causes and Consequences of Violence:  
Peace-building by Civil Society Actors  
 
Peace-building has to address both the causes and consequences of violent conflict: 
Material destruction, and non-physical damage such as traumatisation, hatred 
towards those seen as belonging to ‘the enemy’, break-down of relationships, and the 
weakening or malfunctioning of structures and institutions. It includes all those 
activities that address structural issues, relationships between the conflict parties or 
otherwise seek to reverse the destructive processes of conflict and war, and is by far 
the category with the greatest variety and largest number of activities. Peace-building 
is often defined as beginning only after a cease-fire has been agreed (see Boutros-
Ghali 1995, Lewer 1999). However the findings in this case study show clearly what 
was already suggested in chapter 2.2.4.3, namely that the same activities and 
strategies can be found – only perhaps less frequently - in early stages of crisis 
escalation and even during war times.  
Peace-building activities have been reasonably well documented, including 
evaluations of individual projects and a few meta evaluations and studies about one 
or the other type of activity. In addition, I have used minutes of coordination 
meetings, leaflets and other ephemeral material.  
As to the presentation of the findings in this category, I decided to first try to sketch 
the overall picture in each of nine sub-categories of peace-building identified (see 
chapter 2.2.4.3) in order not to allow examples that may be interesting but not typical 
to distort the understanding of what has taken place. For examples, I have looked for 
either ‘good practice’ or activities that were somewhat out of the ordinary. 
 
7.1 Humanitarian Relief 
In chapter 2.2.4.3 it was argued that helping people to survive a war is a first step to 
reversing its destructive processes, and for that reason aid can be considered part of 
peace-building. Humanitarian relief and support of IDPs and refugees has been one 
of the major areas of activities by international civil society in the former 
Yugoslavia.  
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7.1.1 Material Humanitarian Aid 
During the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, two NGOs played a major role as collection 
points and transmitters of aid to the Muslim and Croat parts of the country: the 
Catholic Caritas and the Bosnian-Muslim Merhamet (Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 
1996, different minutes of the [Ex-]Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis).227 They and 
other large humanitarian NGOs almost all closely cooperated with UNHCR which 
coordinated the transports into Bosnia-Herzegovina and the airlift to Sarajevo.228  
What made the relief efforts in the period of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina special compared to other conflicts is the extent of small private 
initiatives that went beyond sending money to the accounts of the established aid 
organisations.229 An almost uncountable number of small citizen groups collected 
food, clothes, medicine, tools or other items, and either sent it with one of the larger 
agencies, or hired a truck of their own to drive it down (see Schmitz 1998:12).  The 
survey conducted for this study identified around 200 groups in Europe and North 
America being involved in such work, and there is reason to believe that this is only 
a tiny percentage of the total number. For Germany alone, Klaus Vack, a peace 
activist whose organisation, the Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie 
(Committee for Basic Rights and Democracy), was very involved in humanitarian 
aid claims that there were 1,700 German groups who rendered aid to Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and 1995 (Vack 1996:14 and 41).  
Aside from collecting money and/or buying and sending material aid, NGOs and 
citizens’ groups were also involved in a number of other humanitarian activities 
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 Variously known as (Ex-)Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskeis,  ‘Koordinierungskreis 
Jugoslawienarbeit’, or ‘Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis’ (including in the minutes of the 
meetings), this coordination circle met in Germany almost every month. from 1992 to 1995, 
exchanging information about the work of different humanitarian and political initiatives. 
Regardless of how a particular set of minutes are headed, they will be referred to as "(Ex-) 
Jugoslawien-Koordinierungkeis".  Most projects have been addressed on multiple occasions at 
these meetings – therefore this summary reference that will be given in several places of this 
chapter. 
228
 According to Cutts (1999:6), by the end of 1995 there were over 250 international humanitarian 
organisations operating under the UNHCR ‘umbrella’, with ICRC being the only major 
humanitarian organisation to operate outside its framework. 
229
 This picture is different from that of the Kosovo crisis and war 1998-1999 where there was a lot of 
protest but not as much individual relief work other than that of established large humanitarian 
NGOs and of the diaspora communities, though some of the smaller groups that had engaged in 
relief during the Bosnia war reactivated their efforts and brought relief to refugee camps in 
Macedonia and Albania. .  
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during and after the wars of that period: Establishing soup kitchens, equipping 
hospitals or sending doctors and nurses to increase the number of personnel working 
there, or bringing wounded children or adults for treatment to third countries.  
The motives of these groups certainly varied. Many did it out of purely humanitarian 
reasons – feeling compelled to help in the face of the reports of suffering, because 
they had relatives in the region or in some cases also just because they used to spend 
holidays in Yugoslavia and knew people personally. “We must do something”, “We 
cannot watch” were key phrases to be found again and again in the descriptions of 
various small groups.230  
Others, especially groups with a background in the peace movement, mixed 
humanitarian with political motives. An example is the German Komitee fuer 
Grundrechte und Demokratie. When the conflicts in former Yugoslavia started, they 
began to organise humanitarian aid after having participated in the Helsinki Citizens’ 
Assembly’s Peace Caravan in November 1991.231 They saw humanitarian aid in the 
context of their protest against the war and as propaganda against military action: 
When a war has started and surpassed a certain border, then a dynamic of 
aggression once started cannot be stopped, unless there are strong forces 
within the country. In such a situation a weak peace movement can only 
help people in certain fields. The other is to support those forces 
interested in peace where bloody conflicts hold sway (Vack 1996:41, 
translation CS). 
This approach was shared by many other citizens’ groups that combined aid with 
peace-related activities. for example, the Antikriegshaus Sievershausen, a small 
group from Northern Germany, conscientiously took the aid they collected to all 
ethnic groups, making a priority of delivering to Serbian victims of war in order to 
counter-act the prevalent view in Germany that “the Serbs” were the perpetrators and 
“the Croats” and “the Muslims” the victims.232 They hoped that through the contacts 
between the parties that they had to facilitate in order to reach the various 
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 See for example Scotto 2001 for Communità /Associazione Papa Giovanni XXIIIrd, and 
Arbeitskreis Jugoslawienkonflikt 1995 for the group with the same name in Trier/Germany. 
231
 That caravan travelled throughout Yugoslavia demonstrating for peace and meeting anti-war 
groups in all republics. 
232
 The Serbian parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina received comparatively little aid from the international 
community though there were some NGOs that made a point of delivering aid to all sides. As far 
as I know, it has been mostly the Serbian and Yugoslav Red Cross Societies that filled the gap 
here, with support from UNHCR (Mercier 1995:128pp). 
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destinations of their aid longer-term relationships between the ethnic groups after the 
war would be possible (Antikriegshaus Sievershausen 1995:244). 
 
7.1.2 Sheltering Refugees and Displaced  
7.1.2.1 The Overall Picture 
As explained in chapter 3, there are no reliable figures for the total of those who were 
displaced or became refugees during the wars. Estimates speak of 3 million for the 
Croatian/Bosnian wars in total, up to 1.4 million IDPs and refugees from Kosovo in 
1998 and 1999, and 150,000 seeking to escape violence in Macedonia 2001.  
Between 1992 and 1995 large refugee camps were created in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Croatia, fewer in FR Yugoslavia, either run by UNHCR, the governments of the 
host countries, or larger NGOs.233 When the readiness of Croatia to accept Bosnian 
(Muslim) refugees came to an end, many people were sent on to other third countries 
in Europe, or even North America or Australia and New Zealand.234  
During the NATO war on FR Yugoslavia in 1999, the high numbers of Kosovo-
Albanian refugees overwhelmed the neighbouring countries. In Albania and 
Macedonia, UNHCR together with the World Food Programme, NATO and around 
180 to 200 NGOs had to deal with some 800,000 refugees in several hundred camps (see 
UNHCR 1999a,Wilkinson 2001).235  
The role of civil society actors has not been limited to be partner of international 
organisations in running refugee and IDP camps. They also have been  
                                                 
233
 Serbia received hundred thousands of refugees from Bosnia and Croatia. The FR Yugoslavia at the 
end of the year 2000 hosted still about 390,000 refugees (Wilkonson 2001), or according to the 
United States Committee for Refugees (2001) even 484,000 of whom close to 290,000 had come 
from Croatia and 190,000 from Bosnia. In 2007 it were still over 100,000 according to Klincov 
(n.d.).  
234
 Many people also found a place to stay either with families, or moving into empty houses left by 
those who had fled ‚in the other direction’. The regulation of ownership and eventual return of the 
original owners to their houses has been one of the major tasks in reconstruction in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
235
 Partners of UNHCR in Macedonia were among others Action Contre la Faim, American Refugee 
Committee, Arbeiter Samariter Bund, Care Australia, Catholic Relief Services, Centro Regionale 
d’Intervento per la Cooperazione, Danish Refugee Council, HELP, International Catholic 
Migration Commission, International Center for Migration Policy Development, IFCR, 
International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, Intersos, Italian Consortium for 
Solidarity, Mercy Corps International, Norwegian Refugee Council and Oxfam (UNHCR 1999a). 
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• supporting refugees that had come to third countries; 236 and  
• They facilitated access of refugees to third countries. This last type of initiative 
will be described in the following section.  
 
7.1.2.2 Helping People to Escape 
In 1993 the plight of those displaced by the war became known to the wider public 
through intensive media reporting. Many were without adequate shelter in the 
already overwhelmed neighbouring countries, or still in Bosnia finding that their 
homes suddenly lay in ‘enemy territory’ and facing immediate expulsion or worse. 
The first response of civil society in the western European countries was to appeal to 
their governments to accept larger numbers of refugees, but the EC countries proved 
to be very hesitant and, when eventually agreeing on quotas, these were considered 
to be too low by many people in civil society (see 8.2.3). For that reason, in some 
countries citizens started initiatives to enable displaced to gain entry outside the 
official ‘quota system’. The example on which I have the best documentation is a 
German initiative, but there were comparable efforts in several European countries. 
In autumn 1993 several German groups, mostly with a peace movement background, 
came together to found a new initiative first called Survive the Winter, soon renamed 
Survive the War. This initiative used a gap in the German immigration laws. People 
from non-EU countries could get a three-month visa if they were invited personally 
by a resident who guaranteed the costs of their stay. Through the network of its 
supporters and through public appeals, Survive the War found hundreds of 
individuals, families and local groups, both ethnic Germans and people with a 
migration background from the area to personally invite refugees.237 These refugees 
were either identified in camps in Croatia or later in (quite risky) trips undertaken to 
areas in Serbian-controlled parts of Bosnia where Muslim minorities were trapped. 
These invitees usually first stayed with their ‘sponsors’, and then obtained 
permission to remain since, once in the country, they could not be deported because 
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 For example SOS telephone lines, advice centres, psychological support etc. Sometimes groups 
also sought to hide people who were threatened with eviction (for example Kosovo Albanians or 
Serbs). See Baglioni 2001:227, Pax Christi Nederland (ed.) 1995 and the minutes of the (Ex-
)Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis in Germany. 
237
 Later, people were also sent on to partners in Sweden and other countries. 
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of humanitarian concerns.238 The initiative soon had to build its own transit camp 
close to Zagreb where at some times several hundred people stayed - the average in 
1995 was 300. Before the end of 1995, Survive the War had helped almost 8,000 
mostly Muslim Bosnians to escape (see Den Krieg ueberleben 1995 and 1998, and 
the minutes of the (Ex)-Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis 1993, 1994 and 1995).  
 
7.1.3 Summary: Relief Work - Almost a Social Movement 
For reasons of space, it is almost impossible to do justice to the enormous 
humanitarian aid efforts undertaken by thousands of groups in response to the first 
years of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. While in terms of the impact on the 
ground, certainly the large organisations (both state and non-state) were more 
important, for a study on civil society interventions the spontaneous direct help by 
many small groups and individual citizens are of special interest. I think that the aid 
they organised and delivered can be considered an important expression of a social 
movement responding to the conflicts. While this question of a movement will be 
discussed further in chapter 8, it could be noted already here that it was as visible and 
present as it was heterogeneous in nature: Purely humanitarian motives (often mixed 
with implicit or explicit criticism of governmental efforts that were considered 
insufficient), political motives to help one or the other side identified as the victims 
of aggression, and motivations to help to overcome the conflict through the aid 
activity were at least three stand points clearly distinguishable. 
 
7.2 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of Combatants 
As mentioned briefly in chapter 4, DDR has mostly been the responsibility of the 
international military peace-keepers and the civilian administration where there was 
one set up, sometimes with the aid of private mercenary firms. Civil society actors – 
NGOs – have played a role mostly in the third phase, the reintegration of soldiers. 
Many offered vocational training for former soldiers. Veterans have also been a 
target group for psycho-social trauma care, and for projects in the context of ‘dealing 
with the past’. This kind of work on reintegration of soldiers, however, may be better 
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 Often the  refugees found work and were able to support themselves. 
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placed in the peace-building categories on reconstruction, economic recovery and 
social/psycho-social work, with veterans just being another target group, and will be 
presented below.  
 
7.3 Reconstruction and Refugee Return 
The category ‘reconstruction’ refers to the physical rehabilitation (repair or 
rebuilding) of houses, roads and infrastructure (water, electricity etc.). 
Reconstruction has usually been closely linked with material aid as well with the 
return of IDPs and refugees. In the following section I will first sketch the overall 
picture, and then turn to one special type of reconstruction project that combined 
physical reconstruction with all sorts of community activities. 
 
7.3.1 The Overall Picture  
It would be a misconception to assume that reconstruction only started after cease-
fire agreements were signed. NGOs were active in many areas of Bosnia-
Herzegovina long before the end of 1995.239 After the end of the war, the countries 
hosting refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia wished them to return which 
in consequence boosted reconstruction efforts after 1995. Large and small INGOs 
acted as implementing partners for UNHCR or for individual governments (see Pezer 
2002:240pp). The same picture developed after the Kosovo war of 1999. 
 
7.3.2 ‘Social Reconstruction’ and Other Projects with Complex Mandates 
7.3.2.1 ‘Social Reconstruction’ in Pakrac 
Pakrac is a small town of 10,000 Serbs and Croats in Western Slavonia, Croatia, that 
was heavily damaged during the fighting s in 1991. With the cease-fire it became 
divided with a Croatian sector in the centre of town and a Serbian part on the 
outskirts belonging to the Serb-controlled areas, with UN peace-keepers on both 
                                                 
239
 For example the Schweizerische Arbeiterhilfswerk (Swiss Workers Aid) established 18 
reconstruction projects between 1994 and 1995, as a result of which 2,800 people were able to 
return to their villages (Wenger and Perovic 1995:34pp) 
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sides of the line between Croatian and Serbian controlled territory. Different UN 
bodies (Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP, 
UNPROFOR) initiated a peace-building project called a ‘social reconstruction’ 
project. It sought to implement thoughts that General-Secretary Boutros-Ghali had 
just formulated in his Agenda For Peace (1992). The idea was to normalize as 
quickly as possible the inter-ethnic relations between the conflict parties, to 
contribute through concrete projects of cooperation to the social and economic 
development of the region, and to help with reconstruction and stabilization of the 
economic structures. It was hoped that refugees and IDPs would be able to return 
quickly and live in peaceful co-existence (Boehm 2001:181).  
In early 1993, UNDP invited several NGOs, both local and international, to 
participate in the social reconstruction efforts. 240 The analysis here will focus on one 
of the projects, the Pakrac Volunteer Project.241 The Croatian partner of UNDP was 
the Antiratne Kampanje (Antiwar Campaign Croatia –ARK.)242 ARK recruited both 
Croatian and international volunteers for the project, directly or through international 
partner organisations.243  By 1997 about 500 international volunteers (average age 
                                                 
240
 The UN Social Reconstruction Project did not only consist of the Pakrac Volunteer Project. Care 
Austria, Austrian Peace Services, Help Age International and UN bodies (UNPROFOR, UN Civil 
Affairs, UN Police Force) also were involved in it at certain times or throughout the running of the 
project. UNPROFOR ran check-point meetings, a Parcel Delivery Programme and a Village 
Visitation Programme, and also helped with the rebuilding of infrastructure (water, electricity, gas, 
telephone) Help International financed a visiting programme that allowed teams of social workers 
to visit several hundred of elderly people on both sides of the border. CARE started a project of 
physical reconstruction of houses, while building materials and tools were financed by a Dutch 
Foundation (Stichting Fluchteling). This project also ran into problems, and the project could not 
be carried out as originally planned (the reconstruction of one particular street) but the materials 
were used by the Volunteer Project and Croatian Workers Brigades’ for reconstruction in the 
town. CARE later then helped to rebuild 33 houses on the Serbian side of the town, and 
established a revolving fund with the local communities to finance reconstruction. On the Croatian 
part 100 houses were renovated, but on the Serbian side this number could not be reached due to 
the lack of building materials. CARE’s involvement came to an end with the reoccupation of 
Western Slavonia, the director of the Serbian CARE timer yard losing his life while fleeing 
(Boehm 2001:185pp). 
241
 For the general description of the project, see Schultz 1994, Milasinovic 1995, Das 
Freiwilligenprojekt Pakrac 1996, Vack 1996:175, Centar za mirovne studije 1997, Fetherston 
2000:18pp, Boehm 2001, Committee for Conflict Transformation Support 2001, Kruhonja, 
Ivanovic and Stanic 2002:256p, Large n.d.:75. 
242
 ARK is an umbrella peace organisation that was founded in 1991 soon after the conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia developed, with members in Zagreb and in several other Croatian towns (Osijek, 
Rijeka, Split). 
243
 Partners were Service Civil International, International Voluntary Service, Brethren Service, 
Cotravaux (France), Medjugorije Appeal (Britain), Christian Peace Service and Komitee fuer 
Grundrechte und Demokratie (both Germany), Group for a Switzerland without an Army -GsoA 
(Switzerland), Suncokret and Austrian Peace Services. 
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23-24) had worked in the Croatian part of Pakrac (Boehm 2001:196). They worked 
on the cleaning and repair of public and private buildings and of a wastewater 
pipeline. They harvested corn, collected wood for school winter heating, started a 
youth club giving among other things English lessons, organised sports activities and 
a jazz dance group. They visited elderly and solitary people, cared for children, set 
up a weekly local radio show, installed a computer-network in the local school, 
produced an e-mail news letter and a paper newsletter, and gave workshops on peace 
education for teachers and elder pupils. A women’s group they initiated began to 
distribute humanitarian aid, to run a laundry and have some other income-generating 
work through knitting and sewing. 
Wilson, who worked himself in the project and afterwards wrote an evaluation of it 
(that unfortunately remains unpublished), describes the basic idea of ‘social 
reconstruction’ as follows: 
Spontaneous contacts were gradually extended and systematised, building 
a base in the 'Croatian' community founded on seemingly innocuous 
activities (playing with children, language lessons...). Long term 
volunteers then acted as catalysts in the much more difficult coalescing of 
a few Pakracani around particular issues and needs, in some cases in 
groups such as a youth club, women's group, or interests such as a school-
based email project. … Over the next three years these initiatives in turn 
became springboards for social development and a diverse set of activities 
and trainings aimed at 'empowering' groups and individuals. (Committee 
for Conflict Transformation Support 2001) 
Having peaceful co-existence as its wider goal, the Volunteer Project sought to work 
also on the Serbian side of the town. But attempts to cross the border and work on 
the Serbian side met with many difficulties and little acceptance by the Croats in 
                                                                                                                                          
 Austrian Peace Services  (OEsterreichische Friedensdienste-OEFD) that will be mentioned at 
several places throughout this chapter, was founded in 1993, with the Austrian Fellowship of 
Reconciliation one of its primary initiators. OEFD offered voluntary and unpaid positions of 
usually 14 months in projects in the former Yugoslavia. They distinguished four types of projects: 
human rights and peacebuilding; youth and social work; support of higher education (at the 
universities of Sarajevo and Podgorica); womens solidarity. The volunteers were placed with local 
projects that they supported through their work. Most of its volunteers were men who as 
conscientious objectors served did a 14 month period abroad which Austria recognised as an 
alternative to regular civilian service. OEFD also tried to encourage women to become volunteers, 
although they had to be financed by other sources. Until the beginning of 2000 there had been 79 
men and 16 women doing the service, 10 to 12 at the same time (see Haemmerle 1998 and 2001, 
Thurswald 2000a). 
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Pakrac.244 Therefore ARK made contact with the Center for Antiwar Action in 
Belgrade, an activist group not unlike ARK’s members. Part of the Center was the 
group MOST that worked with refugees and IDPs, combining humanitarian and 
psycho-social aid with the goal of helping people to handle the conflicts more 
constructively (see Grupa Most n.d.). MOST joined the Pakrac project in 1994. Their 
style of work was very different from that of the international volunteer project on 
the Croatian side. They only used Yugoslav volunteers, and had a much smaller 
number of people in the field at any given time (in summer 1994: 5). They stayed 
with families, seeing this “as the best way to gain the confidence and friendship of 
these people” (Stanisic 1994:4). Most of their work was with children, but there were 
also group activities with adults. They started a ‘House of Friendship’ project that 
they used for workshops on nonviolent conflict resolution, English language lessons, 
handicraft courses, sports tournaments and other similar activities. For a school they 
provided books and other teaching materials as well as tennis shoes for children. The 
women’s group produced handicrafts and collected mushrooms and tea and sold it in 
Belgrade, organised seeds for agricultural products in addition to other activities.  
When in May 1995 Croatia re-occupied Western Slavonia, this work was interrupted, 
though MOST tried to stay in contact, and among other things started to document 
the casualties of the military operation (Stanisic 1994, Centar za antiratnu akciju 
1995, Santic 1995, Boehm 2001).  
The project on the Croatian side continued for some time.245 But hampered by lack of 
funding (international donors more and more focused on Bosnia), the reduced need 
for physical assistance and ongoing managerial problems made ARK in 1997 decide 
to close the project (see Bozicevic 1997, Committee for Conflict Transformation 
Support 2001).  
                                                 
244
 Although the volunteers were also used as messengers – as were UN and other NGO staff -  by 
those who had relatives on the other side, carrying parcels and letters (Wilson 1997, Boehm 2001, 
Committee for Conflict Transformation Support 2001). 
245
 By the end of 1995, the youth club and the women’s group had become independent structures. An 
Information Centre Pakrac was created together with other NGOs and UN to provide the 
population with legal and other advice. Conflict transformation training was offered through a 
group that grew out of ARK for nonviolent trainings, calling itself ‘Miramida, and which in 
1996grew into  the Centre for Peace Studies. When the Pakrac project closed, the Centre left 
Pakrac and continued its work in Zagreb. 
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The evaluation of the volunteer project is mixed. The physical reconstruction seems 
to have gone well, and a number of houses were rebuilt. The women’s groups and the 
youth club are two other tangible outcomes, and continued their existence after the 
end of the Volunteer Project Pakrac.  
The wider goal of making a contribution to reconciliation between the Serb and the 
Croatian part of town must be considered to have mostly failed. Even before 1995 
when the Croatian military action changed the basic situation, the Croatian 
inhabitants of Pakrac showed little understanding of the project’s non-partisan 
approach. Indeed, threats of serious physical violence were made against Croatians 
working with the project. (Wilson 2007). Nevertheless, Boehm concluded that whilst 
it did not reach its goal to normalise the relations between the two populations, it 
however was able to contribute to the relations between both sides. So were those 
Serbs who had participated in the project mostly those who stayed when Croatia 
reoccupied the territory in May 1995 (Boehm 2001:205).246 
 
7.3.2.2 Social Reconstruction’ and Other Complex Projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Kosovo 
In 1995, some former international volunteers from Pakrac founded a reconstruction 
project in Gornji Vakuf in Central Bosnia with UNDP funding. Like the Pakrac 
project, the project in Gornji Vakuf worked at the grassroots’ level, combining 
physical reconstruction with social work with youth, war invalids and women on 
both sides of the divided town. Its basic assumptions were that the political success 
of the Croat-Muslim Federation ultimately would depend on reconciliation at the 
grassroots level, that social normalisation was the first step towards that goal, and 
that the presence of international volunteers would help toward achieving it (see 
                                                 
246
 In addition, a number of concrete problems and conflicts could often be traced to the use of short-
term young and inexperienced volunteers (Committee for Conflict Transformation Support 2001, 
Wilson 2007). On the other hand, Boehm (2001:196) thinks that the most important contribution 
of the volunteers was through their idealism and their working together with local people. Being 
young themselves, they reached the young generation, and their presence had a positive impact on 
the population traumatised by war 
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Pierce 1996, Centar za mirovne studije 1997, Demichelis 1998, Pierce and Stubbs 
2000:159, Scotto 2002).247  
 Some other INGOs pursued similar projects but with professional (local and 
international) staff rather than international volunteers and without using the term 
‘social reconstruction’. What their work had in common with the UNDP-supported 
projects of ‘social reconstruction’ was their multi-faceted character, combining 
physical reconstruction with economic incentives, vocational training and with multi-
ethnic social work mostly with children, youth and women.248  
 
7.3.3 Summary: Reconstruction Work - A Highly Conflict-sensitive Task 
Projects combining physical reconstruction with peace work have mostly been 
evaluated positively – provided that the international staff involved had the necessary 
experience and skills (which was not always the case when young volunteers were 
used). In general, however, other reconstruction efforts have met with a number of 
problems. Often refugees were favoured in programmes over those people who had 
stayed during the war which increased the tensions between these two groups. 
                                                 
247
 Soon after, the UNDP also started a third project of ‘social reconstruction’ in Travnik (Central 
Bosnia). Where among other things c. 520 houses were rebuilt, mainly for returnees from EU 
countries, as well as roads repaired. The basic issue in Travnik was to build houses for those IDPs 
who occupied the homes of refugees, thus freeing accommodation and bringing refugee returnees 
back to Travnik. See Engberg and Stubbs 1998, Demichelis 1998, Pierce and Stubbs 2000. 
248
 An example is Pax Christi Germany’s project in Zenica in Central Bosnia (Kukla 2003, Schiel 
2002, Pax Christi and Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst n.d., Pax Christi n.d.). Pax Christi had been in 
the area since 1995, working with volunteers in a refugee camp. From 1997 they had one or two 
longer-term staff in Zenica, and started to focus on the issue of IDPs and their eventual return. The 
main focus of their work was to support IDPs from four camps and two barracks in and around 
Zenica, seeking to empower them to make a positive decision to return to their home community 
even if that was now controlled by another ethnic group, and to prevent irreversible dependency. 
Other goals were to reduce social tensions in Zenica, increase the readiness to live together with 
people from other ethnic groups, and thereby contribute to prevent further violent conflict. The 
Pax Christi staff tried in conversations with IDPs to reduce their fear, negotiated with the 
administration in the villages they came from, provided building materials and quite early on in the 
project set up a carpentry workshop. Pax Christi also supported people who had returned with 
regular visits, connected them if necessary to psychological aid, aided them in their dealing with 
authorities, linked people to reconstruction programmes of other INGOs and also rebuilt 160 
houses and apartments with funding from the German Foreign Ministry and private donations. 
Through such activities they supported the return of 267 families.  
 Their second area was social work in two housing complexes in Zenica inhabited by returnees 
(from Germany), war widows, veterans and Roma. There they supported a kindergarten, 
conducted house visits, gave sewing and computer courses and set up regular meetings for women 
and men. As a concrete success they reported that they managed to convince a Muslim-Croat 
women’s group and a Serbian women’s group to meet. The project ended in 2003.  
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Another problem was the different approaches by different NGOs on how to conduct 
reconstruction projects. For example, Kleck (2007a:111 pp) describes how in the 
Republika Srpska some NGOs rebuilt houses and handed them over ready while 
other agencies only gave building materials which caused ill-will among the 
returnees. A third problem was how to choose whose houses were to be rebuilt. 
When the internationals made the decision, it was often on the basis of abstract 
figures rather than on real need. Thus, in the Bosnian Federation, aid from 1994 
tended to be distributed equally 50:50 to Bosnian Muslims and Croats, regardless of 
local demographics or the extent of damage (Demichelis 1998). When the 
internationals left the decision to the local authorities, they had to overlook the fact 
that the system was frequently abused. The result sometimes was that people got 
houses rebuilt they did not need but either sold on or used as ’holiday homes’ since 
they were in fact living abroad. 249 
An assessment of peace-building work in Kosovo by the Collaborative Learning 
Projects found comparable problems: For example, when the water system of one 
ethnically mixed village was repaired, it was overlooked that the reservoir was 
located in the Albanian sector ”As a result, every time the pump broke down, 
tensions between K-Albanians and K-Serbs escalated“ (CDA-Collaborative Learning 
Projects 2006:45). 
 
7.4 Social and Psycho-social Work 
In the survey of peace-building activities, three common types of activities were: 
international volunteers working with refugees and IDPs in camps, social work with 
young people, and psycho-therapeutic work, mostly with women. They are important 
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 Demichelis (1998) gives an example from Gornji Vakuf One NGO tried to implement a 
‘Federation–building and multi-ethnic reconciliation project’ by repairing structures and 
infrastructure for joint use by Muslims and Croats, and the World Bank financed the repair of 
some other buildings. For the project they had to secure authorization of the city’s two mayors but 
these seem to have had only the interest of their ethnic group in mind, trading four (formerly 
ethnically mixed) central urban apartment buildings that after their repair were used only by one 
ethnic group. The reconstruction priorities were not those of the people, the project became called 
“the politicians project”. Vocational training was also rejected by the population because the 
trainers did not come from the area and were only from one ethnic group. In the end the NGO left 
with two buildings unfinished. 
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areas of peace-building by civil society actors, and especially the last two are usually 
considered to be of special relevance for dealing with conflict.250 
 
7.4.1 Social Support for Refugees in Camps 
Some volunteer peace services and other NGOs found a special niche in providing 
social support for refugees and IDPs living in camps. This was a field often neglected 
by those running the camps who were struggling to maintain the basic physical 
services. Large numbers of short-term volunteers worked in camps during the time of 
the Bosnia war, playing with children, organising sports, language lessons and discos 
for teenagers, having coffee with elderly people, setting up handicraft circles of 
women (the products often were sold abroad, thereby giving the women knitting 
socks or other items some little income).251 
The main goal of such work was to mitigate the effects of war and enable grassroots 
participation in psycho-social post-war recovery. Volunteers who reported about 
their work also mentioned ‘help people to overcome grief’, ‘signal of solidarity with 
the fate of the refugees’, ‘a chance for learning and doing for volunteers in an 
international context’, ‘a signal for the people back home that we do not have to 
remain helpless onlookers’. Ruez (1994:74) writes that the atmosphere in the camps 
clearly improved, the aggression of children and young people was reduced, and 
                                                 
250
 See different manuals and books on peace-building, e.g. Reychler and Paffenholz  (eds.) 2001, 
Aktionsgemeinschaft Dienst fuer den Frieden (ed) 2008. 
251
 See Koordinierungskreis Jugoslawienarbeit 1992a, Brandlhuber 1994, Ruez 1994, Fuderer 1995, 
Bauer and Muller 1996, Jakobi-Schwan 1996, Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1996, ICVA 2000.  
 The first initiative to undertake this type of work off was the Croatian /international organisation 
Suncokret,  founded on the initiative of a Dutch volunteer with the Antiratne Kampanje Croatia 
(see CFD 1993a,  Ex-Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis 1993, Ochsenstein 1994, Anti-War 
Campaign Croatia 1995, Berndt 1996, Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1996, Vack 1996a and 
1996b, Large n.d.:33). It began by inviting international volunteers of all ages to come to Croatia 
to work for three weeks in the camps. Soon this became an organisation of its own called 
Suncokret (Sunflower). A number of international organisations supported Suncokret by recruiting 
volunteers to work side by side with Croatian volunteers.. By summer 1993, Suncokret already 
had had 400 domestic volunteers and 1000 foreign volunteers from 34 international organisations 
and from 19 European countries plus the  USA, Canada and Australia. By 1996 this figure had 
risen to 2,000 international volunteersWhen Suncokret found that the permanent change of 
volunteers became a problem, they deployed longer-term volunteers, and also increased their 
professional staff.  
 In addition to Suncokret, soon comparable work was done by a number of other international 
NGOs in camps in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, while FR Yugoslavia’s visa 
restrictions made larger international presence in that country impossible (see Le Meut 1994, 
Bauer and Muller 1996:157, Krauß 1996, Tullio and Vertucci 2002, Clark 2003b). 
7. Peace-building by Civil Society Actors  167 
 
 
adults found new courage. In addition, the presence of the internationals also was a 
certain protection for the refugees.  
 
7.4.2 Youth Work 
Children and youth have been one of the prime target groups in NGO peace-building 
in all countries of former Yugoslavia, because they “offer strong potential for social 
innovation and therefore a promising target group for reconciliation work” (Fischer 
2007c:234). In Kosovo, half of the population is under 25 years which gave NGOs 
an additional reason for concentrating on young people there (Llamazares and 
Reynolds Levy 2003).  
Many INGOs initiated youth centres. Some of these projects have been well 
documented through publications by people involved in the work and/or studies 
made about them. In Jaice, the German Friedenskreis Halle (Peace Circle Halle) 
worked between 1996 and 1998/99 together with the International Mennonite 
Organisation in setting up and running a youth club (see Krauß 1996, Kurschat 1998,  
Friedenskreis Halle 1999, Weishaupt 1999, Fischer and Tumler 2000, Kurschat 
2000, Weishaupt 2000, Klotz 2002a).252 They organised games for children, parties, 
concerts, English and German language classes, photographyand computer courses. 
After overcoming some initial problems of acceptance in the community and the 
eventual withdrawal of the Mennonites, the Centre was quite successful and brought 
Muslim and Croat youth together through the various activities. One indicator used is 
that the young people decided to form a mixed Croat-Muslim football team (before 
the war there had been two ethnic teams).253  
                                                 
252
 The Friedenskeis Halle (FK Halle) is a peace group from Eastern Germany that like so many other 
peace groups got involved in practical work in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. 
253
 Another example is ’Mladi Most’ in Mostar founded by Aktion Suehnezeichen - Friedensdienste 
(ASF - Action Reconciliation Service for Peace). ASF is a peace service that was founded after 
World War II and since then has been sending young volunteers mostly to work with victims of 
the Nazi regime, for example in Israel and at the sites of German concentration camps in Eastern 
Europe as a sign of atonement. Today, they have a world-wide programme. See <http://www.asf-
ev.de/en/introduction/> [17.7.2008].  
 In 1994, when Mostar was put under international administration, they opened a youth centre 
“Mladi Most’ (‘Youth Bridge’) in the Western (Croatian) part of the divided town (see Netzwerk 
Friedenskooperative 1996, Fischer and Tumler 2000:24p, Scotto 2002 chapter 7). It was first a 
youth club with programmes similar to that in Jaice (language, music, arts, literature, discussion 
groups). In 1997 it was closed for some months and then re-opened with a new concept, only 
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The basic idea in these and – as far as I could discern from the material available – 
most youth clubs or centres has been to promote interethnic contact and eventual 
reconciliation as well as empowerment of young people to work actively on shaping 
their future. Typical of this commitment is the following: 
We wanted to build an island for the children and youth for whom living 
in war had become normal because they barely have known anything else, 
an island where the conflicts between the ethnic groups that their parents 
modelled and passed on could not reach them. Or where they could learn 
to handle these conflicts differently than is usual in the world of the 
adults. (Friedenskreis Halle 1999, translation CS) 
Kurschat (1998, 2000), a social worker by training, calls this kind of youth work 
‘multi-ethnic or multi-communal social work’. Having himself worked in Jaice, 
Kurschat lists a multitude of activities typical of social workers but with the implicit 
function of bringing people together across ethnic or other perceived lines of conflict. 
According to him, this creates a neutral space or protected area in which people, 
independent of their ethnic or religious identities, come and do things together, such 
as attending a computer course or playing football. Furthering reconciliation is rarely 
made explicit as an objective for fear that approach ethnic divisions directly would 
be polarising (Kurschat 2000:59).  Rather than making ‘the conflict’ the issue to 
meet about, the activities are used to reflect on group processes and one’s own 
behaviour, and thereby deal with the conflict indirectly.254 
The establishment of youth centres was not the only youth-related activity. The 
following three types of activities were rather frequent in the sample, and basically 
pursued the same strategy of bringing together young people from different ethnic 
backgrounds, hoping that playing and working together would help to overcome the 
conflict. Some of them were short-term ‘one-offs’, but others were of a more long-
term nature. 
• Meetings and conferences of young people: A good example for such an activity 
having a sustainable outcome is an international encounter for young people 
between 12 and 18 years in 1993 organised by Norwegian People’s Aid in the 
framework of its youth project ‘Young Voices’. Out of that meeting grew a youth 
                                                                                                                                          
offering programmes (with many cultural activities – music, film, theatre) but not being a meeting 
point anymore. In 2000 the centre moved to East Mostar (the Muslim sector), and was turned into 
a local organisation with the name ‘Alternative Seminar Space for Youth Reconciliation’. 
254
 Though these examples are all from Bosnia-Herzegovina, similar work has been undertaken also 
in the other countries, in particular in Kosovo.  
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movement with groups in different ex-Yugoslav countries, the ’Post Pessimists’ 
who maintained links across the ethnic conflict lines throughout the 1990s.255  
• Youth magazines: These sometimes were a product of youth centres, but there 
have also been separate projects. For example did the mentioned German 
‘Schueler helfen leben’ finance a Bosnia-wide paper (Nepitani) that was 
launched in March 1997 as a bimonthly distributing 4,000 copies gratis. In 2000-
2001 it was replaced by a new magazine, IZA, that also tackles political subjects 
(Fischer and Tumler 2000:36p, Stovel 2000‚ Scotto 2002, ‘Vermintes Gebiet’ 
2002).  
• Holiday camps for children and youth: This was one of the activities of the 
Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie.  Between 1994 and 2003, a total of 
16,500 children from the different sides of the conflict had taken part in these 
annual summer camps where they mostly engaged in activities like sports, 
swimming, excursions, dancing, singing and playing (Dieter 2004:6, Vack 
1996).256 
 
7.4.3 Psycho-social Assistance 
As already shown in some other examples, many relief organisations developed 
specific techniques, tools and programmes for intervention in the former Yugoslavia. 
One of them was psycho-social programmes mostly targeting women. The projects 
pursued different approaches, ranging from individual medical care and 
psychological counselling to group therapy, women’s self-help groups, women’s 
groups primarily engaged in income-generating activities, literacy courses or other 
types of recreational or educational activities (Agger et al 1999:17pp, 66). Today, 
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 Norwegian People’s Aid continued to support their work, for example by organizing a conference 
specially for youth from the FR Yugoslavia in 1994 in Austria, where besides people from 
Prishtina Belgrade and Subotica also participants from Bosnia (Tuzla) and Croatia (Zagreb) came. 
During the 10-day meeting that was co-led by Austrian psychologists, they worked on a 
newspaper, a film and a radio programme. Some months later a third meeting took place in 
Norway again in which also refugees from Norway participated (Jugend-Netzwerk Europa 1998, 
Royal Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2001, Broughton 2002:273, Du Pont 2002:240, 
Large n.d.79 and 91). 
256
 Other organisations have been Beati I costruttori di pace, Classes internationales de Paix, Comuni 
Padovani per la Pace since before 1994, Corazon del Mundo (Spain), IFIAS (Germany), Peace 
Bridge Basel, War Child (Britain). 
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psycho-social care is recognised by international donors as one of the standard 
categories in peace-building support because of its relationship as explained by 
Agger et al.:  
The overall aim of psycho-social assistance is to promote human rights, 
reconciliation, and psycho-social well-being. Methods for achieving this 
should aim at supporting already existing protective social and 
psychological factors, and reducing the stress factors at different levels of 
intervention (Agger et al. 1999).257 
One of the main drivers for this type of work was the reports on mass rapes of 
Bosnian (Muslim) women and the existence of ‘rape camps’ where women were kept 
by (Serbian) soldiers that went through the mass media in autumn 1992. Many 
women’s groups, both local and international, responded to these reports with fact 
finding missions and concrete projects on the ground. From the beginning of 1993, 
international funding for rape victims, mental health and psycho-social assistance 
started flowing into the region, facilitated mostly through international NGOs.  
The initial objective of most programmes was to assist rape victims, but soon it 
turned out that either the figures were highly exaggerated, and/or women were not 
willing to let themselves be identified as having suffered from rape.258 Therefore 
gradually NGOs reframed their objectives so that they offered assistance to 
traumatised women and children in general (Agger et al. 1999:24).  
Many organisations held trainings or workshops on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
in the area and/or placed individual psychotherapists in the field.259  
Another widespread approach was to set up gynaecological clinics and shelters 
offering both medical and psychological care for traumatised women. To my 
knowledge the first (international) one was started by a German-based gynaecologist 
who opened a clinic in Zenica. With her supporters from a women’s initiative, 
Scheherazade, she formed a new NGO called Medica Mondiale that is still active and 
has branched out to other conflict areas. The centre in Zenica besides offering 
medical and psychological care gave humanitarian aid to women and their families, 
and conducted psycho-social programmes. Opened in 1993, it had space for 20 
                                                 
257
 Pupavac mentions that ‘psycho-social became a catch term which is rarely defined, and that aid 
agencies “express confusion over its meaning and the activitries it covers” (203:158). 
258
 The first reports extrapolated from the existing figures, assuming that the ’real figure’ was many 
times as high as the cases documented. See chapter 8. 
259
 See Tauber 2000, Becker 2001, Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst 2002 and n.d.-b, Scotto 2002. 
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women and 9 children (Scheherazade Newsletter 1993, Netzwerk 
Friedenskooperative 1994 and 1996, Medica Mondiale 1996).260  
Comparable work has also taken place in Serbia and Montenegro – traumatisation 
and rape took place on all sides of the conflict and was not, as some international 
media made believe at that time, limited to people from one side being the 
perpetrators and those from the other the victims.261  
Many of the projects went beyond dealing with the trauma women had suffered – be 
it from rape, losing their husbands or families to ‘mere’ displacement. They sought to 
empower the women to reorganise their life, (re-)gain trust and confidence, re-build 
social networks and develop income-generating perspectives, realizing that solving 
these problems also did a lot to help with regaining psychological balance. In a 1997 
workshop of women involved in this kind of work from the different parts of former 
Yugoslavia this was summarised as follows:  
We have to understand the constant and necessary link between economic 
survival strategies and psycho social work, never sacrificing one for the 
other (Medienhilfe Ex-Jugoslawien 1997). 
The centres often also engaged in activities that brought people of different ethnicity 
and all age groups together, just like the different projects described in the earlier 
sections of this chapter did. 
Evaluations of psycho-social projects found that the projects  made a significant 
humanitarian contribution, supported self-esteem and counter-acted loneliness, 
contributed to social stability through creating opportunities in a safe environment 
for the re-establishment of social networks, skill-building (literacy) and trust, as well 
as in some cases helping with income generation (Agger, Vuk  and Mimica 1995, 
Agger et al. 1999, Pupavac 2003). On the other hand they criticise that - at least in 
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 Other comparable centres have been Vive Zene in Tuzla (run by another German organisation 
since 1993, see Vive Zene 1995, Smillie 1996), Amica supported by Italian, Swiss and German 
organisations working in Tuzla, Bijeljina and Vlasenica (see Wenger  and Perovic 1995, 
Friedenskooperative 1996, Smillie 1996, Fischer and Tumler 2000:20, ICVA 2000), Zene Zenama 
in Sarajevo (see Kleck 2007b, ), and Norwegian’s People’s Aid that set up a clinic in Zenica and 
supported another centre in Tuzla (Agger et al 1999, ICVA 2000, Scotto 2002). Many of the 
centres sooner or later became local NGOs. Amica  for example became ’Prijateljice’ at the end of 
the 1990s. 
261
 The group MOST that grew out of the Belgrade Centre for Anti-War Action  has already been 
mentioned. An international group has been Medact that assisted with trauma intervention 
programmes in Belgrade, and devised  “caring for carers” inputs for staff at refugee centres in 
Serbia (Large n.d.:79). 
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the four projects Agger’s teams evaluated in Bosnia-Herzegovina - little real 
participation by beneficiaries was to be found. They generally were seen as helpless 
and too traumatised, which was strengthened by a strong focus on Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder rather than approaching the problems from a human rights point of 
view (Agger et al 1999:62pp).  
While that study from 1999 concluded that the projects also contributed to the 
training of health professionals and the modernisation of mental health policy and 
practice in the countries concerned, other authors have raised doubts over what they 
see as the assumption of the ‘universal relevance of Anglo-American psycho-social 
models’, even suggesting that such intervention ‘may hinder spontaneous recovery 
from traumatic situations’ (Pupavac 2003, see also Belloni 2000).  
 
7.4.4 Summary: Social and Psycho-social Work - Between Good Will and 
Professionalism 
Under this peace-building category of social and psycho-social work quite different 
approaches and types of activities were collected. On the one side there have been 
the professional services NGOs offered in the fields of youth work, work with 
women, trauma etc. On the other side there has been – as was the case with 
humanitarian aid and reconstruction – much involvement by untrained international 
volunteers and activities by groups without much (if any) track record in the type of 
service they offered. This supports once more the thesis of the movement character 
of part of the international response to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. And it, 
of course, also poses serious questions regarding the overall impact of the various 
efforts on the people and the conflicts on the ground. The evaluations available tend 
to draw a mixed picture here, noting some success but also problems and 
shortcomings (compare for example the section above on psycho-social work for 
examples). I will return to these questions later in the overall conclusions to this 
chapter. 
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7.5 Economic Recovery 
Economic recovery is a field in which states and international organisations like IMF 
and World Bank have played a larger role than civil society actors (see chapter 4). 
The general driving motive in this area is that economic foundations are necessary to 
sustain longer-term peace, and that short-term recovery buys confidence in the peace 
process (see Woodward 2002:185). 
Very few NGOs have had the financial means for large financial grants. Most NGOs 
in that field rather concentrated on funding projects of implementing partners, giving 
micro credits, conducting vocational training or giving material help to set up small 
business (like farming animals, tools etc).262 To give some examples for illustration: 
• The Church World Service would seek to involve beneficiaries in its work.  
Hence, for example, if approached by someone for a cow, they would ask that 
person to gather 15 people from their village who also needed a cow, and then go 
to market with them to buy cows (United Institute for Peace 2003).  
• The Italian Associazione Sprofondo founded in 1995 a cooperative bank as an 
inter-ethnic project in Sarajevo (Banca del lavoro o gruppi di collaborazione) 
(Tullio and Vertucci 2002). 
• Other examples for income-generating projects (knitting and sewing by women 
refugees, carpentry workshops) have already been mentioned in the context of 
the ‘social reconstruction’ and the therapeutic women’s centres.  
• Vocational training has been another typical activity of civil society actors. Very 
often these trainings took place in a context of multi-ethnic cooperation, the 
organisers seeking to make sure that ‘former enemies’ attended them together, 
and thereby also contributing to reconciliation (see CDA-Collaborative Learning 
Projects 2006 for Kosovo). 
Concerning the conflict-related ‘side effect’ of economic programmes, the CDA-
Collaborative Learning Projects (2006) evaluated programmes in Kosovo according 
                                                 
262
 Trade Unions need to be mentioned as a separate civil society actor in the context of economic 
recovery. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, an umbrella organisation, started 
working in former Yugoslavia at beginning of 1990s when free trade unions were founded 
throughout Eastern Europe, seeking to support the fledgling market economy. After the war, they 
opened an office in Sarajevo that is responsible for all South East Europe. Their work consists of 
advising trade union confederations and implementing capacity building programmes, and they 
form a link between trade union movement and international institutions (Fischer 2007b). 
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to whether their work had any impact with regard to the interethnic violence that had 
erupted in 2004. They found that interethnic business relationships created with the 
help of international actors tended to be immune to the violence: However, they also 
remark critically that the relationships did not lead to the people involved taking 
action against the violence – the cooperation was limited to the strictly economic 
field. 
 
7.6 Transitional Justice and Human Rights Documentation 
Transitional justice (see chapter 4.3.1.6) has been a field of peace-building which 
was dominated by governmental actors (e.g. the creation of the International 
Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia), with NGOs in a more merely supporting 
role. Civil Society actors could be found mostly in the fields of human rights 
documentation and ‘dealing with the past’.  
 
7.6.1 Fact-finding and Documentation of Abuses 
Over the years, a large number of NGOs have been involved in human rights 
documentation, both groups for whom human rights reporting is their main mission, 
and groups that came across human rights violation in the course of their work and 
reported on them.263 Examples of the first would be Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International (Human Rights Watch n.d., 2000 and 2003). Amnesty was 
monitoring the human rights situation in Yugoslavia already long before 1991 (see 
Woodward 1995:182).264 During the wars, they also reported on systematic taking of 
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 Human rights investigation and reporting is a category of activities that do not easily fit under one 
of the three ‚grand strategies’ because most of the projects and missions dealing with human rights 
have two aspects: the establishment of longer-term ‘rule of law’, with the collection of facts for 
prosecution and reparation on the one hand, and the immediate and middle-term prevention of 
violations on the other hand. The line between monitoring and active protection is a thin one. The 
collection of data itself can play a protective role since it may deter perpetrators (see Benedek 
2001:213 and Mahony 2006:3 and 91pp), though Benedek (2001:211) remarks that this may also 
lead to disappointments when people expect monitors to intervene but there mandate does not 
allow it. 
264
 Before 1991, they published reports on prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Serbia, 
ill-treatment and torture in Kosvoo, use of force by JNA and VRS forces for displacement of 
populations. 
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hostages and their ill-treatment, and sexual violations of Muslim women as a weapon 
of war (Mercier 1995:111).265  
 
7.6.2 Dealing With the Past 
Alongside human rights monitoring, ‘dealing with the past’ has probably been the 
field with most involvement by external civil society actors. One example would be 
the veterans’ project by the Centre for Nonviolent Action (CNA). The CNA could be 
considered one of the ‘embedded’ interveners in conflict – a mostly local 
organisation though initiated by an international group.266 In addition to their main 
focus - nonviolence training - in 2002 CNA started a project with war veterans under 
the title ‘Dealing with the Past’. Their motivation has been to offer an alternative 
approach to the issue that in the discourse in the countries of former Yugoslavia is 
heavily dominated by what happens at the ICTY in The Hague, and that sometimes 
leads to feelings of victimisation and nationalist sentiments rather than to increased 
willingness to face the past.  
Their concrete objectives were building a pool of former combatants who would be 
constructively engaged in a process of self-critical public debate on the past, raising 
public awareness on the need to confront the past as a means of future violence 
prevention (Wils 2004). “How I found myself in war and how to reach sustainable 
peace” was the title given to 14 public forums held between 2002 and 2004 in Serbia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro where war veterans – identified by the CND 
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 See also Friedenskooperative 1996, Chandler 1999:96, Zitzlaff 1999:50, Stovel 2000:31, Kruhonja 
2002:253, Large n.d.:70.  
 Especially important have been the different local human rights organisations in the various 
countries, e.g. the local Amnesty International and Helsinki Committee for Human Rights groups, 
the Humanitarian Law Fund (Serbia), the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedom 
(Kosovo), Forum for Human Rights (Macedonia), different member organisations of the Antiratne 
Kampanje Croatia, Documenta (Zagreb), Research and Documentation Center (Sarajevo) and 
many more (see Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung 1995, International Center for Transitional Justice 
2008c).  
266
 The CNA was initiated in 1997 by a Serbian nonviolence trainer who had come as a conscientious 
objector to Germany and worked with the German nonviolence training centre Kurve Wustrow. 
He went in 1997 to Sarajevo in a pilot project for the Civil Peace Service scheme to set up what 
was first a project office of Kurve Wustrow. Very soon the CNA became an independent NGO 
with offices in Sarajevo and Belgrade, supported by the Kurve Wustrow under the Civil Peace 
Service scheme, and by the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management 
which has been accompanying the project since its beginnings with participatory evaluations. 
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through their training work – were invited to speak. Most of the forums went well 
though there have occasionally also been interruptions by veterans’ organisations. 
 
7.6.3 Summary: Transitional Justice and Human Rights Monitoring - An Important 
Task for Both Civil Society and Governmental Actors 
This field of activity perhaps more than some others requires the close cooperation of 
state and non-state actors. As was shown in chapter 4 and here in section 7.6, 
probably the main activities in this field come from the side of state actors. But civil 
society actors, engaged in human rights documentation and in helping to find 
alternative avenues towards dealing with the past, play an important subsidiary role. 
In many cases their expertise on the ground is essential because official 
governmental monitoring and fact-finding missions are usually either short-term or 
not as familiar with the situation as NGOs which maintain a presence on the ground 
for a much longer period. And while ‘dealing with the past’ through unofficial 
channels is certainly not well developed in the area of former Yugoslavia (unlike 
some other countries, see Buckley-Zistel 2005), projects like the one by CNA show 
that there is some space for such approaches. 
 
7.7 State-building, Democratisation and Civil Society Support 
Rebuilding public institutions, state-building, democratisation and civil society 
support is a vast category of many different approaches and activities. It is an area 
where both state and civil society actors can be found. In the following sections I will 
look at rebuilding of public institutions, support for political parties and elections, 
media support, support of local NGOs and -  a topic closely related to the others but 
still different - ‘solidarity work’ with groups and movements in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
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7.7.1 Rebuilding Public Institutions 
I use the term ‘public institutions’ as a broad category including all the infrastructure 
of a state – from the security sector to tax and customs system to schools and 
kindergartens.  
Apart from their involvement in human rights training,267 civil society actors figure 
comparatively little in security sector reform with the exception that some NGOs 
play a role in police training.268  
As to civilian institutions, schools have attracted particular interest from international 
civil society. To illustrate this point with just one example, taken from the work of 
the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a large US organisation with multiple 
programmes reaching from material aid to the support of reconciliation: In 
Macedonia where CRS have been active since 1993, their activities include helping 
to establish a national Parent-Teacher Association (PTA). Their goal was to use the 
common concern of school education to bring the different ethnic communities 
together. In a three-year programme starting in 1995-96 financed by a US$ 1,2 
million USAID grant, they helped to set up local Parent-Teacher-Associations as 
well as a national steering committee. Local communities were responsible for 
raising funds and obtaining supplies and local services (for example to do repairs in 
schools) to match CRS’s contributions. CRS in addition conducted regional 
awareness training workshops. Through the PTAs, the project succeeded in fostering 
inter-ethnic cooperation, increased the participation of women, and provided safe 
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 Human rights counselling and training has been an almost standard activity in post-war situations 
all over the area, and conducted by both state actors (OSCE for example) and NGOs. 
268
 There have been NGOs involved in police training (for example SIPRI and the Constitutional and 
Legal Policy Institute in Kosovo, see CORE 2002:55). One large NGO focusing on legal reform 
has been the American Bar Association (ABA). ABA claims to be the largest voluntary 
professional organisation in the world with more than 400,000 members, aiming “to be the 
national representative of the legal profession, serving the public and the profession by promoting 
justice, professional excellence and respect for the law” (American Bar Association 2008). After 
the end of the war in Bosnia, they started an international project, the Central European Law 
Initiative (CELI). Its objective was to advance the rule of law in the world by supporting the legal 
reform process in Central Europe and the former Soviet countries. In Bosnia CELI first aimed to 
help to reintegrate the legal systems of the Federation and the Serbian Republic but that was 
impossible at that time. By 2002 ABA had held 42 training workshops and completed 23 legal 
assessments on topics ranging from foreign investment to the juridical organisation (Riskin 1999, 
CORE 2002:55, King, Dorn and Hodes 2002:23pp).  
Another example would be the seconding of a staff person from the Bradford Department of Peace 
Studies to the Vushtrin Police Academy in Kosovo after 1999 (verbal information by Howard 
Clark).  
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space for community problem solving. Leatherman (1999) writes that for the success 
of the project it was important that CRS was already known and trusted through its 
humanitarian assistance that gave it an entry point to the different communities. 
Other helpful factors were positive media coverage, the high esteem in which US 
citizens were held in Macedonia (the project staff included US citizens), and the 
‘demonstration effect’ of the success of the first associations (see Leatherman 1999, 
Leatherman et al. 1999:149,166 and 173, Miall 1999, Ackermann 2000:149).269  
 
7.7.2 Political Parties and Democratic Elections 
Support for ‘democratic’ political parties and elections are a field in which both state 
and non-state actors have been working. In the protectorates, it has fallen to the 
international administration to design a (new) electoral system, and implement or 
later oversee the conduct of elections. In independent countries state actors were 
involved with advice and monitoring (see the work of the OSCE described in chapter 
4). In both scenarios, large amounts of money have been channelled over the years to 
what were considered oppositional or democratic parties, sometimes directly, 
sometimes through INGOs (among them so-called ‘quasi-NGOs’ because of their 
strong link to governmental institutions). Otherwise the main role of international 
civil society organisations (meaning here mostly NGOs, party foundations and 
political parties themselves) in this field has been to advise state bodies, educate 
voters, and monitor elections (see also Carothers 1999:123pp, Bose 2002:218pp).270  
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 Examples for other activities related to schools include: 
•  The German group Schueler Helfen Leben (Pupils Help to Live) worked in Bosnia-
Herzegovina on models for self-representation of school pupils, so-called student councils. 
(Fischer and Tumler 2000:36p, Emrich and Rickerts 2007). 
•  Contacts made between schools or individual classes in other countries and schools in the 
area of former Yugoslavia. Sometimes this took the form of ’twinning’. So for example 
promoted the Italian Berretti Bianchi school partnerships between Aleksinac (Serbia) and 
Seravezza (Italy) after the war of 1999 (l’Abate 2002b, Tullio and Vertucci 2002).  
•  Providing materials and training methods of peace education has been another activity, for 
example Beati i costruttori di pace in Kosovo after 1999 (see l’Abate 2002b) and United 
Methodist Committee on Relief in Bosnia (see Demichelis 1998, Riskin 1999).  
•  The German group Susanna Lipovac/ Kinderberg e.V. set up in the late 1990s an educational 
web domain on peace education for all Yugoslavia (Fischer and Tumler 2000:34). 
270
 In Germany, the political foundations attached to the major political parties have been a major 
channel of support.. They have all been active in the area of former Yugoslavia, supporting 
oppositional parties (mostly also independent media and local NGOs) with money, networking and 
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7.7.3 Media Support 
The support for independent media began right with the conflicts in 1991, with both 
civil society and state actors such as the EU Commission and OSCE heavily involved 
in it. 
The mass media in all countries of former Yugoslavia (with the possible exception of 
Slovenia) have traditionally been close to those who ruled. When Yugoslavia fell 
apart and a wave of nationalism accompanied the armed confrontations, these media 
fuelled the tension through what can be termed ’hate speech’ - justifying or even 
inciting violence against ’the enemy’ who was often portrayed in long-thought-dead 
stereotypes from World War II. But in all countries there have also been both print 
and electronic media, often founded between 1989 and 1991, that tried to send out 
another message, promoting pluralistic values, criticizing their own government and 
its politics.271  
Rhodes (2007) who conducted a meta-evaluation of ten years of media support in the 
region found different objectives for media support, falling in two main categories, 
namely changing society and media-specific goals. Simplifying his findings and 
adding on from other sources, I would like to distinguish three main goals here: 
• The first was through the support of media that were considered as ‘oppositional’ 
or ‘democratic’ to contribute to changing the society and influencing the politics 
in the target country. “Media support is – intrinsically – among the most 
politicized forms of foreign aid“, Rhodes states correctly (2007:16). This goal has 
motivated the media support throughout the 1990s especially in FR Yugoslavia, 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
• The second goal, overtly pursued in Bosnia and Kosovo after the wars, but also 
                                                                                                                                          
seminars (see minutes of the (Ex-)Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis, Handrich 1999, ICVA 2000, 
Heinrich-Boell-Stiftung 2001b).  
 From the side of the US, it has mainly been USAID, a fully state-financed agency that was active 
in this field with own projects and by providing funds to other US organisations like the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI). NDI is a party foundation of the Democratic Party, and like its 
Republican counterpart, the International Republican Institute (IRI), NDI has been very active 
since about 1996/97 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, FR Yugoslavia and other countries of the former 
Yugoslavia with multiple programmes designed as democracy aid (see Gagnon 1998b and 
2002:215pp).  
271
 Among them were Radio B92 and newspaper Vreme in FR Yugoslavia,  Radio 101 and the papers 
Feral Tribune and Arkzin in Croatia, Monitor and Radio Antenna in Montenegro, Koha Ditore and 
Zeri in Kosovo, and Dani and Oslobodjenje in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Rhodes 2007:20). 
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in Macedonia after the 2001 Ohrid agreement, was to build media that would be 
independent and ’objective’ and that would “contribute to peace by providing 
objective (non-inflammatory) information and providing open debate on 
important peace issues” (CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006:13). In 
addition, the international actors sometimes wanted to support media with multi-
ethnic staff and programme as an element of the multi-ethnic society that they 
wanted to encourage.  
• The third set of goals covered professional standards, accountability and self-
regulation, etc, especially as a theme of media support in the protectorates.  
The main activities of media support from the side of civil society have been the 
following:272 
• Financial support and the donation of equipment;273  
• Training for journalists;  
• Advising on media laws and regulatory frameworks; 
• Networking between media and journalists from different countries, and with 
international networks;274  
• Creation of local media or media programs by international actors or under their 
influence: This activity has been more characteristic of state actors (see chapter 
                                                 
272
 Rhodes describes two other types of activities,  mostly to be found in state actor interventions: 
reform of legal and regulatory frameworks and support for media institutions. See also Topic 
(2007:157pp) for that type of work in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
273
 One of the major - if not the major - civil society supporter of such media has been the Open 
Society Institute (OSI). It was founded in 1993 by the American-Hungarian multimillionaire and 
philanthropist George Soros to support his already existing work of supporting democratic 
transition in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Open Society Institute 
2008). The Open Society Institute set up regional offices in most of the countries of former 
Yugoslavia, mostly registering as local NGOs under the name of Open Society Fund. Their 
general objective has been to build a strong and diverse civil society. To that purpose, among other 
activities (for example furthering human rights and rule of law) financial support to local NGOs 
and existing independent media was given, and training for journalists offered (Bekkering 1997, 
Clark 2000:110, Lund 2000c:194, ICVA 2000, Stovel 2000:30, Fond Otvoreno Drustvo Bosne I 
Hercegovine 2001, Sali-Terzic 2001, Large n.d.:142). 
274
 To give one example: in 1992 the European Citizens’ Forum and the international radio network 
FERL (European Federation of Free Radios) invited in 1992 journalists to Rijeka for a conference 
on free media. The outcome was the founding of an alternative information network of journalists 
(Alternativna Informativna Mreza - AIM) from the area and support for the regional Croatian-
Italian radio Rijeka-Fiume (Alpe Adria 1993). AIM has throughout the period under study been an 
important actor in independent and critical reporting. 
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4), but there are also civil society organizations using this instrument.275. 
• Support for media institutions (media centres, journalist associations or unions 
etc.)  
As to the outcomes of media support in general, Rhodes found that the impact of 
assistance to media has been substantial, as demonstrated by increased respect for 
human rights, existence of independent media, free flow of information, improved 
professional standards among others (2007:8), and was an effective way to promote 
pluralism (2007:34). Material support in particular he judges as very relevant and 
efficient, especially when donors had a local presence and the financial means for 
substantial support (Rhodes 2007:19pp). It can be assumed that without that 
international support most independent media would not have made it through the 
1990s. Though some media eventually closed down (like Arkzin or Nasa Borba), the 
journalists trained by working for them now often have important roles in the new 
media or in political life. He found however a lack of donor coordination which led 
to larger numbers of new ‘independent’ media competing for international support. 
The funding available led to a plethora of new media founded because there was 
money of which many were not able to survive (2007:20). 
 
7.7.4 Support of Local NGOs 
Besides media support, the support of local NGOs is a field with intense activities of 
civil society actors in the peace-building subcategory of state-building, 
democratization and civil society. 
The support of local groups that were founded either before 1991 or later (but 
independently of the interventions by external parties) needs to be distinguished from 
that of new local NGOs founded solely for the purpose of becoming implementing 
                                                 
275
 Search for Common Ground produced and broadcast in 1994 a series of interactive radio 
programmes to promote peace and reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Riskin 1999, Search for 
Common Ground n.d.). And in 1992-93, Reporters sans Frontières and the French organisation 
Droits de Parole ran a radio station from a ship in international waters at the Dalmatian coast, 
seeking to broadcast unbiased information to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. But this project 
had to stop when the International Telecommunications Union forbade its emissions (Mercier 
1995:xvi, 143). 
7. Peace-building by Civil Society Actors  182 
 
 
partners for a programme or project devised by the international organisation.276 
However, there are no very firm boundaries between the two categories since NGOs 
mushroomed all over the area in the 1990s, and many that started out as an 
international initiative became stable locally-led groups (for example the mentioned 
Centre for Nonviolent Action in Sarajevo and the Open Society Fund). This section 
will deal with support to those groups and movements – mostly anti-war, feminist, 
human rights groups - that were clearly under local leadership and pursued a wider 
agenda than just running one particular programme or project funded from abroad.277  
General support for the groups took mostly the form of financial aid, sending 
international volunteers to work with them, networking and training. The first three 
instruments are dealt with in this section. Training for NGOs will be discussed in the 
next section on ‘peace and dialogue’ because it is very difficult to separate them 
from trainings for a wider circle of participants.278  
 
                                                 
276
 The latter happened  either right from the beginning of a project or, more usually, in the context of 
‘handing over the project into local hands’ which is a standard international strategy to secure 
sustainability,  
277
 Before 1991, with the exception of Slovenia, Yugoslav civil society was relatively weak, although 
there were certain traditional organisations like unions and humanitarian groups, as well as 
intellectual circles in the large university towns. This picture changed in 1990-91 with the 
liberalisation in most republics and the first multi-party elections (see chapter 3). When the danger 
of war became obvious, and especially after the violence in Slovenia in July 1991, there was a 
short-lived peace movement in summer 1991 with demonstrations in larger towns, issuing peace 
appeals and founding new groups. But with the rapidescalation in Croatia that autumn the new and 
old groups found themselves on different sides of military as well as mental frontlines.  
 From 1991 on, civil society in all (soon: former) Yugoslav republics has had five main 
constituents: independent media, anti-war groups (they preferred that term to ‘peace’), women and 
feminist groups, human rights groups, and organisations engaging in humanitarian work. 
Sometimes a single group would include elements of  those, as Antiratne Kampanje (Croatia), the 
Centre for Antiwar Action in Belgrade and Women in Black (Belgrade). 
278
 There were also other kinds of services intended to help local NGOs, from opening a library/info 
point (ICVA 2000), the provision of legal advice, providing meeting space (a Japanese group 
financed a meeting house close to Sarajevo for the youth network Nesto Vise (Fischer and Tumler 
2000:41), vehicles and driving, making print materials for local groups available, printing articles 
written by local groups, offering translation services, and raising their international reputation by 
giving awards to local activists (for example in 1997 the Norwegian Endowment for Freedom 
awarded its Andrey Sakharov Preis to Vesna Pesic, the founder of the Centre for Antiwar Action 
in Belgrade and president of the smallest of the three parties that made up the Zajedno coaliton 
(see Centar za antiratnu akciju ed. 1997).  
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7.7.4.1 Financial and Material Aid to Anti-War, Women’s and Human Rights 
Groups 
Groups from the Western peace movement in 1991-92 quickly identified partners in 
the former Yugoslav countries, and almost all of them at one time or the other 
collected donations for their work, and often delivered it in person. The mentioned 
Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie alone in 1991 donated 120,000 DM 
(about 60,000 €) to more than a dozen peace groups and media. Other groups 
donated computers, fax machines, books and the like, or helped to translate 
international books into the local languages (see Pax Christi Nederland 1995, 
Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1996, Vack 1996a and 1996b). 
Aid came also from larger and professional NGOs and foundations. For example, in 
1999 the Heinrich-Boell-Foundation, a foundation of the German Green party that 
was active on the conflicts since 1992, opened a regional office in Sarajevo. By 2001 
they were supporting 37 projects, mostly run by local NGOs. Among them were the 
Women in Black and Women Infoteka, two well-known women’s organisations in 
the area (Heinrich-Boell-Stiftung 2001b).279  
: 
7.7.4.2 Sending International Volunteers 
Many organisations sent volunteers to work with local NGOs, and in addition there 
were also a number of unattached internationals finding their way to the offices of 
these groups, and sometimes staying for months if not years.280 In Europe and North 
America there were a number of pre-existing organisations seeking to work for peace 
and reconciliation through offering volunteer work and international exchange, most 
                                                 
279
 Larger NGOs and foundations served as intermediaries or funding conduits  to international state 
donors that often gave them money than to the local group directly, mostly for administrativel 
reasons.. So Sweden, for example, financed all its work with NGOs in the region through Swedish 
NGOs (see Duffield 1996). Other countries gave grants directly, for example Canada, France and 
Netherlands (see Smillie 1996). 
280
 The difference to projects like Balkan Peace Team (see chapter 6), or later the work of the German 
Civil Peace Service is that these volunteers worked as supporters of the local groups, not as non-
partisan externals. In that they can much more be compared with solidarity work international 
brigades did in Latin America in the 1980s than with the professional peace-building undertaken 
by the large international NGOs in the area. 
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of them Christian-based volunteer peace services.281 In the context of the wars in 
former Yugoslavia, the renewed interest in that type of work led to a new wave of 
volunteer services, under the umbrella term of ‘civil peace services’, joining these 
older agencies. Already mentioned in this study were Austrian Peace Services and 
the German Civil Peace Service. These new services were much more strongly 
focussing on ‘peace’ which does not mean that they excluded humanitarian aid or 
social services, but rather that they put this kind of work into the explicit framework 
of peace-building.282 
Almost all anti-war and human rights groups in the area had at least one international 
volunteer in their office since 1991 or 1992. These volunteers helped with a variety 
of tasks, not least important of which were maintaining international links and 
translating materials.  
Pete Haemmerle, one of the key people in Austrian Peace Services (OEFD) as well 
as the Balkan Peace Team, wrote in two assessments of the work of the OEFD that 
the work of peace services is effective in peace-building at the middle and grassroots 
level of society. In some cases they were able to prevent violence although peace 
services of course could not stop wars. But they could build bridges, protect human 
rights and help to overcome feelings of hopelessness (Haemmerle 1998 and 2001).  
 
7.7.4.3 Networking and Linking 
Networking was a function played by many internationals who worked closely with 
local groups. There were at least four directions for such networking: 
• Between local groups and the local authorities: A group that consistently named 
linking as an important function of its work was the Balkan Peace Team (see 
Schweitzer and Clark 2002:30, Mueller 2004). Internationals often found it easier 
to access to such authorities. When BPT volunteers accompanied local activists 
in Croatia, they were met immediately by senior police or judges (Young 1998).  
                                                 
281
 Besides supporting local NGOs, many of them worked in refugee camps, in youth centres or social 
reconstruction projects (see above).  
282
 There is today a European Network Civil Peace Service (EN.CPS) meeting once a year for 
exchange of information and discussion of various topics, e.g. training standards. See European 
Network Civil Peace Services (n.d.). 
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• Between local groups and the ‘international community’ working in the country, 
be it state or INGOs: For example, the main mandate of the International Council 
of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to  
foster communication and cooperation among the NGOs and to facilitate 
a coherent NGO interface with the representation of common issues to 
IFOR, OHR, UNHCR, OSCE, World Bank and other multinational 
institutions, governments, cantonal and municipal governments (quoted in 
Smillie 1996:49). 
ICVA supported local NGOs through a variety of means: networking, exchange 
of information, training, advocacy, arranging meetings for local NGOs in its 
office, helping international organisations to identify candidates for training 
abroad, running a library and information centre, publishing a bulletin NGO 
News, being an intermediary for the EU PHARE programme, etc. Among others 
it initiated the Sarajevo NGO Council, the Tuzla NGO Reference Group and the 
Banja Luka Local NGO Forum (see Stubbs 1996b, Bekkering 1997, ICVA 
2000). 
• Between groups in ‘enemy territory’ in times when travel or contact was 
impossible, or groups shy to seek direct contact fearing a bad reception: When in 
late 1991 contact between Croatia and Serbia was almost fully interrupted, 
internationals were still able to travel from one country to the other, and pass 
messages, take letters or help to organise meetings in third countries (see 
Schweitzer 1991 and 1992).283 
• Between local groups and international civil society: Many international 
networks made contact with groups in former Yugoslavia, or were approached by 
local groups who had heard of them. Foremost of them were various women and 
peace networks like Women in Black, IPPNW, International Women Network 
for Peace, International Fellowship of Reconciliation, War Resisters’ 
                                                 
283
 One special project in this context was the creation of an e-mail network throughout the former 
Yugoslavia in 1992-93, at a time when e-mail was a new technology with which most people were 
unfamiliar. An activist from the German Federation for Social Defence together with some other 
peace groups in Europe (Tilburg za mir, Group for a Switzerland Without an Army), and - later 
financed partly by the Soros Foundation - helped to set up the ZAMIR network with mailboxes in  
Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, and from 1994 on also in Sarajevo, linking 150 groups and 
individuals with each other (Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung 1992, n.d.-a, n.d.-c, Schweitzer 
1994:57, Large n.d.:142, Tilburg za Mir n.d.). 
 Before ZAMIR was operational, a fax bridge set up with the help of activists in Vienna served the 
same purpose (Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1994), as did the office of War Resisters’ 
International (see the archives of the WRI website, www.wri-irg.org).  
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International and the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (see 
IPPNW 1993, War Resisters’ International 1994, Women in Black 1994c, 
Ackermann 2000:149, Jovanic 2001, Kruhonja 2002:253).284  
Another activity in this context was to invite representatives of local groups, 
media, parties and intellectuals to conferences, speaking events and the like (see 
Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1996, National Peace Council, Tullio and 
Vertucci 2002). 
• Between local groups from different conflict areas: At least two different 
international groups have facilitated contact of activists from former Yugoslavia, 
especially Kosovo, with Northern Ireland, obviously feeling that the two conflict 
regions had things in common: Under the name of KONI a body of Pax Christi 
Germany (Bistumsstelle Rottenburg-Stuttgart) together with the Forum Civil 
Peace Service developed since 2000 a dialogue programme between Serbian, 
Albanian and Slavic Muslims from four towns in Kosovo with North Irish 
‘Cross-community workers’ (Pax Christi et al. 2000, Forum Ziviler 
Friedensdienst 2002). 285 Several years earlier, in 1995, the British trainers’ 
network Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (CCTS) organised a 
study trip to Northern Ireland for activists from Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia.   
The networking function has rarely been highlighted when international civil society 
groups describe their activities. At best, it is mentioned as one function among 
several. I think that this underestimates the importance of this role. The linking and 
networking is a function of vital importance for civil society because it leads to a 
discourse and transfer of experiences and knowledge. It is a method of empowerment 
because local and international groups are finding themselves as equal partners in 
                                                 
284
 There were also professional organisations like a German Umbrella of ‘democratic scientists’ 
(Bund der demokratischen WissenschaftlerInnen –BDWi) who started cooperation with the 
Serbian initiative ‘Responsibility for the Future’ (Jovanovic 2001), and cooperation between 
international journalists (see below). 
285
 The Forum Civil Peace Service (CPS) is a German umbrella organisation that was founded in 
1996 to promote a peace service of professional ‘peace experts’, comparable to development 
services. Its first activities were trainings for such ‘experts’. Pax Christi Germany which had been 
sending volunteers to the former Yugoslavia since 1992, was one of the organisations setting up 
pilot projects for the civil peace service. From 1999 on, there was then state funding for the CPS, 
and then the Forum CPS administered projects for some of its member organisations as well as 
sending own staff to the field. Pax Christi was the initiator of projects in Zenica and Banja Luka in 
Bosnia, and Benkovac in Croatia (see Bauer and Muller 1996, Pax Christi International 1996b, 
Ruessmann 1999b, Ruessmann 1999c, ICVA 2000, Meyer 2000, Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst 
2002, Schiel 2002, Kukla 2003, Pax Christi 2003, Forum Ziviler Friedensdienst n.d.-b). 
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international networks rather than in a relationship of donor and recipient. And it 
builds bridges when direct contacts are difficult because either one side does not take 
the other seriously (often the case when local NGOs have to deal with international 
organisations or local authorities), or because people do not dare to make direct 
contact for fear of being rejected (such was the case, at least early on, with anti-war 
groups caught up on different sides of the war). On general terms however, the 
observation by Mendelson (2002) who researched NGO support in different 
countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia needs to be taken seriously that intense 
involvement in international networks also can distract local groups from their own 
issues, although I have found little evidence of this problem in the area under study. 
 
7.7.5 Solidarity Work 
Solidarity work is of course a form of support for local groups. The reason why it has 
been made a section of its own is that unlike the general support described before it 
focussed on particular issues whose goals are shared by the international interveners– 
issues like the right to refuse to military service, or a struggle for independence or 
regime change.  
 
7.7.5.1 Support for Those Avoiding Military Service 
Support for conscientious objectors, deserters and draft evaders were an issue for 
international antimilitarist and pacifist groups. There were an estimated 300,000 of 
such men, the majority of them probably from the FR Yugoslavia, followed by 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Friedrich 1995).286 Partly this support took the 
form of protest and advocacy in third countries where governments and the EU were 
lobbied to grant them asylum (see chapter 8). In the area of the former Yugoslavia, 
concrete support to hide or flee the countries was given.  
                                                 
286
 There were some women volunteers in some of the armies but no draft or other pressure on 
women to join the military in the countries in question. 
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War Resisters’ International (WRI) was the international umbrella organisation 
whose members played a crucial role in this.287 It had contact with a youth group in 
Slovenia since the late 1970s, supporting them in the 1980s in their struggle for 
recognition of the right of conscientious objection. When the wars then began, WRI 
and its network of member organisations got involved in multiple activities of 
support and solidarity, ranging from training through to support of conscientious 
objectors and draft evaders. Local groups were the first contact of those seeking to 
escape or avoid military service, for example Women in Black in Belgrade or the 
Antiwar Campaign in Croatia. Partner organisations from abroad such as the 
Hungarian peace and human rights organisation Alba Koer helped them to cross the 
border to third countries and received them there, or sent them on to other countries. 
A deserters’ network linked to WRI was crucial in coordinating these international 
efforts that often had an element of civil disobedience since the European countries 
were hesitant to recognise avoidance of military service as a reason for asylum.288  
The high number of those who avoided military service undoubtedly had an impact 
on the conflicts. It played an important role very early on during the violent conflict 
in Slovenia and then the war in Croatia because many men then still serving in the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) left for patriotic reasons, often joining the newly 
formed armies of the secessionist republics, but seriously damaging the ability of the 
JNA to wage effective warfare in summer 1991. Later many from FR Yugoslavia 
and Croatia sought to escape military service, especially if that meant being sent to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina – something that both countries did though officially always 
denying the fact. Friedrich, one of the coordinators of the International Deserters’ 
Network, thinks that “even if the mass desertion in Yugoslavia was not the cause for 
achieving a cease-fire agreement, it certainly contributed to a questioning of the 
ability to continue the war” (Friedrich 1996: 188). 
 
                                                 
287
 WRI was founded after World War I of pacifist groups united around the issue of refusing military 
service. 
288
 The deserters’ network was founded in 1993 and had in 1996 member groups in 13 European 
countries, combining concrete support of deserters with advocacy work for the right of asylum. 
See War Resisters’ International 1994 and 1998a, Friedrich 1995, Friedrich 1996.   
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7.7.5.2 Solidarity with Kosovo – the Activities in Kosovo 
The nonviolent character of the resistance movement in Kosovo appealed to a 
number of groups and organizations interested in and committed to nonviolent 
resistance themselves.289 Once more, War Resisters’ International was one focus, 
another was certain groups in particular from the French and Italian language area.290 
This work had two sides: advocacy and public information work abroad that will be 
described in the next chapter, and concrete activities with the Kosovar organisations 
in Kosovo.  
As an example of work in Kosovo I would like to sketch the work of the Campagna 
per una soluzione nonviolenta del problema del Kossovo (Campaign for a 
Nonviolent Solution of the Problem of Kosovo). It was a coordination of different 
Italian NGOs that was initiated in 1992 by Albert l’Abate, a well-known nonviolent 
researcher-activist from the University of Florence (see Troebst 1998:97pp, l’Abate 
1997:7-8, 22 and 59pp, Marcon 2000:144, l’Abate 2002-b).291 After two years of 
publicity work, organising delegations to Belgrade and Kosovo, and other work more 
focussed on the international and Italian public, in 1995 they started trying to 
establish a permanent presence in Prishtina under the name of a ‘Peace Embassy’. 
Since the FR Yugoslavia and especially Kosovo were difficult to access for 
foreigners planning to stay for any length of time (the first volunteer sent there in 
1995 had to leave after three months), they only succeeded in having one or two 
permanent staff there from August 1997 until 1998. The objectives of the Peace 
Embassy were human rights monitoring, creating a meeting place for people of 
different nations, cultures, political orientations and religions, facilitating 
intercultural relations, finding common denominators between Albanians and Serbs; 
supporting networking between Albanians and the pacifist groups in Serbia and 
                                                 
289
 It was nonviolent until in 1997/98 the armed Kosovo Liberation Army took over the de-facto 
leadership of the movement, and started to determine its strategies. 
290
 Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente, Centre Martin Luther King in Switzerland, Helsinki 
Citizens Assembly Geneva, the Collectif du jumelage Geneva-Prishtina and the Campagna 
Kossovo in Italy were the main groups identified in the survey. 
291
 The organisations coordinating the Campagna were MIR (Fellowship of Reconciliation Italy), Pax 
Christi, Beati i Costruttori di Pace, Agimi-Caritas di Otranto, and it was also supported by the 
Movimento Nonviolento, the Segretaria Nazionale per la Difesa Popolare Nonviolenta and a 
regional government (Regione Val d’Aosta). 
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supporting twinning of Italian and Kosovar schools and organisations (l’Abate 
2002b).292  
It is difficult to assess what if any role the international support by these rather small 
and radical nonviolent groups played for the resistance in Kosovo. Larger NGOs 
other than some humanitarian (Caritas, working with the organisation Mother 
Theresa) were rare in Kosovo. The Open Society Fund supported some media, but 
otherwise there was no significant financial or other political support of the 
movement4. The Kosovo-Albanian resistance was mostly financed by the Albanian 
diaspora (see Clark 2000). The nonviolent strategy as represented by President 
Rugova and Shkelzen Maliqi (Maliqi, 1995, n.d.-a, and -b) was developed without 
international counselling or training. War Resisters’ International twice was 
approached (in 1992-93 and 1998) for a training in nonviolent action but in the end 
the plans fell through because each time the local side for security reasons cancelled 
the preparations (see War Resisters’ International 1994 and 2002). Thus, on the 
whole, it may be concluded that the solidarity work did not play an essential role for 
the struggle in Kosovo other than helping them with propagating their objectives 
abroad (see chapter 8).293  
 
7.7.5.3 Overthrowing the Yugoslav Government 
In contrast, the overthrow of the Milosevic regime in October 2000 by a nonviolent 
mass movement led by the students’ movement Otpor is a success story of 
nonviolent resistance, though rather contested in regard to the role played by 
                                                 
292
 Their work as that of the other groups involved in Kosovo solidarity was slowed down in the 1998 
events and the fact that the struggle had become a violent one, and then fully interrupted by the 
NATO war against FR Yugoslavia. But after that war they mostly picked up the contacts. The 
Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente (which was also a member organisation of Balkan 
Peace Team) in 2001 began a Civil Peace Service project in Mitrovica, and the Campagna opened 
a ‘Centre for Friendship Between the People’, and continued with different dialogue activities 
(between ethnic groups, youth, religious leaders and schools). 
293
 A‘counterfactual’ question is worth addressing: what if there had been more international 
engagement by civil society, perhaps including setting up a large international presence in Kosovo 
for nonviolent peace-keeping, as urged by the US organisation Peaceworkers in 1998 (see chapter 
6.3.2). Perhaps at an earlier stage such support could have prevented the movement from turning 
violent and still helped it to achieve its goals. If, as I believe, there were real chances missed, 
international civil society shares the burden of responsibility for the events that eventually led to 
the NATO war of 1999. 
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international support.294 In August 2000, as national elections approached, Otpor 
launched an anti-Milosevic campaign with the slogan ‘he is finished’. On the election 
day, the 24 September, more than 30,000 volunteers monitored some 10,000 polling 
stations. The strategy Otpor pursued was to call for massive participation in the 
elections, and – assuming that it would be likely that Milosevic would try to rig the 
results – collect proof for any irregularities and use them for public protest (Nenadic  
and Belcevic 2006:15). Immediately after the election, the opposition parties 
declared their candidate Vojislav Kostunica as victor, while Milosevic claimed that 
neither had the majority. In response, the opposition called for a general strike that 
was full in force after a few days. On 5 October, hundred thousands of protesters 
assembled on the streets of Belgrade, storming the parliament and state-run 
television and radio stations, mostly without using violence. On October 6 Milosevic 
acknowledged defeat. 
The successful overthrow of the Milosevic regime is probably the clearest example 
of the interplay between three sides: a vibrant local protest movement, 
democratisation policies by international governments and large INGOs close to 
these governments, and international nonviolent grassroots movements as the third 
component.  
There had been protest against the Milosevic regime throughout the 1990s, mostly 
led by oppositional parties and students. Independent media like Radio B92 and anti-
war and feminist groups like the Centre for Antiwar Action and Women in Black 
received support by the international civil society throughout the 1990s. They 
received financial aid, had volunteers working with them and were closely linked to 
different international networks. There have also been trainings that discussed 
nonviolent action strategies throughout the 1990s (see Bund fuer Soziale 
                                                 
294
 Otpor (meaning ‘resistance’) was founded in autumn 1998 by a small group of  students who had 
been active in the previous protests of winter 1996-97 (see 3.4).  The protests began in September 
1999 with rallies in 20 cities, asking Milosevic to resign. The police reacted with violence but the 
protests continued, though the numbers dwindled for some time as the political opposition started 
to fragment once more. However, between November 1999 and early 2000, Otpor developed a 
national-wide but decentralised organisation trying to avoid exposing leaders which would have 
made repression easier. In May 2000, 18 political parties united to form a new coalition calling 
itself Democratic Opposition of Serbia  (DOS). 
 The description of the overthrow of Milosevic and Otpor’s role in it is based on Vasovic 2000, 
Popovic 2001, Nenadic and  Belcevic 2006, Centre for Applied NonViolent Action & Strategies 
2008a and 2008b, Zunes 2008.  
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Verteidigung 1993, Large n.d.:100). But for most of the time this support was given 
mostly by small international NGOs being part of the peace movements of their 
respective countries who collected donations among their membership and 
supporters. Only a few large organisations with ample financial resources, like the 
Soros Foundation (see above), were engaged in this field. This situation changed 
after the NATO war, due to Western governments’ new interest in supporting regime 
change in Belgrade making resources available in quantities previously 
unimagined.295 For ‘democracy aid’, the USA alone spent US$10 million in 1999 
and US$31 million in 2000, money that was spent on sponsoring meetings and 
trainings or went mostly to oppositional parties and municipalities, NGOs and media 
(Carothers 2001:3). A proportion of that money was channelled through a small 
number of US QUANGOs, the National Endowment for Democracy, the already 
mentioned National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republican 
Institute (IRI) being the three most important ones. Carothers (2001) estimates that 
the level of EU aid in these two years was similar, also about US$40 million. Besides 
money, the material support included office equipment, and also protest materials 
(IRI paid for 2,5 million ‘he is finished’-stickers, t-shirts and sprays).  
The second element of international support for Otpor consisted of conferences, 
trainings and workshops.296 Some commentators attribute these events with a pivotal 
role in the overthrow of Milosevic. In July 1999, the EastWest Institute (EWI) 
organised a conference in Bratislava, right after the end of the Yugoslavia-Kosovo 
war, with the title “The Future of the FR Yugoslavia in the context of post war 
reconstruction” (see Mathews 2001).297 Participants included people from the 
political opposition, trade unions, NGOs and media, as well as key figures from the 
                                                 
295
 The relationship between the FR Yugoslavia and the Western world had improved after the 
Dayton Agreement. The sanctions were mostly abolished, and Milosevic was seen by many as a 
guarantee for stability in the region. Only after the NATO war of 1999 this changed, and EU and 
USA agreed that it was time for a regime change in Serbia /FR Yugoslavia, combining economic 
sanctions, diplomatic isolation including the indictment of Milosevic by ICTY, and democracy aid 
(see Carothers 2001 and chapter 4 of this study). 
296
 For the following sections on material aid and trainings, see Gagnon 1998b, Cohen 2000, Dobbs 
2000, Mathews 2001, Thompson 2001, Mascolo 2005, Paulson 2005, Nenadic and Belcevic 2006, 
Zunes 2008: 
297
 The EastWest-Institute is a think tank founded in 1980, involving a number of elder statesmen 
(among them George W. Bush Sr. and Helmut Kohl),and , with offices today in USA, Belgium 
and Russia. It set up a task force working on FR Yugoslavia, engaging both in international 
advocacy work and concrete work with actors on the ground. 
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EU, Council of Europe and OSCE. The subject of the discussion was how to achieve 
a ‘free and democratic’ society.298 EWI then organised a series of meetings between 
September 1999 and February 2000 that brought the Community for Change into 
contacts with international actors like the Council of Europe, and the Community 
held meetings in Belgrade which soon became an important forum for opposition 
groups. In July 2000 a new conference in Bratislava decided to work on common 
visions for the elections. Soon after the new party ‘DOS’ was formed and Kostunica 
nominated as presidential candidate.299 
From 31 March 2000 to 3 April, again in Budapest, IRI held a training for 20 or 30 
Otpor activists. As trainer they had Robert Helvey, a close colleague of Gene Sharp 
at the Albert Einstein Institution, a NGO that since 1983 had been “dedicated to 
advancing the study and use of strategic nonviolent action in conflicts throughout the 
world“, having worked with resistance and pro-democracy groups in many countries 
of the world (Albert Einstein Institution 2008).300 Helvey presented a toolbox of 
methods and strategies for nonviolent revolution that obviously was very influential 
(the Otpor successor CANVAS is still relying heavily on this methodology as can be 
seen by their website).  
In summer 2000 IRI then organised trainings for election observers in Szeged, on the 
Hungary-Yugoslav border. They trained about 400 monitors who went back and 
trained another 15,000 (other sources speak of 20,000).  
These – the money and the trainings – were the main international support that the 
movement against Milosevic received. For its part, Otpor tried to keep it secret at the 
time, fearing a backlash if it was known - opposition was anyway portrayed by the 
regime as being directed from abroad. After Milosevic’s overthrow when it became 
known, this caused a big outcry in Serbia and also abroad.  Even today, for many 
                                                 
298
 Two initiatives were launched as a result of the conference: A group called Community for 
Change that understood itself as a consortium of pro-democry forces; and a Task Force to assist 
the Community for Change and to develop a comprehensive action plan. EWI served as its 
Secretariat. 
299
 Another workshop often referred to in this context took place in October 1999 in Budapest, 
organised by NDI. Activists, among them Otpor members from Serbia, received there a closed-
door briefing by Doug Schoen, a Democrat who talked about an opinion poll conducted by a US 
firm. This showed that Milosevic had a70% negative rating among Serbian voters, but that 
opposition leaders didn’t fare much better. He recommended Kostunica as the one with the least 
negative rating. 
300
 The Center for Civic Initiatives in Belgrade translated Gene Sharp’s monograph From 
Dictatorship to Democracy and distributed 5,500 copies. 
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leftists Otpor (and other Eastern European groups struggling to overthrow their 
governments) are puppets of the US government.301  
To assess the role and importance of the international support, it must be asked why 
the movement in 2000 succeeded and what was different compared to the earlier 
attempts to overthrow the regime.  
With Mauro (2002:327) I would see the economic devastation of the country 
resulting from the war, the sanctions, and the failure of the government to introduce 
economic reforms as one cluster of factors. Other reasons were the military and 
diplomatic defeat in all the wars that Milosevic had waged (Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo); the unification of the opposition parties, proper organisation 
of the election campaign, effective election monitoring; and the readiness of Serbia’s 
citizens to push through their electoral will, even at the cost of confrontation with the 
police and the army. 
Otpor members and other local activists are convinced that without external support, 
Milosevic would still have been toppled, only perhaps later.  However, media reports 
from that time state that these same activists considered the foreign support received 
as ‘critical’. The financial aid may here may not have been as vital (though helpful 
and in case of the independent media essential throughout the 1990s) as the strategic 
conferences and trainings. Mathews, referring to the EWI meetings, comments: 
It is difficult to know to what extent the Bratislava Process contributed to 
the successful overthrow of the Milosevic regime. However, members of 
the Task Force, some of whom are now members of the government, 
privately attest to the importance of the initiative, pointing out that it did 
provide the first real opportunity for the pro-democracy forces to meet 
and coalesce around a common strategy (Mathews 2001: 13) 
An indicator for that is that unlike 1996-97, the movement applied a clear and unified 
strategy, and consciously involved many parts of society into the protest movement. 
                                                 
301
 A number of leftist websites pursue this topic, with authors that promote conspiracy theories not 
only about Europe but Latin America, Burma and other places as well: 
http://www.trend.infopartisan.net/trd0607/t360607.html, 
http://www.voltairenet.org/article30032.html, http://www.paxamericana.net/2007/09/whats-
next.html, http://emperors-clothes.com/engl.htm, http://www.wsws.org/de/2004/dez2004/pora-
d02.shtml, http://venezuelasolidarity.org.uk/ven/web/2007/under_cover_coups.html, 
http://www.antiwar.com/szamuely/pf/p-sz050501.html.  
 Examples for articles of that vein are Meyssan  2007 and Israel / Varkevisser n.d. See also 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/comments.php?nav_id=42936, B92 blog discussion that reflects the 
Otpor issues. 
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Neither was the case in the earlier protests. I believe it not to be far-fetched to 
assume that this was an outcome of the strategic teachings by the Albert Einstein 
Institution (see also Carothers 2001, Mathews 2001:17). But the revolution was in 
my eyes nevertheless a local one, aided but not engineered. Zunes (2008) who has 
studied revolutionary movements all over the world states that the very fact that it 
was a mass movement and not a coup is proof of that. He also thinks that in spite of 
the support there was little understanding generally within the international 
community of the nonviolent movement (a phenomenon that is not surprising 
considering that the nonviolent movement in Kosovo met with similar ignorance).302  
 
7.7.6: Summary: State-building, Democratisation and Civil Society Support -A 
Highly Political Agenda 
In this last section very different approaches may seem to have been lumped 
together. At first glance, an international NGO advising a fledgling government on 
how to set up a tax system has little in common with a group of war resisters 
engaging in semi-clandestine work to help deserters flee their country. Nevertheless, 
both are part of state-building, democratisation and civil society support. In fact, the 
difference is not the position the external party takes towards the government in the 
target country as may be assumed at first glance. The solidarity movement with 
Kosovo had a very positive relationship to the Kosovar government under Rugova, 
and as described above the EU and USA started to seriously engage in furthering 
regime change in the FR Yugoslavia after the Kosovo war of 1999. The differences 
in approach perhaps arise partly from the position external civil society actors takes 
in regard to their own governments (and alliances of states). Supporting deserters– in 
spite of some good-will declarations, (see chapter 8) – has not been high on the 
agenda of the Western governments, and also the Kosovo issue was mostly seen 
from purely human rights or crisis prevention stand-points, not from a point of view 
of sympathy to the goals of the Kosovar movement.303  
                                                 
302
 He reported being told by Otpor leaders that the CIA even offered some of them earlier in 2000 
guns which they rejected. 
303
 There is of course a middle field: Financing or training independent media and NGOs in particular 
is a field that found support by both Western governments and civil society groups within these 
countries. Here the political agendas of civil society and governments were not that different. 
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7.8 Promoting Peace Skills and Dialogue 
Of course almost all peace-building has to do with peace and dialogue. So this 
heading must not be misunderstood. It concerns those activities and strategies that 
pursue peace work, dialogue or reconciliation without linking these activities or 
goals to other activities like social work or reconstruction aid (see above).  
 
7.8.1 Training in Peace Skills 
Education and training in relation to ‘peace skills’ was a widespread activity 
organised by both state and non-state actors.304 CDA calls it “one of the most popular 
approaches to peacebuilding programming” (CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 
2006:11), and in an earlier paper the same organisation wrote. 
Trainings in peace skills are one of the most common methods by which 
international, national, and local agencies work for peace. Trainings, like 
other educational activities, are seen to inform people's efforts by 
providing new ideas and skills. Or they are seen to catalyze people to see 
possibilities for action where they thought things were hopeless, and to 
undertake activities that will help bring about peace. (CDAINC 2002) 
Stovel (2000) who studied NGOs and peace education in Bosnia lists a wide 
spectrum of educational programmes covering active learning training for teachers, 
inter-community cooperation, human rights education, ‘political literacy’, diversity 
appreciation, education on stereotyping and prejudice, trauma healing workshops, 
conflict resolution training, peace education, media literacy and inter-group 
mixing.305  
                                                 
304
 The term ‘peace skills’ was borrowed from the Issue Papers of the project “Reflecting on Peace 
Practice” by the Collaborative of Development Action, see CDAINC 2002).    
305
 Almost identically, the CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects (2006) found in Kosovo training in 
conflict resolution, human rights, nonviolent communication and related topics in all the 
communities visited for their study. 
 Large (n.d.:88pp) in her study describes some different approaches to training and related conflict 
resolution work, and also quotes examples of training agendas. On the basis of these three studies 
and what I found in the survey of trainings materials, it seems to me that while differing in detail, 
the following list of topics were most common in the trainings: 
•  Personal issues (identity, self-esteem, handling anger, trauma healing); 
•  Spirituality (depending on who gave the training –ranging from traditional Christianity to more 
New-Age related approaches); 
•  Group processes (working in a team, decision-making and leadership in groups, issues of co-
ordination and conflicts between groups or within one group) ; 
•  Dialogue, communication, prejudice reduction and interethnic reconciliation. 
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Training was an activity in which both local and international groups engaged. 
Already mentioned for their work with war veterans have been the Centre for 
Nonviolent Action in Sarajevo and Belgrade, and the Croatian group Miramida that 
developed out of the social reconstruction project in Pakrac.306  
Probably the first groups to facilitate trainings in nonviolence in the region were War 
Resisters’ International (WRI) and the German Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung 
(Federation for Social Defence-BSV; see War Resisters’ International 1994, Bund 
fuer Soziale Verteidigung n.d.-c). 307 As mentioned above, WRI had maintained 
contacts with a group in Slovenia in the 1980s. When the conflicts began, WRI 
activists, among them one whose home organisation was the BSV, visited Slovenia 
in summer 1991 and met there also with Croatian activists from a small ecology 
group called Green Action who were just starting up an anti-war group. They had 
heard that there was something like ‘training for nonviolence’ and wished to try it 
out. The German group sent three trainers down soon after in October 1991 during 
the war in Croatia for a first three- or four day training that was mostly meant to 
show the local activists what nonviolence training was about. After that training, the 
organisers also visited Belgrade, mostly motivated by the need to see the ‘other side’ 
                                                                                                                                          
 Depending on the topic of the training, there were also: 
•  Nonviolent action and campaigning 
•  ‘Political and media literacy’;   
•  various topics of special interest to the group trained, e.g. human rights, gender, community 
development, fundraising, management, psychological counselling etc. 
•  Special methods or approaches on dealing with conflict have included nonviolent 
communication (Marshall Rosenberg), Alternatives to Violence (a Quaker programme 
originally conceived for working with prison inmates), Active Listening, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution,  and mediation. 
•  Training of trainers in these various types of training has played an important role. 
306
 Another example for a mixed local-international initiative is the Peace School in Gorski Kotar/ 
Mrkopalj in Croatia. Gorski Kotar was already introduced, in 5.3 above as an example  as an 
example of a local mediator preventing violence in his region. In consequence of the early 
prevention of violence, several villages in the region started to co-operate, and become an example 
in Croatia for moderate politics. These activities became known beyond the Croatian borders, and 
especially attracted the engagement of Austrian and Swiss peace activists.. From 1993 on they 
helped to organise a ‘peace school’ for  children, teacher and adults. From 1996-97 on the 
activities expanded with the arrival of two conscientious objectors from Austrian Peace Service 
working with the school on a permanent basis. In 1999 and later, the Peace School also conducted 
one-week seminars in other places in the region like the Vojvodina, Maribor, and Banja Luka (see 
Wintersteiner 1994 , Tiffinger and Tiffinger 1998, Tiffinger 1999, Tiffinger 2000, Austrian Peace 
Service 2001, Pucher 2001, OEsterreichische Friedensdienste n.d.). 
307
 This description is also partly based on personal memory having been the mentioned link between 
WRI and BSV, and being with the first trainers’ group in October 1991. 
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of the conflict. Their meeting with the Centre for Antiwar Action in Belgrade 
resulted in more trainings also in Serbia in 1992, as well as follow-up trainings with 
other groups in Croatia, given by trainers approached through BSV or the WRI 
network.308 
It is not easy to evaluate trainings beyond a first feed-back by participants on what 
they liked and did not like about the seminar. I would like to start with a quote of a 
Serbian grassroots’ activist working with MOST, the group previously mentioned as 
the Serbian counterpart in the Pakrac project: 
And how did my peace activism start? In 1991, I was a young 
psychologist, unemployed for four years, and a mother of two small 
children. In the former Yugoslavia, the only country I had, the war and 
the fallout began. …This is when an unusual thing happened: my friend 
and former professor … invited me to attend a strange seminar on 
mediation and nonviolent conflict transformation. … After the seminar, 
some new vistas opened before me, new views on conflict in general, so 
that the conflict in our country too assumed another dimension; I 
understood that this was not only happening to us, even though I had a 
hard time accepting it. Wishing to share this unique experience with our 
colleagues and to introduce them to these ideas, we organised the first 
local seminar for the interested people who ‘shared our ideas’. And this is 
how it all began, this is how the MOST group was created, the group that 
has since, in the fifteen years that followed (these past fifteen years), 
made and still makes  an invaluable contribution to the promotion of the 
ideas of peace and tolerance among people, through various aspects of 
education (Kijevcacic 2007:55). 
Similar observations were made in the two training evaluation meetings that took 
place in 1993 and 1995 in Hungary and Austria, where trainers and activists from the 
former Yugoslavia met with trainers from abroad (Schweitzer 1993c, Exchange 
Meeting Among Conflict Resolution Trainers and Peace Educators 1995, Large 
                                                 
308
 Some of the British trainers later formed the Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (until 
1997 Coordinating Committee for Conflict Resolution Training in Europe). The CCTS is a British 
group (with some international links and contacts)  that was set up after discussions about training 
needs at the second Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly in Bratislava in March 1992. Later that year 
trainers related to the new Committee visited Croatia, in particular the young group in Osijek with 
which one of the trainers, a well-known Quaker mediator, from then on formed a close 
relationship (Nikolic 1993:439, Anti-War Campaign Croatia 1995:233, Clark n.d., Large 
n.d.:7,39p and 99).  
 From 1992 on, trainers from CCTS regularly went to the region to conduct trainings in issues like 
mediation, conflict resolution etc, and also participated in two evaluation meetings with trainers 
and activists from the area of former Yugoslavia. In 1995 a Northern Irish member of the 
Committee organised an exchange project in form of a visit of peaceworkers from former 
Yugoslavia for eleven days to Northern Ireland to learn about the problems and reconciliation 
work in that country.  
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n.d.:91): The first and foremost effect of the trainings was personal change and 
empowerment.309  
But there definitely often were two further outcomes, as was also found in Kosovo 
after 1999: 
• There often was change of attitudes towards the other ethnic group(s), people 
starting to be more relaxed with them, stereotypes and ‘enemy images’ broken 
down. (CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects 2006:38). 
How long lasting and stable such changes of attitudes were remains an 
unanswered question however. That would require evaluations that covered a 
longer period of time. 
• In several cases, trainings, especially the early ones, played a role in the 
formation and strategic planning of new groups (see the quote above, Schweitzer 
1993c, Exchange Meeting Among Conflict Resolution Trainers and Peace 
Educators 1995). This definitely qualifies as impact as it is understood by 
evaluators because it has longer-term and sustainable effects (see Rubin 1995, 
Paffenholz and Reychler 2007). 
 
7.8.2 Dialogue Projects 
In the conclusions of this chapter will be discussed what different strategies and 
methods interveners used in order to promote inter-ethnic cooperation and eventual 
reconciliation. The promotion of ‘dialogue’ is (just) one of the tools for that purpose. 
In this section here I will look at those projects and programmes that pursued 
‘dialogue pure’, or dialogue for the sake for dialogue, meaning that it was not linked 
to any other type of activity, be it reconstruction or social work. Also excluded here 
are the types of encounters that were described under middle level peace-making. 
                                                 
309
 Sometimes, this may have been the only outcome,  as CDA suspects in its Reflecting on Peace 
Processes project of the CDA that published a general paper  about the role and impact of trainings 
in peace processes (CDAINC 2002). That paper confirms on a more general level what was found 
for the trainings in former Yugoslavia:  
 People often report that trainings have changed their lives and given them crucial skills that they 
then use in their own organisations, work, family, and personal lives. However, there is equally 
evidence that these skills usually stop at the level of the individual-that people do not subsequently 
train others in those skills as was originally intended, or go on to undertake new peace activities. 
(CDAINC 2002) 
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The difference between the two is the purpose: if the objective of a meeting is to 
concretely discuss solutions to the conflict, or if the purpose is generally to develop 
understanding for each other’s views. That there is a grey area here does probably 
not need extra mention.310  
Generally the promotion of dialogue can be defined as providing  
opportunities (meetings, structures, processes, a ‘dialogue space’) for 
direct contact and communication between people from opposing sides. 
[Agencies] believe that, if well managed, dialogue will lead to mutual 
understanding and moderation of views (Olson 2001).  
Dialogue in this context usually refers to two components of a groups’ or an 
individual’s identity: the ethnic identity (inter-ethnic dialogue) or the religious (inter-
religious dialogue). At least in the case of former Yugoslavia these two were, as far 
as I could see, usually clearly separated.311 
 
7.8.2.1 Inter-ethnic Dialogue 
Many encounters, especially of oppositional, feminist and anti-war groups (be it 
seminars, workshops, or just ‘meetings’) took place without needing any mediation 
by international actors. But there have also been cases where such meetings would  
perhaps not have taken place if there hadn’t been groups or individuals from the 
international civil society making them possible through ‘good offices’ or what at the 
high level would be called ‘shuttle mediation’, visiting groups based in the different 
countries at war and encouraging them to meet.312  
                                                 
310
 In Olson’s (2001) terminology: “dialogues  focused on civil society”. In Duffield’s (1996)  it 
would be the first of his two approaches, arranging appropriate conferences and workshops to 
bring people together. (The other approach he names is training in conflict resolution based on 
‘clarifying mistaken perceptions and providing psychological and social skills for defusing 
potentially tense situations’.) See also Ropers 2004 for different types of dialogue. 
311
 Though religion was an ethnic marker, so that when for example Muslims and Orthodox 
Christians talked with each other, it meant mostly ethnic Muslims (since Muslims are considered 
an ethnicity) and Serbs. The same with Catholics who are mostly identified with Croats. 
312
 See Large (nd:92) who lists as topics for such meetings 1. issues of co-ordination within anti-war 
movements; 2. clashes with local authorities over questions of eviction and minority rights; 3. 
differences with central governments. 
7. Peace-building by Civil Society Actors  201 
 
 
One example is the work of the Nansen Academy (Norway) that helped to create the 
Nansen Dialogue Network which uses inter-ethnic dialogue as a tool for peaceful 
conflict transformation.313 Its mission statement reads as follows: 
§ Nansen Dialogue will, through applying the ideas and skills of dialogue, 
empower people who live in conflict situations to contribute to peaceful 
conflict transformation, and democratic development with promotion of 
human rights. 
§ Nansen Dialogue is marked by the wish to provide a neutral and open 
space where the different actors in a serious conflict can meet face to face 
in truthful and honest communication. The aim is to break down enemy 
images, as well as to increase understanding of each other’s positions, 
interests and needs. Facilitators and lecturers try to stimulate the cognitive 
analysis of the conflict itself and the experience of “the other’s” position. 
The focus is not on who is right or most guilty, but on how to build 
respect for democratic principles, human rights and peaceful conflict 
resolution for future improvement of society. These principles are to be 
an alternative in political organisation to national chauvinism and ethnic 
loyalty (Nansen Academy 2008).  
The work of the Nansen Academy grew continuously from its beginnings with a first 
seminar for 14 Bosnian students in Lillehammer in 1995. In 1998, both Serbs and 
Kosovo-Albanians attend their 10 week courses, followed up by workshops. The 
attendees remained in contact, and the groups functioned throughout the hostilities of 
1998, until 1999 both communities were for some time dissolved (Clark 2000:142), 
but took up work later again. 314  
The main activities of the network are the organization of meetings. So for example 
they held in 2000 a seminar on relations between Montenegro and Serbia, and in 
2001 a roundtable on attitudes of young people about the status of Montenegro. Until 
2000, they have had 165 participants in total (Broughton 2002:273, Nansen Academy 
2008, Nansen Dijalog Centar 2008, Stallaerts 2002:317).315  
                                                 
313
 The Nansen Academy is an institution of humanistic orientation founded in 1938 to counter the 
growth of totalitarian ideologies in Europe. Its main programme nowadays is adult education in 
philosophy and arts for students with different political, religious and cultural backgrounds. Its 
Department of Dialogue and Peacebuilding offers inter-ethnic dialogue seminars for various target 
groups, mainly from ex-Yugoslavia, but also from other conflict areas (Nansen Academy 2008). 
314
 Today, in 2008, the Nansen Dialogue Network has offices in the Nansen Academy and in Oslo and 
Nansen Dialogue Centres in ten cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Kosovo and Macedonia, many of them founded in 2000 or later. 
315
 Another example, with the participants probably being on the borderline between middle and 
grassroots’ level were the dialogue support Balkan Peace Team (BPT) gave to civil society groups 
in Serbia and Kosovo. In 1997, the team that had part-time bases both in Belgrade and Prishtina 
was instrumental in bringing together Serbian anti-war activists from Nis (south Serbia), students 
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The promotion of dialogue has not been limited to the area of former Yugoslavia. 
Many initiatives in third countries working on the conflict sought contact to diaspora 
groups from the region. In the survey, there were a number of small citizens’ groups 
that had this among their list of activities. In their dialogue efforts, a third side 
usually came in: people from the host community. The reports from such events 
indicate that it not always was easy to bring groups from the different sides together, 
but that some groups succeeded. (for example Balkan Peace Team promoting 
dialogue between Serbian and Kosovar students, see Mueller 2004).316 
 
7.8.2.2 Inter-religious Dialogue 
In the survey on the former Yugoslavia some activities can be categorised as inter-
religious dialogue, both high-level meetings between religious leaders, and cross-
community dialogue, ecumenical masses etc. at the grassroots.317  Sometimes this 
dialogue happened between two of the faith groups, sometimes several came 
together. As in the Middle East conflict area, protagonists of inter-religious dialogue 
have tended to point out that the main traditional religions in the area (Islam, 
Orthodox and Catholic Christianity and Judaism) all belong to the Abrahamic 
tradition (see Steele 2002:75). There were efforts for such dialogue right from 1992 
on, for example by the Conference of European Churches (Gruppe fuer eine Schweiz 
ohne Armee 1992b). An example for bringing together leaders of these four 
communities is a meeting the World Conference of Religion and Peace brokered in 
October 1996 and which led to the establishment of an Inter-Religious Council in 
                                                                                                                                          
from Belgrade and Albanian students who in that year for the first time since years went to the 
streets for public demonstrations. The team arranged the contact and accompanied the activists to 
visits, but did not participate in their meetings. The contacts made between the Serbian and 
Albanian civil society groups led as both sides professed afterwards to not only better 
understanding but to mutual support in the protest activities they were engaged in, and have partly 
also survived the 1999 war (see Schweitzer and  Clark 2002, Mueller 2006).  
 In 1993, a peace house in Mohacs, Hungary, was set up by Peace Bridge Basel, and supported 
among others by the Threshold and other NGOs from abroad. Mohacs was used over the years by 
many peace, anti-war and women’s groups, especially from Croatia and FR Yugoslavia, and also 
served for the reunion of families, summer camps for younger people etc. (Mandrino 1995, 
Rappold 1997, Large n.d.:74). 
316
 Balkan Peace Team was introduced in chapter 6 on peace-keeping. 
317
 Brajovic defines as follows: “inter-religious dialogue is a formal process in which authoritative 
members of at least two religious communities come together for an extended and serious 
discussion of the beliefs and practices tat separate the communities” (Brajovic 2007:187). 
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1997 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A Jew became the first chairman, succeeded in 1999 
by a Catholic (Du Pont 2002:241).318 
 
7.8.3 ‚Peace Projects’ With Complex Mandates 
There were a number of projects that undertook a wide range of activities under the 
explicit headline of ‘peace work’. The multi-pronged approach they share with the 
‘social reconstruction’ projects described above in 7.3.2, but unlike them material aid 
has played only a minimal or no role at all. Rather typically three areas of work are 
combined:  
• Support of civil society groups. 
• Social work, identifying projects or places that then could also be used as a 
vehicle to further the goal of inter-ethnic collaboration. Often these are youth 
centres as described above, but also other places or objects were chosen – as for 
instance did Balkan Peace Team France( the successor of the international BPT) 
choose a library in Mitrovica (Kosovo) for its work from 2001 onwards (Balkan 
Peace Team France 2001, 2002a and 2002b, Clark 2003b).  
• Training in peace skills and/or promotion of inter-ethnic dialogue. 
As an example for such complex projects, I would like to describe the Osijek Peace 
Teams, a local ‘embedded’ intervener:319 
Osijek Peace Teams was a project founded by Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and 
Human Rights Osijek, Croatia, that was founded in 1992. This peace team project 
                                                 
318
 An example for grassroots’ activities is a German group Oekumenischer Dienst im Konziliaren 
Prozess –Schalomdiakonat (Ecumenical Service in the Conciliatory Process- Shalom Diakonia). 
They are a group with a mostly Protestant background, and train lay people to work full-time for 
peace and reconciliation, accompanying those who graduate from their courses in their later 
workAt least in the former Yugoslavia, that work has often had an aspect of inter-religious 
dialogue. Thus two of its members organised inter-religious contacts, prayers, visits and seminars 
in Sarajevo and Republika Srpska (Voß 2000:125, Putevi Mira 2003). 
 Also activities of inter-religious dialogue also took place among the diaspora in third countries. 
For example,in 1992 two young Franciscans brought together t three groups in Cologne, Germany 
-  Christlich-islamische Gesellschaft in Koeln, Franziskaner Koeln and Zajedno Pomoci, a group 
that was founded out of the prayer initiative to organise humanitarian aid for Central Bosnia) -   to 
begin publicly praying for peace in Bosnia for Muslims, Jews and Christians (Neitzert 1996, 
Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1994). 
319
 Another example for this approach though coming to the area in numbers only after the period 
under study and deployed by several German development and peace service organisations have 
been the German Civil Peace Services financed by the German Ministry for Development. See 
Konsortium Ziviler Friedensdienst 2006 and Footnote 285. 
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began with the support of the Swedish Life and Peace Institute, who financed it, and 
Austrian Peace Services, who deployed international volunteers to work with the 
Croatian volunteers recruited through the Osijek Centre (for the following, see 
Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Osijek 2001a and b).320 The 
project officially began in 1998 with the end of the UNTAES mission in Eastern 
Slavonia which meant the withdrawal of many international support structures. But 
there was a pilot Listening Project already from 1996 where people were interviewed 
about the peace efforts, the return of former neighbours and future co-habitation.321 
The first (10-week) training for the Osijek Peace Teams took place in summer 1998, 
the concrete work started in 1999, with usually one international volunteer (from 
September 1999 mostly coming from Austrian Peace Services) being placed in a 
team with several local people. Teams were deployed to several small towns or 
villages, living in the local communities. In Dalje, for example, they helped to set up 
a youth club, organised a youth summer camp for youth from Croatia and Austria 
and supported a school partnership with an Austrian school. In Okucani, besides 
workshops with children and the formation of a youth group there have also been 
workshops with women, a hiking club, activities to embellish the village, a 
psychological series of workshops for war veterans and five ecumenical services 
with catholic orthodox and Adventist priests. Other activities included regular legal 
counselling, help with dealing with authorities, courses and seminars on diverse 
topics (from computers to languages, election monitoring to de-mining), help to 
reconstruct libraries or sports halls and special activities for the reintegration of 
returnees or disadvantaged ethnic groups like Roma (see Reiter 2000). 
As to the evaluation, initially local people had a hard time understanding the purpose 
of the project, expecting material humanitarian aid, and not seeing how seminars 
could help to improve their situation especially in view of the ‘danger’ in meeting 
people of the other nationality.  However, as the project became better understood, it 
                                                 
320
 And also Grabner 1999, Unger  and Leitner 1999, Ruessmann 1999d, Leitner et al. 2000, Reiter 
2000, Mathews 2001:100p, Kruhonja and Ivanovic 2002, Milan and Stanic 2002. 
321
 By the term of Listening Project is meant a specific method developed as far as I know in the USA 
where interviewers ask people about their opinions on critical issues, allowing people to express 
and vent their own thoughts and feelings. This is seen as  a tool for coming to terms with a 
difficult situation. Sometimes the interveners take what they are hearing in the interviews as basis 
for identifiying concrete needs that then are met by more practical interventions  (for example 
planning of concrete aid), but sometimes ‘listening’ remains a tool of its own. The Osijek Peace 
Teams based many of their interventions on such Listening Projects. 
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became more successful. An external evaluation showed the listening programme, 
along with other activities, empowering those who had been implementing it as well 
as those being listened to,  
in the way that it reduced their prejudices and fears of the other 
nationality, it raised the communication with the other nationality to a 
higher level, and it increased their motivation to participate in peace 
activities (Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Osijek 
2001b:107); 
The summary of the evaluation published by Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and 
Human Rights Osijek (2001b:116pp) lists a very large number of further general and 
specific achievements, as well as areas that need improvement, the latter mostly 
raising issues around management, project monitoring, training and preparedness of 
staff. 
 
7.8.4 Summary: Promoting Peace Skills and Dialogue Work - Only One Approach in 
Peace-building 
There have been many more examples of peace and dialogue work than could be 
mentioned in this chapter. Especially external civil society groups with a peace 
movement or nonviolence movement background tended to engage in this field. In 
the coming chapter on advocacy work I will show how this interest shaped 
discussions and the institutionalisation of new programmatic funding and types of 
projects in these third countries. However, from what has been described in this 
chapter so far, it is clear that such ‘peace work pure’ is only one strategy in peace-
building. As most other approaches it displays a list of success stories (like Nansen) 
as well as considerable lack of impact in other cases.  
 
7.9 Cultural Activities 
This last category of peace-building activities is relatively small. There were 
meetings and workshops of artists, for example Italian writers meeting Bosnian 
writers, financed by the Italian Fondo Alberto Moravia (Marcon 2000:14). The 
Austrian Peace Service supported in 1998 a ten-day workshop of painters with a 
dozen artists from Vojvodina, the Krajina, Slowakia and Rumania. The paintings 
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were sold and the money donated for refugees (Buchmayer 1998, Eckert and 
Ellensohn 1999).  
Many NGOs engaged in the organisation of sports events, often in the context of 
other work (see the International Volunteer Project Pakrac described above; ICVA 
2000).  
Similarly, concerts, theatre plays and readings were a popular activity, often linked 
with the message of ‘peace’. So organised for example the Open Society Fund in 
Belgrade in 1992 a ‘Music of Peace’ festival (Large n.d.:55). In a somewhat different 
spirit, Greek artists came to solidarity concerts in Belgrade on invitation of the 
Greek-Serb Friendship Association in 1992 (Michas 2002:19,24,34). Joan Baez gave 
a solidarity concert in May 1993 in Sarajevo (Morillon 1993:187). And Pax Christi 
Flanders and Netherlands organised a multicultural music festival together with the 
Musicians Without Borders in summer 2000 in several towns in Kosovo, as well as a 
festival in Macedonia. (De Vrieze 2002:298, Lubbers and Wagenaar 2001). 
Another typical activity was to invite artists to third countries, publish CDs of local 
musicians, or to organise exhibitions. So did for example the small local citizens’ 
group Bosnien-Forum Singen prepare an exhibition by painters of all ethnic groups, 
calling it ‘exhibition of reconciliation’ (Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1996, Berdi 
1996).  
Some NGOs or other donors sought to establish more permanent institutions to 
support arts. For example, the German-Bosnian-Herzegovinan Society in Travnik set 
up an artist-in-residence programme to revive the cultural scene, where artists were 
sponsored to stay for up to three month in the centre if they committed to work 
creatively for the community (Fischer and Tumler 2000:25pp).  
Many of the organisers of the events or other projects here argued – as much as could 
be discerned from the material available - that their work contributed to the 
development of the country or region in question, and also to reconciliation because 
it targeted the different ethnic, formerly enemy, groups. 
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7.10 Conclusions 
Peace-building activities by civil society actors were described in nine categories: 1. 
relief work, 2. disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of soldiers (DDR), 3. 
reconstruction and refugee return, 4. social and psycho-social work, 5. economic 
recovery, 6. transitional justice and human rights documentation, 7. state-building, 
democratisation and civil society support, 8. promoting peace skills and dialogue and 
9. cultural activities.  
The actors in peace-building have ranged from small informal citizens’ groups to 
large organisations that can compete in terms of outreach and resources with state 
actors. In this chapter here I have tried to make sure to include those actors who in 
chapter 2.3.1 were called ‘embedded’ actors, meaning local groups seeking to 
intervene in the conflicts in their own or in a neighbouring country (like Osijek Peace 
Teams, Centre for Nonviolent Action Sarajevo, MOST etc) not only because they 
have done (and are mostly still doing) interesting and successful work, but also 
because this category tends to be overlooked. Peace-building still too often translates 
to people coming from abroad.322 Another observation that has repeatedly been made 
throughout the chapter (especially in the sections on relief, social work, civil society 
support and solidarity work) is the enormous number of small citizen groups and 
initiatives with a peace movement background that became active supporting war 
victims and civil society groups in the former Yugoslavia. The degree of activities in 
this field justifies use of the concept of a movement of support – a question that will 
be taken up again in chapter 8. 
As to target groups of aid, it can be observed that there were some groups clearly 
favoured, while others were neglected. Main target groups have been women, 
refugees/IDPs and youth, because they were considered as being either being 
particularly affected by war or (in the case of youth) particularly open for 
reconciliation efforts. Often neglected were elderly people, former soldiers, and 
sometimes also generally those who had stayed during the wars rather than to flee. 
Some civil society interveners were conscious of this fact and tried to include these 
                                                 
322
 In the case of the former Yugoslavia here it could not be claimed that these locals in fact were 
more important than the internationals – for such a claim there were simply too many 
internationals. But there are other countries around the world (for example the Philippines) where 
the relationship is indeed reversed. 
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groups (for example, building homes for senior people or working with veterans), 
but generally it can be noticed that this happened rather late compared to the aid to 
the other groups (see Sali-Terzic 2001:143). 
 
7.10.1 The Main Instruments of Civil Society Peace-building 
On an abstract level, the main instruments used by civil society actors were  
1. Material aid (humanitarian relief, building materials, materials for income-
generating projects, money, etc); 
2. Information (training of various sorts, from vocational training to training how to 
overthrow a dictator, documentation of human rights violations);  
3. Other non-physical support (all the different activities involving intervening 
actors working with local people, be it institution-building, or working with 
youth, traumatised people, local NGOs, refugees etc.)  
In general, there are two more instruments of peace-building: 4. force and 5. law, but 
both were more or less been prerogatives of state actors, though being supported 
occasionally by civil society actors.323  
In some cases, as shown in the sections on support of refugees and deserters, civil 
society groups have turned to methods of civil disobedience, defying the laws and 
regulations of sometimes several states (both in former Yugoslavia and the laws of 
the country they lived in) to help people escape from the war.  
 
7.10.2 The Main Goals of Civil Society Peace-Building 
These instruments were used to achieve a limited number of general goals and 
objectives listed below, matching rather well the three functions of peace-building 
listed in chapter 2: reversing the destructive processes of war through various forms 
of aid (goal 1), addressing relationships (goal 2), and dealing with structural issues, 
in particular state and civil society reform (goal 3). 
                                                 
323
 Examples of force would be the international administration in the protectorates opening roads and 
access to villages for refugee return, firing politicians and closing media who did not comply with 
the administration, e.g. worked against refugee return or continued to promote ethnic hatred. The 
best example for the instrument of law is the International Tribunal (ICTY). 
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7.10.2.1 Meet Basic Needs Like Food, Housing and Health  
This was the primary objective in humanitarian relief, reconstruction, medical and 
psychological aid projects. It mostly had an approach focused on individuals.  
Compared with what is happening in many countries in the southern hemisphere, the 
relief efforts in the war-affected countries can be considered a success by 
humanitarian standards in spite of the fact that not all areas were always reached, and 
people in isolated places suffered serious shortages.324  
There have, however, been definite issues around ‘doing harm’ in relief, 
reconstruction and economic development aid: 
• Often relief organizations during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina were made to 
give part of their relief to paramilitaries controlling access to the regions they 
wanted to reach. 
• Humanitarian aid when channeled through local elites (as was often done) 
increased their power, and invited in many cases bribery by potential recipients 
(see Belloni 2000:6). 
• The sheer amount of aid coming especially to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 
certainly had negative effects on social-economic development: its negative 
impact on the labor market included ‘creaming off’ qualified local workers to 
earn much higher salaries with international bodies, while aid agencies met 
responsibilities that otherwise would have been the state’s, (see Schneckener 
2003:58). Pugh (1998:4) speaks of fostering “aid junkies”, while Woodward 
(2002:199pp) also mentions economic distortions introduced by international 
presence. 
• At several instances in the text I refer to projects that contributing to tensions in 
communities rather than dissolving them – for example different actors having 
different policies on reconstructing houses in one and the same community.  
• Both in reconstruction and relief another sore issue often was how to choose the 
recipients. There seems to were no ‘golden way’: For example, if outside 
                                                 
324
 There was some discussion on whether the relief efforts prolonged the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(see Burg and Shoup 1999:400, Friedenspolitische Perspektiven im ehemaligen Jugoslawien 
1995). From an ethical point of view I find it impossible to accept that argument since what it 
proposes is not intervening to alleviate concrete suffering on the assumption that in so doing a 
more abstract future suffering could be turned aside. 
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interveners simply distributed housing materials equally among the ethnic groups 
independent of need, they had problems to justify their choices either in regard of 
their own objective to help those most in need, or vis-à-vis the local authorities. 
However, if they consulted the local authorities and asked them to do the 
choosing, this often opened the way to bribery and advantage-taking by certain 
groups.  
 
7.10.2.2 Promote Inter-ethnic Cooperation and Reconciliation 
I was struck by how the goal of interethnic cooperation or reconciliation of the 
different ethnic groups penetrated almost all peace-building activities. It seems (and 
could be demonstrated by numerous quotes) that most intervening actors (including 
the state actors) considered the ethnic splits the main problem to overcome, assuming 
that if there was co-habitation and co-operation, future violence would be 
prevented.325 This objective was clearly stated as the primary one in a number 
projects and programmes (for example the dialogue projects, many of the trainings 
and the work of the civil peace services). In many other cases it was not the ‘official’ 
or declared primary objective (that was e.g. reconstruction, return or setting up a 
youth centre) but the basic goal that the interveners pursued, almost using the 
declared objective as a ‘Trojan Horse’. Examples are the ‘social reconstruction’ 
projects, most of the youth work, some economic programmes as well as many civil 
society building efforts.326 One observation repeatedly made in the context of such 
projects was that the other (more material) work done by the internationals was 
                                                 
325
 This was also observed by Cox:  
All international strategies in Bosnia are based on assumptions as to the extent of 
these ethnic divisions, and whether they are a permanent or transient feature of the 
social environment. Every international programme has an ethnic dimension to it, 
whether the programme is expressly designed to promote ethnic reconciliation or 
merely meets with obstacles presented by ethnic conflict. International strategic 
planning can be analysed along a spectrum from ethnic reintegration on the one side, 
which assumes that ethnic identity can ultimately be removed from the political 
process, to ethnic accommodation on the other, whereby ethnicity is assumed to be a 
quasi-permanent feature of the region, to be controlled or contained within political 
structures (Cox 1998:7). 
326
 Ryan (1995:134pp) has called this strategy ‘contact plus the pursuit of superordinate goals’, 
including among others joint activities (for example youth clubs, sports, reconstruction efforts), 
economic interdependence by furthering small trade between the ethnic groups, and the creation of 
multi-ethnic institutions (for example community centres, NGOs, media). See also CDA-
Collaborative Learning Projects 2006:11. 
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essential for them to build up trust, and be able to work on inter-ethnic cooperation. 
It gave them legitimization and access under circumstances when people found it 
hard to understand what somebody wanted who did not distribute material aid or 
build something, and also helped them avoid to speak in the first place about ‘peace’ 
or ‘reconciliation’. 
Many actors found that that term ‘reconciliation’ was not generally well received in 
the area. Many people felt that it was just asking too much, and that it imposed 
foreign agendas not shared by the local community. In response some of the 
international actors decided to make reconciliation a long-term ultimate goal rather 
than a concrete project objective that was shared immediately with the recipients of a 
project (see Committee for Conflict Transformation Support 2001). Others, 
especially those active in the social movements, rejected the implied analysis, 
arguing that the conflicts were not ethnic in nature but political, and that therefore 
reconciliation between the ethnic groups was not the appropriate approach. 
Given the omnipresence of this goal, hard evidence of success is astonishingly 
modest. Sometimes organisations mention concrete indicators like that there was 
now a multi-ethnic foot-ball team or women’s group. Even the US Institute for Peace 
(2003) named as indicators for reconciliation that a Sarajevan folk singer planned a 
concert in Banja Luka, that the Herzegovinan (Croat) coach of the national football 
team expressed his intention to include Serbs, and that a Bosnian Serb winner of a 
national beauty contest declared that she would represent her homeland Bosnia-
Herzegovina rather than the Serbian Republic. While each of such cases of course 
are nice to cite, they mean in my eyes very little in regard to overall society-wide 
attitudes, and even less regarding the question if the ethnic gaps had been bridged to 
a degree that they could not be re-opened. The pre-1991 history of Yugoslavia itself 
shows that cooperation in peace times is different from developing relations that 
withstand the future potential for violence: periods of ethnic violence were several 
times followed by periods where the conflicts became latent and ethnic identity went 
into the background. More recently, in Kosovo, the study by the Collaborative of 
Development Action on the influence peace-building projects a propos the March 
2004 riots underlines this difference. Many peace-building programmes that 
achieved some level of inter-ethnic cooperation did not contribute significantly to the 
prevention or restraint of interethnic violence in the riots of 2004 (2006:60pp). 
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Most programming assumed that the transfer from individual-level 
change to more socio-political change would happen automatically. 
Agencies typically assumed that the results of their activities would 
automatically “spill over” into other domains of participants’ lives—that 
the profound personal and relationship changes catalysed by NGO 
activities would lead to changes in political attitudes and actions, or 
trickle out to influence others in the community or trickle up to influence 
key decision makers. Many assumed that participants who had had a 
transformative experience in the programme would spread their 
experience and changed attitudes to others – from family to colleagues to 
the community at large. The evidence gathered in this research suggests 
that this did not happen, at least not automatically, and that such “spill 
over” cannot be assumed (CDA- Collaborative Learning Projects 
2006:47). 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia, ethnic cooperation to some degree was 
enforced by the international (state) interveners. In Kosovo, they have tried but 
barely succeeded – most Serbs and other ethnic minorities have preferred either to 
live in enclaves or have left the country altogether. To what extent civil society 
programmes have aided in changing attitudes is difficult to assess – the individual 
project reports (that often are about only one or a few specific communities) imply 
they did, but what the relationship if any is there to an overall change is impossible to 
say, nor is it possible to determine how much such changes would have occurred 
unaided over time, simply just based on local resources and without the direction of 
an international operation.  
 
7.10.2.3 Restore a Functioning Society, State and Economy and Promote Political 
Change 
This goal covers the various reconstruction and state-building efforts, the measures 
taken to develop a sustainable economy, as well as many projects designed to further 
independent media and civil society organisations. Clearly most of these activities 
did not happen from a non-partisan position but used the template of what the 
international interveners considered the best models.  
Much has been written about the shortcomings and the sometimes erroneous 
assumptions in state-building and institution-building in the protectorates but my 
concern here is to discuss the role of civil society actors. They were mostly to be 
found in the category of ‘civil society building’ which could mean many different 
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things, from various ways of supporting local groups and media to networking, 
training or dialogue activities. This work was often accompanied by a somewhat 
vague picture of what civil society is - other than assuming that it somehow is 
important for sustainable peace (see Belloni 2000:10, McMahon 2001, Prendergast 
and Plumb 2002:327).327  
Based on the survey, it seems to me that civil society support and state-building was 
effective where the international interveners had good knowledge of the situation on 
the ground, and started their work from a sound assessment of needs and cooperation 
with already existing groups rather than introducing plans devised abroad and then 
artificially setting up new NGOs to implement them.328  Purely material support – in 
spite of the risk of dependence which of course is a negative factor – and 
international networking and linking seem to be especially essential, with capacity-
building and training being more debatable (see the negative findings in the 
evaluation of media support).329 Smillie mentions that many NGOs received the 
same training again and again. “For many, the problem is not ‘how to write a report’, 
but how to write six reports, in English, in six different formats every quarter, or 
even every month”(Smillie 1996:6). 
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 There are at least two very different concepts of civil society: one is the Eastern European 
developed in socialist times that sees civil society in contrast to the state, being ‘non-political’ in 
the meaning of party-politics. That was also the predominant understanding of civil society in the 
former Yugoslavia – for example most anti-war groups claimed to be ‘not political’ by which they 
meant not having relations to any political parties. The other view – probably more the Western 
European and US-American one - sees civil society in the tradition of de Tocqueville where 
democracy depends on checking the power of the state by what he calls a ‘political society’, and 
with much more tolerance and inclusiveness regarding political parties (Crook 2001). On the 
whole it seems to me that the second view was the predominant one in the interventions on former 
Yugoslavia, often meeting and sometimes conflicting with the ‘non-political’ view of local actors. 
328
 Gagnon (1998 and 2002) studied five different NGOs that all pursued the goal of reconstructing 
civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He found that the most effective were those who used 
reconstruction projects as the focus, and those who focused on capacity-building for local NGOs. 
As less successful he rated party-building and civic education because it used the North American 
model and misunderstood the political reality in Bosnia. However, his small sample in my eyes 
really does not permit such general conclusions because their relative effectiveness or non-
effectiveness may be explained by the identity of the individual interveners (the party builders was 
the US National Democratic Institute - no wonder that they used the US model). The positively 
rated NGO capacity-building was done by Delphi-STAR, a US women project very close to the 
grassroots and knowing exactly what the needs of civil society were. This was by far not the case 
with all capacity-building projects. 
329
 Though there is also a danger to international networking, namely if it leads to the local groups 
being focused more on these international networks than on building local alliances (see Stubbs 
2007:221). 
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Contrasting the examples of Kosovo and FR Yugoslavia I tried to argue above that 
determined support by international civil society made a difference, but that that kind 
support was not always forthcoming. One observation in this context was that that 
goal was not limited to support of political parties and civil society, but also was on 
the agenda of many relief and reconstruction efforts, especially those by ‘non-
professional’ interveners like peace movement groups. 
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8. Addressing Other External Actors: Public Information, Support 
Activities, Protest and Advocacy by Civil Society Actors 
 
The activities described in the last three chapters on peace-making, peace-keeping 
and peace-building have not exhausted the list of what was found in the survey. The 
omissions can be identified as: 
• Information directed at the general public - media outside of former Yugoslavia 
and ‘pure research’ studying the conflicts;  
• Activities supporting intervening actors - applied research, funding, coordination 
and capacity-building of other intervening external actors.  
• Numerous activities of protest and advocacy targeting other intervening actors or 
the general public, seeking to inform them and/ or to change their behaviour;  
In the first section of this chapter I will look at the role of media – both the 
mainstream mass media and so-called alternative media seeking to disseminate 
‘other’ or ‘true’ information on the conflicts.330   
The second section of this chapter shortly addresses activities that support other 
interveners, for example training field staff or networking among intervening groups. 
The main focus of this chapter lies on protest and advocacy by civil society actors 
that was taking place outside the conflict area. I use the term ‘advocacy’ to refer to 
efforts that seek to convince other actors (usually state actors) through means of 
information and dialogue to take or not take certain action. It is closely related to 
lobbying, except that lobbying may refer to the direct pursuit of the vested interests 
of the lobbying group (for example to lobby a Ministry to finance a training for 
conflict interveners that would be given by the lobbying group). Advocacy includes 
lobbying, but in addition entails activities like giving advice from which, if heeded, 
the advocating group would not directly profit (for example advising a government 
to deploy preventive peace-keeping forces in an area).  
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 I am leaving out here the second type of actor involved in producing and disseminating 
information: the scientific studies produced in the academic world. The results of the numerous 
scientific studies have been quoted throughout this book, but a meta analysis of the research done, 
its approaches, interests and potential influence has been beyond the scope of this study, and 
therefore is not mentioned beyond this introduction. 
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Both protest and advocacy mushroomed in the second half of 1991 when the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia became violent. Protest and advocacy was not the 
sole prerogative of peace and related movements though they played an important 
role here. Aid organisations, human and minority rights groups, women’s groups, 
and of course diaspora organisations all raised their voices in the first years of the 
conflicts until the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The target of the protests 
was rarely the actors on the ground. Most protest and advocacy was directed at other 
intervening actors – the so-called ‘international community’ that was asked to take 
(or not take) certain action. Different issues were addressed and contradictory 
positions, for example both for and against military intervention, put forward. Protest 
developed again in late 1998 and in 1999 during the Kosovo war, but this time it was 
mostly the peace movement and related groups that carried the protest, and its focus 
was critique of the NATO intervention. And when in 2001 a civil war in Macedonia 
seemed to develop, it were also mostly these peace groups responding though their 
reactions and activities were only a shadow of what took place in 1989. 
I divide the analysis of protest and advocacy into two parts: In the first part I will 
discuss the different issues with which they dealt. The second part then looks at the 
main instruments used. The sources used have been mostly publications and grey 
material by the actors themselves – other than two smaller publications by Schmitz 
(1998) and Large (n.d.).  
This chapter is the last one describing the interventions of civil society actors in the 
former Yugoslavia. After completing the analysis of the different areas of activity, I 
will return in the conclusions to the question already raised in the preceding chapter, 
namely if there has been a social movement of its own forming on the wars in former 
Yugoslavia. 
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8.1 Disseminating Public Information: The Role of International Media 
8.1.1 The Mainstream Mass Media  
The role of ‘globalised’ media in conflict has become a topic for debate since at least 
the wars in Iraq in 1990-91.331 There is a discussion in media research on the amount 
and kind of political influence media can wield (the ‘CNN effect’, see Kent 
2006:177pp), as Barker has observed: 
Policymaking is a political process which is affected by various social and 
economic factors… and media systems play an integral role in shaping 
the social context in which policies are developed. Through the media, 
citizens learn how government policies will affect them, and governments 
gain feedback on their policies and programs. Media systems act as the 
primary conduit between those who might want to influence policy and 
the policymakers – controlling the scope of political discourse and 
regulating the flow of information. (Barker 2005:2) 
The mainstream media from summer 1991 onwards were full of headlines and 
reports on the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia – random samples of newspapers 
from Britain, France, Italy, Spain and Germany indicate that there was virtually no 
day without mention of it in the major newspapers throughout these countries and 
probably all of Western Europe.332 
The US government at first tried to stay aloof and its change of attitude towards the 
war in Bosnia has largely been attributed to media influence. For example, it has 
been claimed that the pictures and reports of the Muslim detainees in the Bosnian 
Serb detention centre at Trnopolje in August 1992, and the pictures from the 
Sarajevo market bombing in February 1994 “led to changes in the application of 
foreign policies that have had a direct bearing on the war” (Weaver 1998, see also 
Kent 2006, Malik 2003). Gow (1997:215) mentions pressure from both the media 
and public opinion for the US to be involved, especially during spring 1993 when the 
Vance-Owen Plan was discussed.333 Media reports in 1992 and 1993 on the rapes of 
Bosnian women wielded a heavy influence, albeit using figures based on estimates 
                                                 
331
 There are many books as well as dozens of articles have been written on how media contributed to 
create the context in which foreign policy on the conflicts in former Yugoslavia (and other wars) 
operated. See Barker 2005, Zoellner 2005 and Kent 2006 for bibliographies on the topic. 
332
 TV reporting probably was of similar frequency but I have not been able to research their 
reporting. 
333
 Public opinion polling in that time showed that the majority of the US people wanted the 
government to intervene (see Gow 1997:215p). 
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and extrapolation that later turned out to be exaggerated (Meder and Reimann 
1996:11, Chandler 1999:96, Lucarelli 2000:35).334 Kent (2006:4) attributes the 
provision of soldiers to UNPROFOR for purely humanitarian tasks as a direct effect 
of the ‘something must be done’ message promoted by the media.  
An interesting side effect noted by Kent was the indirect influence of the reporting 
on Yugoslavia on other conflicts:  
It seems quite likely that US policymakers, in August 1992 after the 
Omarska camp story broke, perceived Somalia to be an easier 
intervention than getting involved in Bosnia, and more likely to achieve 
results and save lives (Kent 2006:214). 
Other than these concrete examples, the main role of the mass media has probably 
been in agenda setting and ‘framing’, meaning influencing how what is happening is 
interpreted (see Kent 2006:194pp). One example of such framing would be the 
description of the Bosnian war and where to place the blame for what happened, 
namely summarily blaming ‘the Serbs’, directed from Belgrade, for a ‘war of 
aggression’.335 
Of course the flow of influence is not one-way. Politicians (and others) also seek to 
influence public opinion through passing or withholding information to the media. 
This was particularly obvious in the Kosovo/FR Yugoslavia war in 1999 (see 
                                                 
334
 Kent notes the same influences on the British government, and quotes Douglas Hurd’s “attack on 
the ‘something must be done’ school of journalism”, seeing a “consistent use of all media by 
politicians” (Kent 2006:2-3 and 208). 
335
 The interventions by the different actors were all guided by some implicit or explicit assumption 
on the character of the conflict (see Cox 1998:7pp, Kaufman 2001:4pp). In international 
government circles, two variants of the civil war/ethnic conflict paradigm were the most common. 
The first variant was to see the wars as a truly ethnic conflict with all sides to blame. The arms 
embargo against all republics of former Yugoslavia which was maintained (at least officially) until 
end of 1995 is maybe the best expression of this attitude. Most famous and often referred to is 
President Clinton reading Richard Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts and deciding that because of the 
intractability of the conflict there was nothing really he or anybody else could do (see Bernecker 
2001). This may be more an anecdote handed down from author to author, but in general this view 
was shared by many – all violence in the area was seen as one single ‘civil war’. 
 The other variant which quickly came to dominate the politics of the international community put 
the blame on Serb nationalism, and therefore focussed its efforts on destroying the capabilities of 
‘the Serbs’ to wage war. The sanctions against FR Yugoslavia, as well as the air strikes in Bosnia 
that targeted exclusively the Serbian troops, are examples for this. In both cases there was the 
general pretext that all sides were to be treated equally, and that misbehaviour from any side 
would lead to consequences, but in fact breaches of agreements by Croats and Bosniaks were 
usually only punished by declarations and at most by the threat of sanctions (see Woodward 
1995:7pp, de Jonge Oudraat 1999:70). 
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Ackerman and Naureckas 2000, Herman and Peterson 2000).336 A blatant example of 
the manipulation of the media by NATO was the reporting on the bombing of a 
civilian train in April 1999. NATO published a videotape showing the train moving 
very fast to prove that it was not possible to divert the missiles. Later it turned out 
that the video was played at three times the normal speed (Skoco and Woodger 
2000:86).  
According to Herman and Peterson (2000:113) CNN in particular served throughout 
the war as a reliable “de facto information partner” repeating the information fed to 
them by NATO without questioning it. This was in contrast to other media outlets 
such as the German paper Frankfurter Rundschau which at least put a warning in 
their paper every day that the information they received was restricted and therefore 
unreliable. 
With regard to the British print media Hammond (2000) makes an interesting 
observation: The conservative press while supporting the British military expressed 
some caution and questions about the NATO war, but the more liberal section 
followed the Blair government in its emotionally loaded moral assessment of a ‘just 
war’.337 Public service broadcaster BBC maintained a more independent line, for 
example showing the effects of the NATO bombings on civilians. Also the 
mainstream media in other European countries basically supported the war as did 
their governments (with the exception of Greece) though in some countries critical 
voices may have been stronger than in the US and Britain (Deichmann 2000, 
Johnstone 2000b, Røn 2000, Hammond  and  Herman 2000). The Russian media 
mirrored similarly mostly the opposition of their government of the war although 
disagreeing over several issues like the position towards Milosevic, the significance 
of the war for Russia’s position in the world and the notion of Slavic fellow-feeling 
(Hammond, Nizamova and  Savelieva 2000). 
 
                                                 
336
 According to Skoco and Woodger (2000:85), NATO did not have a sophisticated media strategy at 
the beginning of the war, being focussed on preparing for its 50th anniversary and expecting the 
bombing to be short and the media not to be very interested. When the war continued, NATO  
made efforts to correct this and by the end of the war it had a well functioning PR system in place. 
337
 From my own observation, that has not been the case for German media, though the same 
observation can be made in regard to the different political parties and their attitude to the war. 
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8.1.2 Alternative Media 
The 1990s was the decade when the internet was developed. At the beginning of that 
decade there were only e-lists that featured information on the conflicts since 1991-
92 (APC / Yugo /Antiwar and CL/ Europe / Balkan were two such lists). The creation 
of websites and e-mail as a (mass) means of communication spread later. 
NGOs were a significant source of ‘alternative’ information – that is, information 
that either could not be found in the mass media at all or that came with a different 
interpretation.338 They all reported regularly on the conflicts, mixing analysis, reports 
on actions their constituencies were engaged in, and reports on local groups in the 
region. 
In addition there were also newly created magazines and publications: The Helsinki 
Citizens’ Assembly founded YugoFax in September 1992. At the beginning it was a 
printed paper that  
analyzed the progress of the war, examined the specific problems facing 
individual republics, covered the failure of the European Community to 
bring peace, and emphasised the importance of citizens’ initiatives in 
bringing about a resolution (Editorial of Yugofax 1992).  
It cooperated with the Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR, based in 
London) that had begun a War Report during the second Gulf war. In 1992, YugoFax 
was merged with the revived War Report and became Yugo WarReport. Bulletin of 
the Institute for War and Peace Reporting.339 The speciality of IWPR’s reports was 
that it gave a voice to independent journalists from the area rather than sending out 
foreign journalists to do the reporting. The reports were published in English and in 
                                                 
338
 Examples would be Pogrom as the magazine of the Gesellschaft fuer bedrohte Voelker (Society 
for Threatened People), Nonviolence Actualité, a magazine close to Mouvement pour une 
alternative non-violente (MAN), Peace News (WRI), ZAM-Zeitschrift fuer Antimilitarismus 
(Newspaper for Antimilitarism) of the Austrian ‘Arge fuer Wehrdienstverweigerung und 
Gewaltfreiheit’ (a group supporting conscientious objection), Friedensforum (Netzwerk 
Friedenskooperative, Germany, an umbrella of German peace movement), The Nonviolent Activist 
(War Resisters’ League USA). 
339
 In 1992 it changed its name to Balkan War Report, and in 1998 after stopping the print version to 
IWPR’s Balkan Crisis Report, now sent out for free by e-mail (see War Report 1998). Today, the 
IWPR has expanded its reports also to other areas of the world (Caucasus, Africa, Philippines – 
see www.IWPR.net) but the Balkan has remained one of its foci. 
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Croatian/Serbian and Albanian, and clearly had twin targets: people in the region 
looking for independent information, and people in other countries.340  
As to the main functions of the alternative media, it can be said that they sought to 
address two, sometimes three target groups: their own constituency with the goal to 
inform them, shape their opinion and report what was done in their name; the wider 
public (as far as it could be reached), offering information that differed from what 
could be found in the mass media; and sometimes also the public in the crisis areas. 
It is impossible to directly discern impact these alternative media had other than 
being a reference in the controversial debates on the conflicts. But the fact that IWPR 
has widened the range of its activities and is now offering the same kind of service 
with journalists from many countries and conflicts in the world could be considered 
an indicator that there is a need and a ‘market’ for that type of information.  
 
8.2 To Support Interventions by Other Actors 
Under this category which could be considered a form of ‘indirect intervention’ fall 
all those activities that have other intervening actors, not local actors in the former 
Yugoslavia as their target group, seeking to support their work in various ways: 
through applied research, money, networking, information gathering or capacity-
building.  
 
8.2.1 Applied Research 
Research institutes as actors are mentioned in three other sections of this study: 
Under peace-making because a few of them have engaged local actors actively in the 
                                                 
340
 A somewhat similar approach was taken by the Group for a Switzerland without an Army 
(GSOA), an initiative that originally was founded to organise a referendum for the abolition of the 
Swiss Army end of the 1980s. They had good contacts to groups in the area of former Yugoslavia, 
and initiated a magazine they called Para Pacem in October 1992. Its objective was  
to document the activities of groups that work against the war in former Yugoslavia, [and 
to] give the non-nationalistic opposition committed to violence a voice especially in 
Switzerland. (Para Pacem 1996:2).  
 In c. 2001 the makers of the magazine created an independent NGO to continue the project under 
the new name Medienhilfe (media help). 
 The German Initiative fuer Frieden (IFIAS), an NGO very close to the Social Democrat party, for 
some time translated and distributed between 1992 and 1994 the magazine ARKzin of the Croatian 
anti-war movement (Initiative fuer Frieden 1994). 
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search of negotiated solutions, under ‘information’ above for ‘pure’ or non-applied 
research, and under advocacy (below) because many such institutes were providing 
advice to shape or influence the policy of (state) interveners. Another type is that 
kind of applied research that sought to directly support the work of interveners (both 
state and non-state) through expertise, evaluations and in a few cases action 
research.341  
 
8.2.2 Funding 
A very important issue for civil society actors is to find the funds for their work. 
Generally, there are five possible sources: 
• Money already owned by them;342  
• Individual donations from small and large donors;343  
• Grants from governments and international organisations (EU, UN-
organisations);344 
• Grants by other (often intermediate) foundations or agencies;345 
• Grants by companies. 346 
                                                 
341
 One example would be the Life and Peace Institute in Uppsala (Sweden). At the beginning of the 
conflicts in 1992 it ran a research project on the role of the churches in the conflict, sending a 
researcher who at the same time taught at universities (Life and Peace Institute 1992). 
342
 An example here is the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Transformation that covers its core costs 
with funds donated by a private person, while grants - e.g. from the German Foreign Ministry - are 
sought for special projects. 
343
 An NGO almost exclusively relying on individual donations collected through its regular 
supporters and additional mass mailings is the German Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie 
(Komitee fuer Grundrechte und Demokratie 2008). Also the Balkan Peace Team (chapter 6) and 
the Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung relied heavily on donations from individuals (Balkan Peace 
Team 1999, Mueller 2006:191pp.) 
344
 See the UNDP-financed reconstruction projects described in chapter 7. Most Western countries 
have such agencies or at least funding schemes  run either through their Foreign or their 
Development Ministries.  
345
 An example would be the Olof Palme International Centre in Sweden. The Swedish state agency 
SIDA wished to support local NGOs and independent media but sought international 
implementing partners to channel the money. An intermediate recipient was the Olof Palme 
International Centre that worked in the area since it was founded in 1992. It received its money 
from SIDA, and conducted its work - mostly about support of local peace initiatives - through 
local organisations (NGOs, independent trade unions, parties) as implementing partners. In 1998-
99 it had more than 30 such partners that all were financially dependent on the Centre (Duffield 
1996, Evensmo 2000).  
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Funding is usually mentioned as one of the first issues when discussing the 
challenges of the implementation of projects. Especially smaller organisations like 
Balkan Peace Team struggled to the degree of damaging the programme to find 
funds for their work (see Mueller 2006:191pp). And as with local NGOs, so too 
international NGOs depending on donors and grants had to deal with the annual grant 
schemes that made medium-term projects difficult, with the interests, expectations 
and directions of donors, and had to adapt their plans in order to receive grants.  
 
8.2.3 Co-ordination and Networking 
Co-ordination and networking between international actors also have to be counted 
as support activities. In the former Yugoslavia, it was often the role of the UNHCR 
to bring international NGOs together, and in Kosovo OMIK set up NGO Resource 
Centres in several regions of Kosovo (Antikriegshaus Sievershausen 1995, 
Woodward 1995:296, Lucarelli 2000:35, CORE 2002:54). But there were also NGOs 
playing an important role in co-ordination: 
• The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) not only supported 
local NGOs (see chapter 7) but also extended its services to the co-ordination of 
international groups. For example it produced an annual address list of NGOs 
with information on the fields they are working in (ICVA 2000, Bekkering 1997, 
Stubbs 1996b).  
• In several countries there were national meetings of organisations working on the 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia. In Britain the National Peace Council was 
hosting a Working Group to serve this purpose. In Germany there was a 
Coordinating Committee coordinated by the Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung and 
financed by the Green Party Foundation (Heinrich Boell Stiftung) that met 
regularly between November 1991 and December 1995.347  
                                                                                                                                          
346
 Many organisations, for example the International Crisis Group have been combining several of 
the funding sources. In their report for 2007 they list 19 governmental donors from different parts 
of the world, 15 foundations and 14 companies in addition to also collecting individual donations 
(International Crisis Group 2008). 
347
 Usually it was attended by 10-20 participants from different groups, and exchanging about both 
the political assessment of the war situation, and about projects the participants were either 
planning or already carrying out (see the different minutes of the National Peace Council and of 
the (Ex-) Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis in the bibliography). 
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8.2.4 Organising Information Visits to the Area 
There were a number of visits that were organised by groups with previous 
knowledge of the area to introduce others (either other NGO representatives, 
sometimes also politicians or media people) to the problems and conflicts of former 
Yugoslavia. Just to give one example: A peace researcher based in Linz (Austria) 
organised a delegation from Linz to Kosovo in 1993 in the context of an attempt to 
convince the town to enter a twinning relationship with Prishtina. The delegation 
took place after Linz had rejected that proposal of twinning but offered to finance the 
delegation instead. The report of the delegation was published and together with a 
slide show used for further public relations work. One result was that the town 
started to support the demand to put Kosovo under international administration 
(Steinweg 1994 and Steinweg ed. 1994). 
 
8.2.5 Capacity-Building with Conflict Intervention Actors 
In the survey I found several organisations, mostly grassroots’ peace organisations, 
which organised trainings for people planning to work in the region.348 The German 
Civil Peace Service - already mentioned in chapter 7 - was one.  Since its work 
started in 1997, there were during the period under study usually two courses of 
about 4 months each year, with between 12 and 20 participants.349 Especially in the 
first years many participants went to the area of former Yugoslavia under the Civil 
Peace Service scheme or with comparable projects.350  
Training for nonviolent intervention is a topic that deserves deeper analysis and 
description because there have been many developments over the last ten years – 
                                                 
348
 Civilians sent by state agencies at that time usually went without extra preparation. Nowadays that 
has changed with a number of governments having set up their own training courses for experts in 
‚post-war peace-building’ as it is mostly called. 
349
 The structure of these courses at that time was a basic course of about 6-7 weeks, 3 weeks of 
internship, followed by another 2 weeks of the basic course, and then 2 weeks of ‘specialisation’ in 
topics like monitoring, mediation, building civil society, project management and others more. The 
basic courses covered topics like conflict analysis, working in a team, gender, peace building, 
nonviolence and dealing with trauma (see Wagner 2000, Knittel and Monsef 2001). 
350
 In Britain, Responding to Conflict in Woodbrooke offered 3 month courses once a year since 1991 
that are mostly directed at people coming from conflict areas but also had participants who would 
qualify as external actors. In Austria, there have been since 1993 four-week International 
Peacekeeping Courses with mixed participants (both state and non-state) at the Austrian Study 
Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution Stadtschlaining (see Schweitzer et al 2001, chapter 5). 
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both contents-wise with the growing experience of what is of practical use, and 
number-wise with many new organisations world-wide engaging in comparable 
trainings.351 Unfortunately this would go beyond the period and topic under study 
here. 
 
8.3 Protest and Advocacy: The Issues They Addressed 
This and the following section 8.4 are turning to the third type of activity that 
addresses other actors rather than intervening directly into the conflicts: protest and 
advocacy. A lively public debate was one of the most striking elements of the whole 
period of the wars in former Yugoslavia. We can identify three main periods: 
between 1991 and 1995 (up to the Dayton and Erdut agreements), the Kosovo crisis 
and war of 1998–1999 and the Macedonia conflict in 2001.  
Mostly this protest was directed against other intervening actors. While there were no 
mass demonstrations on the scale of the 1991 protests against the first Iraq war, it is 
important to acknowledge that there were groups holding vigils and protests in front 
of embassies of ex-Yugoslav countries, or writing appeals and statements and faxing 
or mailing them to the actors in question.352 Some groups even went beyond that and 
chose methods of civil disobedience to make their points. For example a small group 
of activists from the mentioned Gesellschaft fuer bedroehte Volker that became 
increasingly critical of Croatia’s involvement in the war in Bosnia,  and so in 1993 
‘occupied’ the Croatian Embassy in Berlin for one day and one night in protest 
(Donat 1993). 
Rather than giving a chronological account of the period under study, the following 
description focuses on the topics and problems around which protest and advocacy 
developed. Some of the issues only came up at certain moments, while others came 
up more than once, or continued throughout the period. The section after that then 
will look at the main instruments used. 
 
                                                 
351
 For example Peaceworkers UK, Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente in France, Training 
for Change in the USA, Patrir in Rumania, EPU Stadtschlaining in Austria (see ARCA 2008). 
352
 See the different minutes of the Ex-Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis for mention of such actions 
in Germany, and Le Meut 1998 for one in France. 
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8.3.1 The Break-up of Yugoslavia and the Interpretation of the Conflicts 
8.3.1.1 Early Interest in Yugoslavia 
Before summer 1991, Yugoslavia was not on the agenda of many civil society 
groups. In the survey I found only two kinds of organisations that dealt with 
Yugoslavia and the growing tensions between its republics: One was international 
umbrella organisations that had members from the region like the already mentioned 
War Resisters’ International (WRI). WRI and the publication related to it, Peace 
News, started to report and warn of a possible violent crisis in 1990, but with the 
focus on seeking nonviolent alternatives and nonviolent defence in support of the 
movement, not speaking up against the secession (see War Resisters’ International 
1991b, 1994 and 1998).   
The other type was organisations that because of their mission and objectives were 
close to the issue. ‘Friendship’ organisations including migrants from Yugoslavia 
and members of the different host countries belonging to them, but also NGOs 
interested in ethnic and cultural minorities. One example is the German Gesellschaft 
fuer bedrohte Voelker (Society for Threatened People-GfbV).353 They supported the 
secession movements as ethnic groups seeking self-determination. In their eyes 
Yugoslavia had been an artificial construction that came to life only because of 
World War I and II (see Zuelich 1990).354 
 
8.3.1.2 Different Positions Towards the Break-up of Yugoslavia 
In 1991, and retrospectively in later discussions, there have been different positions 
towards the break-up of Yugoslavia in international civil society: 
• Groups and organisations and media supporting the secession (like the GfbV), or 
arguing that there was no other choice given ‘the threat of genocide’ as whose 
                                                 
353
 The GfbV was founded in 1970 by has its headquarters in Germany, with branches today in some 
other countries (Austria, Switzerland, South Tyrol/Italy, Luxemburg, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Chile.)  
354
 During the wars, they compared the European politics with the ‘appeasement’ policy in 1938 that 
“levelled the road for Word War II and Auschwitz”, and demanded among other things a complete 
blockade of the borders of Serbia-Montenegro to Bosnia and Croatia, to secure militarily 
humanitarian aid and protection of people in the enclaves, an international tribunal for war crimes 
and to lift the arms embargo “against the legal Bosnian government troops” , as well as protesting 
against a possible division of Bosnia (Geismar 1994, Rohder 1993). 
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perpetrators they saw ‘the Serbs’ (see Kent 2006:6). 
• Groups that took a non-partisan view, emphasising the need for minority rights to 
be respected and the process to happen non-violently. Examples are the French 
Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente (MAN) or the German Bund fuer 
Soziale Verteidigung (see Nonviolence Actualité 1993a, Bund fuer Soziale 
Verteidigung 1992, 1993, n.d.-a and n.d.-c). 
• Groups and media that harshly criticised the break-up that many of them saw as 
being engineered by Germany and/or the EC as a whole. These latter voices 
became stronger over the years, and the theme of ‘socialist Yugoslavia being torn 
apart by the West’ is still a virulent topic in parts of the peace movement (see for 
example Hartmann 1999:43pp and the sources quoted below in the section on the 
Kosovo war).355  
 
8.3.1.3 Partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
A related but still separate issue in this context has been the discussion that took 
place during the war of 1992-95 on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Especially the 
Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (see chapter 5) was very engaged in demanding that 
Bosnia must not be divided on ethnic lines, speaking up against nationalism and 
attempts to divide the country through the different peace plans provided by the 
international community (Kaldor and Faber 1993, Kaldor 1994, Helsinki Citizens’ 
Assembly 1995). Instead, they suggested a protectorate for Bosnia (‘UN Transitional 
Authority’) based on an agreement by the warring parties long before the Contact 
Group started drafting its peace plan.  
 
                                                 
355
 As a variant of this can be seen those groups and media (though numerically - irrelevant) that put 
the blame for the wars on the Croatian and Bosnian government. Kent summarises this position 
nicely for the British media until the mid 90s:  
…the wars were seen as a pre-emptive assault by Serbian forces against first, a 
genocidal Croatian fascist government, then against a fundamentalist Muslim 
government intent on genocide against Serbs in Bosnia (Kent 2006:6). 
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8.3.2 Human Rights Violations and Prosecution of War Crimes 
The issue of human rights violations and especially the mass rapes of Bosnian 
women that became known in late 1992 was one of the earliest topics for 
campaigning.356 Demands expressed were 
• that raped women should be treated like male war victims in regard to reparations 
and compensation (see Ott 1992); 
• that rape should be included in the list of war crimes, and perpetrators prosecuted 
by an international tribunal (see Wullweber 1993, Donnard 1994, Large 
n.d.:70);357 
• that persecution because of gender was recognised as sufficient grounds for the 
granting of asylum (Die GRUENEN Bundesverband et al 1992, Internationale 
Fraueninitiative gegen die Gewalt an Frauen 1993, Frauen helfen Frauen n.d.).  
Another special human rights issue was the right for conscientious objection and the 
protection of objectors, deserters and people who otherwise evaded military service. 
In the last chapter it has already been described that there was a grassroots’ network 
of like-minded groups, mostly related to War Resisters’ International that helped 
these people to hide, escape from the country that sought to draft them and supported 
them during their stay as refugees in third countries (see above 7.1.2.2). There were 
also activities of protest and advocacy on this issue. For example, in 1992 the 
European Civic Forum, an international organisation with members from East and 
West Europe collected signatures for a draft decision improving the juridical 
situation of deserters from armies of the former Yugoslavia, to be presented to the 
European Parliament.358 This collection of signatures took place in 16 countries. It 
probably was a factor in the positive decision of the European Parliament on 28 
October 1993 in support of deserters (Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1994, 
Europaeisches Parlament 1995, Jakobi-Schwan 1996:193). 
                                                 
356
 As described in the last chapter, another reaction especially of women's groups was to go to 
Croatia and Bosnia first for fact finding, and then setting up projects of practical aid for the victims 
(Medica, Vive Zene etc, see Agger et al 1999). 
357
 This demand was also made in regard to human rights violations in general. Many organisations 
petitioned governments and UN in the early months of the Bosnian war to create an international 
tribunal to persecute these crimes (see for example Minnesota Coalition 1994).  
358
 The European Civic Forum was founded in 1989 mainly by members of the European Cooperative 
Longo Mai. 
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8.3.3 Acceptance of Refugees by Third Countries 
Another campaigning issue was for the right of displaced people to flee to third 
countries outside the region. One example would be an appeal by the National Peace 
Council in the UK submitted to the Minister of Overseas Development on 28 July 
1992: 
Following reports in the press about the extent of the exodus of refugees 
from various regions of the republics of former Yugoslavia…, we are 
writing to lend support to the actions the British Government has taken to 
date in its contributions to the relief effort… . 
At the same time we feel moved to say: could we not be doing more to 
help these desperate people… we appeal to you to reconsider the scale of 
our help to the victims of this bitter conflict… Surely it is now time for 
the UK, and other countries throughout Europe, to take responsibility for 
a tragic situation we can no longer avoid and reconsider suggestions for a 
quota system to enable the burdens consequent on this evil war to be more 
evenly shared. (National Peace Council 1992d) 
This appeal stands for dozens if not hundreds of similar ones that were produced and 
published by many civil society organisations, for example by the above-mentioned 
Gesellschaft fuer bedrohte Voelker that campaigned for special status for war 
refugees (Hermes 1995), as did the French Mouvement pour une alternative non-
violente (Carlen 1994, Le Meut 1995a). 
 
8.3.4 Solidarity with Kosovo – the International Activities 
A fourth issue addressed by civil society throughout most the 1990s was the 
nonviolent movement in Kosovo. In the last chapter already some solidarity activities 
that took place within Kosovo were described.359 The majority of these actions, 
however, took place not in Kosovo but abroad, addressing and appealing in particular 
to the Western European and the US governments to pay attention to Kosovo. In the 
                                                 
359
 There have been solidarity activities not only with Kosovo but with a variety of groups and 
movements in the former Yugoslavia, and not only with peace-minded and anti-nationalist groups. 
While protest that supported the different governments in the region was probably mostly led by 
diaspora groups, there have always also been people of non-Ex-Yugoslavia nationality been with 
these groups and joining their struggle (see as example the German-Croat Friendship Society 
described by Zuelich 1990). 
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following I would like to give a few examples for protest and advocacy in this 
context:  
A Swiss group, a local branch of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly from Geneva, 
proposed in January 1993 a twinning between Geneva and Prishtina. They argued 
that the situation in Kosovo was explosive, human rights violated and the Albanian 
majority deprived of its rights, and suggested an international monitoring mission of 
INGOs to “support and protect the democratic and pacifist organisations in Kosovo, 
and alert international opinion in the event of provocation or threats” (Solioz 1993). 
Their suggestion was not an official twinning between Geneva and Prishtina, since 
Geneva as host of international conferences has a policy of neutrality, but a ‘civil 
society twinning’ involving the establishment of a ‘House for Peace, Human Rights 
and Reconciliation’ in Prishtina that could be supported by citizens associations in 
Geneva.360 
The French Mouvement pour une alternative non-violente was interested in the civil 
resistance in Kosovo from  1992 onwards.361 In the next years they conducted some 
visits, and in their articles in NVA asked for solidarity with Kosovo (de Villeneuve 
1993, Le Meut 1996, Nonviolence Actualité 1995b), as in the following example: 
The only solution today will be to initiate a process of decolonization 
with a guarantee of the right for self-determination for the Kosovars. This 
process could be guaranteed by an international nonviolent interposition 
force that would be composed mostly with members of NGOs. 
First it is important to make the situation down there known, to inform the 
people and to appeal to the political decision-makers. The nonviolent 
resistance of Kosovo deserves an active support of the French and 
international public opinion (de Villeneuve 1993:5, translation CS). 
They continued their work on Kosovo after the end of the Bosnia war. For example, 
in 1997 they campaigned for the Nobel Prize for Peace to be awarded to Kosovo’s 
President Rugova (‘Le Prix Nobel de la Paix 1996 pour Ibrahim Rugova’ 1997, 
Glorieux 1998).  
In early 1998, they and some Italian organisations discussed how to support the 
maintenance of the civilian resistance (Glorieux 1998), and welcomed the OSCE 
                                                 
360
 In the following years, HCA Geneva became also a member organisation of the Balkan Peace 
Team, and continued their campaign for human and civic rights in Kosovo (see Schweitzer  and 
Clark 2002).  
361
 At least that is the date it is first mentioned in the magazine Nonviolence Actualité (NVA) related 
to them (Le Meut 1992) 
8. Information, Support, Protest & Advocacy by Civil Society Actors 231 
 
 
Kosovo Verification Mission which at least one of their activists also joined as a 
monitor (Le Meut 1998). During the Kosovo/Yugoslavia war, they protested the 
NATO bombing, but generally welcomed that the Serbian rule over Kosovo was 
broken (Carlen and Duchesne 1999). 
 
8.3.5 Pro and Contra Military Intervention  
One of the hottest controversies has concerned the use of military means to end the 
wars. This discussion began with the question of military intervention in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and became an outright protest movement when NATO decided to 
attack FR Yugoslavia in 1999. During the violence in Macedonia in 2001 and the 
response by NATO, protest came up again but because of the quick peaceful 
settlement of the developing civil war never went beyond statements of concern. The 
following section therefore will focus solely on the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo. 
 
8.3.5.1 For and Against Military Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
With the realization that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina would not end as quickly as 
the earlier conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia, and in the face of growing numbers of 
reports of atrocities and of the situation in beleaguered Sarajevo, many voices started 
to make themselves heard demanding a more decisive military commitment from the 
international community and/or at least lifting of the arms embargo against the 
Bosnian government.362 An example for such military action had just been set with 
the second Gulf War in 1991 where the UN and the Western countries had not 
hesitated to go to war to ‘liberate Kuwait’ and ‘restore international law’. The feeling 
of ‘something must be done’, ‘we cannot just continue to watch’ was not only the 
dominant message of almost all mass media in that time, but was also reflected in the 
demands and positions of many civil society groups.  
                                                 
362
 Chapter 4.1.3 and 4.2 describe how the military engagement of the international community 
slowly increased between 1992 and 1995, starting out with a peace-keeping mission with a purely 
humanitarian mandate and monitoring of the arms’ embargo, and ending with a bombing 
campaign on Serb positions in Bosnia in 1995. 
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These demands for more military engagement cannot be identified with any 
particular political spectrum but tended to come from groups and political parties 
throughout the right-left-spectrum, including those from the peace, human rights and 
ecological movements. For example, the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly - that was 
introduced in chapter 5 - campaigned continuously for more military engagement of 
the western world (UN, NATO and European Union) to protect the UN-declared safe 
areas through a strengthened military engagement (see Kaldor 1994, Helsinki 
Citizens’ Assembly 1995).363 Many international peace organisations struggled very 
hard to find positions, sometimes the internal conflict between those who could 
imagine a military intervention and those who could not led to serious splits in 
organisations (see Schnettler, Wiese and Koerber 1995).  
Some other peace organisations, however, retained a strict anti-militarist/pacifist 
position. For example, in 1992 War Resisters’ International and the International 
Fellowship of Reconciliation issued an open letter which I would like to quote in 
some length because it contains two points of the pacifist argument that was used by 
many groups: the danger of a military escalation caused by military intervention, and 
ulterior motives pursued by the international community when propagating military 
intervention. 
Since the war spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina, there have been widespread 
calls for military intervention, even in letters from the anti-war movement 
in Sarajevo. The Bosnian government have pleaded for military 
intervention under the auspices of anybody willing to mount such an 
intervention and with goals ranging from escorting relief convoys or 
opening Sarajevo airport to disarming the former JNA and the 
paramilitaries… 
Any use of military force -- no matter how limited it is intended to be -- 
introduces a different logic, a military logic offering a rationale for 
further, less limited use of additional military force…  
                                                 
363
 The demand for military intervention was also raised by the majority of the anti-war, women’s and 
human rights groups in the former Yugoslavia – those groups that were the primary partners of the 
international civil society. In an open letter of anti-war groups to the international peace movement 
issued in April 1994 this disagreement was addressed. The signatories, activists from Slovenia, 
Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo, expressed their 
concern ‘that peace groups in Europe spoke up chiefly for nonviolence. The state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina had to be defended with all means available’. (Offener Brief an die 
Friedensbewegungen 1996). 
 The other points in this letter were about the need for international support for their work, but that 
such support needed to come from groups being well-informed about the situation, criticizing mass 
actions like the HCA peace caravan or Mir Sada, and listing some specific common concerns like 
neofascism, need for support of war resisters, etc. 
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What begins with a small action - e.g. to secure the area around Sarajevo 
airport -- might, if the Western troops get involved in heavy fighting, 
become a major military intervention with tens of thousands of soldiers 
and much heavier arms than those currently used in former Yugoslavia…  
Every decision to use military force strengthens the general argument in 
favour of the military-based so-called "New World Order".  
Since the end of the old East-West conflict, politicians and the military 
from Western countries are looking for new roles for their forces. Not 
only the JNA, but they too are fighting for their survival as an institution 
(War Resisters’ International and International Fellowship of 
Reconciliation 1992). 
A third standard argument is missing in this statement which was often added to the 
other two points: the argument that not all other means had been exhausted, and that 
there were alternatives to military intervention. The reference to ‘alternatives’ meant 
more or less everything that civil society undertook on the ground in the conflict 
zones, from training in conflict resolution and mediation through practical solidarity 
work with anti-war groups in the region to much unconventional work with refugees 
and in reconstruction as it was described in chapter 7.364   
Similar discussions - in Germany called the ‘pacifism debate’ - happened in most if 
not all European countries and North America, although of course the discourse and 
the influence of the different positions differed from country to country.365 For 
                                                 
364
 As an  example I would like to cite the German Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung. It worked from 
1991 onwards intensively on the conflicts of former Yugoslavia. An undated overview from c. 
1993 lists as activities: 
• Sending trainers for mediation and nonviolent conflict resolution to Zagreb, Osijek, Belgrade 
and Pancevo; 
• Building up an electronic Mailbox network; 
• Started research project to evaluate programmes of nonviolent conflict resolution; 
• Participated in different international projects and conferences, for example Peace Island Vis, 
Peace Caravan, conferences of HCA, Verona-Forum;  
• Supported partnerships between peace groups in Germany and former Yugoslavia;  
• Joined the Solidarity for Peace Caravan to Sarajevo (Beati i costruttori di pace); 
• Made an appeal asking people to accept a refugee or a family in their home; 
• Initiated regularly meeting Coordination of all groups working on Yugoslavia; 
• Members and staff of BSV give several times a week presentations and seminars talking about 
former Yugoslavia (Bund fuer Soziale Verteidigung n.d.-c). 
365
 This debate has been and still is a mostly ethical one, drawing often on the Christian ‘just law’ 
concept (see Becker-Hinrichs 1999, Haensel  and Stobbe 2002, Tenbergen 2000).  
 Another standard argument were comparisons to Germany under the Nazis and World War II. 
During the Bosnia war, especially in 1994-95 when the inner centres of Sarajevo and Tuzla were 
hit by grenades and the Eastern Bosnian protected areas attacked, President Milosevic was 
compared with Hitler like 1991 President Hussein. Europe’s politics in Bosnia got compared with 
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example German peace movement groups were also very critical of UN peace-
keeping.366 In France and in Italy, there was much more support for UN Blue 
Helmets. The line here was here rather drawn between Blue Helmets on the one side, 
and NATO bombing on the other (Dufour 1994, Muller 1994). 
 
8.3.5.2 The NATO War on FR Yugoslavia 
The readiness of NATO to militarily intervene in the Kosovo conflict in autumn 
1998 (the activation order), and then their attack on the FR Yugoslavia after the 
failure of the Rambouillet negotiations in March 1999 saw a more unanimous protest 
than the military interventions into the Bosnian war, probably because of several 
reasons coming together: First, in spite of the reports in 1998 on the numbers of 
displaced in Kosovo, there was not such a strong public pressure created of 
‘something must be done’ as had been the case in relation to Bosnia. Second, there 
was no UN decision covering the attack by NATO which made it illegal from the 
point of view of international law, something that was pointed out by international 
lawyers already before the beginning of the war (see Haensel and Stobbe 
2002:86pp). Third, the war lasted for months, and the more pictures and reports came 
out of air raids on Serbian towns and civilians falling victim to the attacks, the 
stronger the criticism grew. Fourth, NATO was already ‘the bad guy’ in the eyes of 
most in the peace and related movements. And finally, even many those who felt that 
a military intervention was necessary were unhappy with NATO because no ground 
troops were sent in to protect the Kosovo Albanians on the ground, leaving them to 
the mercy of the Serbian troops. 
                                                                                                                                          
the Appeasement politics of 1938 (see Czempiel 1995). One sentence often heard in Germany was 
that ‘no more war’ was not having priority over ‘never again Auschwitz’ (Fischer 1999). But 
‘nazifying’ the Serbs was a phenomenon not only in Germany but in other European countries and 
the US as well, for example by free use of the terms ‘holocaust’, ‘genocide’ and ‘concentration 
camps’. “The most effective way to demonise anybody today is to link them somehow to the Nazi 
experience” states Hume (2000:71) with some cause.  
 The ‘pacifism debate’ that had started with the second Iraq war even before the conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia gave it much speed, did however not end with the Bosnian war but was continued, 
becoming very lively again during the Kosovo war (see Haensel  and Stobbe 2002). A good 
summary for the German discussion during the Iraq time can be found in Narr and Vack 1991. An 
example for the continuation after 2001 is Volmer 2002. 
366
 The reason probably was an ongoing campaign against a change of the German constitution that 
would allow Germany to deploy troops outside of NATO area. 
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This does not mean that there was no support for the war in international civil society 
including parts of the peace movement.367 One good example is the ‘Hague Appeal 
for Peace’: In May 1999, during the Yugoslavia/Kosovo war, a long-planned large 
international peace conference with this title took place in The Hague to 
commemorate the original Hague Peace Conference that took place one hundred 
years before (see Hague Appeal for Peace n.d.).368 Ten thousand peace activists from 
all over the world came together, and Kosovo was one of the main topics.  Its 23-
page final appeal includes two paragraphs that are of relevance in this context here 
because it documents how the majority of the participants viewed the wars in Bosnia 
and Kosovo and the role of the international community in them: It speaks of “recent 
outbreaks of genocide”, listing Bosnia and Kosovo alongside Rwanda and 
Cambodia, and among many other points demands the  
speedy and effective intervention of humanitarian forces, subject to the 
prescriptions of the UN Charter, when civilians are threatened by 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and extreme national 
disasters (Hague Appeal for Peace 1999:5). 
Those who condemned NATO’s attack were divided among themselves. The main 
contested point was the positioning to the struggle of the Kosovo-Albanians for 
independence.369 One side criticised the NATO attack but supported its eventual 
outcome, Kosovo being made an international protectorate. “For sure, the war 
declared on Serbia defends a just cause. But it does not suffice that a cause is just for 
a war to be just” wrote a well-known nonviolent activist and researcher, Jean-Marie 
Muller in early 1999 (Muller 1999b). 
The other position perhaps most predominantly represented with some or many  
those on the political left displayed no understanding or sympathy for the cause of 
the Kosovo Albanians whom they sometimes just titled ‘terrorists’, and implicitly 
denied the oppression that took place in Kosovo in the 1990s as well as the presumed 
                                                 
367
 The discussion on just war and legitimization of the war because of the assumed ethnic cleansing 
planned by Belgrade played a role in the big churches and again – like in Βosnia – was more 
prominently represented by the (moderate – Social Democrat) left and Green parties (see Refalo 
1999, Haensel and Stobbe 2002:56) than with the conservative Right. 
368
 It was initiated by the International Peace Bureau (IPB), the International Physicians for the 
Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear 
Arms (IALANA), and the World Federalist Movement. 
369
 And still is, see for example the articles on the webpage of the Kasseler Friedensratschlag 2008 
referring to Kosovo or its recognition as an independent country in early 2008. 
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threat of genocide.370 Instead, they accused the West (USA and Europe) to have 
wilfully split Yugoslavia that they saw as one of the last resorts of socialism in 
Europe (see Chossudovsky 2006, one of the spokespersons of this position).  
 
8.4 The Main Instruments of Protest and Advocacy 
In this following section I am leaving the particular issues around which protest and 
advocacy developed in the period under study, and turn to the forms this protest took: 
its instruments. To give a taste of the complexity of the activities, I would like to 
start this section with a quote. It is from a leader of a women's peace network 
organisation from the beginning of the Kosovo and Yugoslavia war 1999, and in my 
eyes is typical for the protest and advocacy activities in the European peace 
movements:  
At the beginning there were individual telephone calls, then telefaxes and 
appeals piled up with the request to pass them on, to collect signatures, to 
write lobbying letters, to keep contact with the groups and organizations 
of the network. Then came requests to support demonstrations in 
Bonn,…Erfurt, Berlin. Then the pressure to participate in the daily vigil 
here in Bonn, to contact other women organizations…, to send around 
materials appeals by ourselves,… Finally there was the invitation to speak 
on the Erfurt congress of the Mothers Against the War. 
There was need to deal fully with the political level: Letters to the 
Chancellor, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Defence, then the heads 
of the party fractions in Parliament, finally all MPs, as well as support 
letters for those MPs who had publicly declared their position against the 
war of attack of NATO. There was need to maintain contacts to the NGO 
scene and not to ignore citizens who were aghast…” (Frauen Netzwerk 
fuer Frieden 1999:3). 
 
8.4.1 Instruments of Protest 
8.4.1.1 Appeals 
The most common activities of protest have been appeals, open letters and/or press 
releases.371 They were printed in the publications of the organisations issuing them, 
                                                 
370
 How dominant that view was and is varies from country to country. For example, in Britain it 
seems to be more marginal than it is in Germany (information by Andrew Rigby on Britain; for 
Germany see the webpages of the Kasseler Friedensratschlag 2008). 
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faxed to the media, put on e-mail lists or later in the 1990s on websites in the 
internet, and/ or distributed as leaflets on the streets or at conferences. Generally, 
probably the following categories could be distinguished: 
• Appeals “to end the war”, directed vaguely both to the international community 
and / or to the local actors.  
• Appeals demanding specific certain action like granting asylum to objectors and 
deserters from former Yugoslav countries or creating safe havens in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.372  
• Declarations primarily intended to express a position or a concern, for example 
support for or condemnation of an act.373  
The main functions of these instruments have been to express an opinion divergent of 
what the governments or the mass media subscribed to, and to suggest certain action 
the state actors should take. Besides that, they also had of course a function within 
their own constituency, contributing to the shaping of the opinion within it – and 
sometimes fighting over certain issues (see the ‘pacifism debate’ described above).  
 
8.4.1.2 Public Events 
Many NGOs and citizens groups organised evenings on the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia in general or certain aspects like “nonviolent alternatives”, “situation of 
COs” or the like. Sometimes there was just one speaker of the organizing group, 
sometimes there were panels with either speakers with contesting views, or shedding 
                                                                                                                                          
371
 Some of the appeals and open letters were signed by many people. The collection of signatures 
was a means used by groups in order to emphasise the public support their respective demands 
had.  
372
 For example conducted the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly in 1992/93 a postcard campaign all over 
Europe and North America demanding safe havens in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and open borders for 
refugees. This campaign that according to the HCA was an idea of UN special envoy Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki had a response of nearly 300,000 postcards. The organisers attributed the decision of 
the UN to create safe areas to their initiative though deploring that they were “reservations for 
Muslims” and not what they had wanted (Faber 1993, Kaldor and Faber 1993). 
373
 There are numerous such declarations by the Catholic Church collected in Buchbender and Arnold 
(eds.) 2002:77-183. 
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light on different aspects of a topic. There have also been a number of invitations of 
speakers from the former Yugoslavia to speaking events and conferences abroad. 374 
There have been also many conferences on the situation or aspects of it in European 
countries.375 Sometimes they targeted local or national public, sometimes 
international impact was intended, for example by connecting conferences to ‘official 
events’. For example, in August 1992 the Institute for War and Peace Reporting and 
the British American Security Information Council invited leading opposition and 
minority leaders for a simultaneous alternative Conference to the London Conference 
(‘Citizens’ Movements. Alternative Paths to Peace’ 1992). 
A somewhat special event - both regarding its size and the calibre of people involved 
- has been the ‘International Tribunal on the NATO-war against Yugoslavia’ taking 
place parallel as two events in the USA and in Germany in 2000. That Tribunal was 
organised and supported by a large number of organisations of different political 
orientation (nonviolent, women’s, leftist groups, as well as grassroots’ peace 
initiatives), with the US International Action Centre led by former US Attorney-
General Ramsey Clark who also wrote the ‘bill of indictment’ as its initiator (see 
‘Internationales Europaeisches Tribunal ueber den NATO-Krieg gegen Jugoslawien’ 
2000, Kasseler Friedensratschlag 2000). A number of smaller conferences prepared 
the tribunals that accused NATO and the government leaders of those countries most 
actively involved in the attack on the FR Yugoslavia of breaking international law.376 
                                                 
374
 Several initiatives created photo exhibitions and showed them during evening events. This was not 
limited to larger organisations (for example the development organisation Christian Peace Service, 
that did an exhibition on children refugees, see CFD 1993) but also done by small local groups 
(Ex-Jugoslawien-Koordinierungskreis 1993).  
 There were also other related activities like presentations in schools. For example, the Italian 
humanitarian NGO INTERSOS worked in schools in Rome, informing on “The Children and the 
War”, and in November 1999 on refugees from Kosovo (Tullio  and Vertucci 2002:214-215).  
375
 As conferences (in contrast to information evenings) are counted events that had more than one 
speaker, and lasted at least one day. 
376
 The list of 19 grievances starts with “Planning and Executing the Dismemberment, Segregation 
and Impoverishment of Yugoslavia”, includes concrete actions during the war (“Destroying and 
Damaging Economic, Social, Cultural, Medical, Diplomatic and Religious Resources, Properties 
and Facilities throughout Yugoslavia“ and ends with “The Purpose of the US Actions Being to 
Dominate, Control and Exploit Yugoslavia, Its People and Its Resources. The Means of the US 
Being Military Power and Economic Coercion” (Kasseler Friedensratschlag 2000). Under “Relief 
Sought” the initiators suggested among other points the formation of a federation of all peoples in 
the region, the “strict prohibition on all forms of foreign interference with or disruption of efforts 
to establish unity, peace and stability in the Balkans”, the abolition of NATO and of the “illegal ad 
hoc international criminal tribunal for Yugoslavia” and the removal of all foreign troops from the 
Balkans. 
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The functions of these diverse public events have been different ones: 
• Addressing a wider public for information-sharing (information evenings for 
example) 
• Forming opinion within the own constituency (panels and conferences where 
speakers with different opinions were given a voice) 
• Addressing the state actors, expressing protest or trying to otherwise influence 
them (conferences with participation of such actors, or with wider media 
coverage like the mentioned ‘tribunal’). 
 
8.4.1.3 Demonstrations 
One of the standard accusations against the peace movement during the time of the 
Bosnian war was that they did not hold demonstrations against the war. This 
observation which was shared by many – including activists in the peace movements 
themselves – is certainly correct, if leaving aside the traditional annual events that 
addressed aspects of the wars in former Yugoslavia, mostly the military engagement 
of the Western countries in them (see Friedensforum 1994). The numbers of 
participants however before 1999 did not come close to the numbers of the protests 
against the Iraq war of 1991 or the best times of the peace movements in the 1980s.  
Andreas Buro, a long-term civil rights and peace activist and retired professor for 
political science wrote in an early article on this question:  
But against what should we demonstrate here in Germany? The federal 
government and the EC have so far worked for a mitigation of the conflict 
with non-military means, though not always in the way we would have 
wanted them to do ,… In reality the peace movement has a new task for 
which it is little prepared: How can solidarity that transcends borders be 
organised in Europe? (Buro 1992:26, translation CS). 
More typical than larger demonstrations have been vigils or small demonstrations 
with perhaps less than 50 participants that have been conducted by many groups of 
different orientation (not only peace movement but also immigrant groups with their 
supporters and others).  
The picture changed during the Yugoslavia/Kosovo war when in many countries 
large demonstrations were held against the NATO attack with several thousand 
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participants each (see Friedensnetz Baden-Wuerttemberg 1999, Moore 1999, 
Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 1999a, Pinter 1999, Spinnerets 1999). 
 
8.4.1.4 Legal Means 
Several attempts have been made to use legal means against the NATO war on FR 
Yugoslavia, in order to force the international community to stop the war or at least 
to seek redress afterwards, but all remained without success.377 One example would 
be a complaint to ICTY by the American Association of Jurists together with jurists 
from Toronto. The Tribunal quickly rejected the complaint together with similar 
received from the FR Yugoslavia and a Russian Parliamentary Commission, feeling 
compelled to announce the rejection in a press release but without really giving any 
reasons  (International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2000, see also Pinter 
2000).378 
 
8.4.1.5 Other Public Actions 
Aside from demonstrations, there have been other public actions over the decade. 
Again, it is only possible to name a few examples from a large amount of data 
collected on the civil society actors: 
• Peace prayers (see the different minutes of the German (Ex-)Jugoslawien-
Koordinierungskreis from the early 1990s),  
• Symbolic actions. The GFbV for example planted in 1995 a ‘cemetery’ with 
wooden crosses remembering the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa close to Chancellor 
Kohl’s private home, demanding the lifting of the arms embargo (Martin 1995). 
• Fasts and hunger strikes: For example, there was a hunger strike of five artists in 
                                                 
377
 This is not a very common tool, but one that in some other cases has been used successfully, the 
most famous perhaps being the arrest of the former Chilenean dictator Pinochet in London because 
Spain had filed a suit against him. 
378
 Two other examples have been the following: 
 In the US, 31 congresspeople filed a lawsuit against President Clinton seeking an end to military 
strikes against Yugoslavia. The court rejected this motion as well as FR Yugoslavia’s seeking a 
legal order to halt the NATO Bombing at the International Court of Justice (Simons 1999). 
 In Germany five family members of civilian victims in the small town Varvarin went to court 
asking for compensation, but the court rejected their complaint (Kasseler Friedensratschlag 2003).  
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solidarity with Bosnia in France in August 1995. They referred to the ‘Avignon 
declaration’ signed by thousands of people at a festival of Avignon that 
demanded the resignation of Boutros-Ghali for incompetence, immediate action 
by the Hague Tribunal against the perpetrators of Srebrenica, the continued 
presence of the Blue Helmets in Bosnia, keeping up the international pressure 
against Serbia, “defence of the democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina”, and the lifting 
of the arms embargo (Nonviolence Actualité 1995a).379 
• Very few actions of civil disobedience were directed at representatives of the 
conflict parties except the ‘smuggling’ of refugees from the war areas into third 
countries (chapter 7.1.2.2). One was a nonviolent blockade of a British Air Basis 
in Germany (Brueggen close to Moenchengladbach) on the 18 April 1999. 
 
8.4.2 Instruments of Advocacy Work 
There is an overlap between this work and what has been described under ‘middle 
level’ approaches in the chapter on civil society peace-making (see 5.2). If the 
activity in question clearly had local actors as a main target group, then I categorised 
it as ‘peace-making’. If – as far as I could discern from the sources – the main target 
group were other internationals, I put it here under advocacy. However, there is a 
grey area because people from the region participated in some of the advocacy 
activities as well.  
 
8.4.2.1 Advocating and Lobbying For Political Options 
The International Crisis Group (ICG), a private high level advocacy organisation 
founded by former diplomats and politicians, and having quite some influence in 
political circles, is a good example for advocacy work.380 I am not aware of any 
study of the impact their recommendations to the international community had in 
general, but there are indicators that at least some of their reports on Bosnia wielded 
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 In 1999, several people conducted a fast between middle of May and beginning of June in Paris, 
“to appeal to the responsible politicians and as witness for peace in justice”. It was an action 
supported by many groups, among them MAN, Arche de Lanza del Vasto, Cun de Larzac, Church 
and Peace, Quakers, IFOR and others  (Nonviolence Actualité 1999b). 
380
 In the bibliography there is a list of most of their publications concerning the former Yugoslavia. 
8. Information, Support, Protest & Advocacy by Civil Society Actors 242 
 
 
influence: One was their critique of the Bosnian electoral system which according to 
Gagnon (1998:11) led the UN to reform the system to make an election of moderates 
more likely (International Crisis Group 1997b). Destexhe (2001) names the ICG 
report on Brcko (1999a) as a second report having been influential.381  
Other organizations, for example human rights organisations like the International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and the US-based Human Rights Watch, did 
not address peace-making in general but advocated for attention to human rights 
issues (see Troebst 1998:93pp) in general.382 
Advocacy work has, of course, not been limited to those established organisations. 
Also new groups and organisations got involved in this type of work. One example 
would the (already cited) Verona Forum (see chapter 5.2.2.1) that also engaged in 
lobbying as a direct outcome of its work among representatives from the different 
countries of former Yugoslavia.383  
 
8.4.2.2 Institutionalizing ‘Civilian Alternatives’ 
Very successful advocacy has taken place around the issue of civilian alternatives, 
though the issue in question here was not specific action on the conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia but the establishment of institutions and state funding supporting NGO’s 
working on conflict. This is probably the only case that could be considered a real 
success story in the field of protest and advocacy: 
In Europe and North America, it was in the 1990s that the discussion on civil conflict 
resolution grew exponentially (Paffenholz 2001b, Weller 2007). The conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia were not the only international conflict triggering interest on how 
to solve or settle international conflicts – the 2nd Iraq war, Somalia, Rwanda were 
                                                 
381
 Other examples for advocacy work would be the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that 
made suggestions regarding Kosovo (Troebst 1998:91pp) and the European Stability Initiative 
(ESI, European Stability Initiative 2001, 2007) that wrote a number of expert reports on different 
issues. ESI is a non-profit research and policy institute, founded in 1999 by an international group 
of practitioners and experts, funded mostly by government and corporation grants. Its goal is to 
provide policy makers with analysis, and is claiming to have had “a substantial impact on 
international policy towards South Eastern Europe. Its advice was sought regularly by a range of 
policy makers across the region.” (European Stability Initiative n.d.). 
382
 Baglioni 2001 distinguishes this type of work from that of advocacy groups but I would argue that 
it is advocacy as well, only on a more specific topic. 
383
 It established a permanent coordination and communication at the European Parliament in 
Brussels for that purpose. 
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other key events in this decade. But there can be no doubt that Yugoslavia played an 
essential role in the debate both for the formulation of the need, and for examples on 
what kind of work could be envisaged.384 What was new in the 1990s has been that 
the scope of interest was broadened from peace-making (mediation, negotiation) to 
more encompassing approaches, and people searched for different tools to deal with 
conflict without violence. One focus of these alternatives has been the sending of 
civilians to conflict areas to support peace processes (see Schirch 1995). The reasons 
for the popularity of this approach were probably two factors – the formal 
resemblance to the sending of the military (‘send civilians instead of soldiers’), and 
that it allowed a comparatively easy and direct access to work on the conflicts – 
easier than for example trying to influence the high-level leadership.  
Under the heading of ‘Civil Peace Service’ Europe-wide initiatives first in Germany 
and some years later also in the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, France and Italy 
sought to establish a new type of service situated somewhere between the older 
volunteer services for youth, alternative service to military service, the work of 
established development organisations and peace teams (see Truger 1996, Centro 
Studi Difesa Civile 1998, Balkan Peace Team 2000, Trittmann 2000, Schweitzer et al 
2001, War Resisters’ International 2004a). 
The initiatives in the different countries varied a lot, with some working on training 
alone (Netherlands), others finding a niche for volunteer services in the context of 
the abolition of military draft in their country (France, Italy), and in Germany an 
‘expert service’ was established comparable to the established development 
cooperation services, only focussed on dealing with conflict. The German example is 
well documented, and therefore I would like to describe it as an example of the 
complexity of successful advocacy work that managed to convince a government to 
institutionalize a new instrument and budget line that exclusively focuses on conflict 
resolution work: 
The development of a Civil Peace Service in Germany started in 1991 with a 
declaration and subsequent work of the Protestant Church of Berlin-Brandenburg 
                                                 
384
 See the two conferences on “Peaceful Settlement of Conflict” at the Protestant Academy of 
Loccum in 1993 and 1994 ( Calließ  and Merkel (eds.)1993 and 1994), and Weller 2007 for the 
history of the discussion in Germany. Some early overviews on ‘civil conflict resolution’ methods 
were published by Diamond  and McDonald 1993, Ropers 1995, Ropers and Debiel (eds.) 1995, 
Rupesinghe 1995, Ryan 1995. 
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(see Evangelische Kirche in Berlin-Brandenburg 1991). The above-mentioned 
Federation for Social Defence took up the concept and until 1994 developed its own 
version of it, gathering together a diverse group of supportive organisations and 
individuals of different political orientation. Eventually, in 1996, this coalition 
became a NGO of its own, the Forum Civil Peace Service. The Civil Peace Service 
as envisaged at that time was planned to be ‘large-scale’, having the goal to develop 
a pool of 100,000 people within 20 years. Trittmann (2000) describes in detail the 
lobbying that began in 1995. First individual politicians from all parties were 
contacted who were known to be open to this thinking. The result was a proposal in 
the Parliament, submitted by a small number of MPs from all parties just after the 
Dayton Agreement. This was to train within two years 200 experts in conflict 
resolution to be sent to Bosnia. After this proposal was rejected, a new opening was 
found when one of the bundeslaender (states) - North-Rhine Westphalia that had just 
formed a new government of Social Democrats and Greens - showed interest in 
supporting conflict resolution and a peace corps. It decided to fund from 1997 
onwards a suggested four-month training for what the German initiators by then 
called ‘peace experts’ (today the official English translation is ‘peace consultants’), 
having in the meanwhile abandoned the concept of sending large numbers of people. 
The first courses were offered by two umbrella organisations, the Forum CPS and the 
umbrella of the Protestant Peace and Development Services in Germany, AGDF (see 
Wagner 2000 for a description of the development of the first courses).  
Parallel to these efforts to establish training courses, lobbying at the federal level 
continued in the form of conferences and round tables to which state representatives 
were invited. Public events made the concept known, and intensive liaison with the 
existing volunteer and development service organisation was required to convince 
them of the need for such a new service. In 1997 the Parliament organised a hearing 
on the subject; but again, under the conservative government of that time, there was 
no opening for institutionalisation. In all these discussions, the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia played the role of the prime example for the need of such work. In late 
1998, with the change of government from the conservatives to a Social-Democrat--
Green coalition, this changed.  When forming the coalition, both parties agreed to 
support ‘an infrastructure for crisis prevention and civil conflict resolution, including 
the deployment of ‘peace experts’ or ‘peace consultants’. A (still-existing) 
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instrument and a budget line ‘Civil Peace Service’ was created, based in the Ministry 
of Development. 385 Of course, the Civil Peace Service was not created as an 
instrument to intervene in the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia though the first 
projects funded mostly took place there. However, without the impetus of these 
conflicts, the establishment of such an instrument would probably not have taken 
place. 
 
8.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to give an impression of what civil society actors did aside 
from direct project work in former Yugoslavia. The picture that emerged has been 
one of intensive public debate, with two foci of actors: The first were the mass media 
that not only played a crucial role in forming public opinion, but also stood in a 
reciprocal relationship with the political actors who both were influenced by them, 
and sought to influence what was reported on their actions. 
The second focus was those groups and organisations engaged in public protest and 
advocacy work. Besides the peace movement that was probably the strongest in this 
type of activity there have been also other groups and organisations involved – 
human rights and women's organisations have been mentioned in particular. But 
while they shared discontent with what the state interveners did, the contents of what 
they protested and lobbied for or against varied a lot. In fact, contradictory objectives 
have been pursued: for or against (more) military intervention, and for or against the 
secession of republics or autonomous regions being perhaps the most contested 
fields, often setting not only civil society actors against state actors, but 
disagreements within civil society as well. 
 
8.5.1 Protest, Advocacy and Work on the Ground 
One of the noteworthy points is that many actors combined protest and advocacy 
with work in the area of former Yugoslavia, be it humanitarian aid, human rights 
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 Until end of 2008, about 470 ‘peace experts’ have been sent to about 45 countries. The annual 
budget increased over these years from 5,3 million € to 19 million €. See Bundesministerium fuer 
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2008b, Kortmann 2009. 
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monitoring or one or several of the multiple other activities described in the last 
chapters. That is not unusual for large agencies – with very few exceptions 
humanitarian aid, development and conflict transformation agencies engage in 
advocacy work from time to time. However, in this survey there have been many 
small groups, mostly from the peace and the feminist movement, for whom the order 
of activities was reversed. Their starting point has been work in their home countries, 
not the work in the field. Many peace groups, for example, had just gone through a 
period of intense protests against the US-led attack in early 1991 on Iraq after Iraq 
had occupied Kuwait (the so-called 2nd Iraq war). But then during the first years of 
the wars in former Yugoslavia they added direct work in the field as was described in 
the earlier chapters to the plethora of their activities, some of them explicitly 
explaining that they preferred such work over protest against the war back home (see 
Buro 1992).  
The means the groups used were mostly ‘traditional’ - appeals, public events, 
information through alternative media, vigils, advocacy work and, much more rarely, 
mass protest on the streets. Civil disobedience occurred but was not prominent, and 
never went beyond the symbolic.386  
 
8.5.2 The Functions of Public Information, Support, Protest and Advocacy 
Public information, protest and advocacy had different functions: 
• Expressing disagreement with the action of state actors (governments, UN, 
NATO); 
• Informing their own constituency; 
• Struggling for shaping a consensus position within their own constituency; 
• Informing wider public (usually on a ‘truth’ different than what the political 
leaders or the mass media pronounced); and 
• Seeking enforcement of a certain act (stopping the war on Yugoslavia, paying 
recompensation to victims) through engaging the legal system. 
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 As far as I can tell, there have been no civil disobedience acts that were considerably disruptive or 
effectively threatened to withdraw power from the state actors. 
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Support activities (training, funding etc) were activities that sought to empower other 
actors to intervene in the conflicts. Without such indirect intervention, work in the 
field would probably have been impossible. In several places, in particular in Chapter 
6 on peace-building, it has been mentioned how otherwise well-intentioned projects 
suffered from the use of field staff without adequate skills. And lack of coordination 
between NGOs led to contradictory and even harmful consequences, for example 
when different donors competed with each other or pursued different policies in 
regard to choosing beneficiaries of humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts.387  
 
8.5.3 Relationship Between International and Local Civil Society 
An important issue is the relationship between the international groups (NGOs) that 
claimed to work in solidarity with local anti-war groups/civil society, and these local 
groups. On the one hand, international civil society helped the local civil society by 
giving them a voice internationally through translating and reprinting articles, 
statements and the like, by creating alternative media where critical journalists from 
the region could publish, and by inviting their speakers abroad to give presentations. 
On the other hand, there has been a clear disagreement between those groups and 
many of their pacifist supporters on the matter of military intervention. The local 
groups generally were in favour of military action by the international community 
while the pacifist organisations among their friends abroad had a problem with it (see 
the two open letters from the local groups and from War Resisters’ International 
quoted above).388 
 
                                                 
387
 The whole of support activities fall under the wider issue of building and maintaining an 
infrastructure of conflict intervention. The need for such an infrastructure has become increasingly 
acknowledged in the last ten years, and is reflected in many policy debates both among state and 
non-state actors (see for example the entries in the Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation 
and Reychler and Paffenholz 2001). It is not far-fetched to argue that the experiences intervening 
actors made in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s played an important role as a background for 
this discussion. 
388
 This is also partly true for the Kosovo solidarity work. It may not be too far-fetched to assume that 
the concrete support the local groups received at the same time from the internationals was the 
reason that local activists lived with these disagreements, while the internationals appreciated the 
work of the local groups and valued the existence of local partners too much to let this 
disagreement to stand in their way. 
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8.5.4 A ‘Yugoslavia Movement’ 
Were the conflicts in former Yugoslavia nothing more than a new topic existing 
movements like the peace movement addressed? Or is it possible to speak of an 
international social movement that formed itself around the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia (a ‘Yugoslavia movement’)? And if so, what kind of movement was it? 
Or was it not one movement but several?  
There is no single definition of social movements that is shared by all those studying 
social movements. The definition that I prefer comes from Dieter Rucht. He speaks 
of  
systems of action of mobilized networks of groups and organizations that 
are of a certain duration and based on collective identity, and seek to 
promote, prevent or undo social change with the means of protest (Rucht 
2007:15, translation CS).  
Most authors see social movements particularly active in the field of collective 
protest.  
Social movements can be interpreted as the rational and purposeful efforts 
of people who are not represented in institutional politics, and who 
collectively and publicly express their demands in order to influence 
public policy making (Kolb 2005:34).389  
Most movements focus on issues in their own society. Those that are dealing with 
issues abroad are usually described under the terminology of ‘solidarity movements’ 
or ‘transnational movements’ (see Passy 2001).390 
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, there are two arguments speaking in favour of 
considering it a movement of its own: 
1. The fact that there were many new groups emerging during the first year of the 
wars in 1991 and 1992, as the survey on interventions clearly shows. 
2. The sheer amount of activities by civil society actors here, ranging from 
organizing direct help to protest and other work back home. 
                                                 
389
 See also  Rucht 2002, Tilly 2004.  
390
 Passy (2001:5) defines solidarity movements as follows: “Individuals who are involved in this 
movement defend the interests, rights, and identities of others“, not benefiting directly from their 
participation in collective action. Sometimes also the term ‘altruistic movements’ is used. See 
Burstein 1999, Guigni 1999 and also the articles in Guigni and Passy (eds) 2001 on ‘political 
altruism’. 
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Therefore I would argue that there cannot be any doubt that there has been a special 
movement on the former Yugoslavia, and that it cannot be just subsumed under 
‘peace movement’ as for example Schmitz (1998) does. This movement had aspects 
of both solidarity movements and of national protest movements: It was a solidarity 
movement insofar as there was a lot of support of local civil society. Also the intense 
engagement in humanitarian aid, though being a different kind of solidarity, is often 
counted as an activity of what some authors call ‘altruistic movements’ (see Burstein 
1999, Guigni 1999 and the articles in Guigni and Passy 2001). And it was a protest 
movement focussing on the politics ‘at home’ addressing the interventions of 
governments and international organisations.  
That there were contrasting and contending views on what to do about the conflict 
does not invalid this assessment about there having been a ‘Yugoslavia movement’, 
at least when following Giugni who points out that  
social movements are complex sets of groups, organizations, and actions 
that may have different goals as well as different strategies for reaching 
their aims (Guigni 1999:xx).  
That would mean that movements do not have to speak with one voice, nor actually 
pursue the same goals. This ‘Yugoslavia movement’ was a movement that was 
neither fully a solidarity movement, nor a protest movement targeting the politics of 
the home countries of the civil society actors but had elements of both, uniting them 
in a manner hitherto unknown. 
 
8.5.5 The Impact of Public Information, Protest and Advocacy 
Last not least it needs to be asked what influence did the information, protest and 
advocacy activities have on the political decision-makers?  
For the mass media, it has been assessed that there definitely was an influence on 
politics even though how it exactly came about, and how decisive it was remains 
contested. 
For advocacy in its strict sense of the word, some examples have been given above 
on its successful application, with the establishment of state-funded civil peace 
services throughout Europe being perhaps the most relevant and long-lasting 
outcome. 
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More difficult is to assess what role the protest activities played. Researchers of 
international movements and NGOs have rarely been able to make a convincing case 
for the impact of protest, because the question of attribution is extremely sensitive 
and complex. Study of consequences of social movements considered “one of the 
most neglected topics in the literature” (Guigni 1999:xivp, see also Meyer 1999).  
In the literature on former Yugoslavia, some very generalised assessments can be 
found, like ‘pacifism’ being blamed for a late military intervention in Bosnia, or 
human rights reports by NGOs causing local perpetrators to harden their position in 
order to portray themselves more successfully as misunderstood or maligned by the 
international community (Fitzduff and Church 2004:11, citing Anderson 1999). 
There are few indicators that there was much impact from the side of those 
challenging military means beyond the public debate on how to respond to the war in 
Bosnia. The balance went rather in favour of fast and decisive military action or at 
least the readiness to apply such means, as the case of Macedonia 2001 shows. The 
reasons for these developments are, of course, very complex, with the contribution of 
those parts of civil society that demanded ‘humanitarian intervention’ probably being 
a small one compared to the interests and power politics of NATO and the European 
Union respectively the nations leading in each of the two alliances. 
This chapter has tried to show that intervention does not necessarily require physical 
presence in the conflict area. The heated discussions and the intensive lobbying that 
accompanied the direct work in the former Yugoslavia were more than just a 
‘background noise’ to the work on the ground. In many ways it shaped the 
motivation as well as the focus of what civil society actors undertook, and in turn the 
experiences made on the ground were fed back to the discussions in the home 
countries. 
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9. Conclusions: Strategies of Intervention by Civil Society Actors in 
Protracted Violent Conflict  
 
The preceding chapters have described a multitude of activities of civil society 
actors, categorised by ‘grand strategies’ of peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-
building and ‘public information, support, and protest and advocacy’. In the ‘grand 
strategy’ of peace-making only few cases of mediation involving political leaders 
were found, dealing with particular aspects or moments of conflicts. Civil society 
actors were shown to have access to the high level leadership only if they either came 
from a peer position (elder statesmen like Jimmy Carter who mediated in Bosnia), or 
have established their credentials as honest brokers in long-term work (Sant’ Egidio 
mediating between Serbia and Kosovo). Though the two cases presented (a cease-fire 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and an agreement on re-opening of schools in Kosovo) were 
not of lasting impact, they showed that civil society mediators can make a difference 
where official negotiators fail. Much more frequent have been different kinds of 
second-track workshops and comparable meetings that targeted either influential 
people belonging to the respective current regime, or – more often in the case under 
study - the political and civil society opposition. Equally grouped under peace-
making have been so-called micro negotiations and mediation at local or regional 
level. 
Like peace-making, civil society peace-keeping was dealing with two different 
contexts: the ‘conflict at large’, and with concrete protection of concrete persons at 
certain places and times. Three types of peace-keeping were found in this sample: A 
longer-term project with peace-keeping as one – but not the only – element of its 
mandate (Balkan Peace Team), protection activities by projects pursuing other 
objectives but who assumed a role in protection when the situation warranted it, and 
short-term interpositioning projects (the different peace ‘caravans’ in Bosnia) – the 
latter with rather doubtful outcomes. For the issue of what civilian peace-keeping can 
achieve as an alternative to military peace-keeping, a better picture arises by 
including the civilian monitoring missions sent to the area by international state 
actors (ECMM, KVM). However, the evaluation of civilian peace-keeping remains 
contested with contrary conclusions being drawn from the examples – while one side 
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sees ample proof that protection needs armed force, the other believes that the 
admittedly limited successes of the civilian missions are indicators for a hitherto 
untapped potential of nonviolent peace-keeping. 
As the different size of the chapters indicates already, civil society peace-making and 
peace-keeping were rare in the former Yugoslavia compared to peace-building. 
Peace-building activities by civil society actors have been described in nine 
categories: 1. humanitarian relief, 2. disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
of soldiers (DDR), 3. reconstruction and refugee return, 4. social and psycho-social 
work, 5. economic recovery, 6. transitional justice and human rights documentation, 
7. state-building, democratisation and civil society support, 8. promoting peace skills 
and dialogue and 9. cultural activities. Generally speaking, of particular impact seem 
to have been multi-dimensional projects combining relief or reconstruction with 
social work or other forms of non-physical support, and support for civil society that 
oriented itself on the needs of the local groups and institutions already in place rather 
than artificially contributing to the creation of new ones. Further it was noticed that 
an overriding concern with interethnic cooperation and reconciliation that dominated 
much of the work seems to have had only modest outcomes if measured on the 
professed higher goal of preventing future violence. 
Regarding what civil society actors did aside from direct project work in former 
Yugoslavia, the picture that emerged has been one of intense public debate in the 
mass media and protest and advocacy targeting the international (state) community. 
It was concluded that it is possible to speak of a social movement on the conflicts in 
the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The probably main positive outcome of these 
debates and struggles has been a much increased interest in and support for civil 
conflict transformation by both non-state and state actors.391. 
This final chapter here will not repeat in further detail what was already concluded in 
the chapters on each of the different strategies. Rather, it takes one step back and 
tries to make some further more general observations regarding conflict interventions 
in the area of former Yugoslavia. The chapter falls into two parts. The first part looks 
once more at the work of civil society interveners, their instruments, goals and 
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 Unfortunately, in addition to or in spite of the equally increased reliance on military means by 
state actors that can be observed in the last ten years as well. 
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strategies, as well as the question of ‘do no harm’ – or rather: the instances where 
civil society intervention did harm. The second part comes back to the general 
framework of conflict intervention with the three ‘grand strategies’ presented in 
chapter 2. Based on the findings of this case study here, an expansion of that model 
is suggested. The final remarks then comment on the role of civil society actors in 
conflict intervention, and express the need of further case studies of other areas in 
order to confirm some of the findings and conclusions. 
 
9.1 On the Work of Civil Society Interveners 
9.1.1 A Wide Range of Instruments of Intervention 
The survey on interventions in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia that was the basis 
for this study identifies about 230 methods or instruments of intervention by non-
state actors (including actors that would not be considered civil society).  This list 
that can be found in appendix 1 and is certainly far from complete. To develop a 
systematic overview as did Gene Sharp (1973) for methods of nonviolent actions, the 
survey would have to be expanded to project work in other conflict areas. 
Nevertheless, a certain picture has developed, with the distinction between the 
functions of peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-building and information/ protest/ 
advocacy proving to be a framework that is not ideal but useful enough to categorise 
the vast majority of functions that activities fulfilled.392  
Another important observation to be made regards exclusiveness versus combining 
different approaches. While most programmes run by governments or international 
organisations have had no problem with mixing different approaches and strategies, 
NGOs and citizens’ group – with the exception of some large established INGOs - 
tended towards a single focus approach. In the area of former Yugoslavia, many of 
them had only one particular activity, be it humanitarian aid, training work, setting 
up one youth centre or the like. In a sample of 420 citizens’ groups and NGOs 
mainly from European countries, the following distribution was found. Humanitarian 
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 The support activities described in chapter 8 are left out  here since they are the basis for working 
in the other strategies.  
And to avoid a misunderstanding here it needs to be emphasised that this is about functions, not 
about projects. Many civil society projects were multi-purpose or multi-functional, pursuing more 
than one strategy at the same time 
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aid for the purpose of this comparison has been separated from other peace-building 
activities. The total figures are of no importance, but the picture is documented here 
because I believe it shows a tendency.  
 
Table 5) Combination of Strategies 
189
124
5 0
40
64
0 1
30
2 6 1013
0
50
100
150
200
Hum. Aid
Peacebuilding
Peacemaking
Peacekeeping
Protest -Advocacy
Aid & PB
Aid & PM
Aid & PK
Aid and protest
PB & PM
PB & PK
PB & Protest
Aid & PB & PK
 
The picture probably holds few surprises for those familiar with grassroots’ work in 
conflict areas. Those using only one approach or type of activity are clearly more 
than those combining different types (358:62). Aid and other types of peace-building 
activities are those most usually combined, although a more detailed analysis would 
show that there is some chronological sequence to it: Many small groups started with 
aid and later branched out into other types of work. Civilian peace-keeping work as 
mentioned above could only be found in combination with other approaches – a 
finding that cannot be generalised since in other conflict areas there are NGOs that 
fully concentrate on peace-keeping.393 The rather high number of those who 
combined either aid or other peace-building work with protest fall, as described in 
the last chapter, in two categories:  on the one hand, those whose primary mandate 
was work in the field and who engaged in advocacy when needed to support or 
protect that work, and on the other hand movement organisations traditionally more 
at home with protest and advocacy but who added work in the field to their activities 
in the course of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. 
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 For example Peace Brigades International or Nonviolent Peaceforce. See Moser-Puangsuwan and 
Weber (eds) 2000, Schweitzer et al 2001). 
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9.1.2 Much Help But Not Enough Empowerment: Some Final Observations 
Regarding Goals and Strategies 
9.1.2.1 On the Goals Pursued 
The multiple goals that intervening civil society actors pursued in order to have an 
impact on the ground can be generalised and reduced to a few basic objectives, 
pursued sometimes with more than one strategy: 
• Stop the war and /or prevent future violence from re-occurring. This is an overall 
goal of the vast majority of activities in all ‘grand strategies’. 
In peace-making, to 
• Contribute to a political solution of the ‘conflicts at large’ (e.g. high-level and 
middle level peace-making, advocacy work). 
• Find solutions for concrete manifestations of the overall conflicts or related 
matters at the purview of those at middle or grassroots’ level negotiating about 
them (e.g. trying to ensure that certain villages do not participate in fighting, as 
did happen in some instances in Croatia). 
In peace-keeping and some forms of peace-building, to 
• Protect people from violence (e.g. protective accompaniment, helping people to 
flee war and to return safely). 
In peace-building, to 
• Meet basic needs like food, housing and health. 
• Promote interethnic cooperation and reconciliation.  
• Restore a functioning society, state and economy and promote political change. 
• A second set of goals can be identified aiming more to influence the international 
political debate and the intervening states than directly addressing the parties on 
the ground:_ Influence the actions of international state actors in regard to the 
conflict, in particular here demanding either  
a) establishing faster and more decisive military intervention to protect human 
rights and prevent genocide 
b) ‘civilising’ international politics by promoting nonviolent methods of 
intervention and the non-use of military force.  
9. Conclusions  256 
 
 
• Advocate for institutional support for activities of civil society.394 
In the previous chapters much was said about the degree to which organisations 
succeeded in achieving these goals. In a nutshell: It is a picture of very mixed results. 
Immediate material aid helped people to survive the war, but on the other hand the 
economic situation in the war-torn countries remained poor. With the exception of 
Slovenia and to a certain degree Croatia that thrives on tourism, most countries are 
still highly dependent on international financial aid. There have been projects that 
took care of the physical reconstruction, projects that without doubt protected local 
activists and citizens against violence, and projects that had a positive impact 
regarding overcoming the traumata of war and rebuilding civil life. But on the other 
side there are the disillusioning findings on the question of whether peace-building 
made a difference in Kosovo 2004 (CDA -Collaborative Learning Projects 2006), 
and also a general lack of convincing evidence that all the work on interethnic 
reconciliation has had impact beyond short-term successes like mixed football teams 
or women’s groups. Local civil society groups grew in all countries in spite of the 
hostile political situation in the 1990s, and in one case even managed to overthrow 
their repressive regime. On the other hand, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have 
shown that intense support of civil society, especially if that meant initiating new 
NGOs to become implementing partners for international programmes, does not 
automatically lead to more democracy and liberal values (see Fischer 2008, and the 
section below on ‘doing harm’).  
 
9.1.2.2 On the Role Assumptions on the Causes of the Conflict Played 
The analysis and assumptions of civil society actors about the conflict played an 
important role in the development of strategies and activities. Many civil society 
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 Besides these motives for intervention, there have been organisational or individual agendas that 
clearly played an important role: 
• The altruistic impetus of ‘something must be done’, the need to help (mostly to be found in the 
grassroots’ relief efforts). 
• Show through examples that civilian/nonviolent methods of dealing with conflict ‘work’ and 
deserve (state) support 
• Satisfy the stakeholders of an organisation by showing that the organisation responds to these 
conflicts that are high on the international agenda. 
• Have projects that attract funding (and thereby often also secure the economic survival of the 
own organisation). 
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actors espoused the ethnic paradigm, assuming that the ethnic conflict was either the 
cause of the conflicts, or at least the most obvious and relevant block on the path to a 
peaceful future and the prevention of future violence (see Duffield 1999:142). An 
expression of dealing with the ethnic paradigm have been the overriding concern 
with ‘multi-ethnicity’ in all programmes, and the multitude of projects like trainings 
in prejudice reduction, nonviolent communication or other tools designed to 
overcome identity conflicts.  
Only some organisations have argued that this approach often was not particularly 
helpful because the ethnic divide played less of a role than other divides, be it 
political divides or conflicts between refugees and those who stayed during the war, 
(see Kurschat 1998).  
Other groups, often those part of the Western peace movement, followed the 
interpretation of local oppositional intellectuals by blaming the elites of all sides for 
the conflict that used (and often first awakened) nationalism for the pursuit of their 
own goals (see Kaldor 2001, Woodward 1995). Some even maintained that it was no 
ethnic conflict at all and that people had always lived together peacefully. This 
approach found expression, for example, by delivering aid consciously to all sides of 
the conflict, and/or by civil society support protecting and empowering local groups 
to stand up against these elites. 
Still others more or less accepted the official explanations and views predominant in 
the media and statements of politicians at the time, using terms like ‘the Serb-
occupied Bosnia’ (as if there had been no Serbs in Bosnia), ‘war of conquest’ etc., 
and directing their support (be it advocacy or aid) only to the side(s) they perceived 
as the victims.395 
Leftist groups tended to interpret the wars as an imperialist scheme to defeat 
socialism seen as being represented by Milosevic’s Yugoslavia, and therefore 
concentrated their focus on making the official politicians’ stand point of that 
country being heard, and rejecting any kind of foreign intervention into the conflicts, 
often including that of civil society.  
But the survey also showed that at least from the side of small and new civil society 
groups, there was often little analysis of the conflict at all. All-too-often activities 
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 I have a number of leaflets collected that express such views. 
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were chosen on the basis of a felt need ‘to do something’, or unreflected assumptions 
which were rarely questioned. A result of the lack of good analysis was that 
strategies and activities seem to some degree have been more determined by what the 
civil society interveners thought they were good at doing (for example giving 
trainings in nonviolence or mediation) rather than assessing what was really needed. 
The saying that to the person who has a hammer every problem looks like a nail 
unfortunately has found ample examples in this case, and emphasises the plea by 
Anderson and Olson (2003) to start with an analysis of what is needed for ‘Peace 
Writ Large’ as they put it (see also Paffenholz and Reychler 2007).   
 
9.1.2.3 Doing Harm 
The interventions in the former Yugoslavia have unfortunately produced a long list 
of examples on how international actors can do harm through their interventions. 
Doing harm is not a prerogative of state actors. Although it may be a bit 
disheartening to finish the study with such a long list of negatives, naming them is 
important because each of them directly translates into lessons for future 
interventions. 
1. One large issue is the very mixed consequences international intervention has had 
for local civil society. On the one hand, the international support for oppositional 
groups and independent media was very important for the work of these groups 
(see chapter 7). On the other hand, however, the influx of internationals willing 
to spend great quantities of money on relief, reconstruction, trauma support or 
‘civil society building’ led to several negative outcomes. (See for the following 
Duffield 1996, Edwards and Hulme 1998, Stubbs 1999, 2000 and 2007, Smillie 
and Todorovic 2001, Broughton and Fraenkel 2002:27, Cooley and Ron 2002, 
De Vrieze 2002, Du Pont 2002:239, Lyons 2007:67, Sejfija 2007:134p.) 
• Projects were undertaken and many NGOs were being founded just because 
there was money (often called ‘seed money’) available, in order to get a share 
of this new source of income. In all countries hundreds of NGOs sprang up, 
but few of them were independent of one particular donor, and few were 
effective. According to the Local Democracy Agency in Tuzla, in Bosnia-
Herzegovina a total of 8,000 NGOs were officially registered as 
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‘humanitarian organisations’ between 1992 and 2001, and around 30.000 
projects undertaken (Sejfija 2007:125). In Kosovo, at the beginning of the 
new decade more than 2,000 local NGOs had registered. Most of these new 
NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were ‘service’ or ‘third sector’ 
NGOs. And the phenomenon is not restricted to the protectorates. Broughton 
(2002) for example counted in Macedonia “hundreds of NGOs” of that type. 
• Many international NGOs have been conducting their projects through local 
implementing partners. But in many cases the local partners were only fig 
leaves established for meeting the requirements of international donors but 
without any real say or influence on the shape of the projects.396 
• The NGO sector became a labour market. While on the one hand this could 
be seen as a contribution to income-generation in a desperate economic 
situation, on the other hand it made the concept of voluntary work highly 
unpopular, more unpopular that it was before. (Volunteerism anyway was not 
well developed in the former Yugoslavia.) The fact that there were now 
sources for getting remuneration for almost any kind of work, including 
activism, led to a set-up where work was often only done if it could be paid 
for (e. g. there are many stories that people expected to be paid to participate 
in conferences or trainings). If civil society is defined as a sector thriving on 
voluntary commitment by citizens, then this phenomenon is clearly counter-
productive. 
• There have been both processes of professionalization and de-
professionalization, especially in the sector of social welfare. On the one 
hand, work that in other circumstances would be traditionally volunteer work 
became paid work and therefore professional, but on the other hand crowds of 
untrained people or people with only a short training on conflict resolution 
skills but without an adequate professional background  entered the fields of 
social work and psychological assistance. 
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 Llamazares and Reynolds Levy 2003 (quoting Sarah C. White 2000:144) distinguish several 
categories of partner relationships: ‘Nominal participation’ where local partners are mostly only 
symbolic or named in funding applications because that is a requirement by international donors, 
‘instrumental participation’ where local partners are seen as a way to increase efficiency, 
‘representative participation’ where local people’s interests and needs shape the project, and 
‘transformative participation’ where empowerment is both means and end of process. 
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• Another point here is  ‘projectisation’, meaning that most of the work had to 
be framed as projects suitable for the short-term cycles (usually one year, 
sometimes two or three) of international funding (see Stubbs 2000). After the 
end of a grant, the current work had to be abandoned or rephrased to meet the 
requirements of being a new ‘project’ because rarely funders were willing to 
engage in the same work over a longer period. Most of them saw themselves 
rather in the role of somebody ‘enabling something new to get off the 
ground’, but forgot (or chose to forget) that there were few alternative sources 
for existing work to be funded (e.g. almost no governmental money, no local 
private donors). 
• Stubbs (2007:221) also observed a new division between service-providing 
NGOs and ‘the supposedly superior ‘conscience or advocacy-oriented 
NGOs’. 
• Competition and lack of coordination among international organisations led 
to parallel projects (more than one youth centre in a smaller community, 
different policies of how to finance reconstruction, etc), or on the contrary to 
a situation where different actors ‘passed the buck’, and in the end no one 
took responsibility for a matter (see Kriesberg 2001:419). 
• Last not least, the dependency on international funding in some cases has 
threatened to undermine the political independence and the credibility of 
local civil society (see the case of Otpor in chapter 7). 
2. A second area of concern caused by the presence of state and non-state actors has 
been the economic side (see Cooley and Ron 2002, Gagnon 1998b, Hansen 2000, 
Stubbs 1999, 2000 and 2007): 
• Prices (for example for rent) increased astronomically. 
• The local labour market and salary levels were distorted with, for example, a 
driver of an international agency earning more than a judge employed by the 
national authorities. 
• In consequence, qualified people tended to work for the internationals rather 
than helping directly to rebuild their country. Just not to be misunderstood: In 
a situation of extreme poverty and high unemployment where whole families 
depend often on the income of one person, people have little choice than to 
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go for the best-paid job. The problem and the blame lie with the 
internationals for not being mindful of these problems. 
3. A third issue has been that civil society agents began taking care of all kinds of 
social and welfare services that in a functioning country are the responsibility of 
the state. International or local NGOs became providers of social services, 
services exclusively funded by international sources. When the international 
money was reduced or stopped coming, often the services were discontinued (see 
Edwards and Hulme 1998).397  
4. A fourth issue is the symbolic side of the international intervention – a side Mary 
B. Anderson in her ‘do no harm’ concept sets much store by. For the case under 
study here it may be observed that the support did not always empower local 
people but sometimes also led to disempowerment.  
• The knowledge of being dependent on international aid is not only a fact that 
neither the local governments nor local civil society could disregard, but 
people are also always reminded of it on the symbolic level by the 
overwhelming presence of road signs and plaques advertising donors all over 
the place, from youth centres to private homes.  
• The same disempowerment can be found in the areas of security and law: 
Security in the protectorates has become a task of the international military 
rather than a responsibility of the local law enforcement agencies. 
• The persecution of war crimes for many years was relegated solely to the 
International Tribunal that generally is only then criticised if it opens a case 
against someone of their ‘own’ ethnicity, but welcomed as long as it 
persecutes those of the ‘others’.  
5. A fifth point, already discussed in Chapter 7 is the overriding concern with the 
‘ethnic conflict’ from the side of many interveners. It has to be asked if this over-
riding focus of so many projects may not have strengthened rather than lessened 
identification along ethnic lines, especially if – as was the case certainly in the 
first years – many well-meaning but naïve international groups without much if 
any knowledge about the local culture and politics but a heavy baggage of anti-
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 That international funding dwindles always is the case some years after a cease-fire: in Bosnia-
Herzegovina it happened from c. 1999 on, and also from Kosovo the caravan has started to move 
to Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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nationalist sentiment started to work on ‘reconciliation’. 
A small number of critical authors have asked the question what the difference is 
between the international politics in the former Yugoslavia, especially in the 
protectorates, and earlier colonial politics. Roland Paris (2002) compares the 
protectorates with the era of the “mission civilisatrice” (the belief that European 
imperial powers had the duty to ‘civilise’ their overseas possessions) of the colonial 
area, and also Stubbs (a.a.O.) compares it with colonial politics. Chandler, one of the 
sharpest critics of the protectorates, states:  
“’White Man’s Burden’ today appears recast in the liberal language of 
‘ethical’ foreign policy, rights protection and ‘civil society’” (Chandler 
1999:3).   
I think that their point is a valid one. While seen from the point of international law, 
the situation is of course different because today’s control of other countries is based 
on international law and meant to be a transitional phase before the country returns to 
independence.398 But on the ideological side the attitudes are not that dissimilar. The 
(Western) interveners mostly imported their way of doing things: They taught them, 
they modelled them, and sometimes even enforced them with the help of their 
military. And this was (is) not a privilege of the state actors alone – the civil society 
actors on the ground were playing a big role here as the well through the simple fact 
of their presence, with the exception of course that they did not have means of direct 
enforcement available. 
 
9.1.3 Relationship Between Governmental and Non-state Actors 
Generally, relations between international interveners were characterised by a 
mixture of conflict and cooperation. While there was always the usual mutual 
criticism - either on particulars or general policies (see chapter 8) - and even some 
cases of civil society actors openly defying state actors in acts of civil disobedience, 
in the overriding number of projects cooperation between non-state and state actors 
was dominant. Three types of relationships can be distinguished:  
• The first is a funding one – state agencies funding NGO work as many European 
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 At least in theory. If the practice would always confirm it is debatable when thinking for example 
of the long-term economic exploitation contracts the USA have made with Iraq. 
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governments, the US and Canada did.399  
• The second would be that of NGOs becoming an implementing partner for an 
international organisation such as UNHCR, or carrying out programmes that 
were in the interest of their government but which the government did not wish 
to take of itself.400  
• The third (that often goes together with a funding relationship) would be a 
positive relationship to the state actors present on the ground, for example using 
their influence and potential for the application of force in controversial cases of 
refugee/IDP return.  
 
9. 2 On the Theoretical Framework of Conflict Intervention 
9.2.1 The Hypotheses on Conflict Intervention  
In chapter 1 a number of often-held assumptions on conflict intervention by civil 
society actors were listed. On the basis of the data found in this case study, the 
following conclusions can be drawn: 
 
9.2.1.1 Different Actors having Different Instruments and Strategies Available 
The first hypotheses concerned different actors having different instruments and 
strategies of conflict intervention available. Hypothesis 1.a) had been that civil 
society actors are mostly involved in peace-building, and play an essential role there. 
This assumption has found ample documentation in this case study.  
It was also found that they had indeed only a very limited role in finding negotiated 
solutions at the governmental level (1.b) - the only clear-cut case being Sant’Egidio 
mediating in the Kosovo conflict. 
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 For example Swedish SIDA, Canadian CIDA, Norwegian People’s Aid (see Evensmo 2000, 
Duffield 1996, Du Pont 2002:239, Large n.d.). 
400
 The difference to a mere funding relation is that here the international organisation defines the 
programme, and the NGO is carrying it out. In other funding relationships, it is usually the funded 
organisation that is applying for the funding, describing a programme. 
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9.2.1.2 Levels of Society Related to Instruments and Strategies 
The second hypothesis was that different levels of society (top level, middle range, 
grassroots) require different instruments and strategies of intervention. This 
hypothesis is difficult to substantiate. While it is undoubtedly true for the top level 
(to which civil society actors as mentioned have only limited access), middle and 
grassroots’ level approaches have been – with the exception of peace-making - in 
many areas hard to distinguish, so that a conclusion for all strategies of intervention 
is difficult. In peace-making, the strategies and approaches chosen clearly varied 
depending on the level of society targeted. But in peace-keeping and peace-building 
the difference seems rather to have been the geographical range of the initiatives: 
there were projects targeting the whole country (e.g. building up parent-teacher-
associations), projects targeting certain regions (e.g. Eastern Slavonia), and projects 
from which only the population of one particular town or even only part of a town 
benefited (e.g. youth centres). 
 
9.2.1.3 Stages of Conflict and Instruments and Strategies 
The third hypothesis had been that different stages of conflict escalation warrant 
different instruments and strategies of intervention – or that different methods vary in 
their effectiveness depending on when they are used. In the chapters on the 
individual strategies, the assumption has been rejected that any of the ‘grand 
strategies’ should be identified with only one particular stage in the conflict cycle:401 
- Peace-making was shown to be a rather complex affair, with at least one ‘peace’ 
being made while other conflicts in the same region went on simultaneously 
(Croat-Muslim war in Bosnia).  
- Peace-keeping took place both before, during and after violent conflict (e.g. 
Balkan Peace Team being in Croatia before, during and after the reoccupation of 
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 In appendix 2 the distribution of certain activities over some years, in each case including years of 
war and years after war is displayed: Training in Croatia between 1991 and 1995, trauma work in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and 1998, youth centres in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
between 1991 and 1998 and physical reconstruction in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina between 
1991 and 1997. 
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the Krajina in 1995).402 
- While numerically the tendency indeed showed peace-building activities to 
increase after cease-fires, there were a significant number of examples of it 
taking place during war and/or even before the conflicts became violent.  
As to the subthesis 3.a) that the more escalated a conflict is, the more coercion/force 
is needed in order to intervene successfully, this question was discussed in chapter 4. 
The result was that empirically in most cases this matches the strategy used by the 
international (state) interveners. But there also have been exceptions that question if 
that hypothesis is always true, or if it is not rather a self-fulfilling prophecy: The war 
between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina was ended by a negotiated 
settlement without obvious ‘sticks’ (see chapter 4.1.3). 
The last sub-thesis, 3.b) that stated that nonviolent peace building and development 
projects are only possible before a conflict escalates to war, and in the post-war 
period, has been clearly falsified as amply shown by the number of such activities 
undertaken in war times (see Appendix 2 for some examples).  
 
9.2.2 A Widened Framework for Categorising Conflict Intervention  
I would like now to return to the question of the ‘grand strategies’ that have been 
used to categorise the interventions into the conflicts of former Yugoslavia. They 
were introduced in chapter 2, and in the chapters describing each of them 
observations were made regarding the following criteria:  
o the problem they deal with,  
o the function they have,  
o the frequency in which they can be found in each conflict stage,  
o the target group of the intervention,  
o and the instruments used. 
Here at the end of the study I would like now to summarise the findings regarding 
these criteria, and as a conclusion suggest a description of the framework of four 
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 Better-known examples would be found if looking at state actors - the international military peace-
keeping missions: The preventive mission in Macedonia, UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
during the war there, and the different UN NATO-led missions after the end of the wars in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Kosovo. 
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‘grand strategies’ of conflict intervention. This framework is meant not to refer to 
civil society actors alone but to all actors in conflict intervention.  
 
9.2.1.1 The Problem They Deal With and the Function of Each Strategy 
Peace-making is dealing with the problem of perceived incompatibilities of interest, 
with the function to find a negotiated solution.  
The problem peace-keeping is dealing with is (potential, I would like to add) violent 
behaviour, with its function being the control, prevention or reduction of violence. 
Peace-building is about the causes and consequences of violent conflict and war: 
Material destruction, what could be called non-physical destruction (social and 
psycho-social consequences of war), and lack of structures and relationships 
necessary for sustainable peace with justice. It has three different though related 
functions: It addresses relationships, it deals with structural matters (for example 
what comes with ‘democratisation’), and as the third function ‘dealing with the 
destructive processes that accompany war’ (aid, reconstruction) has been added.  
The problems information, protest and advocacy deal with as defined here is a) lack 
of knowledge about what is happening, and b) the behaviour of other intervening 
actors. Its functions are information, the expression of disagreement with the actions 
of other actors, advising them what to do (instead), and seeking enforcement of a 
certain action through law. 
 
9.2.1.2 Their Presence and Frequency in Different Conflict Stages 
As to the conflict stage, this chart here can only describe what was found in this case 
study. For other conflicts, the situation is different. In the former Yugoslavia, peace-
making was mostly undertaken when the conflict had already escalated to violence, 
with it being comparatively rare before and after war. Peace-keeping was found in all 
stages of escalation. Peace-building took mostly place after war but to a perhaps 
surprising degree also during war (see above). In the phase before escalation it was 
comparatively rare. Protest and advocacy like the headlines in the mass media tended 
to follow the ‘burning issues’, meaning that it was mostly found during the times of 
open war. 
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9.2.1.3 The Level of Society Targeted 
In general the intervening actors taken all together targeted all levels of society – top 
leadership, middle and grassroots’ level. However, the degree and frequency in 
which each of these levels were targeted varied considerably. For state actors 
(including international actors like the United Nations etc.) typically governments 
were the target group of peace-making, while civil society actors can be found more 
frequently dealing with middle or grassroots levels.  
In peace-keeping, state actors usually dealt with the ‘conflict at large’ having the 
military and other armed forces as their target group. Civil society actors also tried to 
do so (see the different interpositioning projects), but more typically – and more 
successfully – their target group were violence-prone groups and individuals, and 
more concrete conflicts within the overall conflict (for example human rights 
violations and their perpetrators).  
In peace-building, state actors tended to focus more on macro-programmes either 
dealing with structural changes, or reaching whole categories of population (‘the’ 
refugees, ‘the’ school children, etc), while civil society actors could be found both in 
the macro sphere and in having small-scale localised projects that did not reach 
beyond the particular town, village or small target group they worked with.403  
Public information became much more frequent and intense when a conflict had 
become violent, and the same is true for protest and advocacy, their target groups 
being the public in general, intervening actors and also the own constituency.  
 
9.2.1.4 The Instruments Used 
The last factor to describe these four strategies are the instruments used. Peace-
making has three: Law, negotiation and force. 
Peace-keeping as well has three. Force, deterrence and reference to international law, 
and relationship-building. 
Peace-building displays a wide range of instruments. Basically, looking at their basic 
characteristics, these activities fall into five major sets: Material aid (humanitarian 
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 I differ here from Ryan who assumes that the target group of peace-building are the ‘ordinary 
people, and peace-building being about trying to build bridges between them (1995:129). 
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aid, reconstruction), information (through training, advice), non-physical support 
(e.g. social work, psychological aid, facilitation of dialogue etc.), law (transitional 
justice) and again force, namely when changes were enforced by police or military in 
the international protectorates. A sixth which only was found very occasionally in the 
survey was civil disobedience.  
The different instruments used in the fourth macro-strategy (information, support, 
protest and advocacy) can likewise be summarised as being either information, 
material aid, immaterial support, protest, persuasion or law. Civil disobedience as an 
effective means to escalate protest has been very rare in the case study. 
 
9.2.1.5 Summary 
Table 6 on the next page, summarising what is said above, is a development from a 
chart by Ryan (1995:104) who distinguishes only problem, strategy and target group.  
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Table 6) Strategies of Conflict Intervention 
 Peace-making Peace-keeping Peace-building Public Information, 
Support, Protest 
and Advocacy 
Problem Perceived 
incompatibilities of 
interest 
(Potential) violent 
behaviour 
Destruction (material 
and immaterial/social) 
and lack of structures 
and relations necessary 
for sustainable peace 
with justice 
a) Lack of 
knowledge about the 
events in the conflict 
b) Behaviour of other 
intervening actors 
Function (s) Finding a negotiated 
solution; dealing with 
the interests and 
positions of conflict 
parties  
Control, prevent or 
reduce violence 
Deal with the 
destructive processes 
that accompany war  
Information 
 
  Address relationships Change the 
behaviour of 
intervening actors. 
 
  Deal with structural 
issues 
 
Frequency in 
conflict 
stages  
Most frequent during 
escalated conflict; more 
rare before escalation to 
violence and after 
cease-fire 
In all stages. Most frequent after 
cease-fire but also much 
present during war; 
more rare in this case 
before war 
Most frequent during 
war. 
Target 
groups 
chosen by 
state actors 
Governments, leaders Military, armed forces State and large 
categories of population 
Governments 
Target 
groups 
chosen by 
non-state 
actors 
Mostly middle and 
grass-root level, rarely 
governments  
Military, armed forces; 
violence-prone groups 
and individuals, death 
squads etc. 
Both large categories of 
population (rarely state) 
and specific groups and 
locations 
Governments, 
international 
organisations; 
‘society’ in general, 
own constituency 
Basic 
Character of  
Law Force Material aid Information  
Instruments 
used 
Negotiation Nonviolent Deterrence 
and reference to 
international law 
Information Material Aid 
 
Force Persuasion and 
relationship building 
Immaterial support Immaterial support 
 
  Law Protest 
   Force Persuasion 
   (Civil disobedience) Law 
C.Schweitzer 
2009, expanding 
on a model by 
Ryan 1995:104 
   (Civil disobedience) 
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9.3 The Role of Civil Society Actors in Conflict Intervention 
In spite of the increased interest in civilian conflict intervention, there is still no full 
clarity or agreement on what the role of civil society actors in this field is (see 
Fischer 2008 for a recent summary on the debate, and Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). 
On the basis of the case studied here – that in many ways preceded this debate which 
only started around the end of the 1990s – the following observations can be made: 
1. Civil society actors have been complementing the work of state actors in many 
ways.  
• They worked as their implementing partners (see the section on 
reconstruction in Chapter 7);  
• They took care of issues and needs that the state actors were not able to deal 
with and therefore were glad to delegate to civil society (e.g. doing social 
work in refugee camps, or many of the peace-building projects in the 
protectorates after the wars) for which governments rather financed NGOs 
than seeking to implement them themselves; 
• They often were those with the better grounded information since they 
worked at grassroots level and therefore often became welcome sources for 
information. 
2.  They were the avant-garde for approaches, strategies and local partners later 
pursued or sought out by state actors. This is particularly evident for much of the 
civil society support where non-state actors clearly came first and only later were 
joined by OSCE, UN and governments. But it is also true in general for most of 
what are now well-recognised instruments of civil conflict intervention (or post-
war peace-building, or conflict prevention, or whatever the official terms used by 
governments and international organisations are). It was civil society that 
practised them first, and through setting positive examples ‘mainstreamed’ them. 
3. In some cases, they have been able to control or correct actions by governments 
through advocacy or direct action (e.g. helping war evaders and bringing refugees 
to third countries). 
4. The study supports the position taken recently by some researchers doing 
comparative studies of cases of conflict intervention regarding the limited role 
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dialogue and reconciliation work by civil society actors plays for dealing with the 
overall conflicts (see Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, Paffenholz 2009a).404 The 
meagre impact that could be found regarding these efforts indicates that there is 
no strong relationship between these efforts and an overall positive change in 
society and prevention of future violence.  
 
9.4 Some Final Thoughts 
Looking back at the period studied, and the innumerable activities of state and non-
state actors: Which way does the balance go? Was it worth the effort? On the 
positive side, it seems that the post-Yugoslav countries are moving towards a 
sustainable peace, and that in spite of still existing tensions and some serious 
problems ethnic minorities face, wars of the extent of the 1990s look more and more 
unlikely.  
On the other side, was all the effort, and the vast amount of money spent on dealing 
with the conflicts of the area really necessary? Would not the same have been 
achieved with less, and doing less harm on the way? Would - as some people argue - 
financial aid in the 1980s have prevented all the wars? Would a different 
international response in 1991 have changed things? Would a quicker and more 
decisive military action in Bosnia-Herzegovina have ended the war earlier, and more 
pressure on FR Yugoslavia to let Kosovo go prevented the war there? What would 
have happened if there had been a conscious effort to limit intervention to nonviolent 
instruments? Much has been written in favour of these options, but as far as I know 
nobody so far has really systematically worked on such an alternative or 
counterfactual history.405 Also this study here cannot fill this gap but can only remark 
that it may be worth a study of its own. 
It is today fashionable to point out that civil society is nothing good per se, but as 
Barnes (2005:9) put it civil society groups “can be a factor in war as well as a force 
for peace”, a point also quoted by Fischer (2008:241) and raised by Fisher and 
                                                 
404
 On this issue, the publication of a comparative study led by Paffenholz (2009b9 is announced 
whose findings have been preliminary summarized in Paffenholz 2009a  
405
 There are tools developed in social sciences for such judgements on unreal (potential) 
developments. See Horsky 1968 and Mueller 1995:34pp. 
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Zimina (2008). The long and perhaps discouraging list of problems above under the 
heading of ‘doing harm’ certainly emphasises this point. If I were to formulate just 
one lesson from this case study it would be to say that everybody who starts working 
on a conflict – be it in his/her own country or in another country – starts immediately 
to become an actor involved in it, and thereby begins to share in the responsibility for 
whatever happens next. This is something that sometimes may be overlooked when 
regarding the huge discrepancies of resources and power between civil society and 
state actors, a discrepancy that in spite of more and more money going to civil 
society actors has not changed fundamentally. The challenge civil society actors – 
from large professional NGOs to small informal citizens’ groups – face is to become 
a ‘force for peace’. That goal can potentially be achieved, as this case study has 
illustrated. Perhaps the basic recipe is not that difficult after all: it is ‘put first 
analysis and listening to the local civil society, and then see if among the instruments 
you have available are somer that are useful in the situation. If you do not have such 
instruments or are not familiar enough with them, then rather don’t get involved but 
share your analysis with others who have the capacity to play a useful role.’  
Other than that, the warning needs to be expressed that as contexts are different, so 
successful programmes need to differ. What may ‘work’ in one context may be 
absolutely the wrong approach in the next one – that is one point about which almost 
all comparative studies and meta evaluations of conflict intervention agree (see 
Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, Schweitzer 2009). For that reason the findings of this 
study here must not be generalised too much. While many observations probably are 
rather general – as are the instruments – only future comprehensive studies on other 
countries and the role of civil society actors in their conflicts may in the end show 
which of the lessons and findings from this area are historical or geographical 
singular, and which are not. 
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Appendix 1. Instruments  of Conflict Intervention  
 
The following inventory is a direct result of the survey of state and non-state actor 
interventions in the area of former Yugoslavia. It does include activities that have not 
been mentioned in the case study, and also a few standard methods that have not 
been applied in the area of the former Yugoslavia. These are put in brackets. 
Referenced are only those that have not been described in the study. 
 
1. Peace-making 
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
By Law (International Court settling 
conflict)406 
 
By Negotiation Activate institutions of Early 
Warning and Early Crisis 
Management407 
(Early warning and early action 
system at grassroots’ level)408 
  Second-track  problem-solving 
workshops 
 Good offices Good offices 
 Shuttle mediation Shuttle mediation 
 Pure mediationat high level409 Pure mediation at all levels 
 Use existing umbrella organisations 
to discuss issues 
Use existing umbrella organisations 
to discuss issues 
 High-level conferences without 
immediate direct meeting of conflict 
parties  
 
 Face-to-face negotiation at high 
level, facilitated and/or led by 
internationals 
 
 Declarations and appeals410 Grassroots protest and appeals 
directed at the governments and other 
leaders of the countries in conflict. 
                                                 
406
 Did not happen in case study. 
407
 CSCE mechanism initiated in 1991. 
408
 This has not happenend (to my knowledge) in this case here with the exception of some discussion 
and public action by the War Resisters’ International Council in 1990. However, there are 
examples from other parts of the world (for example Nonviolent Peaceforce in the Philippines, see 
www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org).  
409
 The EC mediated in conflict between Italy and Slovenia  between 1992 and 1997 (Lampe 
2000:394). 
410
 Declarations and appeals are one of the most common instruments of diplomatic relations, both in 
normal times, but growing in number in crisis  
 Functions may be: 
 - Express concerns and warnings 
 - Inform public and other governments on positions taken 
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 Establishment of permanent 
institutions and round tables of 
governments 
Permanent institutions or round 
tables of oppositional politicians and/ 
or civil society leaders 
 Establish Standing Conferences  
 Propose peace plans Propose (alternative) peace plans 
 Propose structural solutions 
(secession or solutions within 
existing borders, e.g. autonomy 
models) 
Propose structural solutions 
  Second-track meetings / conferences 
seeking to develop solutions 
 Offer Membership in International 
Institutions and Cooperation 
Agreements 
 
 Micro-negotiations Micro-negotiations 
 Implementation Talks411  
 Inofficial Meetings Between 
Negotiators and Conflict Parties412 
 
 Arbitration413  
By Force (includes 
pressure) 
Recall ambassadors, close consulates Boycott by citizens414 
 Establish No-flight zone  
 Arms embargo  
 Oil embargo  
 Withdraw support Withdraw support415 
 Trade sanctions  
 Ban on investments in sanctioned 
country 
 
 Freeze assets in other countries  
 Ban on cultural exchanges 
(participation in sports events) 
 
 Travel ban  
 Stop issuing visa for certain 
personally identified individuals 
 
 Support as reward416  
 Air force, marine or army for 
surveillance of sanctions 
 
 Air force, marine or army for 
enforcement of sanctions 
 
 Bombing as a sanction/ punishment  
 Conduct manoeuvres as warning417  
                                                 
411
 For example the Peace Implementation Council that met regularly to discuss the progress made on 
the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
412
 On 28.-29 November 1992 the co-chairmen Owen and Vance paid a visit, said to be  “private” to 
President Tudjman at Brioni. According to Owen they accepted the invitation in order to discuss 
‘some of the more challenging concepts’ (Owen  1995:xiv, 72) 
413
 The two cases in the survey are the Badinter Commission 1991, and an international arbitration 
decision to transfer the Brcko district in BiH from RS control to a condominium to share with 
Bosniak-Croat Federation (Egger 1999:19, Partos 2001:51) 
414
 Not used in this case. 
415
 NGOs have withdrawn their support, e.g. stopped relief efforts after attacks on them and/ or at 
least threatened to do so. An example is the ICRC that interrupted its work in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
for several months in 1992 after a convoy was attacked (Mercier 1995). 
416
 For example the ‚Energy for Democracy’-programme of the EU in winter 1999/2000 
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 Arms deliveries (legal or illegal)  
 Training of local forces  
 Send military advisors  
 Send mercenaries Send / come as mercenaries or join 
int’l volunteer brigades418 
 Air strikes to directly force a conflict 
party to lay down its arms and to 
agree to a ceasefire / peace treaty by 
destroying its (military) resources 
 
 Conduct land operations to directly 
force a conflict party to lay down its 
arms and to agree to a ceasefire / 
peace treaty by destroying its 
(military) resources 
 
 Cooperation with local troops  
 Establishing permanent military 
presence 
 
 
2. Peace-keeping 
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
General Send military peace-keepers  
 Send civilian peace-keepers 
(Monitoring Missions) 
Send civilian peace-keepers (peace 
teams, monitoring missions) 
 Send International Police as peace-
keepers 
 
 Send Military Observers  
By Force Surveillance of cease-fires   
 Disarmament of soldiers  
 Separation of troops  
 Creation of demilitarized zones and 
’safe areas’ 
 
 Armed protection of humanitarian 
aid 
 
 Open blocked roads, remove check 
points by armed forces  
 
 Accompany IDPs and refugees, or  
ethnic minorities419 
 
 Protect international military and 
civilian personnel 
 
By Non-violent 
Deterrence and 
reference to 
international law 
Presence in situations where human 
rights violations may happen 
Presence in situations where human 
rights violations may happen 
 Monitoring of courts, refugee camps, 
communities, regions, POWs 
Monitoring of courts, refugee camps, 
communities, regions, POWs 
                                                                                                                                          
417
 As warnings. For example, NATO expanded  May 1998 its military exercises with Albania and 
Macedonia as a warning to FRY (Kaufman 2002:159). 
418
 There have been such international units in both the Croatian and the Bosnian wars. Some may 
have come with the ‚support’ of their government (for example from Iran), others came clearly on 
their own, like a Bosnian Serb paramilitary group calling themselves the “Heroes” at the Sarajevo 
airport. Among them were Japanese, Russians and one American (Meder/Reimann 1996:10, Tibi 
1997, Rose 1998:65). Think also of the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War 1936-37. 
419
 For example did KFOR accompany Serb children to school in Kosovo after the 1999 war. 
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  Protective accompaniment (of IDPs) 
and refugees, ethnic minorities or 
activists) 
 Publish findings Publish findings 
 Exchange of detainees and PoW420 Exchange of detainees and PoW 
 Interpositioning of armed or unarmed 
forces to prevent violence 
Interpositioning of unarmed forces by 
staying in threatened area to prevent 
violence 
  Interpositioning by a moving caravan 
of activists 
By Relationship-
Building 
 Contact-building in communities 
(often peace-building activities) 
  Network or bridging of local activists 
with other international actors 
  Bridging local activists to autorities 
  Make international law known to 
conflict parties 
 Use military peace-keepers for relief 
and civil reconstruction tasks 
 
 Media work, press releases, establish 
own mass media to explain 
mission421 
Media work, press releases, establish 
own (probably not:mass) media to 
explain mission 
 
3. Peace-building 
3.1 General, multi-purpose  
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
Material aid Collect donations for various projects 
and activities 
Collect donations for various projects 
and activities 
Non-physical 
support  
Longterm missions for peace-
building purposes 422 
Civil peace service projects with 
well-qualified staff423  
  Send short-term volunteers424 
  Send long-term volunteers425 
 Twinning of municipalities Support twinning of municipalities 
 
3.2 Humanitarian Relief  
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
Material aid Finance relief goods: food, medicine, 
clothes, etc. 
Collect money for relief goods 
  Collect material relief goods 
 Transport relief goods Transport relief goods 
 Deliver relief goods Deliver relief goods 
                                                 
420
 Not only ICRC, also ECMM involved themselves in this in BiH. 
421
  E.g. radio station that SFOR had in BiH) 
422
 OSCE mission. Mostly for transitional justice and state-building tasks. 
423
 Mostly for social and psycho-social support and civil society building.  
424
 For humanitarian, reconstruction or civil society building purposes. 
425
 For humanitarian, reconstruction or civil society building purposes. 
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 Set up and run camps for refugees & 
IDPs 
Set up and run camps for refugees & 
IDPs 
 Finance stay of refugees in third 
country 
Finance stay of refugees in third 
country 
 Establish medical facilities and 
services 
Establish medical facilities  
 (Soup kitchens) Set up soup kitchens 
 (Set up orphanages) Set up orphanages 
 (Set up child care and kindergardens) Set up child care and kindergardens 
  Host refugees in private homes 
Information Searching for missing persons Searching for missing persons426 
 Counselling, advise of refugees and 
IDPs 
Counselling, advise of refugees and 
IDPs 
Non-physicalsupport  Evacuation of threatened people427 Evacuation of threatened people 
 Receive refugees in third countries Support refugees in third countries 
  Send volunteers as humanitarian 
workers 
  Bring wounded children or adults for 
treatment to third countries 
  SOS telephones 
  Send doctors and nurses to work in 
hospitals 
Law  Give war refugees legal status in 
third country 
 
 Expand asylum reasons (e.g. rape, 
desertion) 
 
Civil disobedience  Hide refugees threatened with 
deportation 
  Bring refugees to third country 
against will of that country 
  Smuggle refugees (e.g. deserters) out 
of country to help them escape 
persecution 
 
3.3 Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of soldiers (DDR) 
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
Material aid (Financial incentives to hand in 
weapons) 
 
 Financial aid for reintegration Financial aid for reintegration 
Information  Training of veterans Training of veterans 
 Information on re-integration 
schemes (financial aid, etc) 
Information on re-integration 
schemes (financial aid, etc) 
Force Collect weapons  
 Set up storage centres for weapons  
 
                                                 
426
 ICRC (Mercier 1995). 
427
 UNHCR evacuates Croats and Muslims from Serb-held areas in Bosnia and Croatia (Mercier 
1995:151) 
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3.4 Reconstruction and refugee return 
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
Material aid Physical reconstruction of houses by 
internationals 
Physical reconstruction of houses by 
internationals 
 Physical reconstruction of 
infrastructure (roads, energy, water) 
by internationals 
Physical reconstruction of 
infrastructure (roads, energy, water) 
by internationals 
 Provide building materials Provide building materials 
 Provide money for salaries for 
construction workers 
Provide money for salaries for 
construction workers 
 Provide seeds, machinery / tools for 
income-generating projects 
Provide seeds, machinery / tools for 
income-generating projects 
 Financial support of senior people Financial support of senior people 
  Use international volunteers for 
reconstruction 
  Help with harvest 
  Provide fuel, wood etc 
Information (legal and other) advise for returnees (Legal and other) advise for returnees 
  Link people to reconstruction 
programmes by other actors 
 Mine awareness training Mine awareness training 
Non-physical 
support  
Check-point meetings between 
people from territories that cannot be 
visited by people fromthe ‘other 
side’. 
 
 Parcel delivery programme across 
borders that locals cannot cross 
Take messages, letters, perhaps 
parcels across borders that locals 
cannot cross 
 Village visitation programme across 
borders that locals cannot cross 
 
  Send volunteers as humanitarian 
workers for ‘social reconstruction’ 
Force Deport refugees after end of war  
 
3.5 Social and psycho-social work  
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
Material aid Finance local women groups for their 
work in psychological care 
Finance local women groups for their 
work in psychological care 
  Build home for elderly people 
Information  Educate children in refugee camps Educate children in refugee camps 
  Language lessons 
  Literacy courses 
  Computer lessons 
  Training in trauma therapy 
  Handicraft courses 
  Photography courses 
  Computer courses 
Non-physical 
support 
 House visits to clients (e.g. elderly 
people) 
  Social work in camps 
  Play with children (in camps or 
communities) 
  Organise discos 
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  Work with women and men’s groups, 
set them up 
  Establish youth clubs and youth 
centres 
  Establish internet cafés 
  Organise sports activities and 
tournaments 
  Newspaper, film and radio 
programmes with youth 
  Programmatic activities in youth 
clubs other than sports and education 
  Organize holiday camps for children 
and youth 
 Establish shelters for traumatized 
women (and children) 
Establish shelters for traumatized 
women (and children) 
  Meetings and conferences of young 
people 
  International youth exchange 
  Psycho-social workshops 
  Individual trauma therapy 
  Group trauma therapy 
  SOS telephones 
  Twinning projects of schools 
  Set up family mediation projects 
 
3.6 Economic recovery  
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
Material aid Large-scale credit  to governments  
 Machinery / tools and resources for 
income-generation projects 
Machinery / tools and resources for 
income-generation projects 
 Grants to governments  
 Donor conferences  
 Support / insure private investments Investment by private firms 
 Establish banks  
 Debt relief  
 Micro-credit schemes Micro-credit schemes 
Information  Financial advising  
 Vocational training Vocational training 
Non-physical 
support 
Trade agreements, give trade 
advantages 
 
 Introduce new currency  
 Privatisation schemes  
  Promote special branches of 
economic development (e.g. 
ecological tourism) 
  Organise trade union work 
 
3.7 Transitional Justice 
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
Information  International Police as advisors and 
trainers 
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 Human rights reporting Human rights reporting 
 Training of personnel in the juridical 
system (police, judges, prison wards 
etc) 
Training of personnel in the juridical 
system (police, judges, prison wards 
etc) 
 Counselling of citizens Counselling of citizens 
Non-physical 
support 
Support establishment of local courts  
 Human rights monitoring missions / 
projects (general) 
Human rights monitoring missions / 
projects (general) 
 Monitoring of police Monitoring of police 
 Monitoring of courts Monitoring of courts 
 Help to set up truth  commissions Help to set up truth commissions 
 Help to establish lustration Help to establish lustration 
 Establish human rights centres Establish human rights centres 
 Nomination of special rapporteurs or 
High Commissioners428 
 
  Support victims’ reparation 
  Public events discussion dealing with 
the past 
  Support publications, films etc. on 
dealing with the past 
  Support establishment of memorials 
and museums 
Law Create human rights institutions429  
 Investigation of war crimes and 
criminals 
 
 Establish special tribunal for war 
crimes 
Support work of the tribunal through 
fact-finding 
 Use other international courts for 
persecution of war crimes 
 
 Support establishment of local courts 
dealing with war crimes and human 
rights violations 
Support establishment of local courts 
dealing with war crimes and human 
rights violations 
 Offer amnesties  
Force Pressure on countries to extradite 
suspects 
 
 Arrests of suspected war criminals by 
international forces 
 
 
3.8 State-building, democratisation and civil society support 
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
Material aid Finance reforms  
 Equip military (weapons, vehicles 
etc) (legal or illegal) 
Fundraise for local groups 
 Finance oppositional / democratic 
parties 
Finance oppositional / democratic 
parties 
 Donation of of electronic equipment 
or paper for media 
Donation of of electronic equipment or 
paper for media 
 Finance independent media Finance independent media 
 Provide books, laboratories and other 
teaching materials 
Provide books, laboratories and other 
teaching materials 
                                                 
428
 UN rapporteur, CSCE/ OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. 
429
 Ombudsperson for Human Rights in BiH (Riegler 1999:34, Haller 2003) 
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 Stipend programme for students Stipend programme for students 
 Donate computers and office 
equipment 
Donate computers and office 
equipment for parties and NGOs 
Information Training of security sector personnel 
(police, judges, prison wards, local 
military forces) 
Training of security sector personnel 
(police, judges, prison wards, local 
military forces) 
 Voter education Voter education 
 Train oppositional or democratic 
parties 
Train oppositional or democratic 
parties 
  Train election monitors 
 Train journalists Train journalists 
 Advising on media laws and 
regulatory frameworks 
Advising on media laws and 
regulatory frameworks 
 Send military advisors  
  Advise students 
 Human rights training Human rights training 
Non-physical 
support 
Creation of interim government  
 Implement central government 
functions 
 
 Help to establish civil administration Help to establish civil administration 
 Draft laws Draft laws 
 Veto decisions made by national 
parliaments or government 
 
 Initiate or support institutional 
reforms 
Support institutional reforms 
 Internationals in national 
institutions430 
 
 Deploy international police with 
executive functions 
 
 Run prisons431  
 Set up or advise on tax system Advise on tax system 
 Set up or advise on customs system Advise on customs system 
 Set up border controls  
 Help to establish juridical system 
with police, courts and prisons  
Help to establish juridical system 
with police, courts and prisons 
 Organise elections Support election campaigns 
 Monitor elections Monitor elections 
 Suggest and / or support conduct of 
referendum 
Suggest and support conduct of 
referendum 
 Help people to regain their personal 
documents 
Help people to regain their personal 
documents 
 Help to establish schools Institutions at / around schools: 
pupils councils, parent-teacher 
associations 
  International school partnerships 
(twinnings) 
  Educational web-site  
  Support local groups or parties in 
fundraising 
 Information centres on civic rights 
issues 
Information centres on civic rights 
issues 
                                                 
430
 For example international judges in Bosnian Constitutional Court (Riegler 1999:30), and UNMIK 
sent international attorneys of law to Kosovo (Knoll/Molina 2002:162) 
431
 UNMIK Civil Adminsitration took over responsiblitiy for prison in Prizren (O’Neill 2002:70, 
125pp). 
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  Networking local groups or parties to 
international organisations and 
networks abroad 
  Networking between local groups 
from different ‚sides’ of war 
  Communication aid for local groups: 
Establishment of international fax or 
e-mail networks across borders 
  Link local groups or parties to 
authorities 
  Link local groups or parties to 
internationals in country 
  Linking between local groups from 
different conflict areas 
  Invite delegations of NGOs or parties 
to third countries 
  International volunteers to work with 
local groups 
  Provide meeting space for local 
groups or parties 
  Provide transportation for local 
groups or parties 
  Translations for local groups 
  Build a meeting house for local 
groups 
 Make available non-commercial 
meeting venue for NGOs  
Make available non-commercial 
meeting venue for NGOs 
 Award prices to local activists, media 
etc. 
Award prices to local activists, media 
etc. 
  Publish internationally appeals or 
articles written by local groups 
  Public calls to desert /  avoid military 
service 
 Open permanent base in conflict 
areas (e.g. OSCE missions) 
Open permanent base in conflict 
areas (e.g. ‚peace embassy’) 
  Help establish data-base for 
administration 
 Help to establish higher education Help to establish higher education 
  Exchange of (university) teachers 
  Conduct campaigns on different 
educational issues  
  Bring students to third countries for 
education 
  Conduct summer universities 
  Exchange of scientists 
  Networking between media and 
journalists from different countries 
 Organisation of international 
meetings of journalists (and 
networks) 
Organisation of international 
meetings of journalists (and 
networks) 
 Creation of media or media 
programmes by international actors 
Creation of media or media 
programmes by international actors 
 Establish or advise on media laws 
and frameworks 
Advise on media laws and 
frameworks 
  Support for media institutions: media 
centres, journalist associations or 
unions, self-regulatory bodies 
  Publish books or articles by local 
Appendix 1: Instruments  397 
 
 
writers 
 Establish public libraries / reading 
rooms432 
 
 Establish community centres, cultural 
centres 
Establish community centres, cultural 
centres 
Law Agree to mutually recognise 
educational degrees 
 
Force Enforce reforms  
 Fire politicians / office-holders  
 Fire civil servants  
 Enforce reporting or omissions in 
local media 
 
 Close down  media  
 
3.9 Promoting Peace Skills and Dialogue 
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
Material aid Fund peace-related activities by local 
groups 
Fund peace-related activities by local 
groups 
Information  Training in ‘peace skills’: Methods of 
dealing with conflict (e.g. mediation, 
Alternatives to Violence, non-violent 
communication) 
  Training in ‘peace skills’: issues of 
working in a group (e.g. consensus 
decision-making, strategizing, 
analysis) 
  Training in ‘peace skills’: Active 
nonviolence (campaigning, protest) 
Non-Physical 
support 
 (Inter-ethnic) dialogue meetings /  
conferences 
  Religious dialogue meetings /  
conferences 
  Organise inter-religious prayers and 
services 
  Help to found dialogue groups / 
organisations 
  Conduct Active Listening 
  Establish peace teams / peace service 
teams 
 
3.10 Cultural activities 
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
Material aid  Financial support 
Non-Physical 
support 
 Organize meetings and workshops of 
artists 
  Organize sports’ events 
  Publish CDs by local artists 
  Organise concerts, theatre plays etc. 
  invite artists to third countries or to 
                                                 
432
 e.g. OSCE in BiH 
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organise exhibitions 
  Sponsor/ establish permanent 
institutions to support arts 
 
4. Information, Protest and Advocacy 
Here I would like to refer to Gene Sharp’s 198 method of nonviolent action (see 
Sharp 1973 and 2005). 
In this survey only a small number of them were actually found. 
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
 
 Public reports in mainstream mass 
media 
  Alternative media reporting 
differently or on issues not present in 
mass media 
  Translate and publish articles etc by 
local groups abroad 
  Publish internationally appeals of 
local organisations 
  ‚Pure research’ 
  Appeals & Open Letters 
  Press releases 
  Press conferences 
  Flyers / folders 
  Collect signatures under appeals 
  Declarations expressing a position 
  Information Evenings 
  Panel Discussions 
  Conferences 
  Alternative ‘Tribunal’ 
  Speaking tours of local activists 
  Information campaigns in schools 
  Photo exhibitions 
  Demonstrations 
  Vigils 
  Peace prayers 
  Symbolic nonviolent actions 
  Fasts 
  Conferences for advocacy purposes 
  Meetings with politicians and civil 
servants for advocacy purposes 
  Establish a permanent presence in 
capitals or at seat of international 
organisations 
Law  Law suits against governments 
Civil disobedience  Non-violent blockades of military 
installations (of interveners) 
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5. Capacitate the Interveners 
 State Actors Non-state Actors 
Material aid Fund int’l NGOs Fund other int’l NGOs 
Information  Train international personnel Train international personnel 
 Reports of Ambassadors, Envoys etc  
 Intelligence Services research and 
reports 
Evaluation meetings of interveners 
 Coordination of Diplomatic Means433  
 Investigations, fact-finding missions Investigations, fact-finding missions 
  Action research 
  Evaluations of projects 
 Coordination of work inside country 
(usually international)434 
Coordination of work inside country 
(usually international 
  Coordination of groups working on 
the conflict abroad (usually in one 
country) 
  Surveys 
  Expertises 
Non-Physical 
support 
Scientific Conferences Scientific Conferences 
  Directories of interveners and 
projects 
  Information visits for int’l politicians, 
activists, journalists etc. to area 
Law  Laws on volunteering   
 Laws on sending workers abroad  
 Laws enabling people to leave work-
place quickly for emergency work 
abroad 
 
 Laws allowing concienscious 
objectors to serve abrod 
 
 
                                                 
433
 Either during regular meetings the interveners have anyway, or in extra meetings set up for the 
purpose. See the reports of the different negotiators, for example Owen 1995, Bildt 1998, 
Holbrooke 1998. 
434
 For example UNHCR coordination meetings. In 1996 the OSCE initiated a Round Table of all 
Youth Centres in Mostar which met every other week (Loskot 1997) 
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Appendix 2. Distribution of Certain Types of Activities During and 
After Wars 
 
Training in peace skills 
In Croatia the war raged mostly in the second half of 1991. From 1992 there was a 
cease-fire lasting until 1995 when the occupied parts of Croatia were militarily 
reunited with Croatia. The number of trainings in nonviolence, conflict resolution 
given by international non-state groups (NGOs and smaller citizens’ groups) found in 
the sample were 10 already in 1991, 8 in 1992, 11 in 1993 and 4 each in 1994 and 
1995. Some of the 10 from 1991 also gave trainings later than 1991. The horizontal 
figures mean 1991, 1992 etc., the vertical figures are the numbers.435 
 
Table 7) Training in peace skills 
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435
 The total amount of non-state organisations counted in the survey is 769. 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
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Psycho-social workshops and trauma work in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
While the numbers increased dramatically after the end of the war in 1995, there has 
been a considerable number before 1996 already. 
 
Table 8) Psycho-social work 
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Youth Centres 
The same picture we have with Youth Centres and comparable youth work in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina taken together. Also here the numbers grew over the years 
but with a clear and larger than negligable number before 1996. 
Table 9) Youth Centres 
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Physical reconstruction 
Organisations active in physical reconstruction of houses in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina show the following picture: 
 
Table 10) Physical reconstruction 
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